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2Abstract
Russian political parties remained weak and under-institutionalised in the 1990s, with 
profound implications for the viability of the country’s democratic project. This 
research is concerned with explaining one glaring sign of party under-development - the 
success of independent candidates in federal parliamentary elections. Its originality rests 
on focusing on the uneven geographic concentration of independents’ electoral success, 
given that existing accounts have confined themselves to the national, average picture. 
A second point of originality is the choice of multilevel modelling as the tool of 
quantitative analysis, applied here for the first time in post-communist electoral studies.
The analysis relies on a macro-political explanatory framework where single­
member electoral districts provide the units of analysis, and where the dependent 
variable is the district vote share received by independent candidates. Explanatory 
factors apply at the level of both districts and federal units (regions). They include 
conflict in centre-regional relations, geographic conditions, candidates’ personal 
resources and the use of administrative resources by regional governors. The main 
finding confirms the hypothesis that the independents enjoyed a competitive advantage 
over parties in articulating the new territorial cleavages that emerged, after the collapse 
of the Soviet-system, as a consequence of state-building and federalisation processes.
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9Acronyms
The acronyms for parties, electoral blocs and associations adopted here are those most 
widely used in the western literature. In some cases, they are transliterations of the 
Russian acronyms. For such cases, the English translation of the full name is given in 
the list below (e.g. OVR for Otechestvo - Vsya Rossiya, "Fatherland-All Russia"). When 
the most common version is the English one, the transliterated Russian acronym is 
added in parentheses in the list below, e.g. CEC for Central Electoral Commission 
(TsIK).
Russian political parties, electoral blocs and associations
APR Agrarian Party of Russia
DPR Democratic Party of Russia
KEDR Constructive Ecological Movement of Russia
KPRF Communist Party of the Russian Federation
KRO Congress of Russian Communities
LDPR Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
NDR Our Home is Russia
NRPR National-Republican Party of Russia
OVR Fatherland - All Russia
PRES Party of Russian Unity and Concord
PST Party of Workers’ Self-Government
RDDR Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms
SPS Union of Right Forces
SSR Union of Collective Owners of Russia
Other
ANCOVA Analysis of Covariance
Acronyms and Transliteration 10
CEC Central Electoral Commission (TsIK)
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union (KPSS)
GIS Geographic Information Systems
IGLS Iterative Generalised Least Squares
OLS Ordinary Least Square
NRB New Russia Barometer
PSOE Socialist Workers' Party (Spain)
RIGLS Restricted Iterative Generalised Least Squares
SMD Single-Member District
VTsIOM All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion
A Note on Transliteration
Russian names have been transliterated according to the Library of Congress system. 
Exceptions have been made to conform to widely used forms. In particular, the Russian 
letters j o  and h  are transliterated as 'yu' and 'ya', respectively (e.g. 'Chechnya' instead of 
'Chechnia'). The letter u is rendered with 'i'. Moreover, the transliterated form of 
surnames starting with the Russian e begins with 'Ye' (e.g. 'Yeltsin' instead of'Eltsin'), 
while surnames ending with the Russian -uu, end with 'y' (e.g. 'Ostrogorsky', instead of 
'Ostrogorskii'). Finally, the marks ' and " for the Russian soft and hard signs have been 
omitted.
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Introduction: Independents, Parties and Democracy
"Are party-political politicians good for 
democracy? Politicians are elected to serve 
their constituents. More often than not they 
turn their backs on their constituents and toe 
a party line. Having independent politicians 
ought to be mandatory and not simply a 
novelty".
Paul "R.", UK1
The anonymous contributor to a BBC on-line forum quoted in the epigraph above was 
probably dismayed at the results of the 2001 British parliamentary election, which 
returned virtually no independent candidate.2 By contrast, it seems, Paul "R" would be 
quite happy with electoral returns like those of post-communist Russia in the 1990s; at 
least in terms of independents' success. In the first three Russian parliamentary elections 
held after the collapse of the Soviet Union, non-party candidates gained between 34 and 
64 percent of the plurality seats.3 Contrary to Paul "R", however, most political 
scientists are in agreement that political parties are a crucial aspect of functioning 
modem democracies and consider such a proliferation of independent candidates as an 
important and alarming phenomenon.
There are, in fact, very good reasons why Russian and British voting behaviour 
should differ markedly in the success of the independents. On the one hand, this is just
1 Contributor to the on-line forum on "Are independent politicians good for democracy?", hosted by the 
BBC NEWS web site, in the section "Talking Point", 23 May 2001. Accessed August 2003 at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/vote2001/hi/english/talking point/newsid 1330000/1330549.stm .
2 To be precise, one of the winners can be considered an independent candidate. Richard Taylor won the 
race in constituency 654 under the banner of the “Independent Kidderminster Hospital and Health 
Concern”.
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one aspect of a more general difference in the degree of party system institutionalisation 
between established and young democracies, particularly of the post-communist variety. 
On the other hand, Russia has shown an especially marked pattern of party weakness, 
even when compared to other post-communist cases, which can be seen as evidence of 
the particular hurdles its history has left for party development. A combination of these 
two perspectives, i.e., the typical party underdevelopment observed in transitional 
settings and the peculiar problems of Russia's party weakness, is usually invoked to 
explain the proliferation of independent candidates. The phenomenon is seen as caused 
by the socio-economic and cultural legacies of the Soviet system and by the new 
institutional and strategic choices of post-communist Russian rulers.
This conventional wisdom is based on national factors. As such, it can aptly inform 
crass-national comparisons, such as those between the UK and Russia, but it cannot 
help the analyst explain the conundrum of sub-national variation. That is, why the 
success of independents varies so greatly within Russia. Clearly, accounts based on 
country effects alone are liable to miss a good deal of information if the phenomenon to 
be explained varies significantly within the country; such accounts thus forgo the 
opportunity to determine more complex explanations.
This thesis aims to address and explain the sub-national concentration of the success 
of independent candidates in Russian Duma elections. In this, it reveals a somewhat 
different, and certainly more complex, picture.
The Duma is the Lower House of the Russian Federal Parliament; it is the most 
important of the two chambers of the Parliament and the only elective one.4 The 450 
members of the Duma are elected through a mixed electoral formula. Half of its 
members, or 225 deputies, are chosen from closed party lists in one Russia-wide 
proportional representation constituency, subject to a 5 percent threshold. The other 225 
deputies are elected in 225 Single-Member Districts (SMDs) through a plurality method 
circumscribed by the provisions that at least 25 percent of eligible voters turn out to 
vote and that the winner receives more votes than the option "against all candidates".5
3 In the latest vote of December 2003, the independents won 30 percent of the plurality seats. The scope 
of this thesis, however, is confined to the elections of the 1990s.
4 The other chamber of the Parliament, the Council of the Federation, was elected only once, when it was 
created in 1993. Since then, it has been formed by co-optation or by appointment.
5 In addition to expressing a preference for a candidate, the Russian voter can also tick a box "against all 
candidates" on the SMD ballot.
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This mixed electoral system is "parallel" in the sense that "there is no linkage between 
tiers in the allocation of seats to parties" (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001: 13-14).
In the terminology of Russian law, the "independent candidate" is an individual who 
"presents himself' or is "presented by a group of voters" for election, as opposed to a 
candidate who registers as party-affiliated with the electoral commission.6 By definition 
then, independent candidates cannot appear on the proportional representation (PR) 
ballot, which includes lists of candidates affiliated with political parties or electoral 
associations. Since, therefore, the independents are a phenomenon of the plurality tier
n
only, this thesis is only concerned with the vote in the SMDs.
This chapter has a number of tasks. The first section (1.1) sets up the study of the 
independents in the light of ongoing theoretical debates on the role of parties in the 
consolidation of democracy and in the stabilisation of federations. The second section 
(1.2) compares Russia with other cases of recent democratisation along key dimensions 
of party system institutionalisation, including independent candidates' proliferation. The 
same section also presents a description of the spatial variability in independents' 
success across Russia, or the variance of the "dependent variable" of this thesis. Based 
on this descriptive account, the case is argued for a large-« research design (section 1.3, 
the details on data and research design are deferred to chapters 4 and 5). A concluding 
section presents the chapter structure of the thesis.
1.1 Parties, democratic consolidation and federal stability
Why should anybody be interested in this proliferation of independent candidates? The 
most common view on this question -  one shared by virtually all works on Russian 
elections -  is that the independents are of interest because they are a strong sign of party 
weakness (White, Rose and McAllister 1997; Munro and Rose 2002; Golosov 1997,
6 The electoral rules were initially introduced by presidential decree on 1 October 1993. The main 
subsequent electoral legislation (in English translation) is available at the web site o f the Essex University 
project on elections, www.essex.ac.uk/elections/.
7 In 1995, however, there was one electoral bloc that defined itself as a gathering o f independent 
candidates, the "Bloc of Independents", and ran in both PR and SMD tiers. In the literature, it is 
considered a marginal party because it only received 0.1 percent of the list vote. However, it will be 
shown that it did have an impact on the chances of "individual" independents in the plurality districts.
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2002; Moser 1999, 2001).8 This, in turn, is cause for alarm because parties are 
considered fundamental institutions for democracy; crucial instruments for democratic 
consolidation, and the primary agents of federal stability. In short, the success of 
independent candidates is important because parties are important. To be sure, the claim 
that parties are the only agents of democratic electoral representation and national 
integration is subject to qualification (see this section, below). However, admitting such 
qualifications, it is this conventional wisdom that has provided the impetus for this 
research.
Usually, a corollary of this view that parties are of central importance to modem 
democracies is that independents are a form of disturbance, or "noise", which hampers 
the smooth functioning of elections. A central argument of this thesis is that 
independents should in fact be seen under a different light: as very particular providers 
of democratic representation, rather than simply signals of party weakness. If the long 
term development of democracy impinges on institutionalised parties, in the short term 
the typical party weakness of a transitional setting and a set of institutional incentives 
can create the opportunity for independents to meet the demand for democratic electoral 
representation of particular cleavages. This interpretation will be elaborated in the 
chapter on the explanatory framework of the research (chapter 3) and the chapters that 
present the analysis (chapters 6-8).
It is important to distinguish between the positive role of parties in democratic 
consolidation and an explanation of independents' success in terms of their ability to 
fulfil electoral representation functions. As mentioned above, the topic of the 
independents is important because parties are key institutions of representative 
democracy. The reminder of this section reviews the latter claim.
Parties and democratic consolidation
If political parties play a key role in the working and consolidation of democracy, and 
democracy is a valued outcome, then the proliferation of independent candidates 
represents an important problem. Indeed, by the first half of the last century, few 
arguments in political science had received so much and such clear support as the
8 For a study that uses the proliferation of the independents as a quantitative indicator of party 
underdevelopment, see Ishiyama and Kennedy (2001).
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proposition that modem (i.e. representative) democracy is only conceivable in terms of 
party democracy (Kelsen 1929; Finer 1949; Schattchneider 1942).9 This consensus, 
however, has not always been so stable. The distrust of parties, seen as factions 
endangering social harmony and unity, has a long tradition, including Rousseau, the 
Founding Fathers of the USA and beyond.10 Even the first systematic students of 
political parties, Biyce (1888), Ostrogorsky (1912), and Michels (1915), while 
admitting the central role that parties had come to play in modem democracies, sharply 
criticised their organisational distortions.
And of course the importance of parties does not go undisputed in the contemporary 
debate either. Philippe Schmitter has made strong arguments that other agencies of 
representation, namely corporatist organisations, have replaced parties in important 
policy domains. More specifically, in terms of democratic consolidation, Schmitter 
argues that parties are not the only key actors, and that interest groups should not be 
overlooked (Schmitter 1992, 2001). Finally, it is widely accepted that the most 
established democracies of today are precisely those showing the clearest signs of 'party 
decline1. The role of parties in political life has declined precisely where they are 
supposed to be more stable, more deeply rooted in society, more cohesive, and better 
organised (Wattenberg 1996; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000).
On the other hand, Katz and Mair (1993) and Mair (1994) show that it is only one 
type o f party, the traditional mass party, that is declining. They maintain that parties as 
such are still 'alive and kicking' in Western democracies. Having secured state funding 
and other key resources for their survival, parties virtually monopolise access to public 
office (especially legislative office). Aldrich reminds us that in the USA "the path to 
office for nearly every major politician begins today, as it has for over 150 years. ... All 
serious candidates seek their party's nomination, and they become serious candidates in 
the general election only because they have won their party's endorsement" (Aldrich
9 Some emblematic quotes include the following: "Parties are inevitable. No one has shown how 
representative government could be worked without them" (Bryce 1921: 119); "Modem democracy 
depends directly on political parties, whose importance becomes the greater the more strongly the 
democratic principle is realised" (Kelsen 1929: 19); "Representative government is party government" 
(Finer 1949: 237); And "the political parties created democracy . . .  and modem democracy is unthinkable 
save in terms of the parties" (Schattchneider 1942: 1). Kelsen and Finer are quoted in Hofstadter (1969: 7).
10 "And so strong was this tradition that even as late as 1861, long after his own country was well 
launched upon the development of its two-party system, John Stuart Mill could write an entire treatise, 
Considerations on Representative Government, in which he never elaborated upon the role of party" 
(Hofstadter 1969: 51-2).
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1995: 14). He points out that even candidates endowed with personal resources follow 
this pattern, as "autonomous, ambitious candidates are nonetheless overwhelmingly 
partisans" (Aldrich 1995: 289).
Moreover, even if the importance of the party institution is declining in established 
democracies, this can be distinguished from its contribution to the process of 
establishing new democracies.11 In this regard, Morlino has described the process of 
democratic consolidation in Southern Europe as "party-centred", with political parties as 
its "protagonists" (Morlino 1995, 1998). This is because of parties peculiar ability in 
"forming, maintaining, expressing, and deepening attitudes relating to regime 
legitimacy or illegitimacy" (Morlino 1995: 315).
Parties can fulfil this legitimising role by establishing stable links with civil society, 
which in turn stabilise electoral behaviour (thereby reducing electoral volatility and the 
chances for successful new parties). By taking root firmly in society, the party 
organisation 'controls' the electorate and reduces anti-system alienation (Morlino 1995: 
330-1). All of these developments are empirically associated with successful 
consolidations of democracy. However, not all democratic consolidations have required 
these developments. As Toka notes, in Eastern Europe, masses and elites have accepted 
democracy as 'the only game in town' before political parties came to play a significant 
role in politics.12
The importance of parties to democracy can also be argued in relation to the values 
underpinning one’s chosen definition of democracy. To rephrase Katz's observation on 
the role of elections, "the debate over the value and the place of parties in modem 
democracy stems from the problem of defining democracy itself' (Katz 1997: 4, where 
the word is elections instead of parties). One key value of normative definitions of 
democracy is the accountability of rulers towards the ruled. In the context of the present 
inquiry, it can be argued that individualised representation by non-party candidates,
11 This parallels Rustow's distinction between the study of the conditions sustaining established 
democracies and those necessary for the genesis of democracy (Rustow 1970: 337-40). Rustow claimed 
that to study the genesis of democracy is a peculiar task, quite distinct from the study o f the conditions 
that sustain an already established democracy.
1 The alleged impact of the institutionalisation of the party system on democratic consolidation is 
understood by Mainwaring and Scully as mediated by a supposed increase in the efficiency o f policy 
making, but a government’s stability and the quality of its policies do not in fact seem to be associated. 
Neither does party system institutionalisation appear to have much to do with the legitimacy of the 
democratic regime. East and West Europe do not differ in popular trust of elected officials, despite having 
different levels o f party system institutionalisation (see Toka 1997: 118).
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while at least as good as party representation for a number of purposes (e.g. for the 
articulation and expression of interests), is inferior to party representation in terms of 
structuring the political arena and allowing for the collective accountability of elected 
officials. "Within the mass societies of modem states, if some degree of responsibility 
and accountability is to be enforced, candidates need also to be organized in competing 
teams, i.e. political parties. Thus office-holders who are little known to most individual 
electors can at least be associated with a definite group, which is tied both to a specific 
record in government and to certain pronouncements about future performance" (Budge 
andKeman 1990: 5).
Therefore, in the most common normative definitions of democracy, political parties
are seen as essential in relation to such values implicit in that definition as structured
representation and accountability. As Maclver (1947: 210) put it: "The principle of
representation had to be vitalized by the conflict of parties. When parties flourish we
have in effect passed from a pre-democratic mode of representative government to a
1 ^genuinely democratic one". Aldrich points more precisely to the link between parties 
and the collective accountability of rulers:
"Each official can be held accountable for his or her own personal actions by 
the constituency that elects and reelects that official. But government policy 
is determined by the collective actions of many individual office holders. No 
one person either can or should be held accountable for actions taken by the 
House, Senate, and president together. The political party as a collective 
enterprise, organizing competition for the full range of offices, provides the 
only means for holding elected officials responsible for what they do 
collectively" (Aldrich 1995: 3).
This being the case, clearly it is not only partisan vs. non-partisan representation that 
matters; the type of parties that emerge also has a bearing on the "viability of 
democracy".14 Support for this point has been found in the context of third-wave and 
post-communist party systems, where a positive effect of the institutionalised party 
system has been noted on the quality of democracy, i.e. the capacity to go beyond
13 Quoted in Hofstadter (1969: 7).
14 "The way parties operate and create linkages of accountability and responsiveness to citizens is likely 
to have major consequences for the viability of democracy and the quality o f its outputs" (Kitschelt et al. 
1999: 15).
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democracy's procedural minimum and "give meaning" to elections (Mainwaring 1999; 
Toka 1997; Kitchelt et al. 1999).15
In sum, despite trends of party decline in advanced democracies, and the parallel 
developments of possible party substitutes in the form of interest groups and corporatist 
organisations, the general consensus holds that the party institution is still necessary to 
achieve the collective accountability of rulers, the legitimisation of newly established 
democracies and their consolidation through improved "quality".
Parties and federal stability
The conventional view that political parties are the main agents of representation and 
channelling for popular demands also includes parties' role with regard to regionalist 
demands. In other words, "in democratic societies political parties are the main agents 
responsible for articulating interests including those based on regional or provincial 
distinctiveness" (McKay 2000: 5-6). However, the often-posited role of parties in 
centre-regional relations goes well beyond mere representation. Contrary to 18th century 
views of parties as factions that would inevitably threaten the integrity of any political 
community -  views notably shared by the authors of the American Federalist Papers 
(Hofstadter 1969) -  in the last four or five decades great hopes have come to be attached 
to the role that parties can play in moderating regionalist demands and fostering federal 
stability.
William Riker, Donald Horowitz and many others have stressed this link between 
party development, national integration and federal stability. Riker (1964) argues that 
centralised party systems tend to foster centralised federations. To that end, it is 
important that the parties in charge of national government are also in control of lower 
levels of administration. This argument is based on the view that national parties can 
integrate and moderate centrifugal forces -  primarily territorial cleavages -  in federal 
settings.
A recent formulation of this thesis has been made by Filippov, Ordeshook and 
Shvetsova (2004), who argue that well-crafted institutional arrangements can induce the 
emergence of a particular type of party, the "integrated party", in which ambitious
15 "Without parties to structure the campaign, to provide continuity from one election to the next, and to 
provide links among candidates in different localities and for different offices, the resulting elections are 
unlikely to be meaningful, even if they are technically free" (Katz 1980: 1; quoted in Toka 1997: 122).
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politicians face an incentive to avoid mobilising divisive issues and to moderate 
centrifugal demands from their territorial constituents. This concept is based on the 
historical experience of the US party system, but is considered potentially exportable in 
all federations, given the correct set of institutional incentives. Office seekers will be 
willing to be "imperfect representatives of their constituents" because they need to be 
part of a nation-wide organisation in order to win as many votes as possible; in this, 
they often count heavily on the coattail effect produced by popular presidents or 
presidential candidates. As they put it, "local and regional politicians will not seek to 
disrupt unduly the functions of the federal government for fear of damaging the 
electoral standing of national politicians from their party and, thereby, their own 
subsequent electoral chances" (Filippov et al. 2004: 194).
With reference to the US case, Aldrich notes that, prior to the Republican party’s 
emergence to national prominence, when the North-South division found representation 
as a party cleavage, American parties had functioned as "complex institutions designed 
to maintain national unity by avoiding division among regions, especially over slavery" 
(Aldrich 1995: 65). The example of the US Republican party illustrates that a successful 
integrated party can absorb territorial cleavages within its ranks, rather than letting such 
divisions define intra-party competition. Thus, "[i]t was the complex set of partisan and 
other institutional arrangements that kept the regional issues, especially slavery, from 
being addressed at all, and certainly from being resolved on terms suitable to those who 
would soon become the Republicans" (Aldrich 1995: 285).
It is apparent that this party ideal-type is contingent on a number of institutional and 
political conditions. Firstly, parties must be truly national, in the sense that they must 
successfully compete at different levels of government. Secondly, if there are 
presidential elections, they should be partisan, thus inducing benefit seekers (motivated 
by the prospect of winning the spoils of presidential office), as well as policy seekers, to 
preserve the electoral coalition. It should be noted, moreover, that this model implies a 
sharp aversion to regionalist parties, i.e. "parties which derive their support primarily 
from a single federal subject or subset of subjects" (Filippov et al. 2004: 188). Given its 
underlying assumption that the emergence of "integrated national parties" should be 
promoted, it is fair to say that the proponents of this model would certainly approve of 
institutional rules discouraging regionalist parties, such as exist, for example, in the
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Russian Federation.16 The prevailing view, then, is that political parties have the 
potential to play a crucial role in fostering national integration and inducing federal 
stability. As with the thesis that parties are necessary for democratic consolidation, the 
argument that fostering "integrated parties" is conducive to federal stability will be 
critically considered in the concluding chapter in the light of the findings of this 
research.
1.2 Russia and the other party systems of the Third Wave
Having established the accepted importance of party institutionalisation to modem 
democracies, the discussion now turns to how the Russian political system compares 
along this dimension to other democratic political systems, especially with respect to the 
phenomenon of independents’ success. There are three defining elements to this 
comparison. Firstly, that Russia falls into the category of transitional systems, which 
sets her apart from established democracies such as the UK. Secondly, that among 
transitional democracies, post-communist cases such as Russia face special obstacles to 
party development. And thirdly, that even compared to most other post-communist 
cases, Russia exhibits several signs of especially low party institutionalisation; among 
these signs is the phenomenon of independents' proliferation.
To get a sense of the distance between established and transitional democracies, one 
need only note that in the latest UK election to the House of Commons (the elections of 
2001), 118 independent candidates ran in about 20 percent of 659 UK constituencies 
(compared to 643 conservative and 640 labour candidates). As noted at the start of this 
chapter, none of these independents managed to win a seat, except for the “single-issue” 
winner of constituency n.654 (see fn.2). Before that, it had come as a surprise when in 
1997, for the first time since 1950, one independent had managed to win.17
16 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the electoral rules discouraging regionalist parties in the Russian case.
17 Independent Martin Bell won with over 60 percent of the district votes in the Tatton constituency, 
where Liberal Democrat and Labour candidates had withdrawn in order to support his candidacy. Before 
Bell, the 1945-1950 Parliament included three MPs who had been elected as independents in by-elections. 
Similarly notable as an exceptional occurrence, independent Ken Livingstone was elected mayor of 
London in 2000.
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In contrast to the entrenched role of political parties in UK politics, as well as the 
experiences of other third-wave countries, political parties in all post-communist 
countries have, in general, been initially relegated to secondary roles. Thus, parties in 
post-communist democracies "formed after or during the first elections, rather than 
preceding these fundamental democratic initiatives or playing much of a role in 
channelling the pressures that led to them being held at all". That the organisation of the 
opposition "took the form of social informality in contrast to the officialdom and 
patterns of authority set by party bureaucracy", is doubtless related to the fact that 
previously compulsory participation in party activities had produced a deep aversion to 
the very notion of party (Lewis 2000: 19-20, 33). And, unlike in post-1945 Western 
Europe, where, Von Beyme reminds us, "encompassing notions such as 'Union', 'Front' 
and 'Rassemblement' were [also] preferred" to the idea of "party" (1996: 125), 
democratic party identification in post-communist countries didn’t have a legacy of 
party institutions left behind by prior democratic or liberal regimes upon which to draw.
Moreover, while parties in all third wave democracies are personalistic, weakly 
organised, and unstable, unlike in Russia, in both Latin America and East-Central 
Europe they do nonetheless monopolise access to national legislatures. Tellingly, while 
Russia's parties could be considered similar to those of Peru or Ecuador on several 
dimensions of (under)institutionalisation, only Ukraine has reached the same low levels 
as Russia in terms of party candidate recruitment (Moser 2001a: 48-49). The uniqueness 
of Russia's party failure in candidate selection is even more evident in regional Russian 
elections. Only 13.8 percent of the elected candidates in 1993-94, and 16.8 percent in 
1995-97 has had any party affiliation (Stoner-Weiss 2000: 12).18
To show the distinctiveness of Russia's low level of party institutionalisation, it is 
useful to use Mainwaring's (1999) and Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) framework, 
elaborated for third-wave party systems.
18 In the first post-communist elections held in Ukraine, parties played an even more marginal role than in 
Russia. In 1994 non-party candidates received a large majority of the vote, with only 34 percent o f the 
vote cast for emerging parties (Lewis 2000: 20). A similar pattern in Belarus has been associated with 
more openly authoritarian tendencies of the president Lukashenka. Here also the first parliamentary 
elections, in 1995, saw a majority of winners nominated as independents (Lewis 2000: 25).
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Party system (under)institutionalisation
One key dimension of party system institutionalisation is electoral volatility. According 
to Mainwaring, "party systems range form very stable (the United States, Switzerland, 
Finland and Sweden) to extremely volatile (Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Poland and 
Russia)". Mainwaring measures party system volatility as the sum of the percentage of 
votes gained or lost by each party from one election to the next divided by two 
(Mainwaring 1999: 28). The US average volatility for Congressional elections (1944- 
94) is only 4 percent of the aggregate vote, in Peru it is 58 percent and in Russia 
(between the 1993 and 1995 elections) it is 54 percent (Mainwaring 1999: 28-9). A lack 
of stable party identities in the electorate and of social roots among parties is shown also 
by high levels of split-ticket voting across tiers of a mixed electoral system. White et al. 
(1997, reported in Mainwaring 1999) have estimated that in Russia 70 percent of the 
voters planned to split their vote across the two tiers of the election in 1993, and that 
only 22 percent identified in any sense with any party.
A more precise notion distinguishes between two types of electoral volatility: a) 
voter volatility, and b) elite volatility. In the first case, large numbers of voters shift 
their electoral support across parties in consecutive elections, but the supply-side of the 
equation remains broadly the same (i.e., the same parties contest consecutive elections). 
Such volatility reflects a lack of party identification in the electorate, which in turn 
testifies to the absence of clear and stable social constituencies "frozen" in their 
relationship with parties. Clearly, social cleavages are either missing or are not activated 
at the political level.
In the second case, electoral volatility is due to elite volatility. Here, the supply-side 
of the electoral equation changes markedly from one election to the next. It is the 
politicians who have weak party loyalties, with new parties formed and previous parties 
disappearing. To enhance their electoral prospects and visibility, the most prominent 
political personalities create their own parties, or join into personalistic and unstable 
alliances (blocs). Richard Rose has stressed the supply-side sources of volatility for 
Russia (Rose 2000; Munro and Rose 2002).
"Supply-side initiatives of political elites are the primary cause of Duma 
seats changing hands . . .  There is a big turnover in parties on the ballot from 
one election to the next. In the 1993 Duma election there were 13 parties on 
the proportional representation ballot; in 1995, there were 43; and in 1999,
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the number was down to 26. In a new democracy, party formation invariably 
involves a certain amount of trial and error, but in Russia the turnover of 
parties has been so abnormal that it has become an obstacle to accountable 
government" (Rose 2000: 3).
In particular, the last of the elections considered in this thesis -the 1999 election, 
held after almost a decade of post-communist transformations- lends support to Von 
Beyme's observation that "literature on Russian parties seemed to describe each year a 
new phenomenon" (1996: 122). Probably the most striking feature of the 1999 Duma 
election is the high level of electoral volatility, due overwhelmingly to changes in the 
supply side of the electoral equation.
Table 1.1: Transience o f major Russian parties in the 1990s
Duma elections 1993 1995 1999
(% proportional representation vote)
Three elections 51.3 45 38.2
Communist 12.4 22.3 24.3
Liberal Dem./Zhirinovsky 22.9 11.2 6.0
Yabloko 7.9 6.9 5.9
Women of Russia 8.1 4.6 2.0
Two elections 30.3 18.2 1.2
Russia's Choice 15.5 3.9 n.a.
Agrarian Party 8.0 3.8 n.a.
Russian Unity & Concord 6.8 0.4 n.a.
Our Home Is Russia n.a. 10.1 1.2
One election 18.4 36.8 62.6
Democratic Party of Russia 5.5 n.a. n.a.
Unity (Medved) n.a. n.a. 23.3
Fatherland n.a. n.a. 13.3
Union of Right Forces n.a. n.a. 8.5
Others 12.9 36.8 17.5
Source: Rose (2000: 4).
Table 1.1 lists all Russian parties that have crossed the 5% PR barrier in at least one 
election in the 1990s. They are grouped according to the number of elections they 
contested, thus showing their transience. In 1999, more than 50 percent of the PR votes 
went to parties that not only were contesting their first election, but also were very new 
(Unity, OVR and SPS). All of them had formed within one year before the election, 
with Unity, the second most successful party, formed less than six months before the
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polling day. This means that most participating parties had few roots in society and that 
the electorate was extremely "available"; in the sense of "electoral availability" adopted 
in Bartolini and Mair's study of electoral change in Western Europe (Bartolini and Mair 
1990).19
The spectacular rise of TJnity' was largely due to the 'Putin factor'. The popularity of
9HUnity skyrocketed when the popular President publicly endorsed it in November. This 
suggests that in this election, a very large proportion of the electorate was still lacking any 
stable party identity nearly right up to the polling day and was available for last-minute 
mobilisation.
With reference to party system institutionalisation, Mainwaring explicitly mentions 
the issue of independent candidates: "the ability of non-partisan and antiparty candidates 
to win office serves as another indicator of party [lack of] rootedness in society" 
(Mainwaring 1999: 33). In Russia, non-partisan candidates are not confined to 
parliamentary elections. Presidents have also been elected as, and have remained, 
independents. President Yeltsin was never committed to any party allegiance (except, of 
course, to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in pre-democratic times, of course), 
President Putin's association with 'Unity' in 1999 was not institutionalised either, and 
one can also note the initial success of the independent presidential candidate Alexander 
Lebed in 1996. In Poland a prominent presidential candidate, Stanislaw Tyminski, also 
ran as independent in 1990, but the trend in the post-communist countries of Eastern 
and Central Europe has been largely for partisan elections.
In Latin America independents are also popular, though not in the same proportions 
as in Russia or Ukraine. Several examples can be mentioned in Chile's congressional 
and presidential elections, as well as in Paraguay and in Peru in the second half of the 
20th century (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 126, 304, 320 & 347).
19 To be sure, the quick success of new parties is also known in the West, although it takes similar 
dimension only in conditions o f party-system transition, like in the Italian case. Here, in 1994, 
Berlusconi's 'Forza Italia' emerged as the first party in an election held within a few months from its 
founding.
20 This is revealed clearly by public opinion surveys conducted at that time by the VTsIOM (VTsIOM 
2000: 11, 13).
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Patterns o f independents' proliferation in Russian SMDs
The previous sections have set up the conceptual link between independents’ 
proliferation and party under-institutionalisation and, within a comparative perspective, 
have located the Russian case as presenting extreme examples of both. It is now 
necessary to describe more closely the proliferation of independent candidates in the 
territorial districts in the three Russian Duma elections of the 1990s. The description 
starts with some statistics of central tendency (mean) and dispersion (standard deviation, 
maximum and minimum values). The focus subsequently shifts to the spatial variation 
in the success of the independents across the country. It is this geographical variability 
that constitutes the phenomenon the present study seeks to explain; i.e., geographical 
variability is the dependent variable of the statistical analysis to follow.
For the 1995 and 1999 elections, the data on the dependent variable comes from the 
official publications of the Russian Central Electoral Commission (CEC) (TsIK, 1996, 
2000). For the 1993 elections, I have used an unpublished report by the CEC, kindly 
provided by Timothy Colton and Robert Moser, as well as data included in a CD-ROM 
published by the CEC and the Merkator Centre in Moscow (TsIK and Merkator 1999).
Table 1.2 provides a quick glance at some basic indicators of electoral competition 
and independents' proliferation for the first post-communist competitive vote of 1993. 
The first line of the table shows that the average district-level success for the 
independents, measured as the joint vote share of all non-partisans running in an SMD, 
was 50.2 percent. However, around this all-Russian average, independents' success 
varied markedly: it was null where no independent ran at all, but it reached as much as 
99 percent of the district vote, in Ingushetiya (SMD n.12), where they did run. The 
second line describes the distribution of the number of candidates, both party and 
independent, across SMDs. This statistic ranged from the legal minimum of 2 (in nine 
SMDs) to 20, around a mean of about 7.
The third line of the table shows that in the 1993 election, the independents made up 
over half of the candidates of a typical SMD. However, in some districts they did not 
run at all (in ten SMDs), while in as many as 22 SMDs voters could only choose among 
independents (and the "against all" option). That this variability was not simply due to 
"outlier" districts with extreme values, but was a main feature of the distribution, is 
shown by the large standard deviations associated with mean values. The following line
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shows that, in the typical 1993 SMD, as much as 16.6 percent of the voters took 
advantage of the remarkable possibility, granted by the Russian ballot, to vote "against 
all candidates".
Table 1.2: Cross-district variability in key traits o f electoral competition (1993)
1993 Mean StDev Min Max
Independents Success* 50.2 24.0 0.0 98.9
Number of candidates 6.9 3.2 2.0 20.0
% of Independent candidates** 55.1 24.7 0.0 100.0
Against All 16.6 5.9 1.1 38.1
Effective number of candidates
Total candidates 1,519 (700 Party, 819 Indep)
4.8 2.0 1.5 15.6
* Measured as the joint vote share of all independents running in an SMD.
** The percentage of candidates running as independents in an SMD.
Source: own elaboration of data from the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian 
Federation (CEC), see text for details.
Finally, the fifth line of Table 1.2 records the effective number of candidates; a 
widely used statistic in political science to detect the number of viable candidates and 
vote fragmentation (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). Here it shows that the fragmentation 
of the vote was rather high for a plurality system, with a mean of almost five effective 
candidates per district, ranging up to the very large maximum of 15.6.
These descriptive statistics point to the fact that electoral competition in SMDs took 
many different shapes across the huge territory of Russia. However, the description 
above is focused on the 1993 election only. It is often noted in the literature that the first 
Duma elections were marked by exceptional circumstances, such as their abrupt timing, 
unstable political context, unprepared political forces, etc. (Lentini 1995; White, Rose 
and McAllister 1997). Does that mean that this picture of spatial volatility and 
variability was also exceptional? Or was it a stable feature of the majoritarian tier of 
Russian elections in the 1990s? An answer to this question is suggested by comparing 
the indicators of spatial variability for the 1993 election and those of the following two 
elections (1995 and 1999).
Figure 1.1 reports the number of candidates per SMD. The average number of 
candidates running in an SMD significantly increased from 1993 to 1995, to decline 
somewhat in 1999.
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Figure 1.1: Total number o f  candidates, 1993, 1995 and 1999
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To assess whether the high cross-district variability observed in 1993 was repeated in 
1995 and 1999, however, it is necessary to focus on the change in the standard deviation. 
This is a measure of the average gap existing between the average value and the value 
recorded in each SMD. This indicator shows that the variability in the number of 
candidates did not subside in 1995 or 1999 compared to 1993. Thus, if the first Duma 
elections were more fluid and unstructured due to their exceptional circumstances, this 
is not reflected in the longitudinal change of this key trait of SMD competition. Not 
only did the number of candidates increase on average, but its territorial variability also 
increased, as confirmed by the larger range of the variable (from a minimum of 2 to a 
maximum of 24 in 1995).
Figure 1.2 deals with the success of the independents, measured as the vote share for 
all independents running in an SMD. The graph shows that both the average value and 
the variability around that value decreased from 1993 to 1995, but rose again in 1999. 
Indeed, independent candidates were less successful in 1995 than in the other two 
elections, while the territorial spread of their electoral support was more homogeneous 
in 1995.
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>ource: own elaboration of CEC data.
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Figure 1.2: Average independents' success, 1993, 1995 and 1999
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An impression of consolidation is suggested by the fact that the range of the effective 
number of candidates decreases with time, as shown by Figure 1.3. However, there is no 
consolidation in terms of spatial (cross-district) variability, as the standard deviation of 
the indicator remains virtually unchanged.
Figure 1.3: Effective number o f  candidates, 1993, 1995 and 1999
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The average number o f effective candidates actually increases in 1995 and remained 
high in 1999. Fragmentation of the vote has remained a stable feature of Russian voting 
behaviour in the SMD races of the 1990's.
An indication of a gradual national homogenisation in electoral competition is 
provided by Figure 1.4, on the "visibility" of the independents (i.e. the proportion of 
SMD candidates running without party affiliation). While the share of candidates 
running as independents in the typical SMD goes down in 1995 and then up again in 
1999, following the pattern of their success (Figure 1.2), the territorial variability of this 
indicator does decrease rather markedly from 1993 in both 1995 and 1999. This seems 
consistent with expectations expressed in the literature on the nationalisation of politics 
through territorial penetration by parties (Rokkan 1970; Duverger 1959 [1951]).
Not only are less independents running on average (i.e., there are more party 
candidates), but the territorial variability in their visibility is reduced. The average 
becomes more representative of central tendency.
Figure 1.4: Percentage o f SMD candidates running as independents,
1993, 1995 and 1999
Mean Standard Dev
■ 1993 D1995 D1999
Source: own elaboration of CEC data.
Further indication of the stabilisation of electoral competition over time is provided 
by the changes in the vote cast "against all" candidates in the SMDs, shown in Figure 
1.5. The fact that cross district variability (standard deviation) of this indicator
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decreased between 1993 and 1995 (but rose again in 1999), is compounded by the 
parallel observation that the top value registered dropped from almost 40 to 21 percent.
Figure 1.5: Average vote share "against all", 1993, 1995 and 1999
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The descriptions provided by Figures 1.2-1.5 suggest that the high territorial 
volatility of competition in SMDs, masked under national averages, is not a feature of 
the '’exceptional" 1993 elections only. Rather, it remains a prominent feature of the two 
subsequent waves of SMD races as well. However, this can only suggest tentative
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green, were won by party candidates. This means that the maps show "electoral 
success" measured as victory of the district seat. This is different from the measure of 
success discussed so far, and summarised in Table 1.2 and in Figure 1.2, which is the 
total vote share received by all the independents in an SMD, regardless of who won the 
district seat. The latter measurement will be used in the statistical analysis. A full 
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of different measures of electoral 
success is provided in Chapter 5 of this thesis. The maps, by focusing on the district 
winner, provide a clear dichotomous picture of the territorial distribution of the 
proliferation of independent candidates.
A survey of spatial patterns can conveniently begin by exploring the distribution of 
independents' success among the constituent units of the Federation. The Russian 
Federation is made up of 89 such "constituent units". When referred to collectively, all 
units are called "regions" in this thesis. The 89 regions vary dramatically in terms of 
territorial size, population size, population density, and economic and geographic 
outlook. Moreover, regions differ in "federal status". Differences in federal status 
denote different degrees of autonomy within the Russian Federation and are associated 
with different ethnic make-ups.
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Map 1.1: District winners, 1993, 1995 and 1999
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As summarised in Table 1.3, twenty-one regions are recognised as republics, ten are 
autonomous okrugs ("districts") and one is an autonomous oblast ("regions"). These 
units possess relatively larger shares of non-Russian ethnic groups. The 1993 
constitution granted special rights of cultural and linguistic autonomy to all of them, 
while the republics also enjoy political rights, such as having their own republican 
constitutions.22 The remaining 57 regions (oblasts, krays -territories-, and the two 
federal cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg) are non-autonomous and overwhelmingly 
Russian in ethnic composition.
Table 1.3: Regions'federal status
Category of Federal Status Number of regions
Republics 21
Autonomous Okrugs 10
Jewish Aut Okrugs 1
City of Federal Status 2 (Moscow and St. Petersburg)
Oblasts 49
Krays 6
A close look at Map 1.1 shows that some districts consistently returned independent 
winners in all three elections, while others consistently returned party winners. In terms 
of federal units, there are 12 regions where Duma seats were always and exclusively 
won by independent candidates (Table 1.4). Among these regions, republics and 
autonomous okrugs are relatively more represented than non-autonomous units (oblasts, 
krays). Indeed, one fifth of all republics and one third of all autonomous okrugs, appear 
in this list of regions, while less than one tenth of the Russian oblasts and krays do 
(Table 1.4).
At first glance, it appears that these regions are located in remote and sparsely 
populated areas, some in the extreme outreaches of Russia, or in areas of ethno-national 
concentration. It is interesting to contrast this pattern to the one revealed by the set of 
regions that consistently returned party winners in all three elections (Table 1.5). It is 
apparent that these nine regions include mainly non-autonomous units (oblasts).
22 In fact, the distribution of autonomy rights and fiscal privileges, even among republics, is rather uneven. 
This is mainly a product of bilateral agreements signed by Yeltsin with individual republics in 1994-95, 
and is a feature of Russian "asymmetric federalism", discussed in greater detail in chapters 4, 6-8.
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Table 1.4: Regions with independent winners in all o f  their 
SMDs, in all three elections
Region Location
4 Republics
1. Daghestan North Caucasus
2. Udmurt Urals
3. Ingushetiya North Caucasus
4. Komi North
4 Oblasts
1. Amur Far East
2. Kurgan Urals
3. Magadan Far East
4. Tyumen West Siberia
4 Autonomous okrugs
1. Aga-Buryat East Siberia
2. Koryak Far East
3. Chukotka Far East
4. Evenk East Siberia
Source: own elaboration of CEC data.
Table 1.5: Regions with party winners in all their 
SMDs, in all three elections
Region Location
7 oblasts
1. Bryansk Central
2. Smolenks Central
3. Tambov Central Black Earth
4. Tver Central
5. Kaluga Central
6. Penza Volga
7. Saratov Volga
1 autonomous okrug
Nenets West Siberia
1 republic
Adygeya North Caucasus
Source: own elaboration of CEC data.
These considerations impressionistically point to the possible impact of federal status 
on independents' success. It is therefore useful to directly compare levels of success 
across categories of federal status, and across elections, to explore more closely the
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possibility of a relationship between the two variables. Success is again measured as the 
joint vote share for the independents running in an SMD. The comparison is presented 
in Figure 1.6, where each bar of the figure represents the average electoral success of 
the independents in the SMDs belonging to the regions with a given federal status, in a 
given election. It emerges that, of the units endowed with autonomous status, it is really 
the autonomous okrugs, more than the republics, which provide fertile ground for the 
proliferation of independents. The oblasts, by contrast, tend to discourage this 
phenomenon. However, this pattern is less evident in 1999, when the independents saw 
increased success in the oblasts. Moreover, autonomous okrugs are related to 
independents' success particularly in 1995, while in oblasts and krays these candidates 
fare particularly poorly in that year.
Figure 1.6: T n d p n p n d p n ts ’ s u m p s ?  hi> fo r lo rn l ctn tu c  nnr! v o n r
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Therefore, the picture of the relationship between region’s federal status and
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the federation, called "economic regions". The subdivision of Russia into eleven such 
"economic regions" dates back to Soviet times, when it was used for planning purposes. 
It is preferable to the more recent division into seven macrodistricts implemented by 
Putin, as the former is more sensitive to the economic and geographic clustering 
naturally existing among regions. The location of a federal unit in economic regions 
speaks of its distance from Moscow, its peripheral status, and its possible inclusion in 
areas of historical autonomism (such as North Caucasus and the Urals, or West 
Siberia).23
Figure 1.7 shows some stark differences in average independents' success across 
economic regions. Considering all three elections in the aggregate, the areas of spatial 
concentration of independents' success are the Far East, East Siberia, the North 
Caucasus and Volga-Vyatka.
Figure 1.7: Independents' success by economic region. 
Averages across the three elections
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Source: own elaboration of CEC data.
Breaking down these trends by year of election, however, allows for a more precise 
picture. This is done in Figure 1.8, which reveals that, for example, the Volga-Vyatka 
region was the most conducive to independents' proliferation in 1993, but not in 1995.
23 See Table A. 1.1 in the Appendix for a list o f  Russian units belonging to each economic region.
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Similarly, as far as the North Caucasus is concerned, it is only in 1993 and 1999 that 
independents win disproportionally (compared to national average success). In the 
Central Black Hearth region, 1995 constitutes a particularly negative year for 
independents (reflecting the strength of the KPRF in the SMDs that year). It is in sum 
the Far East, and more moderately East Siberia, that, in all three elections, show a 
marked improvement of independents’ chances well over the national average. These 
are the most distant areas from Moscow.
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These comparisons aim at showing the wide spatial variability of the phenomenon 
under study. This emerges whether the region or the wider economic region is taken as 
the spatial reference unit. Clearly, however, these comparisons cannot provide a 
systematic account of the causal factors at play. The patterns of proliferation of 
independent candidates described above appear kaleidoscopic and provide little ground 
for inferring (even impressionistically) a causal mechanism. The description resembles 
the cartographic approach typical of the first studies of electoral geography, pioneered 
by Andre Siegfried in 1913, when maps were juxtaposed to one another in the search for 
associations in the distribution of dependent and independent variables (Taylor and
Figure 1.8: Independents' success by economic region and year
■  1993 01995  □  1999
Source: own elaboration of CEC data.
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Johnston 1979: 24). A crucial improvement of modem statistical analysis over this 
approach is that it makes it possible to test for explanatory hypotheses derived from the 
literature while controlling fo r  a number o f other relevant factors. This allows the 
analyst to posit a complex explanatory framework.
1.3 Research design
This thesis adopts a large-w, statistical approach based on multiple regression. A 
detailed discussion of the analysis design can be found in chapter 5. At this point, it is 
worth outlining the basic features of the present research design. The basic unit of 
spatial aggregation of electoral results is the Single-Member District (SMD), thus the 
225 districts constitute the number of cases. Because SMDs are grouped within regions, 
and regional effects are deemed to be important in explaining independents' success 
(this is discussed in detail in chapter 3), the correct tool for quantitative analysis is 
multilevel modelling. This technique takes into account the nested nature of the data 
(i.e., SMDs are nested within regions) and avoids the problems of estimation that 
conventional, one-level, OLS (ordinary least square) regression would produce given 
the data structure (see chapter 5 for details).
It should be noted that the quantitatively inclined student of Russia is often 
confronted with problems of data availability and reliability. Official statistics on many 
important economic and social indicators are not available, are incomplete or are 
aggregated at higher levels than needed. In some cases regional authorities have their 
own statistical services, but adding together regional estimates will almost certainly 
impair consistency of measurement across the territory. These considerations seem to 
point to the advantages of the single-case study design, in which one or two regions are 
studied "in depth" through extensive fieldwork research. The objective here is not to 
review in detail the merits and problems of case study vs. large-w designs. However, a 
number of considerations are worth noticing that have tilted the balance in favour of the 
large-w statistical approach for this research. Most importantly, one task of this thesis is 
to link the scholarly understanding of Russian regional-level politics to federal-level
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elections; in particular, to independents’ success at the federal level. In order to uncover 
patterns and regularities, this should be done systematically across the whole territory.
In fact, in the absence of systematic accounts of cross-regional variation in the 
proliferation of independent candidates, there appears to be little theoretical ground to 
select a small subset of regions for a deep case study. Thus, the relationship between 
case study and large-/? designs need not be considered to be mutually exclusive. 
Existing case studies of SMD elections in single regions provide valuable descriptive 
material and conjectures that can (and do) inform the explanatory framework of the 
present statistical analysis (see chapter 3). In this sense, the present approach can be 
seen to complement the small-/? approach. The value of the large-/? approach consists in 
being able to derive estimates of the effect of some indicators upon independents' 
success, while case studies can only suggest these effects. Case studies can also aptly 
follow the large-/? investigation. Once the latter has highlighted significant relationships, 
a case study can focus on an outlier case that does not conform to the expected pattern. 
While such a case study could not constitute a valid test of the relationship (King, 
Keohane and Verba 1994: 209-212), it could point to previously omitted variables.
Among large-/?, quantitative, studies of voting behaviour this research is atypical. 
Since the 1950s, most researchers have relied on opinion surveys of a sample of voters 
representative of the whole national electorate. Several important studies of Russian 
elections have followed this approach (e.g., White, Rose and McAllister 1997; Colton 
2000; Munro and Rose 2002), and some of their conclusions are noted in the review of 
the literature in chapter 2. This is a highly useful method, especially in order to 
investigate the impact of individual characteristics -  such as education, exposure to 
media, interest in politics, income, religious affiliation, ethnic group membership, etc., -  
on voting choice. A limitation of this approach, however, lies in the difficulty (or virtual 
impossibility) of obtaining large enough samples for each region (Linz 1969). 
Hofferbert has stressed this problem with regard to the US (1972: 22-23, quoted in 
Erikson et al. 1994: 7):
"To make equally accurate estimates about the residents of all fifty states, 
one would have to interview fifty times as many people as are included in 
the national sample. Neither the resources, nor the motivation to do a sample 
survey of 75,000 people has yet risen to the task".
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This type of geographically comprehensive opinion survey is certainly not available, 
and indeed would be very difficult to conceive of, for such a huge country as Russia.24 
Thus, rather than focusing on individual voting behaviour, this thesis takes the district 
aggregate of such behaviour as the unit of analysis. Indeed, even if suitable individual- 
level surveys of opinion were available, some interesting questions on voting behaviour 
are not best asked at the individual level (Erikson, Mackuen and Stimson 2002: 10). In 
this thesis, the questions asked are about the cross-district and cross-regional variability 
of the outcome. As a consequence, the impact of individual characteristics within SMDs 
is less interesting than variables aggregated or measured at the level of SMD or higher 
(King 1991: 17-18). This strategy also has the advantage of considering all 225 SMDs 
and all 89 regions of the Russian Federation.
Naturally, this macro design prevents the findings that it generates from being 
applied to individual voters, as cross-level inference would lead to the problem of 
ecological fallacy (Robinson 1950, Alker 1969). However, the macro approach (i.e., 
using aggregate data) of this thesis does not preclude the examination of SMD traits 
based on the aggregation of lower level variables. For example, information pertaining 
to the candidate level, such as candidate's occupational status, incumbency or the 
support received from financial-industrial groups and/or from the regional governor, can 
be aggregated at the SMD level by considering the proportion of candidates of a given 
kind running in the district.
Conclusion and plan of the thesis
This introductory chapter has covered a number of tasks. Firstly, it has presented the 
research task at hand -  namely, the explanation of sub-national variations in the success 
of independent candidates. In the light of conventional accounts of party weakness, 
which apply at the national level, these sub-national variations constitute an "intellectual
24 Another way in which the phenomenon at hand could be studied is by asking candidates about their 
decisions to stand as party or independent candidates. Regina Smyth (1998), for example, studied the 
nature o f the mass-party link emerging in early post-Soviet Russia with a survey of candidates. While this 
method has the benefit o f depth of analysis, practical limitations similar to those encountered by voter 
opinion surveys make it difficult to obtain a representative picture of candidates' choices showing 
regional variations, let alone SMD variations.
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conundrum". Secondly, this chapter has argued that the subject of the thesis deserves 
attention because the under-institutionalisation of political parties, of which 
independents' proliferation is an aspect, has important negative consequences for 
democratic consolidation and federal stability.
After situating the Russian case through a brief comparison with other transitional 
settings with poorly institutionalised party systems, the attention moved to the 
description of the diachronic and, especially, of the sub-national variability in 
independents' success in the Russian case. Spatial variability was considered at several 
levels of aggregation (SMDs, regions, economic regions, etc.). Aggregation by federal 
status was seen to suggest the potential importance of levels of autonomy and ethnic 
composition as explanatory factors. The acknowledgement that this "cartographic" 
descriptive approach could not, however, provide firm leads into the casual mechanisms 
behind what appeared to be a kaleidoscopic variability led to the presentation of the 
main features of the research strategy that this thesis adopts in order to explain such 
variability. It is a large-«, statistical investigation that takes the district vote share for the 
independents as the unit of analysis. The advantages of this kind of aggregate, macro 
approach have been highlighted through comparisons with taking the individual voter as 
the unit o f analysis (with opinion surveys) and with case studies of individual regions. 
The rationale for its use here can be reduced to the fact that the research question being 
asked here is of the "macro" type, as well as to the all-Russia scope of the independents' 
phenomenon.
The remainder of the thesis consists of seven chapters (numbered 2-8) and a 
conclusion. The first part (chapter 2) contains a review of the existing literature 
concerned with party underdevelopment in Russia. The vast majority of the most 
influential studies have confined themselves to the national dimension, focusing on the 
PR tier of the election.
Those who have dealt with the sub-national dimension of variability could not 
consider all areas of the country (Colton and Hough 1998; Moser 1999; Hutcheson 
2003); have chosen to look at regional instead of federal elections (Golosov 1997, 1999; 
Gelman and Golosov 1998) or could not advance solid explanations (Moser 1999; 
Golosov 2002). Studies that specifically focused on regional factors, such as the use of
25 The operational definition of the independent variables is the subject of chapter 4.
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regional administrative resources (e.g. Matsuzato 2000; Hale 1999, 2005), or that are 
based on the direct observation of Duma campaigns in the SMDs (the case-study 
chapters in Colton and Hough 1998), are more useful. These contributions can suggest 
hypotheses for addressing the present research question.
Following from the discussion of the existing literature, chapter 3 sets out to improve 
current explanations by devising an original explanatory framework, which is 
subsequently empirically tested in chapters 6-8. The main explanatory hypothesis is 
based on the linkage between the electoral process and the wider process of federal 
bargaining that was unfolding in Russia in the 1990s. In dealing with the centre, regions 
advocated different ideal types of federalism (from very decentralised to highly 
centralised). The greater the autonomy demands of the regions, the lower the popularity 
of national political parties based in Moscow. Given the virtual absence of regionalist 
parties, which are discouraged by electoral rules, the independents were left in a 
privileged position to articulate and represent the territorial cleavage created by the 
federalisation process. Therefore, the main hypothesis of the thesis is that the greater the 
anti-centralist assertiveness of a region, the greater the advantage of independent 
candidates over political parties. Parallel to this relationship, one has to take into 
account Moscow's response to regional demands, which often managed to appease and 
defuse anti-centralist sentiments. Other explanatory factors presented in chapter 3 
include the partisan use of regional administrative resources and financial backing for 
the 1999 vote; the inhospitable geographic conditions of some regions; and the strategic 
posture of key actors of SMD races -political parties and notable candidates.
Bridging the hypotheses to actual empirical testing, the following two chapters 
present the operational definitions of the variables (chapter 4) and discuss the 
methodology to investigate expected relationships (chapter 5). Given the posited 
explanatory framework, a crucial task is to find a quantitative indicator of regionalist 
assertiveness. This is located in an index elaborated by Kathleen Dowley (1998). The 
operationalisation of other variables is more straightforward. As for the design of the 
empirical analysis presented in chapter 5, the most important aspect is the presentation 
of the general characteristics of multilevel models, which are necessary to take into 
account the properties of the hierarchical data structure (SMDs nested within regions).
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Finally, the empirical models testing the hypotheses of the explanatory framework 
are presented in three chapters, one for each Duma election (chapters 6, 7, and 8). The 
first two elections, held in 1993 and 1995, conform closely to the expectations of 
chapter 3. In particular, controlling for instances of central appeasement, regionalist 
assertiveness is confirmed to be a significant factor of independents' success. Although 
the 1999 election exhibits a different dynamic, it can still be understood within the 
explanatory framework of the thesis. In 1999 a number of leaders of assertive regions, 
with a view to increasing their influence on federal politics and in preparation for the 
key electoral prize of the presidency (which would be at stake the following year), 
managed for the first time to form an interregional political party. This development 
meant that regionalist feelings could be, to a large extent, channelled through the new 
party, instead of sustaining independents' success.
The concluding chapter summarises the main steps taken by the research and the 
main results of the analysis. More importantly, it explores the implications of the 
findings for the scholarly understanding of Russian electoral politics and for broader 
debates in comparative politics, with a view to suggesting qualifications to some 
prevailing assumptions in the field.
As mentioned, the task of next chapter is to review the existing literature in search 
for explanations for the intellectual conundrum presented above: why have independent 
candidates been more successful in some areas (districts, regions) than in others, given 
that most explanations of party weakness apply at the national level?
2Russian Party Underdevelopment: 
The Existing Literature
”Party rivalry distorts the national will. The 
principle o f party-mindedness necessarily 
involves the suppression o f individuality, 
and every party reduces and coarsens the 
personal element. An individual will have 
views, while a party offers an ideology"
Alexander Solzhenitsyn26
This chapter is devoted to reviewing the existing literature on Russian party politics in 
the search for explanations to the empirical problem outlined in the Introduction. It will 
emerge that, despite its theoretical importance for democratic consolidation and federal 
stability, the phenomenon of the independents has received relatively little attention 
compared to other concerns of Russian electoral and party politics.
The literature related to Russian party politics over the last ten to fifteen years has 
approached it from many different aspects. Key works have been published on the 
legislative behaviour of party groups in the Duma, and the institutional rules governing 
that body (Remington and Smith 2001, Ostrow 2000), on the overall role of the Duma 
vis-a-vis the presidency (Chaisty and Gleisner 2000; Chaisty and Schleiter 2002; 
Morgan-Jones and Schleiter 2004), on party organisation (Fish 1995a; Gelman 1998; 
March 2002, Ishiyama 1998, 1999, 1999b, 2000, Hutcheson 2003), and on the link 
between party formation and the peculiarities of the Russian transition (McFaul 1993, 
Golosov 1995). Naturally, studies of individual elections and electoral cycles have also 
flourished, considered in the aspects of voting behaviour, campaign strategies, electoral
2. Russian Party Underdevelopment: The Existing Literature 48
geography, etc.27 Within this burgeoning literature, studies impinging on the issue of the 
independents are of three types:
1) Works on the underdevelopment of political parties in Russia. These constitute 
the overwhelming majority of the relevant contributions. They may or may not 
include a specific reference to the proliferation of independents, but they are 
relevant to the present inquiry in so far as party weakness contributes to the 
proliferation of non-party candidates. If these studies make express reference to 
the independents, it tends to be incidental to their broader aims; the success of 
independents is seen only as a consequence of party underdevelopment. The 
scope of these analyses in usually Russia as a whole (examples include Fish 
1995a, McFaul 1993, Urban and Gelman 1997).
2) Studies that stress the regional, sub-national, dimension of party development 
(e.g. Golosov 1999), or regional factors of voting behaviour (for example, Hale 
1999, Matsuzato 2000). Unfortunately, the numerous contributions on Russian 
electoral geography (most importantly, Clem and Craumer 1996, 2000a, 2002) 
only focus on the proportional tier of the electoral process.
3) Studies directly concerned with independents. These are mostly focused on the 
effect of personal resources (e.g. occupational status), as opposed to party 
nomination, on candidates' success (for example Golosov 2002). The only study 
touching upon the causes of political elite's weak attachment to parties is an 
article by Robert Moser (1999) on the effect of a candidate's occupational status 
and of urbanisation on his/her decision to run as an independent or as a party 
candidate. However, Moser's study does not take into account variables related to 
the regional political context and, as discussed below, deliberately excludes 
important cases (i.e. all autonomous units) from the analysis.
In the first type of literature, explanations of party underdevelopment have clustered 
around a) cultural, b) institutional or c) socio-structural variables that apply to the nation
26 Solzhenitsyn (1991: 70), quoted in Sakwa (1993: 10).
27 Key authors, whose work is discussed below, include Hosking, Aves and Duncan (1992), Dallin (1993), 
Lentini (1995), Sakwa (1993, 1995, 1995a), Fish (1995, 1995a), Urban and Gelman (1997), Slider (1996, 
2001); Belin and Orttung (1997), White, Rose and McAllister (1997), Rose (2000), Munro and Rose 
(2002), Colton and Hough (1998), Colton (2000), Golosov (1999, 2000, 2001), Gelman and Golosov
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as a whole. Each of these three perspectives is reviewed in section 2.1 below. Taken 
together, they account for the general weakness of Russian parties, and therefore they 
provide the background knowledge needed to understand the proliferation of the 
independents. However, because they focus on countrywide effects, they cannot explain 
cross-regional variations in the phenomenon under study.
The second type of literature provides some hypotheses on regional factors of party 
development and can, therefore, shed some light on the cross-regional variation in the 
proliferation of independent candidates. Finally, the third approach takes a more direct 
interest in the independents, but not necessarily in the cross-regional variation in their 
success. The closest such studies get to the spatial perspective is when they consider 
such space-related variables as levels of urbanisation (Moser 1999, for the 1993 and
present purposes. Unfortunately, however, these studies have confined thi 
analysis of the proportional side of the vote only; thus asking only the qi
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that of the first type highlighted above -  i.e. that literature concerned with the 
underdevelopment of political parties in Russia.
The third section is then devoted to the literature focused on sub-national trends in 
party politics (regional elections, regional variations in federal elections, federal races in 
single-member districts). This body of literature is the closest to the concerns of this 
thesis and, for that reason alone, provides a useful starting point. More than that, 
however, the exposure of its deficiencies identifies the gap that this research aims to fill 
and thereby locates this study within the scholarly debate.
2.1 Early investigations: from description to explanation (1988-1993)
The first wave of scholarly publications on Russian parties traced the origins of the 
emergence of multiple parties; in the comparative literature, such origins are believed to 
carry long-lasting consequences for the further development of parties (Panebianco 
1988). This phase includes several steps. The first was the proliferation of social, 
informal movements spurred by Gorbachev's liberalisation of 1988. This was followed 
by the formation of independent political groups in parallel to the officially sponsored 
Popular Fronts. Finally, political parties other than the Communist Party of the Soviet
9QUnion (CPSU) were legalised in 1990. The literature on this phase produces a picture 
of highly fragmented, fluid and precarious formations (Hough 1997; Hosking, Aves and 
Duncan 1992; McFaul 1993; Urban and Gelman 1997). Some of the patterns of late 
Soviet social mobilisation became stable. These include a popular distrust of organised, 
disciplined parties (McFaul 1993: 18), the related rejection by party founders of rigid 
organisations and hierarchies, and the difficulty in establishing social roots and links 
with specific social constituencies (Fish 1995,1995a).
At a time when the popular Fronts were still the dominant form of popular 
mobilisation (Sakwa 1996: 78), Democratic Union (founded 1988) was the first group 
to call itself a "political party", long before this would be legal. It represented the typical 
umbrella organisation observed in other post-communist transitions: highly informal in
29 CPSU stands for Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
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structure, made up of heterogeneous forces with fluid and overlapping memberships 
(Lewis 1996, 2000).
An early encounter with semi-competitive elections came with the 1989 selection of 
the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, and the 1990 votes at the level of Soviet 
Republics and lower levels. Most authors agree that the democratic potential of these 
elections, which formally introduced the possibility of non-CPSU nominations, was 
seriously limited by several factors. Most importantly, limitations derived from the 
persistence of a legal ban on political parties other than the CPSU, and from the de facto  
power of the "CPSU and other reactionary forces to manipulate or obstruct meetings' 
proceedings" (Lentini 1995: 44) where common citizens were to present their 
candidates. Better chances for independents’ nomination materialised in the 1990 
elections than the 1989 ones, though, with the average number of candidates per district 
passing from 1.9 to 6.3 (Hough 1998: 43).30On both occasions, political parties other 
than the CPSU could not legally support candidates.31 Therefore, those who were not 
supported by the CPSU32 were known as “independents” (Smyth 1998: 180). Indeed, in 
1990 the label ‘independent* designated candidates opposing the de-legitimised and 
unpopular CPSU establishment. It seems reasonable to assume that the positive 
connotation to this label which persisted in later Russian electoral discourse may have 
originated at this stage. The most effective of the 1990 electoral associations supporting 
the "independents" was Democratic Russia, an umbrella organisation whose affiliated 
MPs won 40 percent of the seats in the Russian Congress. The party was able to reach a 
relatively solid organisational presence (counting 3-400.000 members at its founding in 
October 1990) and an unprecedented territorial penetration. It supported Yeltsin's 
election to the chairmanship of the Russian Supreme Soviet, and later his June 1991 
electoral bid for the Russian presidency, while managing to mobilise masses of 
demonstrators against the 1991 August putsch. However, in the absence of
30 In her study of party activity in the Astrakhan, Samara and Chelyabinsk Oblasts, Ruth Brown has noted 
the effect of a smaller size for SMDs in the 1990 elections: "the smaller and more numerous 
constituencies in the local elections gave members of the new political groups more opportunity to 
compete than in 1989" (Brown 1998: 11-2).
31 While the historic constitutional amendment of Article 6 of the constitution put an end to the power 
monopoly of the CPSU in March 1990, the new Law on Public Associations which disciplined party 
activities would come into effect only on January 1st 1991, thus testifying to the Soviet authorities' tactic 
of liberalising on paper, while reducing the practical impact of reforms (Lentini 1995: 50).
32 The CPSU "supported" but did not directly nominate candidates in 1990, nor in 1989 (Hough 1998: 43).
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parliamentary elections after 1990, Democratic Russia disintegrated.33 Urban and 
Gelman have noted how the democratic forces of this phase represented the greatest 
victims of the transition to democracy, showing the largest share of intra-party divisions 
and conflict among leaders and between leadership and members (Urban and Gelman 
1997: 189).
After 1990, the legalisation of pluripartism (effective from 1991) spurred party 
formation. But the new forces were atomised groups: Richard Sakwa reported that in 
May 1993 around 1800 political organisations were registered with the authorities, 
prompting him to comment that from a mono-party system, Russia had morphed into a 
system without parties (Sakwa 1996: 80). Indeed, for reasons addressed below, the 
political organisations of this phase were inward looking, ridden by divisions and 
debates on their own identity, rather than concerned with the "politics of interests", i.e. 
the search for electoral support from social interests (Urban and Gelman 1997: 185).
Incipient Russian political parties were highly fluid and weakly institutionalised, had 
little organisational strength and small memberships, showed little capacity for coalition 
building and consolidation, and were created "from above" 34 by members of 
bureaucratic factions or by second-order nomenklatura personalities for their own 
access to power (Gudkov and Dubin 2000: 4). They did not aim at representing clearly 
defined social groups (which themselves lacked collective organisation) and generally 
did not posses social roots. Some of these traits are still observable in Russian parties to 
the present day. And one can see in them the reasons why even the three most visible of 
the early party organisations -  the Social democratic Party of Russia (SDPR),35 the 
Russian Democratic Party (DPR), and the Republican Party of Russia (RPR); all three 
originated within the CPSU -  could not escape extinction. The DPR, led by Nikolai 
Travkin, in fact showed a more pragmatic and effective approach to internal
33 Its remnants joined Gaidar's Russia's Choice at the 1993 Duma elections; it then re-emerged as a 
distinct party at the 1995 Duma elections, only to withdraw before the vote in support of the liberal party 
Yabloko.
34 The practice of creating parties from above, "parties of power" created by will of executive authority, is 
not new in Russia. This point was recently stressed on the Izvestiya (Leskov 2003: 5), which reported the 
archival finding, by Irina Glebova, of a letter written in September 1905 by interior minister Dmitri 
Trepov to Tsar Nichola II, asking for the creation o f a conservative party in the Duma.
35 This party, derived from an informal movement, achieved some organisational presence in towns 
across the union. It relied on an effective self-financing method, and created an independent trade union 
(SOTsPROF) and managed to publish a relatively large range of newspapers at national and regional 
levels (Urban and Gelman 1997).
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organisation (Fish 1995a). It was the only party among those that emerged in the last 
years of the Soviet Union to run as a distinct political party in the 1993 Duma elections 
and to cross the 5 percent proportional representation barrier. Nonetheless, it did not 
outlive the 1995 elections.
This period was characterised by the absence of fresh elections and the institutional 
conflict between the Russian Congress of People's Deputies and the presidency. 
Lacking the electoral incentives that normally drive their development, ’’parties” 
constituted small and fluid factions in the parliament, where their role was increasingly 
subordinate to the leadership of the speaker Kashbulatov. In this, party weakness both 
drove and was driven by Congress’s conflict with the Presidency. These two institutions 
came to represent the only two real parties -  one allied with the regional Soviets, the 
other with the presidential administration. The only two organisations belonging to that 
Parliament that became stable parties, and are still represented in the Duma at present, 
are Zhirinovsky's LDPR and the Communists (KPRF); Yabloko (formed to contest the 
1993 Duma elections) also gained representation in all three post-communist Duma 
elections of the 1990s.36
The causes o f the initial underdevelopment
As for the causes of the underdevelopment, studies on this stage of Russian politics 
have pointed to a number of factors, broadly falling into two categories: short-term, 
contingent factors and long-term, structural factors. To be sure, structural factors also 
impact upon contingent choices, by limiting the range of possible courses of action for 
political actors. The latter, however, retain an important degree of purpose and 
independence, so that their choices cannot be understood as totally endogenous to 
inherited structures. Indeed, the early failure in party development is explained by a 
combination of structurally entrenched long-term factors and contingent short-term 
choices.
Structurally entrenched factors
The structurally entrenched factors that hindered party development in the Russian 
Federation share a common root in the type of non-democratic regime that preceded the
36 But Yabloko failed to gain any list seat in the 2003 elections.
2. Russian Party Underdevelopment: The Existing Literature 54
transition to democracy. They include the peculiarities of the post-Soviet social 
structure and political culture.
Identity crisis and “flattened” society. The engineered social structure of the Soviet 
system curbed social differentiation and ensured the systemic allegiance of the (state- 
dependent) middle classes; defined as the well-educated, white-collar, higher-income 
part of the population (Zaslavsky 1994; Fish 1995, 1995a). An influential study by Linz 
and Stepan (1996: 62, Table 4,3) describes the kind of civil society produced by a 
totalitarian system as "flattened ", in the sense that it has few resources for independent 
organisation and does not show clearly demarcated social groups for parties to 
represent.37
In the last years of the Soviet Union, informal groups and protoparties had defined 
their identity in negative terms; namely, by means of their opposition to the CPSU and 
its political system. With the collapse of the old regime, these organisations abruptly 
lost their reference point, and found it difficult to redefine themselves in positive terms 
(Fish 1995a: 81-82; Urban and Gelman 1997: 186). Seventy years of Soviet rule made it 
particularly difficult for parties to "locate a constituency" (Fish 1995a: 97), and most 
groups claimed to represent all of society or the “average citizen”. The absence of 
private property and, therefore, of the market, effectively prevented the emergence of 
what in the West is commonly understood to be the foundations of civil society: the 
independent self-organisation of society from below (Fish 1995a).
This legacy of the Soviet system is often linked to the absence of traditional social 
cleavages in Russia which could spur party development. However, if traditional 
cleavages such as State-Church, ethnic, centre-periphery, management-working class, 
etc. (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) are weak, new patterns of voting behaviour are emerging. 
Indeed, socio-demographic traits such as youth and higher levels of education are 
positively associated with pro-reform voting (and vice versa). This is a general post­
communist regularity, which reflects different positions toward change. Those who are
37 Along the lines of the convergence thesis of industrial systems, and contrary to the argument presented 
here, authors such as Jerry Hough (1977) have argued that the Soviet Union had by the 1970s reached 
levels of social pluralism and differentiation similar to those of Western advanced economies. This 
perspective seems misleading as it overlooks basic differences in social organisation. Even when regime 
modernisation spurred and required the emergence of a highly educated and urbanised white collar 
stratum, the Soviet regime successfully co-opted these sectors by granting them privileged life standards. 
As a result, even though social stratification indicators came to resemble western middle-class-dominated
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better positioned to take advantage from the opening of the economic system (i.e. the 
young and the educated) vote differently from those whose age and skills militate 
against adaptation to the transformation (Kitschelt 1995: 458-59). Moreover, one 
traditional cleavage that does structure Russian voting behaviour is based on rural-urban 
differences; these have given rise to what several analysts have called a North-South 
divide (Hahn 1997: 159-60; Myagkov, Ordeshook and Sobyanin 1997). This North- 
South pattern is discussed in section 2.3. The fact that some cleavages are in fact 
emerging, but that political parties nevertheless failed to develop, calls for alternative 
explanations.
The present study argues that another geographical cleavage also contributed to 
structure voting behaviour for much of the 1990s and helps explain an aspect of party 
underdevelopment - independents' success. This is a line of division that runs between 
individual subsections of the territory and the rest - a territorial cleavage - based on 
centre-regional relations. This point is developed in chapter 3, where it is placed at the 
heart of the thesis explanatory framework.
The mentioned lack of independent bases of social organisation meant not only that 
there were no constituencies ready to hand, but also that no counter-elite could emerge 
and press for democratisation from below by participating in roundtables and pact- 
making, as in other Eastern European cases. The early protoparties which campaigned 
in 1989-1990 often supported the lower echelons of the same nomenklatura, rather than 
of regime outsiders. These candidates had adopted the reformers' ideological banner in a 
bid for power against the (higher-level) incumbents (Gudkov and Dubin 2000). Ruth 
Brown notes that "it is a significant indication of the influence of the informals that their 
endorsement was sought by the members of the nomenklatura -  even ones as elevated 
as the First Secretary of the Chelyabinsk gorkom (communist party city committee), 
Vadim Solovev, who was endorsed by the local popular front". Similarly, "the Samara 
Voter's Union had to reach an agreement with the gorkom on backing 'progressive 
CPSU candidates' in exchange for registration" (Brown 1998: 12). Friedgut and Hahn 
(1994) stress that nomenklatura candidates won most of the seats in the elections prior 
to the 1994 regional elections. Due to the historic lack of independent professional 
politicians and the lack of institutionalised parties, elections “served as legitimisation
configurations, in fact all groups always remained state-shaped and state-dependent (Zaslavsky 1995a:
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for the status of party officials and party-appointed members of the nomenklatura” 
(Hahn 1994, 8; Hughes 1997). This view is also shared by Helf and Hahn, who note that 
elections in 1990 reproduced the effect of the Soviet practice of nomeklatura 
recruitment, with the winners representing the members of the local administrative and 
economic elite. They had the skills of political participation and local recognition that 
allowed their adaptation to post-Soviet electoral politics (Helf and Hahn 1992).
Gudkov and Dubin (2000) see a continuation of the Soviet mentality in the fact that 
the general public understand politics to be a matter for the administrative official or the 
bureaucracy to deal with, on the basis of a supposed expertise in administrative matters 
(upravlenie). This technocratic assumption leaves little room for programmatic or 
ideological motivations at the polls. Laura Belin and Robert Orttung (1997: 87) also 
report a similar approach by voters in the 1995 Duma campaign. They make note of the 
widespread assumption that ideological convictions hindered the ability to solve 
problems and were incompatible with professionalism. This led to attempts by electoral 
associations to portray themselves as "non-party" associations ("Transformation of the 
Fatherland") or supra-party associations (KRO and "Power to the People"). This 
strategy is especially linked to independents' success in the SMDs. Indeed, 
"professionalism was a common theme among independent candidates ... A director of 
a local gas enterprise in Perm, for example, successfully campaigned for a single­
member seat as someone who knew how to provide steady work at a good salary" 
(Belin and Orttung 1997: 88).
The emphasis on professionalism as the key quality of candidates can also help 
explain the success of "machine politics"; a notion used by Brie for Moscow (Brie 
1997), and by Hale for Bashkortostan and other regions (Hale 1999), to indicate the 
mobilisation of voters from above by regional authorities (Matsuzato 2000: 144-7).38 
Arguably, it could also contribute to the fortunes of the technocratic “party of powers” 
created by the authorities.
Distrust o f political parties. Virtually all observers of Russian party politics have 
mentioned that party development was hindered by the psychological and cultural 
rejection by Russian citizens of the very idea of "party", due to their previous
266).
38 More on this in section 2.3.
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experience with compulsory and routinised participation in CPSU activities and in non­
competitive elections. This is thought to contribute to the low figures observed for party 
membership. For example, Miller, White and Heywood (1996) write that "the 
dominance of 'the party' through 70 years of Soviet experience left voters in the former 
Soviet Union peculiarly allergic to the idea of committing themselves to any party" 
(quoted in Miller, Reisinger and Hesli 1998). Similarly, Peter Lentini stresses that 
"because of its experience under CPSU rule, the Russian electorate harbours negative 
attitudes towards political parties" (Lentini 1995a: 247).
To this, some observers have added the widespread fear that candidates, and 
especially list candidates, would be prisoners of party leaders, of Yeltsin's 
administration or of regional bosses, and wouldn't represent popular interests but, 
instead, narrow interests -  a pattern reminiscent of the "democratic centralism" of
'IQ
Soviet times. In Smyth's interpretation, reform leaders feared that "membership rules, 
dues, hierarchical structures, clearly articulated programmes would decrease their 
popular support" (Smyth 1998: 182). Along similar lines, Fish (1995a) explains that 
party distrust led to a lack of organisation and party discipline in most early Russian 
parties. Interestingly, such fears of the anti-individualist, oppressive aspects of party’s 
internal workings40 have been likened to the distrust of parties by the American 
"founding fathers" (Sakwa 1993: 10, Smyth 1998: 182). However, the latter distrust 
reflected the mentality of that age, well before the advent of mass politics (Hosfstadter 
1969).
Similar observations have been made not only about Russia, but also more generally 
about post-communist transitions. Linz and Stepan have noted the wide currency of 
anti-political attitudes among post-communist citizens; attitudes which include the 
reluctance of voters to give their allegiance to a part, rather than to the whole. This 
explains the anti-party mentality of many leaders in post-communist transitions (Linz 
and Stepan 1996: 272-75; Taras 1998: 105) and facilitates the emergence of 
personalistic or charismatic movements, rather than real parties.41 In his study of
39 Yurii Buida, "Russkii noyabr: oppozitsionnost vkhodit v modu", Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2 December 
1993, pp.l, 3, reported by Lentini (1995: 248, fii.5).
40 As exemplified by the quote from Solzhenitsyn (1991) in the epigraph of this chapter.
Although, admittedly, this attitude is not confined to post-communist polities (Poguntke and Scarrow 
1996; Schedler 1997), it has there specific roots and intensity and it is not primarily associated with 
extreme right positioning as in the West.
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political culture in the two Russian communities of Sktyvkar and Kirov, James 
Alexander also notes that "Soviet rule conditioned people against self-initiated, 
independent participatory activity" (Alexander 2000: 150), thus reinforcing the Tsarist 
legacy. In fact, in addition to the cultural/psychological explanation for low levels of 
popular political participation, Alexander also mentions the impact of material 
deprivation, in as much as "Maslow’s hierarchy of needs predicts that subsistence living 
leads to a politically inactive population" (Alexander 2000: 151).42 The structural legacy 
of an authoritarian political culture and patterns of patronage has also been suggested to 
explain the Russian predisposition for patrimonial or clientelistic modalities of mass- 
party linkages, as opposed to programmatic ones (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Kitschelt and 
Smyth 2002).
Kostelecky has also noticed a strong repulsion to the idea of party at the beginning of 
all Eastern European transitions. Just as it is in Russia, the idea of party was associated 
in those countries with the past experience of the communist party, which used coercion, 
did not represent society and lacked legitimacy. New formations chose to avoid 
labelling themselves "parties", often preferring to call themselves "movements". Only 
the ex-communists and historic parties used that word. Similarly to the pattern followed 
by Russian reformers, the idea of party as a tight organisation has also been rejected in 
Eastern Europe in favour of very open and decentralised structures, which allow for 
building loose alliances among heterogeneous local forces.
However, despite the similarities, "in Russia internal conflict in organisations has 
been deeper, more pervasive, and more crippling in its effect than in most other cases of 
transition polities" (Fish 1995a: 66). In view of this, Fish stresses that the 
cultural/psychological explanation of party weakness based on anti-party feelings 
cannot be decisive. In the light of the experience of other advanced post-communist 
transitions, the question arises as to why, despite a similar initial distrust of parties, 
party organisation grew substantially in the Czech Republic or Slovakia. A key 
difference with Russia is that in the most advanced transitions of Eastern Europe 
(Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) political practice has demonstrated the 
advantages of tighter organisational formats.
42 For the theory on the hierarchy of needs, see Maslow (1968).
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It should also be noted that Eastern European countries are mostly parliamentary, 
therefore a cohesive majority in the parliament is necessary for government formation 
and survival. The necessities of electoral campaigning and parliamentary work have 
gradually brought about a transformation towards more hierarchical internal structures 
(Kostelecky 2002: 154-55).43 Moreover, once they came to dominate parliaments, major 
parties could define "the rules of the game" to benefit themselves and penalise 
movements, associations and independents, not only in national but also in local 
elections.44 Thus, however important, the indisputable influence of long-term structural 
factors on party weakness should not lead one to overlook the role of the state. Indeed, 
"the character and development of Russia's new autonomous political society has been 
shaped above all by the structure, nature, and policy of the state, rather than by socio­
economic modernisation, political culture and psychology, or the cumulative weight of 
centuries of Russian historical tradition" (Fish 1995a: 77).
The importance of state institutions with respect to the underdevelopment of parties 
is discussed below. But before moving on to the role of contingent factors, it should be 
emphasized that this structural interpretation, which stresses the distinctiveness of the 
Russian situation, is more convincing than that interpretation which links Russian party 
weakness to the general crisis of mass parties and traditional cleavages, due to the 
emergence of post-material values, as currently experienced in advanced democracies 
(Sakwa 1995: 190). True, nowadays parties are characterised by "light" organisational 
structures, changing bases of support and high electoral volatility also in the advanced 
democracies of the West (Wattenberg 1996; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Dalton and 
Wattenberg 2000). However, it is necessary to distinguish the different degrees to which 
this applies to the two settings, as well as the trajectories which produced this state of 
affairs in the two cases. Indeed, it is not post-industrial affluence, the growth of middle 
classes, the blurring of class boundaries, the emergence of post-material "values" 
(feminism, environmental concerns, etc.) that are confronting post-communist parties, 
but rather a weak civil society, embryonic social differentiation into groups and interests,
43 Already at the time of the 1992 elections, five of the six main parties in the Czech Republic possessed 
real internal structure and organisation. Also in Slovakia, by 1994, the repeated electoral victories of 
Meciar and his party, made the organised party the dominant format (Kostelecky 2002: 155, 157).
44 For example, in the Czech Republic the law has gradually increased the number of signatures which is 
required to support candidates and has extended the territorial size of districts, while a law passed at the 
start of 2000 only allowed national parties to contest regional elections (Kostelecky 2002: 158).
2. Russian Party Underdevelopment: The Existing Literature 60
the rejection of the very notion of "party", and mass poverty. It is, in sum, still the bitter 
legacies of Soviet-type regimes.
The importance of Russia’s pre-democratic regime type, with its crippling legacies, 
is also likely to reduce the validity of comparisons of Russia with other democratic 
systems in other ages, such as, for example, with the long-term and gradual 
democratisation process occurred in Great Britain (Hough 1998: 40). The point is not so 
much that party consolidation takes time, which is generally true, but that in Russia the 
process is significantly slower than in other post-authoritarian and post-communist 
countries.
Contingent factors
Contingent explanations of party weakness found in the literature include the modality 
of the Russian transition process, the strategic choices of the main actors, institutional 
rules and the timing of elections.
Founding elections? The negative impact on party development of the institutional 
conflict between the Congress and the presidency between the end of 1991 and the Fall 
of 1993 has already been mentioned. This conflict hindered the programmatic 
differentiation of the parties making up the Russian Congress, which sided as a whole 
against the president. In the same period, in the absence of elections, there was little 
incentive for party building outside the Congress. Steven Fish has noted that, not only 
the delay in calling fresh elections after 1991, but also the sequence of partially open 
contests in 1989 and 1990, negatively affected party development. "The 'opening' of 
1989-90 was both too sudden and too partial. It strongly -  and negatively -  influenced 
the growth and effectiveness of alternative political parties" (Fish 1995a: 73).
Of general importance is that Russia did not have clear-cut founding elections of the 
kind typically observed in transitions to democracy (O'Donnell, Schmitter and 
Whitehead 1986: 44), where they play a major role in stimulating party development 
and structuring of the vote. 'Founding elections' are defined as the first competitive 
elections by which key positions of authority are filled, and in the Russian case, no 
single election qualifies. The effect of founding elections was "spread" over more than 
one consultation ranging from the 1993 Duma elections -  the first competitive elections 
for the legislative assembly -  to the 1996 presidential vote, the first post-Soviet vote for 
the top position of authority in the country (Gelman 2003).
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Institutional design. The negative impact of a presidential form of government, like 
Russia's, on party development has been noted by many (e.g. Sakwa 1996: 91). In the 
comparative literature, Juan Linz (1994) has forcefully proposed this line of argument, 
drawing from Latin American examples. Linz has argued that weak party systems and 
weak parties are a structural necessity for presidential systems. In the event he cannot 
count on a sympathetic majority the lack of internal discipline in individual parties 
allows the president to overcome legislative deadlock through co-optation of 
parliamentarians and thereby pass his policies through the assembly (Linz 1994: 34-35). 
In fact, a similar observation was already made by Epstein with regard to the US system 
(Epstein 1975: 264). As Shugart and Carey remind us, Bagehot also had already 
stressed the positive effect of parliamentarism on the chances for the emergence of 
programmatic parties in The English Constitution (Shugart and Carey 1992: 8-9):
“Because governments were made and unmade according to the composition 
of the majority of parliament, a voter’s choice of parliamentary candidate was 
also a choice of executive. Elections thus came to turn on the voters’ 
preferences for government and, by extension, on policy rather than on more 
purely local concerns (such as 'pork' and patronage). As a result, neither 
elections nor the legislative process turned on distribution of particularistic 
goods by means of logrolling across districts. Instead elections offered an 
'efficient' choice from among competing policy options, and legislation is the 
domain of the majority party and its cabinet".
According to the Russian Constitution of 1993, the President can bypass the 
Parliament and enact legislation by decree in areas not yet covered by legislation. The 
president can also veto legislation approved by the parliament and his veto can be 
overridden only by two thirds of the members of each of the two chambers of the 
Federal Assembly. Finally, it is the President who appoints the Prime minister and the 
other ministers. The Duma can reject his nominee but risks being disbanded by the 
president (with new Duma elections being called) in the event that opposition is 
repeated in three consecutive votes. To indicate the dominance of the presidency in 
Russia's form of government, Stephen Holmes (1994) and, more recently, Steven Fish 
(1997; 2001), have used the term "superpresidentialism". Others, on the other hand, 
have stressed that the Duma did play a key role in enacting a high number of important 
pieces of legislation (Remington 2001; Chaisty and Schleiter 2002), and in influencing 
government composition (Morgan-Jones and Schleiter 2004). These authors tend to
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consider the Russian system as "president-parliamentary", following Shugart and 
Carey's typology (Shugart and Carey 1992).
The standard argument that relates the weakness of Russian political parties to the 
presidential form of government posits that a weak Duma represents a relatively small 
prize for parties to win and provides only moderate incentives for party organisation 
building. Moreover, presidentialism also means that government stability does not 
directly depend on the presence of a stable majority coalition in the Duma, thus 
reducing the incentives for the emergence of cohesive and disciplined political parties.
On the other hand, it should be noted that party weakness can also have a negative 
feedback into the weakness of the Duma itself. Paul Chaisty and Petra Schleiter 
conclude that in the Yeltsin years "the weakness of parties in structuring the work of the 
lower house, and in linking the legislative priorities of different branches of 
government" explained the poor public image of the Duma. This is due to the fact that 
1) it prevented "the effective prioritisation" of pressing issues, such as the Chechen war 
or the August 1998 financial crisis, and 2) it hampered co-ordination with the executive 
branch of government and induced the latter to legislate by decree (Chaisty and 
Schleiter 2002: 717).
Yeltsin's attitude. In addition to the impact of institutional design, the personal 
attitude of Russia’s first president, Boris Yeltsin, towards party building also 
undermined the emergence of stable parties. Although he had been part of Democratic 
Russia, once he was elected chairman of the Russian Congress in May 1990, Yeltsin 
soon withdrew membership in, and his commitment to, this umbrella organisation. In 
keeping with the noted propensity of post-communist leaders elsewhere, he instead 
cultivated as much as possible the image of a charismatic and paternal leader above 
parties (White, Rose and McAllister 1997: 169). Exemplary of Yeltsin’s charismatic 
approach was his April 1994 attempt to reach a ‘social pact’ by pressing for the 
adoption of his ‘Charter of Civic Accord’; an accord drafted with no consultation of 
parties, and claiming to represent the ‘national interest’ above party divisions.
Along the same lines, a bridging function between centre and periphery was the 
preserve, not of a national party, but of federal agencies which had the task to recruit 
'promising' regional leaders for promotion to the national level (Huskey 1999: 191, 201). 
Finally, the institute of Yeltsin 'presidential representatives' in the provinces should also
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be mentioned in this respect. Drawing from local cadres, these appointments were to 
provide the kind of 'eyes and ears' of the centre which, in Soviet times, were provided 
by Party functionaries and performed essential co-ordinating and feedback tasks. It is 
possible to see these institutions as administrative substitutes for national political 
parties. The recruitment function was carried out not by political parties, but through 
"informal networks" and "direct co-optation" to state posts (Sakwa 1993: 11).
Electoral system. The electoral system figures prominently in the literature on 
institutional factors affecting party development (classics are Duverger’s book of 1951 
and Sartori’s of 1976). As noted, Russia adopts a mixed system for the State Duma.45 
Hailf of the seats (225) are allocated through party list proportional competition (PR) in 
a single all-Russian electoral district. Party lists must meet a 5 percent threshold at the 
national level. The composition of the other half of the Duma is decided in 225 single- 
mesmber districts (SMDs) where a plurality of the vote is required to win the contest, 
provided that turnout reaches at least 25 percent of the eligible voters. The requirement 
thait parties collect no more that 15 percent (7 percent starting from 1995) of the 
required 100,000 (200,000 from 1995) signatures from any one region of the federation, 
madces it very difficult for parties based in one or only a few regions to contest Duma 
elections 46 The importance of this in explaining party underdevelopment, will become 
clearer in the next chapter, where it is be argued that one cleavage Russia did have to 
articulate was territorial and regionally based.
The way legislative work is carried out by the Upper Chamber of the Russian 
Parliament, the Federation Council, is also credited with limiting the ability of parties to 
articulate regional issues. Thomas Remington notes that the Federation Council, while 
primarily devoted to debating issues pertaining to centre-regional relations, is totally 
deprived of party factions and groups. In this sense, centre-regions issues are not 
chamnelled through political parties also because of the non-partisan principle of 
organisation of the Federation Council (Remington 1998: 220). In addition to this, one 
cam also assume that parties' ability to channel regional concerns was hampered by the 
sheier size of the country (Sakwa 1993: 13).
45 Within the post-communist camp, mixed systems were also employed, with different degrees of 
continuity, in Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania (Shvetsova 1999), and Ukraine.
46 0>n the details of party and candidate registration rules, see Remington and Smith (1996); Hough 
(1998); White and McAllister (1999) and Moser (2001a).
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Belin and Orttung note that the local elite found a congenial arena in the SMDs. 
"Because half of the deputies were elected in single-member districts, the national 
parties had great difficulty in signing up members of the local elite. Regional notables 
could easily win election in the districts on the strength of their reputation among local 
voters and gained nothing from being associated with a party. Many well-known figures 
even saw party membership as a liability because of the negative connotations attached 
to the very idea of political parties at that time [1993 elections]" (Belin and Orttung 
1997:21).47
If, as expected, the SMD tier leads to parochialism in district races, the expected 
reductionist effect on the number of parties, typically produced by majoritarian electoral 
formulas in advanced democracies, did not materialise. In the absence of 
institutionalised parties, voters lacked the information on the (expected) relative 
strength of contestants that is assumed to be at the root of strategic voting (Moser 
1999a: 364). In fact, the majoritarian tier produced a higher proliferation of under- 
institutionalised) parties than the PR tier.
Between the 1993 and the 1995 election the boundaries of several SMDs were also 
altered and the electoral law was amended to the effect that candidates appearing on the 
party lists beyond the 12th position had to appear in regional sub-lists. Their electoral 
chances would then depend on the amount of votes received by the party in the region 
(or grouping of regions) linked to the party sub-list. This represented a concession to 
regional elites, who aimed at correcting the tendency of party lists to be filled with 
Moscow politicians (White and McAllister 1999: 32). One unintended consequence of 
this change was to encourage party proliferation for the 1995 elections, as candidates 
who could not be included in the first 12 positions on a party list, tried to form their own 
lists.48
Anti-incumbent sentiment. Belin and Orttung note that candidates standing for re- 
election often preferred to leave their parties to avoid the general resentment towards
47 In fact, in 1993 the SMD ballot did not record the party affiliation of candidates. However, the 
affiliation of many could be found on the PR ballot, if they occupied the first three positions on party lists 
(both federal and regional sub-lists). Ninety-six percent of the party candidates running in the districts 
were also running on PR lists in 1993 (Colton 1998: 21). Moreover, the ballot paper did report some 
biographical information about the candidate (year of birth, place of residence and occupation). Therefore, 
when the occupation declared was "party official" or "activist", party affiliation could be revealed (Gould- 
Davis 1998: 450).
48 Twelve is the minimum number of seats that a party crossing the 5 percent threshold can hope to win.
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incumbents in times of widespread economic hardship, thus trying to escape 
accountability. In this sense the typical advantage enjoyed by district incumbent 
candidates may not be as strong as usually expected, or may benefit independent 
incumbents more than party incumbents. Consistent with this phenomenon, the 
campaign banner of the (minor) formation 'Bloc of independents', for example, "urged 
voters to pick new faces in December [1995] and not to trust anyone who had been 
elected two years earlier" (Belin and Orttung 1997: 86-87).49 The two co-authors argue 
that anti-incumbent feelings made politicians not just change party, but also run as 
independents. Especially candidates belonging to NDR and KPRF, "saw advantages to 
posing as independents in single-member districts" (Belin and Orttung 1997: 87), while 
"in Nizhnii Novgorod, an NDR candidate was denied registration after she was caught 
posing as an independent while collecting signatures."50
2.2 The unfolding of party politics (1995-1999): pessimists and 
optimists
The lines of interpretation discussed above emerged quite clearly in the literature 
dealing with the mobilisation phase of Russian post-communist politics; that is, from 
1988 up to the 1993 Duma elections. The 1995 Duma election contained some elements 
of discontinuity with the preceding one: it was the first election to be regularly 
scheduled, the first under the new constitution, and the first to be held during ordinary 
times (as opposed to the institutional crisis that had preceded the 1993 vote). In terms of 
electoral results, another novelty was represented by the success of the Communists 
(KPRF). The KPRF dramatically improved its performance, especially in the SMDs, 
and emerged as the only territorially organised party of Russia, or "the party of the 
provinces in 1995" (March 2002: 178). This will remain a stable feature in the following 
election, along with the decline of the LDPR. Finally, the share of independents, both 
among candidates and among winners in the SMDs decreased from over 60 percent to 
about 30 percent.
49 St. Petersburg television, "Vybory-95", 8 December 1995. Reported in Belin and Orttung (1997: 87).
50 Nizhegorodskii Robochii, 11 October 1995, p.3. Reported in Belin and Orttung (1997: 87).
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However, elements of continuity with 1993 are also evident. In the intervening two 
years most parties did not dramatically improve their organisation, their membership 
levels and there were little signs of party system consolidation. On the contrary, new 
parties proliferated, with the entry on the PR ballot box of a large number of marginal 
groupings. These forces have been labelled "irrational", due to the fact that they had 
little hopes of crossing the 5 percent proportional representation barrier (White, Rose 
and McAllister 1997: 198). Indeed, of the 43 parties registered, only 4 cleared this 
hurdle. The tendency for "parties of power" to disappoint was also replicated (with 
NDR and the 'Bloc of Ivan Rybkin', taking the place of Russia's Choice and PRES).
The 1999 elections also did not provide much scope for confidence in the 
consolidation of Russian parties. On the positive side, three parties (Yabloko, KPRF, 
and LDPR) confirmed their ability to win representation in all three Duma elections by 
clearing the 5 percent hurdle. However, the most striking phenomenon of 1999 was the 
sudden emergence of powerful blocs created from above, by regional governors (OVR, 
"Fatherland-All Russia") and/or by instigation of the presidential administration and 
government ministers (Unity). As noted in the introductory chapter, their success 
testifies to the extreme volatility of Russian party politics, and shows a lack of stable 
party identification among voters. Gudkov and Dubin explain the success of the pro- 
Kremlin party Unity with reference to the concept of "negative mobilisation from above". 
The presidential administration, along with the state media, managed to mobilise citizenry 
to vote "against an enemy". The enemy in question was represented by the Chechens who 
allegedly had planted bombs in Moscow apartments and other locations in Russia at the 
end of the summer preceding the 1999 vote. This campaign portrayed Putin as the 
necessary energetic and determinate leader who would bring back order (Gudkov and 
Dubin 2000: 8), and Unity' benefited in this environment as the party closest to president 
Putin.
Munro and Rose have pointed out that in September 1999, i.e. two-three months 
before the vote, pre-election polls revealed that "47% of the electorate had no 
inclination toward a party with a chance of winning list seats in the Duma" (Munro and 
Rose 2002: 123). 'Unity' had not even been formed yet. The two co-authors stress that 
"in NRB [New Russia Barometer] surveys, political parties are consistently the most 
distrusted of all institutions in society, and the Duma comes a close second. In the
2. Russian Party Underdevelopment: The Existing Literature 67
survey immediately after the Duma election, only 9 per cent expressed trust in political 
parties, compared to 75 per cent actively distrusting parties, and the remaining sixth 
neutral" (Munro and Rose 2002: 123). The conclusion is that in Russia a "floating 
system of parties" is observed, characterised by the appearance and disappearance of 
parties from one election to the next, where no stable political accountability is possible 
(Munro and Rose 2002: 8).
On the other hand, it is apparent that, with the partial exception of OVR, the new 
parties fared much worse in 1999 than older ones in the territorial districts. Indeed, even 
though 'Unity' came very close to KPRF in the proportional count, its total number of 
seats was significantly smaller than the communists' because of its very different 
performance in the SMDs. Unity managed to participate in only 18 percent of the 
constituency contests. Moreover, the number of majoritarian seats contested is not 
necessarily correlated with the number of successful nominations. As it did in 1995, 
Zhirinovsky's bloc made a tremendous organisational effort to be present in nearly all 
SMDs. Similarly to its 1995 campaign, however, Zhirinvsky's candidates performed 
very poorly: in 1999 they could not win any territorial race. As for the independents, in 
comparison with the previous Duma election, the number of successful non-party 
candidates rose again, this time to 112 (half of all SMD winners).
The picture that emerges from this account is one dominated by negative conclusions 
and pessimism about the development of Russian parties and party system. However, 
there is a pattern traced parallel to this one in the literature, one that has generated more 
positive findings and more encouraging interpretations. Positive assessments of party 
development in Russia have tended to rely on opinion surveys, although not all studies 
using opinion surveys reach optimistic conclusions. One strand in this literature 
measures party development as the degree to which citizens are "attached to" or 
"identify with" political parties (Miller, Erb, Reisinger and Hesli 2000; Miller and 
Klobucar 2000; Pammett and DeBardeleben 2000; Miller, Reisinger and Hesli 1998; 
Evans and Whitefield 1998; McAllister and White 1998; Wyman, White and Oates 
1998; Toka 1998; Miller, White and Heywood 1996; Wyman, White, Miller and 
Heywood 1995). Significantly, some authors who figure prominently in this survey 
literature, such as Arthur Miller, were previously interested in party identification in the 
USA or in other established western democracies (for example, Miller and Wattenberg
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1983). The fluid use to which party identification is put within the context of Russian 
politics serves as a reminder that concepts that are standard in the analysis of advanced 
democratic systems can be misleading when imported to post-communist contexts such 
as Russia.
Matthew Wyman, Stephen White, Bill Miller and Paul Heywood (1995), were 
among the first observers to use the concept of party identification with reference to 
voting behaviour in the 1993 Duma elections. They find evidence of an emerging multi­
party system that consists of a number of established parties. These parties, according to 
the authors, are beginning (in 1993) to undertake some of the critical functions 
necessary to the development of a stable democracy, while levels of party identification 
have risen quickly. Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield (1998) also write of party 
“identification”. With regards to cleavages, they too found that, contrary to assumption 
of a flattened or homogeneous society, societal cleavages -  mainly in the form of 
sharply different positions towards economic market reforms; not ethnic or confessional 
ones -  were emerging and becoming stable, despite the fluctuation of parties and 
candidates. In direct contrast to the theory of political cleavages, which credit 
institutions such as political parties with activating societal cleavages (Bartolini and 
Mair 1990: 216), Evans and Whitefield conclude that “the absence of strong parties or 
institutions of civil society should by no means be expected to prevent such divisions 
from emerging", and therefore, that post-communist Europe should not be seen as a 
"social wasteland" of "voters deprived of their social identities". Nonetheless, at the 
same time they admit that Russia is something of a special case in this regard, as 
"Russian politics contains relatively few distinctive independent bases for ideological 
divisions" (Evans and Whitefield 1998: 70).
One of the boldest statement in the optimist camp is perhaps that authored by Ian 
McAllister and Stephen White (1998) who find party identification to be the most 
important determinant of electoral behaviour, as opposed to institutional or sociological 
factors. Miller, Reisinger and Hesli (1998), for their part, realign the aim of these 
contributions on identification with their finding that it is in fact voters' attachment to 
leaders, rather than party identification, that constitutes the best predictor of voting 
behaviour. Even more explicit in circumscribing the optimism of works based on 
opinion surveys, are the editors of the 1998 volume to which both mentiond
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contributions belong. They observe that “seeing voting as a result of party identification 
would be, to say the least, eccentric in Russian conditions. . . . The lack of strong 
parties is likely to mean low levels of partisanship for years to come” (Wyman, White 
and Oates 1998: 6).
The lucid tone of the latter statement, however, appears to be rather exceptional 
among scholars using opinion surveys. In general, such surveys tend to lead the analyst 
to overestimate party attachments among voters. The respondent may be induced to 
indicate a party preference by the very fact that the questionnaire asks him/her to do so, 
sometimes presenting him with a list of party labels. His choice may reveal which party 
or leader he feels closest to on the list o f possibilities presented to him, but this is quite 
different from the deep, stable and positive link that is implied by the concept of "party 
identification". In any case, because it designates a lasting and deep attachment over 
time (White, Rose and McAllister 1997: 134), the concept of "party identification" can 
by definition only be applied after a number of elections have been held. This seems to 
rule out any rigorous use of the concept with reference to the 1993 Duma elections, the 
first competitive ones, and even casts doubts on its validity for the 1995 Duma elections, 
held only two years after the first.
One strong exception to the optimistic readings that prevail among the public opinion 
research is White, Rose and McAllister’s highly informative and comprehensive 
account of Russian elections, How Russia Votes (White, Rose and McAllister 1997). On 
the issue of party identification, the authors find that "more than three-quarters of the 
electorate lack any party identification", which is also confirmed by the high levels of 
split-ticket voting (White, Rose and McAllister 1997: 135, 139).51 More recently, 
Munro and Rose have reached similar negative conclusions, also based on opinion 
surveys (Munro and Rose 2002). Timothy Colton seems to take the middle ground 
between optimists and pessimists in his analysis of Russian voting behaviour.52 While 
sceptical about whether party identification in the Western sense is already emerging, he 
finds evidence that a sizeable share of Russian voters are developing a "precursor" to it, 
an "elective affinity" to parties, which he refers to as "transitional partisanship" (2000:
51 A survey conducted by VTsIOM before the 1993 elections found that 70 percent of the respondents 
who knew how they would vote, were planning to split their votes in the two tiers of the Duma election 
(White, Rose and McAllister 1997: 139).
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25, 110). The survey questions used by Colton were carefully worded so as not to 
prompt an answer in the positive or negative sense, and are designed to detect degrees 
of partisanship (Colton 2000: 114). The results show that slightly over 50 percent of 
Russians are absolute non-partisan. Most of the remainder fall within the category 
which Colton labels "weak partisans"; those still free from any stable or deep 
attachment to any party. In sum, less than a third of Russians clearly identified a party 
as "their own". Nevertheless, the author concludes, "Russian political parties, . . .  do 
seem to strike a chord with the public" (Colton 2000: 115).
There is another reason one must conclude this approach based on opinion surveys 
tends to portray parties as more real and important than they are. Namely the fact that 
studies of Russian voting behaviour are heavily biased; focused as they are on the 
proportional tier of the election. As much as half of the electoral process -  the 
majoritarian half -  is overlooked by these studies, while cross-regional differences go 
unnoticed because opinion surveys cannot be implemented in 225 SMDs, nor in 89 
regions (Colton 2000: 3).53 As a result, sweeping conclusions about voters' attitudes and 
attachment to parties are often reached ignoring the fact that in the three Duma elections 
about 60, 30 and 50 percent (respectively) of the candidates elected in SMDs were 
independents. Moreover, if bases for partisan attachment are emerging, the more recent 
elections of 1999 have demonstrated how feeble and superficial these are. Indeed, these 
‘party attachments’ were easily overridden by other determinants of voting behaviour, 
such as Putin's charismatic appeal, or the "negative mobilisation" (Gudkov and Dubin 
2000) against a security threat (the Chechens as terrorists). The forces of emotion and 
circumstance driving so much voting behaviour militates against the institutionalisation 
of programmatic parties and, after 1999, drove existing parties to converge towards 
blurred centrist positions, with even the KPRF assuming a more conciliatory stance 
towards presidential reforms in the new parliament.
It is not just the neglect to consider the SMD races that has led to overtly optimistic 
interpretations of party politics in Russia, it is also the neglect of the regional political
52 Although published in 2000, this volume only studies the first two Duma elections (PR tier only) and 
the 1996 presidential election.
53 As mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, surveys would need thousands of respondents in each 
region to be representative of regional variations. Such numbers are beyond the resources of even the 
most reputable agencies for the study of public opinion. A point confirmed in a personal talk with Lev
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dimension as such. The emphasis on social cleavages and the programmatic 
differentiation of parties as decisive factors for voting behaviour must be contrasted 
with the evidence of such regional-level phenomena as "the boss", "machine politics" 
and the partisan use of "administrative resources". These concepts indicate that votes 
are mobilised from above by regional authorities and do not always reflect voters' 
ideological or socio-economic profile. In many of the 89 regions, these forces are able 
to limit the competitive character of the elections by means ranging from media control, 
partisan use of state resources and personnel, biased rulings by local courts or biased 
decisions of local electoral commissions, to outright falsification of results. The 
discussion now turns to the literature that, more recently, has shed light on these 
regional-level factors affecting party development.
2.3 Territorial districts and territorial politics
The explanations of party weakness highlighted above rely on cultural/psychological 
and social structural explanations based on the legacy of the Soviet system, as well as 
on contemporary institutional factors. They apply generally to the Russian political 
system and thus can only account for general, Russia-wide party weakness. The analysis 
of cross-regional differences in party development and independents' proliferation, on 
the contrary, demands explanations at the level of region.
And Russian regions do differ greatly in many aspects. The Russian territory is huge 
and diverse, stretching across ten time zones, encompassing very heterogeneous 
territorial conditions, highly variable regional resource endowments, and highly variable 
economic and social conditions. The Russian Federation’s adopted form of state (as 
resulting from the Russian constitution and bilateral treaties with individual republics) is 
"asymmetric federalism", which grants different degrees of autonomy to different units 
of the Federation, some of which are characterised by distinct ethnic/religious outlooks. 
In such a fragmented and heterogeneous context, all-Russia averages, in most field of 
social inquiry, are bound to give a very partial account if not an outright misleading and 
distorting one.
Gudkov, vice-director of VTsIOM (All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion, now "Tsentr
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It is by now well known that Russian regions differ, for example, in their degree of 
openness and political pluralism. This is shown in studies of individual regions (for 
example Orttung 1995; Melvin 1998; Farukhshin 2002),54 and in comparative cross- 
regional studies (Tsygankov 1998; Gelman 1999; McMann and Petrov 2000; Reisinger 
and Moraski 2003). Federal units also present different degrees of democracy in terms 
of local self-government,. In Tatarstan not only counties, but also cities are "statified" 
(i.e. headed by unelected administrative officials), while, in the ethnically Russian 
regions, chief executives of all levels of government are popularly elected (Matsuzato 
2001: 183). More generally, with respect to "civil society", Richard Sakwa has pointed 
out that western notions have little meaning in the Russian context, where "dependency 
networks" dominate the scene and are "rooted in local production and supply 
communities, and regional identities" (Sakwa 2002: 5). Not only in relation to the 
federal level, but also relative to the sub-regional local and municipal levels, the 
regional dimension plays a key role. Indeed, "regional governance provides a better 
analytical tool than local governance in Russia at this time. Alliances form, interact, and 
implement policy at the regional scale, not at the urban scale" (Mitchneck 2002: 174).
In terms of electoral results, cross-regional differences are also evident. A clear 
geographical pattern is observed starting from Yeltsin’s April 1993 referendum and 
continuing with the two Duma races and the 1996 presidential elections. According to 
this pattern, Yeltsin's supporters were concentrated in the areas north of the 60th parallel, 
while his support was weakest "in a more or less contiguous band to the south and south 
west of Moscow, stretching from Bryansk to Novosibirsk." (Treisman 1999: 82; 
O’Loughlin, Shin and Talbot 1996; Clem and Craumer 1996; Slider, Gimpelson and 
Chugrov 1994).55 Explanations for this North-South divide have focused on respective 
degrees of urbanisation. Conventional wisdom holds that rural areas, concentrated in the 
South, see higher turnout rates and vote predominantly for conservative forces, while 
Northern urban areas tend to support reformers and have low levels of turnout. However,
Levada"), at their headquarters in Moscow, in February 2002.
54 For example, with respect to Tatarstan, Farukhshin concludes that "the degree of autonomy they won, 
essentially independence from the federal centre, was used to establish a regime based on personal 
power" (Farukhshin 2002: 194).
55 Even as early as the 1989 elections, Kolosov, Petrov and Smimyagin (1990) noted a division along the 
55th parallel, with CPSU establishment candidates winning in the South, and reformers in the North.
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this interpretation has been questioned by Kimitaka Matsuzato, who stresses that "the 
famous 'Red Belt' is not agrarian" (Matsuzato 2000: 143).
Matsuzato notes that, contrary to widespread assumption on the explanatory power 
of socio-economic conditions for voting behaviour, in 1996 the reformer Yeltsin 
received an "unexpectedly large" share of his votes from voters with low levels of 
education, low income, over 50 years of age, living in rural areas or towns under 10,000, 
and thinking that "their economic situation had worsened in the previous year”. Indeed, 
Yeltsin only got less than half of his 40.2 million votes from the 100 largest cities 
(Matsuzato 2000: 193-5). Hough and Lehmann also note the "mystery" of anti-reform 
voters voting for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential elections. They find “part of the 
explanation lies in Yeltsin’s obfuscation of his own position on economic reform in the 
early part of the campaign and his offering of subsidies to every group and region he 
visited” (Hough and Lehmann 1998: 192). Instead of taking root in society as an all­
national formation, the Russian ‘party of power’ artificially extends its territorial and 
social reach using regional power structures as a resource (Kholodkovskij 2000: 187).
Matsuzato has proposed an interpretation of voting behaviour that, while rejecting 
the North-South argument and the related explanations based on urbanisation and living 
standards, is sensitive to the regional dimension of Russian politics. In his view, the key 
factor is mobilisation from above (Matsuzato 2000: 143). This means that regional 
authorities are able to influence the vote in their regions, albeit to different degrees. 
They do so through their control of the regional media, the use of administrative 
personnel for campaign purposes, and their control of the regional economy. This has 
also been observed by Henry Hale, who writes of administrative influences on the 1993 
SMD contests. In addition to the region considered in Hale's case study, Bashkortostan, 
such resources appeared to play a key role in Tatarstan, Kalmykia, Mordovia, 
Kemerovo and Orel. Indeed, these are regions where elections in general (i.e. including, 
and especially, regional ones) seem to be particularly 'controlled' (Hale 1999: 106).
Given these forces corrupting local competitiveness, mere organisational efforts by 
parties toward territorial penetration are not a guarantee of success in the SMDs. This is 
exemplified by the case of the LDPR, which managed to nominate its candidates in a 
very large number (188) of SMDs in 1995, but obtained only one victory. The same 
pattern occurred in the regional legislative elections of 1995-98, where Zhirinovsky’s
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LDPR nominated candidates in 58 regions, but won seats only in six (Golosov 1999: 
1341). In his analysis of this cycle of regional elections, Golosov explained cross- 
regional differences in party development in terms of the nature of intra-elite conflicts, 
an hypotheses already proposed for the case of Sverdlovsk oblast in an article co­
authored with Vladimir Gelman (Gelman and Golosov 1998). If regional elites are 
divided and unable to subdue one another, then the chances of one side starting to build 
a local political party as a tool of political competition are higher. In most cases, on the 
contrary, regional politics is monistic and controlled by the governors, who "simply do 
not need the 'party of power' as a means of translating their influence into assembly 
seats" (Golosov 1999: 1339). This means that the most common scenario in the 1995-98 
regional legislative elections can be summarised as follows. "Where executive power 
belongs to left-wing governors, Our Home is Russia has disappeared, to be replaced 
with the Communist Party (KPRF) or its local mutants . . . Non-communist governors 
prefer to support independent candidates -or anybody who is willing to co-operate" 
(Golosov 1999: 1340). The marginality of national political parties in regional elections 
is even more apparent in gubernatorial elections. Petrov notes that a number of strong 
gubernatorial candidates choose not to publicise their party links and even distanced 
themselves from parties, movements and blocs with whom they had previously closely 
collaborated. They appeared mainly as representatives of the 'party of voters' (Petrov 
2001:4).
Most recently, Hutcheson (2003) has also addressed the issue of party development 
at the regional level. Based on fieldwork in three regions of central Russia, his work is 
primarily concerned with the role of the regional branches of national-parties in regional 
politics. It examines six parties chosen for their ability to clear the 5 percent 
representation threshold in the proportional tier of the latest 1999 Duma elections. The 
choice of the regional dimension of party activity is a welcome novelty for a single­
authored book. However, the focus on party organisation, and the reliance on interviews 
with party officials may have produced a false impression of party solidity. In fact, the 
input of national-party branches in regional politics is negligible in most cases, as most 
such branches had a precarious and volatile life in the 1990s (Golosov 1999). Moreover, 
Hutcheson’s work, while rich in information and insight into local party activity, cannot 
provide a solid basis for generalisations. This is because it is based on only three regions
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(Tatarstan, Samara, and Ulyanovsk), all located in the same economic macro-region, 
and jointly representing under 1 percent of Russian territory and 6 percent of the 
population, as the author admits (Hutcheson 2003: 5). What is perhaps most different 
from the perspective adopted here, is that the selection of parties that form the object of 
Hutcheson's study is based on their clearing the 5 percent threshold in the PR tier. In so 
doing his work continues the sidestepping of Duma races in the territorial districts. This 
is even more surprising given the focus on territorial party organisations, which should 
find their proper arena in the SMDs.
In general national political parties have played a uniformly marginal role in regional 
elections in the 1990s, with the partial exception of the communist party (KPRF). This 
means that there is too little variance along this dimension to consider it as a potential 
explanatory variable in a model predicting different regional levels of independents' 
success in Duma elections. Petrov and Titkov (2000), however, do note an example of 
regional-level dynamics likely to affect the independents' success in a federal election. 
In their study of the regional dimension of the 1999 Duma election, they stress the 
increased role of regional elites against the background of a centre weakened by the 
1998 political crises and the August default. While at the time of the 1995 Duma 
elections most regional governors had been appointed by Yeltsin, by 1999 most had 
been popularly elected. This gave them a stronger hold on regional political and 
economic power, and, in turn, sharply increased the role of administrative resources in 
elections. In 1999 regional governors started to see Duma elections as important 
channels of influence and, therefore, began to employ considerable resources in these 
races, including forming a number of electoral alliances that effectively challenged the 
independents (Petrov and Titkov 2000: 231).56
Up to this point, this section has noted prominent examples in the literature that 
indicate the importance of the regional dimension in politics and electoral politics in 
particular. How does this relate to the study of independent candidates? It is a central 
contention of this thesis that the region represents an important political context that 
significantly shapes the district races and levels of independents' proliferation (see 
chapter 3). The existing literature, however, has overlooked the link between SMD 
results and regional politics. Even political and electoral geographers, who have
56 This point is developed in chapter 3 and 8.
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emphasised regional variations in electoral patters, have focused on the proportional 
vote only, rather than studying the 225 electoral districts (O'Loughlin, Shin and Talbot 
1996; Clem and Craumer 1996, 2000,2000a, 2002; Marsh and Warola 2001).
One contribution that can illuminate cross-regional differences in SMD results is 
Hale's study of the 1999 elections, in which the success of non-party candidates is 
linked to the availability of electoral resources other than those supplied by political 
parties. These "party substitutes" are, namely, the support that a candidate may receive 
from the regional governor, and the backing of regional industrial and financial groups 
(Hale 2005). This is an example of how regional factors can account for cross-regional 
differences in the success of the independents. Thanks to data provided by Henry Hale, 
this thesis will incorporate these two factors in its model of 1999 independents' 
success.57
Another factor that this thesis is able to draw from the existing literature is closely 
related to the stress on "party substitutes" -  governor’s control of administrative 
resources. This phenomenon has been described in the Matsuzato (2000) and Hale's 
(1999) contributions discussed above. Different regional governors "control" their 
regions to different extents. The degree of control is likely to play a role in the possible 
support that a candidate or a party may receive from a governor; the greater the degree 
of control the governor is able to exert on the regional politics -  e.g. on the regional 
media -  the more valuable his support. Therefore, this dynamic could account for part 
of the cross-regional variance in the success of independent candidates.
Moreover, a "classic" spatial hypothesis that can be used here is the positive effect of 
urbanisation on party development. According to this thesis, already proposed by 
Huntington (1968) and by Rokkan (1970), parties initially thrive in urban settings and 
then try and penetrate the countryside. Moser has investigated the effect of urbanisation 
on "elite partisanship" and found no confirmation of this hypothesis (Moser 1999). 
However, this may be due to some limitations applying to Moser's methodology. Most 
importantly, no firm conclusions on a relationship between two variables can be derived 
from a two-way cross-tabulation, as this does not allow the analyst to control for other 
factors. Additionally, Moser excludes all autonomous units from the analysis, bringing
57 Details on these data are provided in chapter 4.
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the number of SMDs considered down to 179 in 57 regions, compared to a total of 225 
SMDs in 89 regions. Urbanisation will be included in the statistical models of this thesis.
Moser does find a relationship between candidate's non-partisanship and 
occupational status. Indeed, this is the standard explanation for independents' 
proliferation. Independents are successful because local elites (defined as having a 
prominent occupational status; primarily membership in regional or federal political 
structures58) can rely on their own personal campaign resources and do not need party 
sponsoring to win an election. Golosov originally advanced this thesis in terms of the 
regional "bosses" avoiding party affiliation (Golosov 1997). The "bosses" (nachalstvo) 
are local "administrative and economic managers" who already occupy a "prominent 
position in Russia's power structure" before running in national elections (Golosov 
1997: 6). Other formulations of this phenomenon include Hughes’s analysis of 
"directorates" of "interlocked" elites (Hughes 1997: 1031). And an important effect of 
personal resources on candidates' success was found in the statistical analysis of one of 
the few studies of the Duma elections specifically focused on the SMD races (Golosov 
and Shevchenko 2000, 2002).59
The hypothesis that occupational status is at the root of independents' success is well 
grounded. Indeed, prominent local elites, or notable candidates, face an advantage over 
other candidates thanks to their personal resources. They do not need party nomination 
and often run as successful independents. This hypothesis, however, does not have 
much purchase on the question of cross-regional variations in independents' success. 
Why are independents more successful in some regions than in others? Is it because 
notable candidates tend chose independent nomination only in some regions? If so, what 
can explain this difference? These questions are the core of the thesis. Answers are 
suggested in the next chapter and tested with the statistical models of chapters 7 and 8.
Another widespread explanation of independents' success posits that they portray 
themselves as the defenders of local interests, something to which elections in territorial 
districts tend to give a premium. Indeed, "candidates in single-member districts
58 See chapter 4 for a more comprehensive definition.
59 Occupational status was also at the heart of John Ishiyama's analysis of the Duma members elected in 
1993 and 1995. Ishiyama derived an index of'notability' for each deputy, which expresses the degree to 
which he is endowed with personal resources as opposed to being dependent on party sponsoring for his 
candidacy. He finds support for the traditional view that cadre parties are fluid organisations that tend to
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frequently promised to lobby for local interests". But it was specifically independent 
standing that was perceived as a more credible avenue to represent local/regional 
interests (Belin and Orttung 1997: 84). This is an important insight and is developed in 
the next chapter. However, similarly to the explanation above, on its own it does not 
account for cross-regional variation in independents' success. In fact, this hypothesis 
should guarantee the same high levels of success to the independent in all SMDs, in all 
regions, given that the territorial nature of district races makes local interests salient in 
all SMDs.
In sum, what is still missing in the literature is an explanatory framework that is 
sensitive to regional political context. This is needed in order to transform the dominant 
explanations relying on the occupational status of notable candidates and on the salience 
of local interests from national constants into variables that produce different effects in 
different regions. Golosov and Shevchenko have explored the effect of one regional 
structural factor on party development, as "the strategies of candidates are to be 
understood in their social context" (Golosov and Shevchenko 2000: 135). However, the 
factor they consider, i.e. the negative impact of networks inherited from Soviet times, 
seems rather weakly operationalised as migratory flows between regions (Golosov and 
Shevchenko 2000, 2002).
In the next chapter, another structural factor is suggested -  namely centre-regional 
relations and the process of federal bargaining of the 1990s. This is the main 
explanatory hypothesis of this thesis.
Conclusion
Ten years after the first competitive elections in the new Russia, the literature on party 
development is both copious and heterogeneous in focus. Apart from the initial 
descriptive emphasis, there have been two broad perspectives. On the one hand, most 
authors have stressed the underdevelopment of Russian party politics. They have 
pointed to the genetic defects of Russian parties in the early mobilisation phase at the 
end of the Soviet era and in the early post-Soviet years. Causes have been found in a
rely on local notables, while programmatic mass parties are more cohesive and disciplined, and tend to
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wide range of factors, broadly falling into either long-term, structural factors rooted in 
the regime type exemplified by the Soviet system, or short-term, contingent factors.
On the other hand, some observers have reached more positive conclusions and have 
detected increasing levels of party attachment (if not traditional party identification). 
Some of these optimistic conclusions, however, seem contradicted by recent events, 
namely the 1999 Duma elections.
Both streams of literature, however, have failed to provide a comprehensive picture 
of the electoral process in Russia, as they are largely limited to the all-Russian, average, 
perspective. This is the product of an over-reliance on the PR tier of the electoral 
process and has led many analysts to overlook cross-regional differences in voting 
patterns. In particular, works interested in voting behaviour have based their 
conclusions on opinion surveys that could not take into full account territorial 
differences.
To be sure, a rich literature has also addressed problems of party development at the 
regional level. Recent studies have shed light on non-competitive practices of voter 
mobilisation used at the regional level (machine politics, administrative resources, and 
the "bosses"), which provide useful tools to investigate Duma races in the SMDs. 
However, most studies of party development in the regions have dealt with regional 
elections, in individual regions or in a comparative fashion, and have not investigated 
the impact of regional politics on federal elections through SMDs. When the link 
between territorial politics and federal electoral results has been considered -  mostly by 
electoral geographers -  the focus has been confined to the spatial distribution of PR 
voting.
Works that have studied Duma races in the SMDs have produced highly valuable 
accounts, but have been largely limited to only a few districts, or to only one election, or 
have focused on explanations on the supply side of the elections only (i.e. candidates’ 
personal resources). A systematic explanation of cross-regional differences in party 
success, which can integrate the experience of the three Duma elections and the most 
perceptive findings on Russian regional-level politics, is still missing.
promote candidates from their own ranks (Ishiyama 1999b: 49-51, 65).
3Explanatory Framework
“Even in highly centralized systems, there  
will be marked local differences in the range  
and character o f  the alternatives presented  
to the citizens on polling  day, not ju s t  
because o f  the variations in the group  
appeals o f  the party  candidates but even 
more because o f  the variations in the extent 
o f  local resistance to partisan conflict".
Stein Rokkan (1970: 15).
The preceding chapters have developed two key determining points of this research 
project. Namely, that the success of independents varies widely across Russian regions 
(the Introduction), and that with respect to explaining this variability, existing accounts 
of party underdevelopment, including those few works that briefly touch upon the issue 
of the independents, are found wanting (chapter 2).
The task of identifying the causes of spatial differences in the electoral outcomes 
necessarily involves finding explanatory factors that also vary across regions and 
electoral districts. The main hypothesis of this investigation is based on two 
considerations. Firstly, the electoral process cannot be abstracted from the context of the 
broader political transformation. Secondly, in the 1990's one key dimension of this 
transformation was the process of defining centre-regional relations. After seventy years 
of fictitious federalism under the Soviet system, the transition process of the late 
1980s/early 1990s opened the door to the process of federal bargaining between the 
constituent units of the federation (the regions) and the federal central government.
Differences in regional stances towards the federalisation process (ranging from 
demands for greater regional autonomy to calls for stronger centralisation) gave rise to a
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territorial cleavage that political parties failed to represent or absorb. The reasons for 
this failure lie in the nature of Russian political parties, national in rhetoric and 
Moscow-based in fact. More specifically, the absence of parties appealing to the most 
assertive regions was favoured by electoral regulations that strongly discouraged 
regionalist parties.
This set of circumstances opened up a window of opportunity for non-party 
candidates to fulfil the function of representing the territorial cleavage. This window of 
opportunity was wide open in the early 1990s, but became increasingly narrow by the 
time of the 1999 elections. Indeed, by that time, the gap between regionalist 
assertiveness and the party system had narrowed considerably due to the direct 
involvement of regional leaders in party building. Therefore, for the 1993 and 1995 
elections, the main hypothesis is that different levels of regionalist assertiveness across 
regions are associated with cross-regional differences in independents’ success. For the 
1999 elections, regionalist assertiveness is not expected to operate in the same way. 
Rather, independents will be more or less successful depending on whether the regional 
governor supports a party or an independent candidate, and on the extent to which he is 
able to stir his region's "administrative resources" towards influencing the district 
campaigns.
Clearly, not only do spatial variations in the outcome variable occur at the level of 
regions, but also across electoral districts within regions. Indeed, the district level 
context is the most proximate to electoral returns. There is a large literature on factors 
affecting district electoral outcomes in established democracies adopting SMDs. In the 
Russian case, data availability constrains the range of factors that it is possible to 
consider. However, such conventional dimensions of district races as the effect of 
incumbency, the candidates' elite status, financial backing, the support of regional 
governors, and the effect of challenger candidates can all be assessed to some extent. 
Moreover, region-level and district-level factors should be thought of as forming a two- 
stage causal order (Davies 1985). In other words, district factors not only influence the 
dependent variable, but are also "caused" by regional factors. Regional factors, then, 
have both direct and indirect (i.e. mediated by district factors) effects on the outcome. 
For example, the decision of the incumbent to run as an independent or as party 
candidate is likely to be influenced by the region's autonomist sentiments. In a highly
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assertive (autonomist) region, the incumbent may well prefer to avoid any connection 
with Moscow-based parties and run as independent. If this is the case, regionalist 
assertiveness will have two types of effects on the outcome. One effect will be direct, 
favouring independents’ success, and another effect will be indirect, favouring the 
decision of the incumbent to run as independent, thus further increasing the share of 
votes received by non-party candidates through the positive effect of incumbency.
In terms of causal paths, this means that two arrows will link regionalist 
assertiveness to independents' success: one reaching the outcome directly, and the other 
passing through incumbency. In technical terms, this typical causal path is often said to 
involve a "mediating effect" between the dependent and the independent variable. The 
causal relationships posited by the explanatory framework of this thesis are graphically 
represented in the path diagram of Figure 3.1.
Unfortunately, the available data do not support a comprehensive model for the 1993 
elections. However, more complex designs can be implemented for the 1995 and, 
especially, for the 1999 elections. A summary of which hypothesis can be tested for 
which election is presented in the last column of Table 3.1. The following four sections 
of this chapter discus one explanatory hypothesis each, with the exception of section 3.3 
which deals with several - candidates’ personal resources, party challengers and 
geographic accessibility.
3.1 The main hypothesis: territorial cleavages and independents' 
competitive advantage
As discussed in the previous chapter (chapter 2), the literature suggests a number of 
explanations for the proliferation of independent candidates. Most observers stress that 
independents' success is favoured by party weakness (organisational underdevelopment, 
lack of voter attachment, or general distrust in parties as institutions). They note that 
weak parties cannot offer significant campaign resources to viable candidates. As a 
consequence, candidates who can rely on personal resources (especially the local 
notables or "bosses") do not need political parties and are able to run as independents.
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The conventional wisdom, in sum, paints a picture of independents' success centred 
on the generalised malaise of the Russian party (or pseudo-party). Under such 
conditions, the story goes, the candidates who are well equipped with personal resources 
self-select into independent nomination (Golosov 1997, 2002; Golosov and Shevchenko 
2000; Moser 1999).
These explanations are meaningful, but overly general. They cannot explain why 
parties do attract viable candidates and do win seats in some districts, but not in others. 
For example, the hypothesis that the success of independents can be traced to their 
personal resources (notability) is not sufficient in the light of the spatial variation in 
their level of success. More precisely, while notable candidates are present in every 
district, they do not always run as independents, and, moreover, notable independents 
are not equally successful in all districts. Clearly, in districts where independents are not 
successful, either personal resources are not effective, or candidates with personal 
resources choose to run as party candidates. Additional takes on the sources of 
independents' advantage over party candidates have been proposed, which, however, 
also fall prey to the same inadequacy. In a passage of her doctoral thesis, Regina Smyth 
has suggested that independent candidates enjoy an advantage over party candidates 
because the former can move "more freely anywhere on the political spectrum" (Smyth 
1998: 273). A more specific version of this hypothesis is the very widely shared 
perception that independents capitalise on their proximity to their constituent base, 
which enables them to declare themselves to be the genuine representatives of local 
interests and above ideological divisions. In support of this, Laura Belin and Robert 
Orttung note that "candidates in single-member districts frequently promised to lobby 
for local interests. A successful candidate in Khabarovsk Kray, for example, claimed 
that all Duma deputies should be independent of parties and 'be guided only by the 
interests of their own voters and regions'".60
To a large extent, this dynamic is part and parcel of any plurality electoral system 
based on SMDs. Robert Moser recognises that “plurality elections parochialize the 
competition for seats to the Duma, enhancing the role of regional elites and 
counteracting the dominance of the Moscow-based elites on the PR lists” (Moser 2001:
60 Election appeal by Valentin Tsoi, published in Tikhookeanskaya zvezda (Khabarovsk), 3 November 
1995, p.2. Quoted in Belin and Orttung (1997: 84).
3. Explanatory Framework 84
514). This perception that the results of SMD elections are determined by local interest 
has been widely maintained ever since the first free elections of 1993, when it was noted 
that "in the local constituencies the voters supported representatives of local interests 
rather than party people, for 129 of those elected were classed as independents” 
(Friedgut and Hahn 1994: 9).
Indeed, the salience of "local interests" is also observed in other countries' SMD 
systems, where it is said to enhance the value of personal candidate recognition (the 
"personal vote") over the value of the party label. About the USA, it has been noted that 
“ ...in single/member district systems, representatives have geographical areas to call 
their own. These systems present an opportunity and create motivations for relationships 
between represented and representatives that are more personal, particularistic, and 
idiosyncratic than in any other kind of system. Such relationships are often based on 
relatively non-partisan, non-ideological, and non-programmatic constituency service” 
(Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1986: 8).
The idea that the independents enjoy an advantage over party candidates because 
they can move more freely over the ideological spectrum (Smyth 1998), or because they 
can claim to be closer to "local interests" (Moser 2001, Belin and Orttung 1997, 
Friedgut and Hahn 1994) provides important clues to the question regarding spatial 
variability. However, on its own, this line of explanation cannot shed light on why 
independents are not equally successful from district to district. In the face of cross­
district variability in the outcome, it leads inescapably to one of two conclusions: in 
districts where independents fail, either 1) local interests are not important; or 2) they 
are better represented by parties.61 Clearly, it would be difficult to find a district 
entirely free from important local interests, thus the question becomes: why do voters in 
some districts see parties as able to represent sufficiently their local interests and voters 
in others do not? As yet, no study has attempted to find out which local interests elude 
party representation. The main hypothesis of this thesis suggests an answer to this 
question.
61 Indeed, Smyth notes that in some SMDs the independents' advantage of greater mobility along the issue 
spectrum does not prevent communist candidates "to win the day" (Smyth 1998: 273). Unfortunately, the 
author doesn't pursue this point any further, thus leaving open the question of why the independents' 
advantage should vary systematically across districts.
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The independents' representation function
An important precondition for answering that question is to see independents' success as 
more than a result of general party failure. In fact, under Russian conditions, both 
parties and independents should be seen as constituting distinct forms of political 
representation, each best suited to carry out a specific representational function. Namely, 
parties are the most effective channels of national representation and political co­
ordination across districts, both for politicians and voters. The independents, on the 
other hand, are best suited to channel not just any "local interest", but territorial 
cleavages.
In Rokkan's language of cleavages, national parties arise from and stir up functional 
cleavages that cut across territorial units (Flora, Kuhnle, et al. 1999: 281-84). By 
contrast, regionalist parties and, in Russia, independents activate and express territorial 
cleavages, i.e. lines of political opposition dividing individual territorial units from the 
rest of the country.
The class fracture constitutes a typical example of a functional cleavage, uniting 
workers across territorial units. On the other hand, the peripheral resistance to the 
centralising drive of nation builders, in Rokkan’s analysis, has typically given rise to 
territorial cleavages, which express and cement voters' bonds within territorial units 
(Flora, Kuhnle, et al. 1999: 320-26). Therefore, depending on whether the dominant 
cleavage in a given SMD is territorial or functional, independents and regionalist parties, 
or national parties, respectively, constitute the most apt form of political representation. 
In the Russian case, as mentioned, regionalist parties face high thresholds for entering, 
and succeeding in, national elections, which virtually leaves it up to independents to 
represent the territorial cleavage.
As already suggested, the notion of territorial cleavage does not coincide with the 
more general notion of "local interest". It is necessary to distinguish between 
predominantly functional "local concerns" and territorialised local issues, because 
without this distinction, attention to "local concerns" could hardly explain the cross­
district variability of independents' electoral success, as all voters in all districts care 
about "local conditions". As noted above, the SMD system itself tends to produce 
territorial patterns of representation in all districts. The point is that "local concerns" can 
lead to demands for functional representation. For example, drawing from the US’s
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experience, Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina explain that local interests may coincide with 
functional representation, “territorial and functional representation are not always and 
everywhere in conflict. A sponsored union candidate in a heavily unionised 
constituency, for example, might feel no conflict about representing union and local 
interests at the same time” (Cain et al. 1986: 19).
There is only one kind of "local concern" that is salient in several Russian units and 
is utterly territorialised -  demands for regional autonomy. Given the tendency for 
Russian parties to have national scope, these demands, which vary in intensity from 
region to region, are best represented by the independents. In sum, while all voters have 
local concerns, only in some regions local concerns take the form o f autonomist or 
regionalist demands, thus constituting a territorial cleavage and giving independents a 
competitive advantage over national parties.62
To be sure, this framework does not assume a rigid division of labour between party 
candidates and independent candidates, with the latter only articulating territorial 
cleavages and the former only concerning themselves with national issues. It is 
important to stress that this is not the case in practice and that the present hypothesis 
does not assume so. The key point is not what type of issues candidates articulate, but 
what types of issues they alone can credibly, and therefore effectively, articulate. The 
hypothesis is that a party candidate (of a national party) who portrays himself as a 
defender of local interests is less credible than an independent who attempts to play the 
same card, i f  the district has a strong territorial cleavage, and all other factors are 
equal. Similarly, independents can and do win by campaigning on national issues in 
districts with or without territorial cleavages. Independents can be electorally strong for 
all sorts of reasons, not just because they can credibly claim to represent local interests. 
The point is that, other reasons fo r  success being equal, an independent has a 
competitive advantage over a candidate of a national party if he runs in a district with a 
territorial cleavage.
Before passing to discuss in further detail what constitutes a “territorial cleavage” in 
the comparative literature and in today’s Russia, it is helpful to clarify the assumptions 
behind the main hypothesis; which is, namely, that independents more successful where
62 Not only are regional parties strongly discouraged under electoral rules, but, also, regions have found it 
very difficult to coordinate their efforts due to the divergent positions taken by autonomous and ordinary 
regions on the preferred federal arrangement (Solnick 1996).
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territorial cleavages are salient. Beyond the obvious requirement that the electoral 
system legally allows independent nomination (as opposed to systems fully based on list 
votes), the validity of the hypothesis requires three conditions:
1. Territorial electoral districts (like Russia's SMDs) in which political representation 
is linked to a sub-national constituency territorially defined. This is necessary for a 
territorial cleavage to become an electoral cleavage; something a candidate can 
articulate. To illuminate this point, the Russian presidential electoral system can be 
considered. It is also a majoritarian system allowing independent candidates, but it is 
based on one all-Russian constituency. In such conditions an independent candidate 
that promises to advance the interests of one region only does so at his own risk and 
certainly does not face a competitive advantage over national party candidates.
2. Early stages o f electoral competition and party formation. As party development 
unfolds, not only are national parties more and more able to respond to social 
cleavages, but also to shape and selectively activate them. A national party, through 
its organisational presence over the territory, can help integrate the national 
electorate into one community. Advanced democracies characterised by long­
standing centre-regional conflicts can have successful branches of national parties in 
their most restive regions (this is the case, for example, the Spanish PSOE in 
Catalonia. See Blondel 1981: 327). At its best, a national party can approximate the 
"integrated party" ideal type.
3. Electoral rules that strongly discourage regionalist parties. Regionalist parties are 
"based on linguistic, territorial, and ethnic claims that refer specifically to the 
distinctiveness of the cultural and economic region from which they draw support" 
(Caramani 2004: 162). In principle, regionalist parties face the same competitive 
advantage as independents when opposed to national party candidates. In practice, if 
the electoral rules discourage regionalist parties from appearing on the ballot in the 
first place, this competitive advantage belongs only to independents.64
63 As discussed in the Introduction the "integrated party" is considered by many to be essential for federal 
stability (Filippov et al. 2004). The emergence of such a party, however, requires a number of 
institutional and political conditions, not merely the passage of time.
64 As noted, the Russian electoral system of die 1990s includes a PR representation threshold of 5 percent 
This is a very high barrier, considering that it applies at the level of one huge, all-national constituency. 
Despite demanding registration rules and a very high representation threshold, at least one regionalist 
party did appear in Russian elections. In some cases, national parties attempt to spouse regionalist themes. 
The possibility that these parties effectively challenge the independents will be investigated.
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These then are the necessary conditions for this hypothesis to work. They are not 
sufficient conditions for independents’ success, which is why the hypothesis predicts 
independents’ success only in some districts. The mentioned conditions apply to the 
country as a whole; to promote independents’ success, they require high levels of 
regionalist assertiveness, which is only present in some regions.
What is a territorial cleavage and what is it in the Russian context?
Social structure and social cleavages have provided a standard framework with which to 
approach the study of elections and party systems, most prominently since Rokkan and 
Lipset's famous contribution (1967). It is worth briefly reviewing this approach. 
According to Rokkan and Lipset, West European party systems have been shaped by 
different combinations of four types of social cleavages (Rokkan and Lipset 1967). Two 
cleavages were produced by the "national revolution": 1) the contrast between the 
nation building drive and the "resistance of ethnic, linguistic, religious subject 
populations in the provinces";65 and 2) the opposition between the "centralising, 
standardising and mobilising nation-state versus the corporate privileges of the Church". 
Two additional cleavages originated from the industrial revolution: 1) the conflict 
between landed interests and the "new industrial entrepreneurs"; and 2) the division 
between owners and employers versus "tenants, labourers, and workers" (Rokkan, in 
Flora 1999: 285).
The typical example of a territorial cleavage in Rokkan’s treatment is the first of the 
four types listed in the previous paragraph. This is the centre-periphery fracture, 
opposing traditional local communities to the modernising drive of the centre in the 
newly established nation-states of Western Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
The typical example of a functional cleavage, on the other hand, is the class cleavage. 
As Lipset and Rokkan explain, the difference between territorial and functional 
cleavages is the following: "in the one case the decisive criterion of alignment is 
commitment to the locality and its dominant culture: you vote with your community and 
its leaders irrespective of your economic position. In the other the criterion is
65 Rokkan and Lipset further point out that this may be a territorial cleavage but is not necessarily so, 
because the cultural or religious resistance movement may "find allies in the central areas and thus 
contribute to the development of cross-local and cross regional fronts”.
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commitment to a class and its collective interests', you vote with others in the same 
position as yourself whatever their localities, and you are willing to do so even if this 
brings you into opposition with members of your community" (Lipset and Rokkan 
1967: 13; quoted in Johnston 1990: 124). This means that a functional cleavage is 
potentially national in scope, in the sense of allowing and requiring cross-regional 
political co-ordination. The class cleavage (workers versus employers), for example, 
typically divides territorial communities into two camps, each of which is part of a 
national camp.
In a district where the dominant cleavage is territorial, on the other hand, the main 
source of political identity for voters is membership in the local community. 
Membership in functional groups (as defined by occupation) is secondary. This means 
that the line dividing the main opposing camps is drawn by territorial boundaries. Under 
such circumstances, a national political party is not well suited to mobilise voters. An 
institution claiming to provide genuine representation must have a local raison d'etre. 
History shows that the cleavages of Western Europe rarely remained purely territorial 
after the completion of the industrialisation phase, the universal extension of suffrage 
and the advent of mass politics at the turn of the 20th century (Caramani 2003: 434, 
Rokkan 1970). But where the territorial component did remain key to the identity of 
local communities, it supported the emergence of regionalist parties (Spain and Canada 
are examples).
In most cases, cleavages are functional, but functional cleavages may have a 
pronounced territorial dimension if their support base is geographically concentrated. 
Thus it is worth noting the difference between a territorial cleavage and a territorially- 
concentrated functional cleavage. In the first case, "territorial defence" (demands for 
cultural, linguistic or administrative autonomy) is the content of the cleavage and 
territorial boundaries are essential to its definition. In the case of a functional cleavage, 
the fact that electoral support may be territorially concentrated is accidental to its policy 
contents. A district predominantly inhabited by working-class dwellers does not for that 
reason constitute a territorially distinct group if workers are also present, albeit in lower 
numbers, in other parts of the country. This distinction is connected to the difference 
between a regionalist party and a party with regional support (or regional party). The 
first mobilises a territorial cleavage, the second mobilises a territorially-concentrated
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functional cleavage. Examples of the former are the Basque 'Partido Nacionalista Vasco' 
and the Italian 'Northern League', while the German 'Christian Social Union' provides 
an example of the latter.66
Russia, of course, has long passed through the historical phases that gradually 
reduced the relative importance of territorial divisions in Western Europe (masses have 
been politically mobilised and the country has long achieved the industrialisation of its 
economy). However, one of the challenges produced with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union has been the redefinition of Russia's state structure, or the process of 
"refederalisation" (Hughes 2002). This means that, particularly in the 1990s, aspects of 
the state-building process have been reopened. The relationship between the federal 
centre and federal units had to be bargained and defined. The centre-regional fracture 
was particularly deep for a small number of federal units, whose leadership adopted 
sharp autonomist stances. This increased the salience of an existing territorial cleavage 
opposing the territorial community (unit of the federation) to the centre. Indeed, 
"evidence suggests a relatively strong and growing identification of Russians with their 
regions and regional leaders rather than with the nation as a whole or central leaders in 
Moscow" (Lapidus and Walker 1995: 106).
With the exception of Chechnya, the units that advocated strong autonomist requests 
entered a process of bargaining with the centre that saw different and alternating 
degrees of success in the 1990s. Some authors have adopted the metaphor of a 
pendulum to describe the ebb and flow of centralisation/decentralisation phases in 
1990s Russia (Petrov 1999). Not only did the strength of regionalist demands vaiy 
across regions, but also across time; often growing when the federal centre was in a 
weak bargaining position. With the Federal Treaty of 1992, the units endowed with
fn
republican status -  especially Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Sakha, -  obtained 
extensive rights and prerogatives, most importantly in the tax sphere. They lost some of 
these rights with the new Russian constitution of 1993, and regained specific 
concessions with bilateral treaties starting in 1994.
66 In keeping with his centre-periphery model, Rokkan labels "peripheral parties" what are here called 
"regionalist parties" (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 154-65). I prefer to avoid the ambiguity of the term 
"periphery", which implies a peripheral geographical location, or a subordination of a culturally and 
economically backward region towards the centre. These connotations are potentially misleading as many 
"peripheries" see themselves more as alternative "centres". For this reason the more neutral term "region" 
is preferred, as in "centre-regional relations" and "regionalist party".
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The regions that did not initially receive special rights were of two types. One group 
was made up of regions heavily dependent on central subsidies (for centre-regional 
financial flows, see Lavrov and Makushkin 2001). The second group includes wealthier 
regions, net contributors to the federal coffers, but lacking an ethnic component to their 
populations (e.g. Sverdlovsk oblast). The first group of regions resented and opposed 
"asymmetric" federal arrangements, advocating a more centralised federation, or even a 
unitary form of state. The second group resented the ethnic principle at the basis of the 
distribution of benefits among units and demanded greater autonomy from the centre, 
but also the elimination of asymmetric arrangements benefiting the ethnic republics. 
These differences added to the variation in the intensity and kind of autonomy demands 
emanating from the regions.
The dynamics of Russian refederalisation is briefly reviewed in the chapters devoted 
to the analysis of individual elections (chapters 6, 7 and 8). As a result of these 
processes, it is theoretically possible to locate Russian federal units along a continuum 
according to their stance on centre-regional relations. At one extreme, independence and 
strong autonomism are advocated; at the opposite extreme, centralisation and even 
unitarism are demanded. It is important to note that regionalist assertiveness is taken 
here as exogenous to the explanatory framework. This means that the variable is taken 
as a given and that the focus is not on its causes, but on its effect on electoral 
outcomes. Indeed, the consequences of a strongly autonomist stance in a region 
include the emergence of a territorial cleavage aligning the region against the federal 
centre. This, in turn, is taken to reinforce the necessity for territorially based channels of 
political representation, which give a competitive advantage to independent candidates 
over national party candidates. As mentioned above, regional (and regionalist) parties 
would also benefit from a territorial, centre-regional, cleavage, but they are virtually
67 See the Introduction for a description of regions' federal status.
68 On the explanation of the different levels o f autonomistic assertiveness of the Russian regions, Janies 
Hughes lists several factors: border vs. enclave location of the region; self-dependent economy vs. 
dependency from federation; ethnic composition; historical assimilation into the Russian empire (Hughes 
2002: 44). Gorenburg adopts an institutionalist perspective that, following Brubaker's (1996) seminal 
approach, emphasises the legacy on the Soviet nationality policies, which resulted in the 
institutionalisation of ethnicity (Gorenburg 2003). Dowley (1998), in her statistical analysis, finds that 
factors pertaining to the theoretical framework of "essentialism" increase the chances of autonomistic 
assertiveness. These factors are 1) the historical legacy of stalinist ethnic persecution; 2) the presence of a 
non-orthodox religious plurality, and 3) the percentage o f regional population using its native language 
(ethnic regions only).
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absent from Russian federal elections because they are strongly discouraged by Russian 
campaign laws and by the 5 percent representation threshold at the national level.
3.2 The moderating effect of (pseudo-) regionalist parties and central 
appeasement
The relationship between autonomism (here called "regionalist assertiveness") and 
independents' success is complicated by two sorts of potential moderating effects, which 
can explain why even highly autonomist stances in a region may fail to translate into 
popular support for independents. The first possibility is that, rather exceptionally under 
Russian electoral incentives, a regionalist party emerges to compete with independents 
as a genuine channel of territorial representation. (The closest approximation of this 
was the 1995, Sverdlovsk-based, party 'Transformation of the Fatherland'). An 
alternative to a regionalist party as such could also emerge if leaders of assertive regions 
overcame difficulties of co-ordination and formed/joined an interregional party. If this 
were the case (as for several regions in 1999, with the OVR party), the popular vote 
would flow towards party support, and away from independents.
The second moderating effect would be the appeasement of the strongest autonomist 
challenges by the federal centre. This may come in the form of financial transfers or the 
political/legal recognition of rights and privileges. This accommodation strategy can 
defuse autonomist demands thus reducing the basis of independents' success.
(Pseudo-)regionalist and interregional parties
With regard to the first moderating effect -  the emergence of "parties of the regions" -  it 
should be noted that even national parties may indeed portray themselves as defenders 
of the interests of the regions. This is a difficult task because different regions have 
different agendas with regard to centre-regional relations. If this strategy is successful, it 
can be expected to close the credibility gap between party and independent candidates 
with respect to advocating local interests, thus reducing the suggested positive effect of 
autonomist sentiment on independents' success. In the Russian case, the only example 
of such a party is Shakrai's 'Party of Russian Unity and Accord' (PRES) which, although
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a national party, claimed to represent the interests of the regions along a centre- 
periphery issue dimension in its 1993 campaign. However, the effectiveness of this 
strategy was limited (it ran candidates in 63 SMDs, but won only three of them). 
Shakrai was, after all, a key figure in Yeltsin's administration and had moreover 
organised the (unelected) constitutional assembly which proposed a recentralisation of 
the federal arrangement counter to the Federal Treaty of 1992, a move naturally 
opposed by the leaders of the most vocal regions.
In contrast to PRES, the 1995 party "Transformation of the Fatherland" was 
genuinely regional, as it originated from one region: Sverdlovsk oblast. The party 
represented an extension of 'Transformation of the Urals', and was led by the oblast 
governor Rossel. This party had an interesting trajectory in the light of the main 
hypothesis of this thesis. Conflict with Moscow first spurred its formation (by 
Sverdlovsk authorities) as a regional party, initially to contest regional elections. As 
Gelman and Golosov put it, "the rich resource potential of Sverdlovsk oblast makes 
such claims [against Moscow] feasible, and this provides for the very possibility of 
independent locally based parties" (Gelman and Golosov 1998: 4 1).69
The regional party then provided the springboard for the project of a regionalist party 
in the 1995 federal elections. Predictably, given the 5 percent representation threshold, 
the project failed to make any noticeable impact on the PR tier of the Duma elections. 
Even in the Sverdlovsk portion of the SMD tier, however, "Transformation of the 
Fatherland" did not achieve much. It nominated candidates in four out of seven regional 
SMDs, and won only one seat (and achieved a second place). By contrast, the 
independents won four seats out of seven in that region. Perhaps this disappointing 
performance can be explained with reference to the fact that Rossel, recently elected 
governor of the region, had been sacked by Yeltsin in 1993 for his regionalist challenge 
and was dropping his most vocal anti-centralist rhetoric. In fact, around the time of the 
1995 Duma vote, he was negotiating with Moscow the rather advantageous terms of a 
bilateral treaty to be signed shortly after the election (Solnick 2000: 155, fn 49).
69 However, the decisive reason for the exceptional success of party building in this region is more to be 
found in intra-elite conflicts that did not result in a winner-take-all scenario, and that therefore found 
expression in the electoral arena. This differs from most regional settings, where "generally, conflicts 
with Moscow, if waged by unified regional elites, tend to reduce political competitiveness on die regional 
level, so impeding party development" (Gelman and Golosov 1998: 42).
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Finally, before the 1999 election, the political context had changed and several 
regional governors, traditional advocates of greater autonomy, took active participation 
in the formation of two national electoral blocs, OVR and Unity. This new phenomenon 
of party building by a coalition of regional leaders should be taken into account as a 
moderating factor against the suggested relationship between autonomism and 
independents' success. Given that Unity was in fact a creature of the Kremlin, it is OVR 
that deserves greater attention. This party constituted an important challenge to the 
independents because of two considerations, both linked to the kind of regions behind 
its formation. Firstly, it was formed by regions that had previously showed high levels 
of regionalist assertiveness and that wanted to defend the autonomy and privileges they 
had already gained. This means that OVR, contrary to other parties based in Moscow, 
could provide a party channel of articulation and representation for regionalist 
sentiments that, according to the key hypothesis of this study, would also be effectively 
articulated by the independents.
Secondly, the founders of OVR included governors and presidents of some of the 
most tightly controlled and illiberal Russian regions (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, the City 
of Mocow, etc.). This means that OVR would have the support of these regions’ 
administrative resources and that, even if the party should fail to appeal to regionalist 
sentiments, there would be other good reasons to expect a strong showing in those 
regions. In this way, the independents would face a very strong competitor and their
70ability to mobilise a potentially sympathetic constituency would be severely limited. 
Central appeasement in response to regionalist demands
The second possible moderating effect is the response by the centre towards the most 
vocal regions. Indeed, the process of Russian re-federalisation was shaped by two levels 
of actors, the centre and the regions. The task has been complicated by the legacy of 
Soviet federalism, which had already granted (largely nominal) rights to constituent 
units in an asymmetric way. At the early stages of Soviet federalism, Russian 
administrative sub-divisions were created with different (formal) status on the basis of 
the overriding principle of ethnic diversity. The result was a federalised RSFSR, "a
70 The emergence of OVR and its impact on independents’ success is discussed in greater detail in chapter
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Federation within the larger Federation of the USSR" (Shaw 1999: 53). In fact, the 
degree of real autonomy granted to constituent units of the USSR and of the Russian 
'sub-federation' was rather limited. Although, to some important extent, regions were 
free to manage the linguistic and cultural plans for themselves, in practice, the Party 
firmly kept together a unitary structure of administration.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the CPSU (Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union), what amounted to an effective mix of co-optation and coercion, 
which used to underpin the hierarchical line of command of the Party from the centre 
outward, ceased to exist. It is possible to identify several stages in the 1990s in the 
search for equilibrium in centre-regional relations, each stage characterised by different 
dominant models of federalism (Hughes 2002). Part of this process included attempts by 
the Kremlin to appease the most recalcitrant regions. Solnick notes that the centre 
effectively split the generally recalcitrant camp of the republics by offering "selective 
benefits" to a subset of them (Solnick 1996: 22). An example of the centre's success at 
dividing regional coalitions seeking greater autonomy (this time a coalition of oblasts) is 
provided by the fate of the Grand Urals Association (Hughes 1994). When the regional 
association threatened to transform itself into a "Urals Republic" in 1993, the centre 
offered selective inducements to one member region, Orenburg Oblast, managing to 
divide the association (Solnick 2000: 148).
This strategy arguably weakened the saliency of the territorial cleavage in these 
regions, and therefore reduced the competitive advantage of the independents based on 
that cleavage. In other words, despite (or thanks to) the strongly autonomist average 
stance of the 1991-1995 period, a number of regions had some of their autonomist 
demands met by the centre. Thus, according to the above hypothesis, the level of 
independents' success should be lower than in regions with the same degree of 
autonomist grievances but deprived of Yeltsin's selective accommodation measures. 
One form of central appeasement that gets particular mention in the comparative 
literature is tactical financial transfers by the incumbent government (for an example 
outside Russia, see Dahlberg and Johnsson 2002). In the Russian case, the motivations 
behind federal transfers to the regions took several forms. They were aimed at defusing 
secessionist and autonomist threats (Treisman 1999); at rewarding compliant regional 
behaviour (Popov 2002: 72); or at alleviating the need for heavy subsidies (Solnick
3. Explanatory Framework 96
1996: 18). However, regardless of the motivations, federal transfers are likely to 
correlate with a moderation of regionalist demands (either through economic cooptation 
or dependency), thus reducing the chances of independents' success.
These means for coaxing regionalist stances towards the centre (ranging from 
legal/symbolic to financial appeasement) amount to different sorts of "carrots". To be 
sure, in addition to the "carrot", the centre may also wish to use the "stick". Namely, 
those covert repressive measures and threats that the Kremlin has been able to wield 
against "recalcitrant" regions when the centre is strong, such as at the start of the 
economic recovery of 1999-2000, and with Putin at the moment (Chirikova and Lapina 
2001: 391). However, for much of the 1990s, the federal centre was too weak to wield 
such negative incentives effectively and consistently. This weakness was due to the 
institutional conflict between the parliament and the presidency escalating in 1993, 
Yeltsin's difficult re-election bid in 1996, and the economic and political crisis of 1998. 
Because the centre was not in a position to consistently use a repressive approach, it had
71to resort to accommodation and appeasement with the most vocal restive regions. 
Sub-regional assertiveness?
It should be clear from the above discussion that positions on the federal arrangement 
are articulated and advocated primarily by the regional authorities, not by sub-regional 
units. The region is the administrative unit that is immediately below the federal level in 
the Russian Federation. As constituent units of the federation, they are entitled to some 
degree of self-rule and their executive and legislative branches are popularly elected. In 
short, the regions are the main subjects facing the centre in the negotiations of centre- 
periphery relations of the 1990s. Conversely, sub-regional units, even regional capital
77cities, are constitutionally subordinated to the regions to which they belong and are not 
primary actors of centre-periphery bargaining. The degree of autonomy granted by the 
regions to their sub-regional units, such as municipalities, varies in practice from region 
to region, but it has been relatively small, so far. This is in part due to the lack of
71 One phase of attempted recentralisation occurred in 1997, starting with the initiatives of premier 
Chubais to bring the regions under greater central control (Petrov 1999: 58). This, however, was 
interrupted by the August 1998 financial crisis.
72 Moscow and St. Petersburg are "regions" (units o f the federation) themselves, not sub-regional 
municipalities.
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financial resources for municipalities to effectively exercise the degree of self-rule 
attributed to them by federal law (Friedgut and Hahn 1994).
Along these lines, a more plausible alternative locus of autonomist demands is 
represented by the case of gas-rich Yamal-Nenets and oil-rich Khanty-Mansi 
autonomous okrugs. The formal status of autonomous okrugs within Russian federalism 
is particularly uncertain as "they are both administratively subordinate to the regions 
within which they are situated, and constitutionally equal to them" (Nicholson 1999: 18). 
Thus, Yamal-Nenets and Khanty-Mansi are characterised by autonomy demands 
towards the centre, and towards another region, Tyumen oblast, in which they are 
located. Since the disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 
and its vertical chain of command, the two resource-rich okrugs have started claiming 
and obtaining substantial portions of independence, in a struggle against Tyumen oblast 
administration (Glatter 1999: 147-49). The example of these two units shows how the 
endowment of natural resources can fuel an assertive regionalist position even in 
autonomous okrugs, units formally subordinated to the oblasts they are located in. 
Indeed, the level of regionalist assertiveness of the Nenets and Khanty-Mansi 
autonomous okrugs is well above average, as measured by the indicator utilised in the 
present research and presented in the next chapter (see Table 4.2, next chapter).
This section has confined itself to the presentation of hypotheses that apply at a 
macro level, the level of regions. Electoral competition, however, takes place in 
territorial districts. The discussion now turns to the treatment of hypotheses applying to 
the SMD level. If elections can be compared to a market, where candidates “supply”
73representation to voters that "demand" policies in a competitive environment, then the 
regionalist assertiveness hypothesis belongs primarily to the demand side (demand for 
greater autonomy). The SMD-level factors explored in this study, by contrast, pertain to 
the supply side (candidates' notability and party support) and to the level of 
competitiveness of the electoral market itself ("administrative resources"). The next two 
sections deal with these district-level factors.
73 The market analogy has a long tradition in electoral studies; one o f the first systematic treatments is 
Anthony Downs' An Economic Theory o f  Democracy. A recent application of this perspective to Russian 
elections can be found in Hale (forthcoming 2005), which discusses problems of party development.
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3.3 The "supply side": notable candidates and party challengers
Candidates'personal resources
It has been noted that elections in SMDs are more personalised and candidate-centred 
than in other electoral systems. The personal qualities of the contestants, or the bases of 
their "personal vote", are likely to become especially salient in SMD elections (Canon 
1990). Among the characteristics that are usually credited with increasing a candidate's 
chances, the most important include 1) the incumbency advantage, 2) candidate's 
notability and 3) financial backing. Candidates endowed with these personal resources 
are viable candidates and their decision to run as independent, vs. party candidates, can 
be expected to affect the overall success of the independents. In other words, if these 
"prominent candidates" run disproportionally as non-partisans, independents' electoral 
returns will be greater, other factors being equal. The measurement of these variables is 
presented in the next chapter (chapter 4).
The incumbency variable is rather straightforward, measuring the decision of the 
district incumbent to stand as a party or as an independent (if he stands at all). The only 
caution here is that this variable does not apply to and thus cannot be measured for the 
1993 elections, since those were Russia’s first competitive elections and hardly 
comparable to the electoral process under the Soviet Union, including the relatively 
liberalised 1989 and 1990 votes.74
The notion of notability, on the other hand, can take many forms. However, a 
common indicator is elite occupational status. This is the variable, for example, that 
Golosov looks at in his study of the role of personal resources in SMD Duma elections 
(Golosov 2002). Elite occupational status is one of the variables used here to gauge 
notability; however, following Golosov, the focus is narrowed to the political elite, 
distinguishing between regional/local and federal political elite.75 As Golosov admits, it 
is not possible to take into account the elite status derived from economic positions. 
This is due to the difficulty of gauging the actual importance of the private-sector 
occupations declared by candidates to the electoral commissions from the mere
74 Moreover, the previous elections comparable to the vote for the Duma would have been the election to 
the Russian Congress of Peoples' Deputies of 1990. However, due to the higher number of seats to 
allocate, these elections were held in many more SMDs over the Russian territory, thus potentially 
leading to several "incumbents" running in each Duma SMD in 1993.
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indication of the name of the firm or enterprise (Golosov 2002: 27). With respect to 
political elite status, the hypothesis is, therefore, that the more the relevant political 
occupations are found among the independents (relative to party candidates), the greater 
the chances for non-partisans.
Finally, the literature on SMD elections, especially in the USA and the UK, attributes 
great importance to campaign funding (Jacobson 1980). Direct data on this dimension is 
unfortunately unavailable for the Russian SMD races. However, for the 1999 elections 
an approximation can be obtained by using the data collected by Henry Hale and used in 
his article on "party substitutes" (Hale 2005).76 The variable measures whether a 
candidate was backed by a major regional or federal financial-industrial group. Clearly, 
the expectation is that candidates backed by these groups stand greater chances of 
success, as one can assume a larger availability of campaign finance than for the 
average candidate.
This subsection has discussed the expected effect of personal resources, namely 
those resources which allow for the strategic decision of prominent candidates (as 
described above) to stand as independents as opposed to party candidates. However, it is 
reasonable to expect that these strategic decisions will also be affected by another 
variable of the model; namely, regionalist assertiveness. Indeed, nomination decisions 
of prominent prospective candidates are driven by their expectations of success (they 
will run as independents where they think this is the winning choice, and vice versa). 
But expectations of success cannot be separated from the competitive advantage that a 
territorial cleavage is expected to give the independents.
In other words, the causal path flowing from regionalist assertiveness to 
independents' success will be both direct and indirect. Direct, in that regionalist 
assertiveness directly favours independents’ success. Indirect, in that regionalist 
assertiveness strongly influences whether or not a notable candidate will mobilise his or 
her personal resources as an independent or party candidate. This can be rendered 
visually in a path diagram (see Figure 3.1 below) by direct and indirect arrows 
stemming from "regionalist assertiveness" and reaching "independents' success" (the 
outcome variable). The statistical implications of this complex causal path, based on a
75 More details on how these occupational resources are operationalised can be found in chapter 4.
3. Explanatory Framework 100
"mediating effect", are discussed in the chapter on the design of the statistical analysis 
(chapter 5).
Party challenge
Party labels function in established democracies by having a positive value for 
candidates' campaigning. They reduce the information-gathering costs of voters and 
provide candidates with a "brand name" that voters know and trust (Aldrich 1995). As 
discussed in the Introduction and in chapter 2, Russian political parties, by contrast, are 
organisationally weak and far more transient. In such circumstances only a subset of 
parties can be expected to have name recognition and provide a "brand name" effect to 
their candidates. However, should there be parties who were able to provide a brand 
effect, they would be expected to reduce the chances of independents in those SMDs 
where they decide to nominate a candidate. As a general rule of thumb, independents 
are faced with a genuine party challenge only in opposition to candidates from parties 
that cross the 5% threshold of PR representation, or perpetuate themselves from election 
to election.
In addition to this "brand name" effect of the main parties, it should also be 
remembered that national parties with a regionalist rhetoric, as well as genuine 
regionalist parties should they exist, are expected to present a real challenge the 
independents in the SMDs where they run (see above, Section 3.2). Indeed, if they have 
a regionalist appeal, they are expected to neutralise the competitive advantage the 
independents have in representing territorial cleavages. Thus, to control for this effect, 
variables can be entered indicating whether either a major party or a (pseudo)regionalist 
party nominated candidates in the given district.
Finally, considerations similar to those noted for the personal resources variables 
suggest that the presence of a party challenge in the district should, in turn, depend on 
the degree of regionalist assertiveness in its region. Especially in the early stages of 
party development, parties are induced to concentrate their campaign efforts where they 
stand greater chances of success. For national parties this means avoiding highly 
assertive regions, while for regionalist or pseudo-regionalist parties the opposite
761 thank Henry Hale for letting me use these data in the present research. Details on his sources follow in 
chapter 4.
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incentive applies. Therefore, another indirect effect of regionalist assertiveness can be 
expected to be mediated by the party challenge variables (see path diagram in Figure 3.1 
at the end of this chapter).
Geographic accessibility of regions
Finally, the geographical location of voters is likely to affect parties’ ability to reach 
them in the campaign. More precisely, remote location and cold weather increase the
77costs of reaching those voters locally when election time comes in December. These 
costs are likely to be higher for national parties than for local independent candidates. 
As Timothy Colton has observed, "the geography of the largest country on the planet - 
sprawling and northerly, with tens of millions of people still inhabiting villages and 
towns with poor and seasonally unreliable transport links and erratic postal services- 
adds a gruelling aspect to the logistics of a Russian campaign" (Colton 2000: 51). His 
survey data show that "the larger the local settlement, and so the closer it is to 
transportation and communication nodes, the more efficiently parliamentary and 
presidential contenders dispense political materials [literature, posters and billboards] to 
the electorate in Russia".78
Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy have recently stressed the economic and social costs 
associated with the Siberian cold and the un-connectedness of local communities. They 
remind us, that "because of the continental effect -the large distance of most of Russia 
to the oceans- it is movement to the east, just as much as to the north, that lowers 
temperatures. And, for Russians, there is much more room to the east than to the north" 
(Hill and Gaddy 2003: 33). The particular weight the cold bears in Russia was 
underlined in 1993 by the programme of one Moscow district candidate entitled 
"Subtropical Russia", in which he promised to bring about a temperature of 20°C 
throughout all of the country and in all seasons.79
77 For a recent study on the "cost of cold" bore by productive activities in Siberia, see Hill and Gaddy 
2003.
78 However, it seems that, just like party campaigners, the analysts conducting Colton's survey were also 
overwhelmed by the difficult logistics of Russia. Indeed, as Appendix B in Colton's book reveals, among 
the areas excluded from the sample are "territories in the north and east of the Russian mainland with very 
low population density, severe weather, or transportation difficulties" (Colton 2000: 237). To the extent 
that a "geography factor" affects party campaigning, this strategy of sample selection is likely to miss 
important information.
79 Mentioned in D.A. Levchik (1996), quoted in Colton 2000 (fii.14, p. 106).
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In addition to low temperatures, the spatial accessibility of regions can also be 
impaired by a mountainous geography. A combined index of the share of regional 
populations living in areas too mountainous or too cold to be reached year round by 
regular means of supply, is used to reflect the problem of campaign accessibility (see 
next chapter for the operational definition of the variable). The hypothesis is that, due to 
their deeper local roots, the independents should be advantaged in the areas that national 
parties find difficult to reach.
It would seem that the flip side of the problems obstructing the campaign activities of 
political parties in areas that are difficult to access, is the factor of urbanisation -  a 
factor traditionally credited with fostering party emergence. Huntington (1968) and 
Rokkan (1970) are among the first contemporary scholars to emphasise that parties are 
originally urban phenomena. Parties find their leaders and their likely followers in urban 
centres; the first within the intellectual stratum, the second among the literate, educated 
citizens, or, for leftist parties, among the industrial working classes. Indeed, Rokkan 
notes that in the historical experience of western European countries, parties spread 
from urban centres to the countryside, a process favoured by the diffusion of literacy 
and means of communication in the early twentieth century.
However, the Russian post-communist context is different from that of western 
Europe at the turn of the 19th century. Russia has already reached advanced levels of 
literacy and education, as well as developed means of mass communication. Thus, the 
urban-rural divide is more important as a correlate of pro-reform vs. conservative voting 
behaviour -  which, as mentioned in chapter 2, is also manifest in a North-South divide -  
than as a factor of party development per se (or of independents' success, for that 
matter). Nevertheless, while literacy and television are spread nation-wide, levels of 
urbanisation are still linked to different levels of physical connectedness of Russian 
communities, e.g. access to railroad and road networks. In this sense, urbanisation 
continues to give an advantage to political parties, as it allows them to maximise their 
organisational strengths and conduct effective traditional campaigns on the ground. For 
this reason, the level of urbanisation of each electoral district is controlled for in the 
models predicting independents' success.
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3.4 Administrative resources
The last element of the market analogy is electoral "competition” itself. In order for 
results to reflect the free interplay of supply and demand, the competitiveness of the 
electoral process must be ensured. If this ideal condition is hardly realised in any 
existing democracy, then here, at least, Russia is no exception. In fact, the partisan use 
of administrative resources has led many to question the existence of the minimum 
standards of procedural democracy in the most affected regions (Brie 1997; Hale 1998, 
1999; Oreshkina 2000; Tikunov and Oreshkina 2000; Oreshkin 2001).
The governor's support o f Duma candidates
Russian regional governors are known to have used state resources to support a party or 
specific candidates in Duma campaigns, but they varied in their capacity to control 
regional politics and elections. The administrative resources at governors’ disposal 
range from controlling the local media -  mostly heavily dependent on regional subsidies 
-  to pressuring local business to contribute to the campaign of the "right" candidate, up 
to controlling local law-enforcement agencies and local electoral commissions. Local 
electoral commissions, in turn, can -  and allegedly do -  selectively enforce the rules on 
candidate registration, or disqualify registered candidates for irregularities in their 
campaign, or even directly rig the vote count. The target of "administrative support" in 
the SMDs can be a party candidate or an independent. The hypothesis therefore is that 
independents1 success will be higher where the local governor actively supports an 
independent, and lower where he supports a party candidate. In turn, both effects will be 
stronger the tighter the governor’s control is over regional politics. An interaction effect 
is thus posited between the success of the governor's preferred candidate and the degree 
of that governor’s control over regional political process.
This pattern of undue gubernatorial influence over the electoral process has been 
noted during the 1993, 1995 and 1999 elections. In this research, however, this variable 
can only be taken into account for the 1999 elections. The reason for this limitation is 
that accounts of this phenomenon in the 1993 and 1995 Duma votes have been 
impressionistic and do not provide usable systematic evaluations across the regions. 
Moreover, the extent of the governors’ involvement in Duma elections is generally
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believed to have increased with the 1999 vote (Petrov and Titkov 2000). This is 
supported by two considerations. On the one hand, most oblast governors consolidated 
their grip over regional politics to a much greater extent after they had been popularly 
elected for the first time in the 1996-98 cicle of gubernatorial elections. On the other 
hand, a number of “strong” regional governors for the first time felt an additional (and 
effective) incentive to coaslesce and form an interregional party to contest the 1999 
Duma elections. After they created the party OVR, these governors would make sure 
that OVR candidates would receive their backing in their own regions.80
The assessment of governors’ preferences, i.e. which party/candidate they support, 
has become the subject of several works in connection to the Duma 1999 elections 
(Kaspe and Petrokovskij 2000; Petrov and Titkov 2000; Strokanov 2003). However, 
these are mostly assessments of generic support or loose alliances, except for governors 
directly involved in party building (and even here with noticeable exceptions). These 
accounts generally do not detect governor's support for candidates in individual SMDs. 
One account that does attempt exactly this is a forthcoming study by Henry Hale (Hale:
o 1
2005). Data on governor's support gathered by Hale and by Robert Orttung will be 
used in the analysis of the 1999 election below.
Governor's control of regional politics
The second component of the administrative resources hypothesis, i.e. governors' 
capacity to control regional politics, has been studied under the labels of "machine 
politics" (Brie 1997, Hale 1999), "caciquismo" (Matsuzato 2000, 2001) or simply 
"electoral control" (ypravlyaemost in Oreshkina 2000; Tikunov and Oreshkina 2000; 
Oreshkin 2001). Tikunov and Oreshkina (2000) elaborated an index of the "electoral 
irregularity" of regions in the Presidential elections of 26 March 2000. Heading the list 
for such irregularity are almost all Caucasian Republics and virtually all the autonomous 
okrugs. The only national formations not included are the republics of Kareliya, 
Khakasiya, Karachaevo-Cherkesiya, while the syndrome is not entirely in place in such 
republics as Kalmykiya, Komi, Mariy El, Udmurtiya, and Chuvashiya.
80 The resons for, and the dynamics of, the emergence of OVR are discussed in greater detail in chapter 9.
81 Details on this data are reported in the next chapter.
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Tikunov and Oreshkina calculate that in the 2000 presidential elections, 14% of the 
Russian territory belonged to regions considered "highly controlled", with very high 
rates of turnout and of support for Putin (Putin received 61.3 percent of the vote, while 
the main challenger, Zyuganov, received 24.5 percent in such areas). In the 1999 Duma 
elections, these "highly controlled" regions had even more clearly concentrated their 
support to benefit the list of "Fatherland-All Russia" (OVR). Three quarters of the total 
votes received nationally by OVR were cast in those areas (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, 
Mordoviya, Kabardino-Balkariya and Daghestan), whose executive heads supported 
OVR and even occupied leadership posts in the movement.
Unfortunately, Tikunov and Oreshkina only report the first twenty regions or so top- 
ranking in terms of "controlled electorates". For the purposes of quantitative analysis, it 
is necessary to have a coherent measure for all regions. One such measurement, used in 
this thesis, relates to one key aspect of regional administrative resources -control over 
the regional media. The "Public examination project", conducted by the Russian Union 
of Journalists and other associations, produced comprehensive indexes of freedom of 
speech in Russian regions for the year 1999.83
In addition to regional governors, the Kremlin also actively tries to influence Duma 
elections by means of state resources, mainly by granting favourable coverage on state 
TV channels to sympathetic candidates and parties. Under Yeltsin, the use of federal 
"administrative resources" went further, as Yeltsin refrained from seriously attempting 
to build a national party and thus put federal administration agencies to this use (Huskey 
1999: 191). Federal agencies, rather than a national party, where explicitly charged with 
the task of recruiting 'promising' regional leaders for promotion to the national level 
(Huskey 1999: 201). However, this strategy did not produce encouraging results and the 
foundation for presidential influence at regional and local levels remained shaky in the 
1990s.
The presidential administration has also tried to influence the outcome of elections in 
territorial districts. In 1995, it was also a federal agency (the Administration for Work
82 In her article, Oreshkina also includes Ingushtiya, and Ust-Ordinskii Buryatskii Autonomous Okrug 
(Oreshkina 2000).
83 Several reputed independent media organisation took part in the project “Public Examination: 
Evaluation of Freedom of Speech in Russia (1999-2000)”. They complied indexes for several aspects of 
freedom of speech in Russian regions. Www.freepress.ru/win/english.html. Accessed June 2003, pp. 14- 
15. See next chapter (chapter 5) for details.
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with the Territories) that was charged with a task that would normally be of a 
presidential political party. In co-operation with several presidential representatives in 
the regions, it aimed at ensuring ’favourable local conditions' for the SMD candidates 
put forward by NDR ('Our home is Russia'), the party led by the then prime minister 
Chernomyrdin. Eleven of such candidates were the presidential representatives 
themselves, but only one succeeded (Huskey 1999: 201).84 These indications of a 
meagre success of federal administrative resources under Yeltsin suggest that it is apt 
for this research to focus on regional administrative resources alone. Moreover, one key 
campaign asset for the federal “party of power” lies in its capacity to ensure the 
favourable treatment by national media, especially national television (Hughes 1994a). 
In this sense, this advantage applies equally throughout the Russian territory and cannot 
explain spatial patterns.
Conclusion
This chapter has built an explanatory framework to explain the spatial variability in 
independents’ success. Table 3.1 summarises the hypotheses it has developed to cover 
the different elements of the "electoral market". On the "demand side", the main 
hypothesis of this thesis posits that independents will cater for the representation 
demands that are based on a territorial cleavage. This cleavage takes the form of 
regionalist assertiveness in the context of Russia's process of federal bargaining of the 
1990s. The greater the anti-centralist stance of the region, the greater the success of the 
independents (as discussed in section 3.1). In studying this effect, however, it is 
necessary to control for the centre's reaction to regionalist demands. Among strongly 
assertive regions, those appeased by the centre (with political/symbolic concessions, or 
with financial largesse), will exhibit lower levels of independents' success than the rest.
84 In another attempt to fashion a more manageable Federation Council, the same federal agency worked 
to enhance the chances of 'sympathetic' candidates in executive and legislative elections in the regions. 
The degree of success of these efforts appears to have been limited (Huskey 1999: 201). After all, with 
the 1995-97 round of elections of regional governors, "the federal influence in regional politics became 
even more insignificant" (Gelman 1999: 93).
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Table 3.1: Theoretical framework to explain the variation in independents ’ success.
Electoral market Hypothesis Explanatory variable Level Data availability
Demand side
Territorial
cleavage
1 Regionalist 
assertiveness Region 1993 1995 1999
Appeasement
2 Political appeasement Region 1993 1995 1999
,  Financial 
appeasement Region 1993 1995 1999
Supply side
OTHER
HYPOTHESES
Candidates'
Personal
resources
(notability)
1 Incumbency District 1995 1999
2 Political elite status District 1995 1999
3 Financial backing District 1999
Party challenge
1 Major party District 1993 1995 1999
„ (Pseudo)-Regionalist 
party District 1993 1995 1999
Geographic
accessibility
1 Share of population in 
remote areas Region 1993 1995 1999
1 Governor's s u d d o i I District 1 0 0 0
d is t r ic t .  T o  t a k e  W i t h i n  r e g i o n s ,  h o w e v e r ,  e l e c t i o n s  t a k e  p l a c e  at th e  l eve l  o f  e l ec to ra l
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Because no party nominates candidates in all districts, this variable can illuminate the 
cross-district variability in the outcome. Moreover, parties that are not major players in 
national terms, but stress regionalist themes in their campaigning, can also be expected 
to reduce the chances of the independents because they can compete for the same
O C
"market niche", i.e. the representation of the territorial cleavage.
Inhospitable geographic conditions are also expected to affect independents' success 
through their effect on candidate supply. Namely, because campaigning conditions are 
more difficult in very cold or mountainous areas, national parties will be less visible and 
even less organisationally present in those areas than in the average region. Therefore, 
they will attract notable candidates, or generally nominate candidates, more rarely than 
in other regions.
Finally, district electoral results are likely to be influenced by the possible use of 
"administrative resources" by the regional governor in support of his preferred 
candidate. In districts where the candidate supported by the governor is a party 
candidate, the returns for independents can be expected to be lower than elsewhere, 
other factors being equal. A positive effect on the outcome is, vice versa, expected when 
the candidate supported by the governor is an independent.
The effect of governor's support, however, is reinforced proportionally to the degree 
of "control" that he exerts on the political process in his region, which is known to vary 
from region to region. One key indicator of this "control", used in the following 
analyses, is the level of control over the regional media. Therefore, a governor's 
candidate preference and his "degree of control" are expected to interact in their effect 
on the outcome.
In addition to this, the models posit another complex relationship between 
explanatory variables (see Figure 3.1). Indeed, not all variables combine linearly to 
account for the outcome. Two have indirect effects, mediated by other variables. Most 
importantly, the district-level variables for the personal resources of candidates and for 
the party challenge mediate (part of) the effect of regionalist assertiveness, as explained 
in section 3.3. The fact that regionalist assertiveness can have both a direct and an 
indirect effect is represented in the path diagram of Figure 3.1 by the arrows leading
85 As noted in section 3.2 above, electoral rules make it difficult for a genuinely regionalist party to 
emerge.
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from that variable. One arrow is directly connected to the outcome, while the other two 
pass through the variables related to candidates' supply. This means that the latter
o/-
variables are both cause and caused, exogenous and endogenous to the model.
Figure 3.1: Diagram o f causal paths posited by the theoretical framework
For the rest, the path diagram in Figure 3.1 shows each variable in a box and groups 
regional-level variables to the right (within the pale grey area) and SMD-level variables 
at the centre (against a dark grey area). The leftmost box represents the dependent 
variable, as signalled by the fact that all arrows converge to it. The two variables 
representing the main hypothesis are highlighted in yellow boxes.
Finally, a note on why regionalist assertiveness is here labelled the "main" 
hypothesis. The expectation o f a competitive advantage accruing to the independents in 
assertive regions integrate and specify the two most-cited explanations for independents'
86 For a concise treatment o f the problems o f  "causal order" and "mediating effects", see Davies 1985, or 
Allison (1999: 60-62).
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success mentioned above. Indeed, based on the territorial/functional character of SMD 
cleavages, one can explain why the personal resources of notable independents translate 
into electoral success only in some SMDs, as well as why local interests are paramount 
for independents' success only in some SMDs. This strategy of explanation for 
independents' success is the most important in the causal framework of the thesis 
because it is original in Russian electoral studies and it bridges an unwarranted gap 
between the study of centre-regional relations and federal elections in the territorial 
districts in Russia.
The next chapter contains the operational definition of the variables introduced in 
this chapter. The sources of related data are also mentioned.
From Hypotheses to Data: Operational Definitions
"The difference between quantitative and 
qualitative measurement involve how data 
are represented, not the theoretical status o f 
measurement. Qualitative researchers use 
words like “more” or “less”, “larger” or 
“smaller”, and “strong” or “weak” for 
measurements; quantitative researchers use 
numbers ”.
King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 152)
The aim of this chapter is to translate the hypotheses of the explanatory framework 
outlined in chapter 3 into variables that can be used to test the hypotheses by means of a 
large-/z, quantitative analysis. Anyone who has designed a quantitative study in the 
social sciences is aware of the difficulties inherent in finding faithful indicators for 
complex phenomena. On the one hand, quantitative measures are often only pale 
approximations of social reality, and on the other subjectivity is necessarily introduced 
into the analysis when the analyst decides how best to codify and quantify events and 
observations.
For this study the difficulties inherent to quantitative analysis are undeniably 
compounded by the fact that Russia’s official collection of reliable political and social 
data is exceptionally meagre for the first decade of post-communism. This holds 
especially for the early 1990s. To make the point, one need only note that there is no 
official release of the vote counts in the SMD races of the first parliamentary elections 
of 1993.87 Moreover, official statistics can be particularly unreliable in some specific
87 For his discussion o f the 1993 district results Timothy Colton had to obtain an unpublished report by 
the Central Electoral Commission, see Colton (1998: 20, fii.44). I am grateful to him for passing the same 
manuscript to me.
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areas. For example a large part of centre-regional financial transfers take the form of 
subsidies to local industries, tax benefits, and other channels that eschew systematic 
monitoring (Lavrov and Makushkin 2001: xxi). And even under the best circumstances, 
the sheer size of the country would make the assembly of uniform data at the local level 
a daunting endeavour. However, while the lack of available data is clearly not 
unproblematic, in the present study, the problem of locating suitable data is primarily 
linked to the challenge of finding reasonable quantitative measures for eminently 
qualitative dimensions. This is the problem with operationalising the concept of 
"regionalist assertiveness", a key element of the explanatory framework. Fortunately the 
study was able to draw on a quantitative indicator for this variable that was elaborated 
independently of the present research, by a different author and for different purposes. 
This clears all suspicions that the index was twisted or biased in such a way as to 
produce the expected results. And while it may not present an ideal solution, as the 
scholarly understanding of political processes in post-communist Russia is still at an 
early stage -  particularly as far as the electoral politics of the territorial districts is 
concerned -  this is an instance in which even less-than-ideal data can generate 
interesting new perspectives. Thus, even with all of the noted limitations, this study can 
claim to detect an important part of the regularity or mechanism that was at work in the 
Russian SMDs of the 1990s.
The chapter proceeds to discuss the choice of variables and the methods of their 
operationalisation for each of the explanatory hypotheses that have been identified in 
the previous chapter. The structure of this chapter follows the organisation of the 
hypotheses in the explanatory framework. The first section tackles the measure for the 
main hypothesis: the positive effect of regionalist assertiveness on independents' 
success. The task is to introduce the quantitative index used in the analysis, to show 
how its original author, Kathleen Dowley, produced it, and how it has been adjusted. 
The index is then compared to common expectations in the literature as to the correlates 
of regionalist assertiveness. This is done in order to get at least an impressionistic 
confirmation that the numbers measure the phenomenon of interest. In the last part of 
the first section, the measure for the main instances of central appeasement of 
regionalist demands is introduced.
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The second section of the chapter is devoted to the other hypotheses, primarily those 
belonging to the supply side of the "electoral market". Variables on the supply of 
candidates include a measurement of the extent to which district candidates endowed 
with personal resources run as independents in a given SMD. The personal resources 
considered are district incumbency, political elite occupational status, and financial 
backing. Other supply-side factors are the challenges posed by party nominations in the 
SMDs. The section also considers the problem of governors' support for individual 
candidates in the 1999 district races based on Henry Hale' data, and the geographic 
factors of party campaigning.
4.1 "Measuring" regionalist assertiveness
It is impossible to quantify a phenomenon such as regionalist assertiveness in a fully 
objective way. Any analyst will use a good deal of subjective judgement when deciding 
which observed event or statement counts as evidence of what degree of assertiveness.
This problem can be alleviated in three ways: 1) by using an index produced 
independently of the research project underway; by a different scholar and for a 
different purpose, but measuring the same dimension as needed in the inquiry concerned. 
This heterogeneity of purposes makes it very unlikely that any original bias potentially 
built in the index will be systematic relative to purposes of the second user. 2) By 
"triangulating" the index with other indicators conventionally deemed to reflect aspects 
of the phenomenon being measured. If all indicators are consistent with each other, this 
can provide a rough confirmation that the index broadly reflects the underlying 
phenomenon. And 3) by explicitly stating the criteria followed to elaborate the measure, 
so that the scholarly community can know exactly where the index comes from. This 
section introduces and discusses the chosen indicator for "regionalist assertiveness" in 
the light of these three points.
Firstly, the chosen measure is based on an index produced independently from the 
author of this research by Kathleen Dowley for a study published in 1998. The original 
purpose of Dowley’s index was to provide a measure for the dependent variable of her 
analysis. Conversely, the index is used here to measure an independent variable
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considered with respect to its expected affect on a phenomenon (independents' success) 
that was totally extraneous to Dowley's interests. This means that if there was any bias 
or "systematic error" in Dowley's estimates of regional autonomism, it is unlikely to be 
systematic relative to the present focus of analysis (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 63- 
65).
Secondly, in order to get a rough idea of whether the indicator is broadly consistent 
with widely shared understandings of regionalist assertiveness in Russia, it is compared 
below to readings of other indicators conventionally taken to express regionalist 
sentiments. Finally, in her 1998 article, Dowley describes the criteria that informed her 
decisions on the coding of observations, in order for future scholars to be able to 
replicate and possibly improve her approach. Drawing on that article, the discussion 
here starts with a presentation of Dowley's index.
Dowley's index
The concern of Dowley’s article (1998) is to explain the different preferences held by 
Russian regions as to the degree of centralisation/decentralisation that federal relations 
should embody. In different passages, she refers to her dependent variable as a region's 
"preferred federal arrangement", its "preferences for economic and political autonomy", 
or its position along a "political autonomy dimension". The types of federal solutions 
advocated by the regions range from high centralisation (as in a unitary state), to full 
independence.
The measure presented in Dowley's article (1998: 370) is built by examining "public 
speeches, declarations and communications" by regional leaders: heads of regional 
administrations -  called "presidents" in the republics -  and speakers of regional 
legislative assemblies (Dowley 1998: 368). As Dowley explains, "events of relevance" 
include:
• "Responses to central decrees relating to the division of powers between the 
centre and the regions";
• "boycotts of federal referendums or elections";
• "withholding of federal taxes";
• "petitions" and "communiques" to the federal government (Dowley 1998: 364).
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In the period between 1991 and 1995, Dowley recorded 1460 such events using the 
Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press (CDSP) and the Open Media Research Institute 
(OMRI) Daily Digest as sources. Each event was coded 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5, according to the 
type of preferred centre-regional relations that it indicated. The code is ordinal in the 
sense that a greater number corresponds to greater decentralisation, as summarised in 
Table 4.1 (below). The number of recorded observations (actions, speeches, and 
statements) varies widely from region to region: from as little as 1 (recorded for the 
Koriak autonomous okrug and Ryazan oblast) and 3 (for many regions; especially 
autonomous okrugs and some oblasts), to up to as many as 46 (for Bashkortostan) and 
62 for Chechnya).
Table 4.1: Dowley's index 
(Based on the type offederal arrangement favoured by a region)
Score Meaning Description
Unitarism The position according to which all important decisions,
(full centralisation) appointments of personnel, "allocations and extractions are
made at the centre".
Strong federal centre Guidelines for important decisions should be defined in 
Moscow, such as those on privatisation, banking, trade, and 
the type of local political institutions. The centre should have 
"final authority" in conflicts with the regions, but local 
governments should be elected.
Territorial confederation Greater autonomy on local natural resources, foreign 
investment, privatisation, land reform, etc. The centre should 
control the defence function and the single currency system. 
Regions should have equal status (thus regions in this 
category criticised the Federal Treaty of 1992). The federal 
centre should not have last authority in disputes, contrary to 
stipulations in the 1993 constitution.
"Cantonalism" or 
ethnofederalism
Drawing from the example of Swiss cantons, the region is 
morally superior to the national state. These regions demand 
recognition as separate nations within the federation, and 
expect more autonomy than other provinces that are not 
nations.
No federal relations 
(Full independence)
This is a nationalist position (a state should correspond to the 
nation), not federalist at all. Full independence is the goal.
Source: Own elaboration based on Dowley (1998: 365-66).
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The codes attributed to events of the same region are averaged, so that each region is 
attributed a mean score for the 1991-1995 period, ranging from 1 to 5. Across regions,
oo
the mean score constitutes a continuous, scale measurement.
The main advantage of Dowley's index is that it considers all 89 regions, while other
O Q
studies of similar problems have focused on a much more limited number of cases. In 
the ranking of regions according to Dowley's index (Table 4.2), only Chechnya and 
Tatarstan receive a mean score above 4. This reflects the fact that, on average, their 
leaders demanded more autonomy than the rest of the regions between 1991 and 1995.
The least autonomist stance (the most assertive support of centralism) is observed for 
Kursk Oblast, with a score of 1.6. This means that its leaders publicly advocated a 
federal arrangement which can be roughly classified as falling between a unitary state 
(which receive a score of 1, see Table 4.1) and a federation with a strong centre (a score 
of 2).
Table 4.2: Ranking o f  regions on Dowley's index
Rank Region
No of 
Mean events 
score recorded Rank Region
Mean
score
No of 
events 
recorded
1 Chechen Republic 4.62 62 46 Voronezh Oblast 2.71 7
2 Tatarstan Republic 4.33 43 47 Novosibirsk Oblast 2.69 16
3 Bashkortostan Republic 4.00 46 48 Primorsky Kray 2.67 12
4 Mariy El Republic 3.86 7 49 Astrakhan Oblast 2.67 3
5 Tyva Republic 3.80 15 50 Ivanovo Oblast 2.67 3
6 Sakha Yakut Republic 3.68 41 51 Kurgan Oblast 2.67 3
7 Khakass Republic 3.64 11 52 Murmansk Oblast 2.67 3
8 Adygey Republic 3.62 8 53 Novgorod Oblast 2.67 6
9 Chuvash Republic 3.62 13 54 Orlovskaya Oblast 2.67 6
10 Karelian Republic 3.56 25 55 Pskov Oblast 2.67 3
11 Buryat Republic 3.50 15 56 Chita Oblast 2.67 12
12 Ingushetiya Republic 3.50 30 57 Kemerovo Oblast 2.64 14
13 Komi Republic 3.44 16 58 Krasnoyarsk Kray 2.63 24
14 Udmurt Republic 3.43 14 59 Volgograd Oblast 2.62 8
15 Altay Republic 3.33 6 60 Amur Oblast 2.60 5
16 Nenets Aut. Okrug 3.33 3 61 Leningrad Oblast 2.60 5
17 Khanty Mansiysk A. Okrug 3.33 6 62 Altay Kray 2.57 7
18 Chukotka Aut. Okrug 3.33 3 63 Arkhangelsk Oblast 2.57 7
88 More details on the rules followed by Dowley for the codification of events, leaders' speeches and 
statements, are presented in her article (Dowley 1998: 365-66).
89 Treisman (1997) only considered ethnic regions.
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19 Kalmikiya Republic 3.29 17 64 Tomsk Oblast 2.57 7
20 Yamalo-Nenets Aut. Okrug 3.25 4 65 Samara Oblast 2.54 13
21 Mordovian Republic 3.20 15 66 Kaluga Oblast 2.50 2
22 Taymyrskiy Aut. Okrug 3.17 6 67 Kamchatka Oblast 2.50 2
23 Tyumen Oblast 3.13 8 68 Kirov Oblast 2.50 2
24 North Osetian Republic 3.12 34 69 Penza Oblast 2.50 4
25 Kabardin-Balkar Republic 3.05 21 70 Perm Oblast 2.50 6
26 Sverdlovsk Oblast 3.04 23 71 Saratov Oblast 2.50 12
27 Karachay-Cherkess Rep. 3.00 11 72 Tambov Oblast 2.50 4
28 Aga-Buryat Aut. Okrug 3.00 3 73 Yaroslavl Oblast 2.50 4
29 Permyak Aut. Okrug 3.00 3 74 Moscow Oblast 2.43 7
30 Ust-Ordynskiy Buryat A.O. 3.00 3 75 Orenburg Oblast 2.43 7
31 Irkutsk Oblast 2.88 16 76 Tula Oblast 2.43 7
32 Vologoda Oblast 2.86 7 77 Sakhalin Kray 2.38 8
33 Daghestan Rep 2.84 19 78 Ulyanovsk Oblast 2.38 8
34 Khabarovsk Kray 2.83 6 79 Krasnodar Kray 2.36 11
35 St. Petersburg 2.82 22 80 Kostroma Oblast 2.33 3
36 Omsk Oblast 2.80 5 81 Smolensk Oblast 2.33 3
37 Jewish Autonomous Oblast 2.80 5 82 Stravropol Kray 2.25 12
38 Kaliningrad Oblast 2.79 14 83 Belgorod Oblast 2.25 4
39 Nizhny Novgorod Oblast 2.79 14 84 Rostov Oblast 2.20 10
40 Vladimir Oblast 2.75 4 85 Ryazan Oblast 2.00 1
41 Magadan Oblast 2.75 4 86 Tver Oblast 2.00 2
42 Chelyabinsk Oblast 2.75 12 87 Koryak Aut. Okrug 2.00 1
43 Evenk Autonomous Okrug 2.75 4 88 Lipetsk Oblast 1.75 4
44 Moscow City 2.72 25 89 Kursk Oblast 1.60 5
45 Bryansk Oblast 2.71 7 Russian average 2.84 10.89
Source: Table 1 in Dowley (1998: 370).
The ranking of Russian regions according to Dowley's index (Table 4.2) shows that 
all regions with a mean score of 4 or above are ethnic units (republics or autonomous 
okrugs), with the exceptions of Sverdlovsk and Tyumen Oblasts. However, not all 
ethnic units are above 3 and among those who are, mean scores vary significantly. 
North Ossetian, Kabardin-Balkar, Daghestan, Karachay-Cherkess and Altay republics 
have a mean score around or below 3, indicating support for a loose, but not ethnically 
defined federation. Dowley attributes this difference among republics to the fact that 
those with lower levels of autonomism, except Altay, are located in the North Caucasus, 
"a region tom apart by interethnic strife" (Dowley 1998: 369). She points to the fact that 
these regions are characterised by difficult ethnic equilibria within their borders, with 
minority ethnic groups demanding rights equal to those of the other nationalities, or 
forming separatist movements. For these reasons, the leaders of these republics may
4. From Hypotheses to Data 118
prefer not to play the nationalist card in their relationship with Moscow (Dowley 1998: 
369).
For a time-specific index
With Dowley’s index, each region receives a score that summarises its level of 
assertiveness over the 1991-1995 period. While this particular time-averaging may 
arguably be suitable in order to study the impact of regionalist demands on the 
December 1995 elections, it is less convincing in a model of the 1999 elections, and it is 
not satisfactory in a model of the 1993 elections. For a study of the 1993 elections, the 
index should be decomposed to reflect only observations that occurred before December 
1993. Indeed, it is clear that observations that occurred after that date cannot possibly 
help in explaining 1993 voting behaviour. Such a decomposition requires going back to 
the raw data originally used by Dowley to generate the 1991-95 average, and calculating 
partial averages reflecting only the observations that occurred until the election of 
December 1993. This has been done.90
The raw data coverage extends back to 1988 (the upper limit, 1995, is the same as in 
the measure published in Dowley's 1998 article). For a measure of regionalist 
assertiveness before 1993, therefore, two time spans can be considered: the 1988-93 
period, the maximum span for which observations are available, or the more limited, 
post-communist, 1992-93 period. The first measure corresponds to the notion that 
regional leaders' preferences over autonomism are likely to only approximate voters' 
sentiments in their long-term, underlying and stable component. This way, arguably, a 
more systematic trend should emerge, rather than short-term fluctuations in leaders' 
bargaining positions towards the centre. Moreover, within a wider time span, more 
observations can be used to estimate the average, which means that the average score is 
less likely to reflect chance fluctuations.
90 This has been possible thanks to the kind permission I received from Kathleen Dowley to use her 
dataset of coded observations. The data set is an SPSS file in which over 1400 regional events, 
declarations or speeches were coded according to the level of political autonomism they indicated. The 
precise criteria for the coding are explained in Dowley's article (1998). The events were also coded 
according to the time at which, and the region in which, they occurred. The present author recoded the 
data to match his dataset, and aggregated the observations in several time periods to perform the analysis 
for different elections (chapters 6, 7 and 8), and to display trends in this chapter.
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On the other hand, the 1992-93 measure has the advantage o f being a potentially 
more precise measure o f the pulse o f the regionalist sentiments at pre-electoral time. 
Regional assertiveness scores in sub-periods are presented in Table A.4.1 in Appendix.
Figure 4.1: Average assertiveness o f regions across time
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Figure 4.2: Regional assertiveness in the periods before and after 1993 elections. 
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The overall trend in centre-regional relations 1988-1995, as captured by Dowley's 
measurements, is shown in Figure 4.1. For the post-soviet period only, this trend is 
presented in Figure 4.2, where the level of assertiveness of a famously vocal region, 
Tatarstan, is compared to the general one. A break in the time line at the point of the 
1993 elections shows the pattern in the two pre-electoral periods.
The 1999 elections, on the other hand, pose a different problem. Dowley only 
gathered observations until the end of 1995. Ideally, the same index would cover the 
whole period of the three elections. Absent such an index, this study follows two 
different approaches. In the first approach, the 1991-1995 average is used also in the 
1999 election, under the assumption that what counts are stable underlying patterns of 
regionalist sentiments, rather than short-term fluctuations. The second approach reviews 
the main events related to centre-regional relations that occurred between the 1995 and 
the 1999 elections and "adjusts" Dowley's index to reflect the changes. The limitation of 
the first approach is that it assumes the fundamental stability of centre-regional relations 
between the 1991-95 and the 1996-99 periods. However, it has the advantage of not 
allowing the possibility that any subjective bias of this researcher could be introduced 
into the index. That, of course, is the disadvantage limiting the second approach; namely, 
"adjusting" Dowley's index to reflect post-1995 changes. Mindful of the limitations 
accompanying both approaches, they will be used in parallel in the empirical analysis of 
the 1999 elections.
The procedure used here to adjust Dowley's index to the subsequent period is the 
following. Two starting points are possible, depending on which baseline value gets 
"adjusted". It is possible to start from the 1991-1995 or the 1994-95 average of 
Dowley's observations. The first route leads to variable "Asser99al", the second to 
"Asser99bl". In both cases, the post-1995 events motivating the adjustment of Dowley's 
representation of regionalist assertiveness are:
1) Instances of centre-regional confrontation occurring in 1998, as reported in 
Petrov (1999: 59). Examples of such confrontation are: direct attempts by the 
Kremlin to re-centralise control over Primorski Kray and Sakha Republic; 
Yeltsin's decree forcing the Republic of Udmurtia to comply with federal law; 
exemplary attacks on corruption and big oil companies in Kursk Oblast, 
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan Republics; tension with the Republic of Ingushetia,
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due to the Chechen refugee crisis; and Yeltsin's conflict with the leaders of 
Samara and Sverdlovsk.
2) Regional measures of economic protectionism, in violation of federal law, as a 
reaction to the August 1998 financial default and economic crisis. Stark examples 
occurred in Kalmikiya Republic, Sakha Republic, North Ossetian Republic, 
Tatarstan Republic and Chuvash Republic (Kahn 2002: 166).
3) Legal non-compliance in regional constitutions and charters. The most dissonant 
cases concern the republics of Bashkortostan, Sakha, and Tatarstan (Drobizheva 
1998: 36).
In "adjusting" Dowley's index to take into account these observation, a score of 3.5 is 
attributed to each republic that figures in one of the three categories above. A score of 4 
is attributed if the republic appears twice, and 4.5 if it belongs to all three groups. For 
non-ethnic federal units, a score of three is attributed to reflect advocacy of a 
decentralised federal arrangement if they appear in at least one group. The resulting 
scores for the relevant regions are then averaged with Dowley's index (1991-95 or 1994- 
94) to produce the adjusted score. Finally, a marginal value of 0.5 is added to those 
regions that held a gubernatorial election after 1995. This applies to a very large number 
of oblasts and is often mentioned as one important reason for the greater assertiveness 
of these regions on the federal plane.
Indeed, in the pre-1996 period, the heads of oblast administrations lacked an 
independent popular mandate and were still appointed by Yeltsin (Petrov and Titkov 
2000). The ranking of regions resulting from this adjustment process is presented in 
Table A.4.2 in Appendix. Again, that the exercise of "adjusting" Dowley's index for use 
in the 1999 models is bound to add another layer of subjective judgement on top of 
Dowley's strongly recommends using Dowley's original 1991-95 index. Heeding such 
recommendation, the analysis of the 1999 vote below follows both strategies in parallel. 
And yet, the limits of using the index for the analysis of 1999 are less damaging than 
they might appear to be. This is because when one takes into account the different 
political context of the 1999 vote (see chapter 3 and 8), in contrast to the 1993 and 1995 
elections, regionalist assertiveness is not expected to be a key factor of the electoral
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results. Map 4.1 contains a map o f Russia that classifies the regions according Dowley's 
index.91
Map 4.1: Cross-regional variation on Dowley's index
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The next sub-section compares Dowley’s index o f regionalist assertiveness to several 
widely accepted (partial) indicators o f the problem, to determine if  the index answers to 
conventional expectations as to the correlates o f regionalist assertiveness. If the 
indicator conforms to these expectations, it should enhance confidence in its use.
Corroborating the index
Even with the acknowledged limits due to subjective judgement and time coverage, 
Dowley’s index has the advantage o f providing a continuous measurement o f a complex
91 In the Map 4.1, regions are grouped into classes according to their score on Dowley's index. The 
criterion for the definition o f  class breaks is the default method in the GIS mapping software ArcView  
(version 3.2). This method aims to show “natural breaks", or breaks "inherent” in the data. As the "Help" 
function o f  ArcView explains, “this method identifies breakpoints between classes using a statistical 
formula (Jenk’s optimisation). This method is rather complex, but basically the Jenk’s method minimises 
the sum o f  the variance within each o f  the classes".
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phenomenon across all 89 regions, and across several years. Rather than taking it at face 
value, however, some confirmation of its merits can be derived from a comparison o f  
the index with 1) a different index built by a different author, Alexseev (1999), to 
measure a similar dimension; and 2) with other measurements o f factors conventionally 
deemed to correlate with autonomy demands.
Alexseev (1999: 265) has produced a typology (i.e. not a continuous measure) of  
regions based on their integrationist vs. separatist stance. The latter concept is very 
similar to the autonomist stance measured by Dowley. If Dowley’s is a faithful 
indicator, its distribution should be broadly consistent with Alexseev's typology. This is 
confirmed in Figure 4.3. The increasing levels o f separatism on Alexseev's measure 
(horizontal axis) correspond to increasing levels o f autonomism on Dowley's index 
(vertical axis).
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The claim is that the impact o f ethnicity is reinforced by the institutional recognition of 
special rights to ethnic groups. Under Soviet times, one such special right afforded to 
some ethnic groups was official recognition o f their "titular status" in a given territorial 
unit. In that unit, members o f the titular ethnic group would enjoy cultural and symbolic 
rights. According to the institutionalist view, these special rights fostered the 
development o f a distinct identity in the minds of the members o f the privileged group 
(Zaslavsky 1993; Gorenburg 2003).
The territorial units with the greatest privileges would develop a greater sense of 
distinct identity and thus potential for separatist mobilisation. Since Soviet times, in the 
hierarchy o f ethnically designated territorial units within the Russian Federation, the 
most privileged units were the Republics (ASSRs), followed by the autonomous okrugs 
and the Jewish autonomous oblast. Oblasts, by contrast, represented purely 
administrative divisions, lacking ethnic designation. Figure 4.4 shows that Dowley's 
index is consistent with the institutional factor o f ethnic mobilisation. Indeed, Republics 
score highest on the index, followed by autonomous okrugs and, finally, by oblasts and 
krays.92
Figure 4.4: Federal status and Dowley's index
Republics Aut. okrugs Oblasts & Krays
Federal status
Source: elaborated from Table 1 in Dowley 1998: 370.
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The distribution of Dowley’s index also proves to be consistent with the widely held 
expectation that separatism is more likely to grow in territorial units endowed with 
independent economic potential. As Figure 4.5 indicates, among republics and 
autonomous okrugs, which on average are the most assertive types o f units, Dowley's 
index decreases as the economic dependency on the federal centre increases. In this 
Figure, the categories o f economic dependency from the centre are taken from Stavrakis, 
DeBardeleben and Black (1997: 227-229).93
Of the structural conditions plausibly conducive to greater assertiveness, the last to 
be considered here is the ethnic distinctiveness o f the region.94 The simplest expectation 
is that regions with larger shares o f ethnic, non-Russian, populations would have a 
greater potential for regionalist activation.
Figure 4.5: Effect o f  economic dependency on assertiveness, by federal status
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Figure 4.6: Dowley's index and regional ethnic composition
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Source: elaborated from Table 1 in Dowley (1998: 370) and 1989 Census.
Dowley's index appears to conform to this hypothesis (see Figure 4.6). The level o f  
regionalist assertiveness (vertical axis) decreases as the percentage o f Russians in the 
region increases (horizontal axis). The Rsq o f .46 indicates a strong association.
It is possible to specify further this simple tendency. In particular, stronger autonomy 
demands should be expected where the non-Russian population is more homogenous. 
By contrast, greater difficulty in playing the nationalist card in federal bargaining with 
the centre should be expected where the non-Russian population is fragmented into 
several different groups. It has been noted,95 for example, that secession is unlikely in 
the North Caucasus republics that have two or more titular nationalities (such as
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Figure 4.7: Interaction between share 
o f Russians and fragmentation o f non-Russian populations
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Source: own elaboration from Table 1 in Dowley (1998: 370) and 1989 Census.
The effect is strongest where non-Russians are concentrated in a small number of 
groups. The "effective number of groups" is calculated following Laakso and 
Taagepera’s (1979) formula for the "effective number of parties". In the graph legend, 
regions with a smaller "effective number of groups" are labelled "concentrated" (they
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Central appeasement
A key element of the main hypothesis is that the effect of regionalist assertiveness on 
electoral results should be investigated while controlling for the response that such 
assertiveness meets from the federal Centre. There is evidence to suggest that Moscow 
has selectively used political/legal and financial tools to appease the most vocal regions 
(see chapter 3).
Observers of the Russian (re-)federalisation process of the 1990s, through which the 
terms of the federal relations were negotiated and bargained upon, have noted several 
instances of asymmetric political appeasement. In this way, a sub-set of regions 
received privileged treatment from the Centre. In the periods leading up to the 1993 and 
the 1995 Duma elections, regions can be roughly grouped according to the level of 
appeasement they managed to extract from the Centre.
In the first period, from the collapse of the Soviet regime to the end of 1993, the most 
important forms of appeasement were arguably the special rights and privileges that a 
few regions received as inducement to sign the Federal Treaty of March 1992. These 
concessions were not enshrined in the Federal Treaty itself but represented side-deals. 
They were made in the republics of Bashkortostan, Kalmikiya, Karelia, Komi and 
Sakha (Kahn 2002: 126; Treisman 1999: 34). Another set of regions, while not 
receiving special treatment to the same extent, also managed to extract important 
concessions from the Centre. These include the Soviet-era Autonomous oblasts that 
were upgraded to republican status in 1991 (and became the republics of Adygeya, 
Altay, Karachaevo-Cherkessya, and Khakassya). The federal units where Yeltsin- 
appointed heads of administration were removed by the Russian president to appease 
local elites should also be added to this group (Matsuzato 2000); these are Krasnodar 
kray, Krasnoyarsk kray, Voronezh oblast, and Pskov oblast. All these units are 
considered "politically appeased" for the purposes of modelling the 1993 elections. A 
dichotomous variable is therefore produced for the 1993 models that marks these 
regions from the rest.
For the 1995 elections, primary examples of appeasement are represented by the first 
bilateral treaties signed by the Russian president with selected republics, starting with 
Tatarstan in February 1994. The first such treaties granted extensive rights and 
privileges (in the spheres of regional budgetary policies, taxation, control over natural
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resources and cultural autonomy). Subsequent treaties signed with other regions varied 
in content, but generally and progressively carried less substantial benefits. Moreover, 
most regions did not receive any treaty until after the Duma elections and the start of the 
1996 presidential campaign. In 1994 and 1995, only republics received bilateral treaties, 
not oblasts. The republics that received substantial privileges by means of a bilateral 
treaty before the 1995 elections are Bashkortostan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Sakha, North 
Ossetia, and Tatarstan (Kahn 2002: 158ff). These regions can be considered the 
recipients of clear political appeasement in the 1994-95 period.
To take into account the cumulative effect of appeasement that occurred before that 
period, the main instances of appeasement observed for the 1993 elections are also 
counted for the 1995 vote. As a result, for the 1995 models, appeased regions are those 
that either received substantial inducements to sign the Federal Treaty of 1992, or were 
granted important privileges and concessions in the bilateral treaties of 1994-95. This 
cumulative approach seems justified also in the light of the temporal proximity of the 
1993 and the 1995 elections.
In the 1996-1999 period, leading up to the third Duma elections, centre-regional 
relations were characterised by waves of conflict and appeasement. Centre-regional 
conflict was heightened in 1997 when Chubais attempted to establish firmer central 
control over some recalcitrant regions (see chapter 8). Appeasement occurred in 1999 
when Primakov forged a new tacit alliance with key regions. In general, the scope for 
central appeasement of vocal regions was limited in this period due to the 1998 financial 
crisis (see chapter 8). The units that can be considered relatively appeased are those that 
signed a bilateral treaty after the 1995 Duma elections,96 although the contents of such 
treaties were less advantageous than those of earlier pacts. The extension of the bilateral 
treaty process to the non-autonomous (oblasts and krays) units was meant to cement an 
alliance between Yeltsin and the governors in view of the June 1996 presidential 
elections. Closer in time to the 1999 elections, the Kremlin confirmed its alliance with
96 These regions are Komi Republic, Mariy El Republic, Chechen Republic, Chuvash Republic, Altay 
Kray, Krasnodar Kray, Krasnoyarsk Kray, Khabarovsk Kray, Amur Oblast, Astrakhan Oblast, Bryansk 
Oblast, Vologoda Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Irkutsk Oblast, Kaliningrad Oblast, Kirov 
Oblast, Kostroma Oblast, Leningrad Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Moscow Oblast, Murmansk Oblast, Nizhny 
Novgorod Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Orenburg Oblast, Perm Oblast, Rostov Oblast, Samara Oblast, Saratov 
Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Tver Oblast, Ulyanovsk Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, 
Yaroslavl Oblast, St. Petersburg, Permyak Aut. Okrug, Taymyrskiy (Dolgano-N.) Aut. Okrug, Ust- 
Ordynskiy Buryat Aut. Okrug, and Evenk Aut. Okrug.
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Tatarstan, when prime minister Primakov renewed the bilateral treaty of 1994 that gave 
the republic extensive privileges. Moreover, signs of bilateral accommodation can be 
seen in the fact that the Kremlim devolved shares of state companies to a selected 
number of regions (Khakass Republic, Krasnoyarsk Kray, Kemerovo Oblast and 
Novosibirsk Oblast). Regions are coded as "politically appeased" if they received any of 
the mentioned concessions from the Centre in the 1996-99 period.
In addition to the already mentioned tools of central appeasement, it is also useful to 
take into account central financial transfers to the regions. There is a body of literature 
that has found that financial flows from the Centre to selected regions were aimed at 
appeasing the strongest Yeltsin opponents in preparation for his re-election bid of June 
1996 (Treisman 1999). Similarly, centre-regional financial relations may also have been 
used as an addition tool of appeasement of the most assertive regions in other periods 
(Lavrov 1998; Kuznetsova 2001). However, three obstacles stand in the way of using 
financial transfers as a sure gauge for appeasement. On the one hand, it is widely 
recognised that financial flows between Moscow and the regions are extremely difficult 
to monitor. They can take several forms (direct transfers, tax relief, subsidies to regional 
enterprises, etc.) and a large part goes undetected because it is covert or flows through 
informal channels. The available information allows specialists to gauge only broad and 
partial trends. On the other hand, the privileged financial treatment granted to key 
regions is often enshrined in what is here called "political appeasement", especially in 
the early bilateral treaties. This means that part of the possible effect of financial 
appeasement is already captured by the variables discussed above. Finally, federal 
transfers to poorer regions may also aim at alleviating need, rather than simply at 
appeasing regionalist demands. However, this is not troubling in the present context 
because both types of transfers can be expected to induce lower assertiveness, 
regardless of whether this is due to economic dependency on the centre or to financial 
appeasement.
In any case, the variable on the financial transfers will only have a tentative role in 
the model, as a control for any residual effect beyond the effect channelled through the 
other appeasement tools. The variable for federal transfers is measured so as to include 
budget loans, and it is calculated as percentage of regional expenditures. For 1993, the 
source of this data is Lev Freinkman, Daniel Treisman, and Stepan Titov's Subnational
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Budgeting in Russia: preempting a potential crisis (1999).97 Unfortunately, this volume 
does not cover 1999 and, for the elections of that year, data on federal transfers to 
regional budgets comes from Raj Desai, Lev Freinkman, and Itzhak Goldberg's Fiscal 
Federalism and Regional Growth: Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s 
(2003).98 This is the data of the average transfers received by the regions in 1996-1999.
This section has presented the operationalisation choices for the main hypothesis, 
regionalist assertiveness, and for the control variables of central political appeasement. 
The next section is devoted to the operational definition of the other hypotheses and 
variables in the models. These variables relate either to the "supply side" of the electoral 
market or to the fairness of the electoral process itself (in terms of Governor's 
involvement in the election and of his use of administrative resources to affect results).
4.2 The supply side of the electoral market
Similar to the market, electoral outcomes depend on both demand and supply forces. 
Voters demand policies, and candidates offer themselves as channels of representation 
(Dawns 1957). On the demand side, it is argued here that a fundamental distinction 
affecting the electoral chances of the independents runs between functional and 
territorial demands or issues. On the supply side, the ‘market value’ of candidates 
depends on 1) their personal assets (finances, local visibility, control of local media, 
etc.); and 2) the added value of their party label (in the case of party candidates).
The personal profile of candidates will affect the district returns for independents 
depending on whether such personal qualities are found predominantly among 
independent or party candidates in the given district. As for the impact of party labels, 
they can affect independents' success in a district if candidates of valued parties are 
nominated in the given SMD. Each of these supply-side factors is operationalised in the 
next sub-sections.
97 More precisely, the data is contained in Annex Table 3, "Budget Arrears, transfers, and Deficit as 
Percentage o f Expenditures" (pp. 88-90) and it is the authors' estimate based on the data from the Ministry 
of Finance and Roskomstat.
98 The table that contains the data is titled "Budgetary transfers as percentage of regional governmental 
revenue, 1996-1999 average", pp. 15-16.
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Notable candidates
The first type of supply-side factors to be considered is the personal assets of candidates. 
The literature on electoral studies suggests that some candidates stand greater (a priori) 
chances of success than others because they can finance richer campaigns, they are 
more visible or better connected than others, or because they can count on their record 
of constituency servicing as district incumbents. In short some candidates can rely on a 
"personal vote" based on personal resources (Herrera and Yawn 1999; Cain, Ferejohn 
and Fiorina 1986; Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart 2000; Carey and Shugart 1995; for 
Russia, Golosov 2002; Hale 2005).
Of all of the types of personal assets that are politically relevant and readily 
measurable (political and economic elite status, and incumbency), those deriving from 
economic positions cannot be fully studied here. This is because the information that 
candidates submitted to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) in the 1990s, though 
rather extensive, does not include any hint as to the political importance of the 
economic interests linked to the candidate. In other words, it is virtually impossible, 
without a detailed, case-by-case, study of thousands of candidates in hundreds of 
districts, to determine whether the company they declare to head is marginal or 
fundamental to the district economy (see chapter 3). This is unfortunate, given that it 
prevents the examination of the effect of economic notability. There is also no 
information on campaign spending for SMD candidates. As a partial remedy for this, 
expert assessments of the financial backing received by a candidate, gathered by Henry 
Hale, will be used for the 1999 elections only (more on this variable below).
As for the political elite status, federal and regional/local political officials are 
considered separately. High regional political officials are more visible and command 
more administrative resources than the average candidate. The coding of candidates as 
members of federal or regional political elites is taken from the Essex University 
Election Database, files on Russian elections in the SM Ds." The information on 
occupational status, naturally, is measured at the candidate level. For example, federal 
political positions range form high federal state officials, such as federal ministers (or
99 The webpage of the Essex project is www.essex.ac.uk/elections/. The Essex database contains some 
discrepancies with the official data of the CEC, which had to be rectified. For example, the last-ranked 
candidate of SMD 68 of the Essex 1999 database does not appear in the official results published by the 
CEC and has been deleted from the analysis.
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vice ministers), to judges of federal courts, army officials, members of federal state 
agencies, etc. Regional political elite members include, for example, members of 
regional executive or legislative branches (regional ministers or members of the office 
of executive heads), regional capital city mayor (and official of capital city 
governments), members of regional or local legislative assemblies, etc.
For the present purposes it is necessary to aggregate the information at the district 
level, which is the unit of analysis of this study (see chapter 5). The focus here is not on 
inter-candidate differences within districts, but on inter-district differences in the pools 
of independent vs. party candidates. The district aggregate measure of the nomination of 
the political elite in each district is achieved by counting how many of the district 
candidates falling within a given occupational category run as independents and how 
many run as party candidates. A dichotomous variable assigns a code of 1 to the 
districts where a majority of the regional political elite runs as independent (0 for all 
other SMDs). Another binary variable does the same for the federal elite occupations. 
This results in the two variables "RegPol" and "FedPol" of the analysis chapters (6 to 8). 
The effect of incumbency is also expressed by means of a dummy variable. Districts 
where one of the independents is the district incumbent are coded 1, all other districts 
are given a value of 0. The variable is labelled "Incumb".
For the 1999 elections only, data originally gathered by Henry Hale allows for the 
study of the impact of financial backing on the success of the independents in district 
races. The data is drawn from several sources close to the district races, and has been 
collated by Henry Hale and Robert Orttung, as described in Hale (2005), where it is for 
use to investigate the impact of financial-industrial groups as substitutes for parties. As 
Hale explains, the sources of his data on the backing received by candidates from 
"Financial-Industrial Groups" (FIGs) include "one major party’s campaign 
headquarters’ internal assessments as of November 11, 1999; written reports on the 
Duma elections submitted by the East-West Institute’s network of observers; Russian- 
language radio reports by Radio Svoboda correspondents (broadcasts during fall 1999, 
transcripts at http://www.svoboda.org/archive/elections99), and the following sources: 
The Moscow Times, December 21, 1999, ISI Emerging Markets; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
October 19, 1999, ISI Emerging Markets; and anonymous regional analysts in personal 
communication with the author" (Hale 2005).
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To perform the analysis presented in this thesis, this data has been linked to 
information on candidates' nomination (party vs. independent) and aggregated at the 
district level. The number of candidates that, according to Hale's coding, are sponsored 
by large economic interests has been calculated for each district.100 A categorical 
variable, "FigCat", has been created and specified into two dummy variables. The first 
dummy variable, "Figlnd", assigns a value of one to districts where a majority of FIG- 
backed candidates run as independent, and zero to all other SMDs. The second dummy 
variable, labelled "FigPar", marks the SMDs where this type of candidates tends to run 
under a party banner. Districts where either no backing at all was detected, or it was 
evenly shared by the two pools of candidates, represent the base category.
Party challengers
In terms of electoral value to the candidates, not all party labels are the same. 
Established labels have a clear image in voters' minds, which helps the latter make their 
voting choices. Voters know what they can broadly expect of a candidate from his party 
attachment, which thus provides an informational shortcut for ill-informed voters to 
make complex decisions. This "brand name effect" is observed in established 
democracies with stable and rooted party systems. It is much less plausible in the fluid 
and young Russian electoral context. It is nevertheless worth testing the impact of a 
challenge by major parties to the independents, and observing if this effect increases 
with time, as the notion of the emergence of a brand name effect would suggest.
In addition to major parties, regionalist parties are of special interest given the 
hypotheses being tested in this study. To the extent that a party can claim to have 
genuine local roots, it can neutralise the advantage that the independents are expected to 
enjoy over national parties in articulating and representing regionalist demands. As 
noted in the preceding chapter, true regionalist parties are very rare. In fact, in the 
course of the three Duma elections under analysis, only the 1995 "Transformation of the 
Fatherland" can be considered genuinely regionalist in the sense of defending the 
interests of one region only (i.e. Sverdlovsk or the broader Urals area). There are, 
however, parties that despite lacking a territorial basis of support advertise their 
supposed closeness to the interests of the regions generally. Examples include the 1993
100 Usually, no more than one candidate per district belongs to such category.
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and 1995 Tarty of Russian Unity and Accord1 (PRES), and the 1995 "Bloc of 89 
regions", which can be called "pseudo-regionalist". The operationalisation here of the 
challenge posed by candidates of major, regionalist and pseudo-regionalist parties to the 
independents is very straightforward. Each party has its own dummy variable and each 
district is coded 1 if the given party nominated its candidate there, zero if not. It should 
be emphasised that these party dummies do not belong to one categorical variable, but 
are separate variables. Indeed, because the unit of analysis is the SMD (not the 
candidates), cases take a value of 1 on more than one party dummy simultaneously, as 
more than one party usually nominate candidates in an SMD.
The electoral process and Governor's involvement
To continue with the market analogy, the smooth operation of the mechanism of supply 
and demand assumes that market forces operate in a fair and competitive environment. 
Thus, when markets don’t run smoothly, the market environment is a key aspect to look 
at when trying to locate the reasons for anomalies. Economists, for example, suspend 
the assumption of fair competition to study the effect of oligopolistic settings on prices. 
Similarly, the level of competitiveness of the electoral environment affects electoral 
results and should be taken into account.
As explained in chapter 3, the hypothesis is that regional "administrative resources" 
can be used by the governor to bend the electoral process to the advantage of a preferred 
candidate. The governorship101 is arguably the most influential political institution at the 
regional level. The degree of control exerted by regional governors over regional 
politics varies from region to region. Those who enjoy greater influence are often able 
to control the regional media, and to influence regional economic interests and law 
enforcement agencies (both police and courts). This state of affairs also varied over time. 
In the oblasts, governors' grip on regional politics has increased towards the 1999 Duma 
elections, after they passed from being appointed by Yeltsin to being popularly elected.
To measure the impact of "administrative resources" on the chance of independent 
candidates, two steps are necessary. On the one hand, it is necessary to determine which 
candidate (independent or party-nominated) received the governor's support in each
101 It should be remembered that, for the sake of simplicity, with the term "governor" I indicate all 
executive heads of the units of the Russian federation, despite the fact that in most republics these are 
formally called "presidents".
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SMD (if any). On the other hand, in order for such support to be effective, the governor 
must be in control of the political process in his regions. Each of these two elements 
taken individually cannot convey the full picture of the impact of administrative 
resources. Indeed, the effect of governor's support for a given candidate can be expected 
to interact with his control over regional politics.
On the first dimension (i.e. which candidate received his governor's support in each 
SMD), this thesis again utilises data gathered by Hale (Hale 2005). Hale was one of the 
first students of the phenomenon of "administrative resources" (or "machine politics") in 
the regions. Most recently, he has argued that administrative tools in the hands of 
regional governors have constituted a functional substitute to political parties by 
providing candidates with the campaign benefits that normally accrue to party candidate 
in western, established, democracies (Hale 2005). However, Hale does not distinguish 
between independent and party candidates as recipients of governors' support and 
cannot assess whether the impact of administrative resources differs for party or 
independent candidates. Moreover, Hale's discussion of governors' support does not 
take into account that this factor should be expected to affect the elections to different 
degrees in different regions. As mentioned, this is because regional governors vary in 
their ability to control the political process in their respective regions.
These questions are the key concerns of this thesis (see chapter 8). The data used by 
Hale in his study was kindly supplied to this author, and it forms the basis for a 
categorical variable, labelled here "GovSup". The sources of Hale's data overlap here to 
some extent with those he used to detect candidate backing from financial-industrial 
groups. They include "assessments by the East-West Institute, Radio Svoboda 
correspondents, and a major party’s campaign headquarters’ internal assessments as of
November 11,1999" (Hale: 2005). Of the two indicators used by Hale, it is the "liberal"
10 ')version that is used here. On the basis of this data, a categorical variable is created 
and entered in the 1999 models. The variable, "GovCat", has three categories, and two
102 As Hale explains, "when assessments from different sources conflicted, judgement calls were made by 
Henry Hale based on the content of their reports. When there was insufficient information in the 
assessments to make a judgement, preference was given to East-West Institute assessments since their 
evaluative process was the most systematic". The "liberal" version of Hale's coding, used as a basis in the 
present analysis, elides a large number of missing observations. It codes as “governor supports no one” 
(instead of "missing") the cases when there is no indication in any of the sources cited that the governor 
supported any SMD candidate. Also "when there is some indication that a governor backs a candidate but
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dummy variables. The first, "Govlnd", codes as "1" the districts where the governor 
supported an independent; the second, "GovPar", marks districts where he supported a 
party candidate. The base category is the remaining scenario, in which no governor's 
support was observed.
However, as mentioned above, it is not sufficient to determine the governor's 
preference for one candidate or the other. It is also necessary to assess the degree of 
competitiveness vs. control exhibited by regional politics. Indeed, a preference for a 
given candidate may remain ineffectual if the governor does not have the means to 
translate it into actual electoral advantages.
Map 4.2: Regional levels offreedom o f speech
Freedom of speech 
■ ■  10 -23
■  24 - 32
■  3 3 -4 3  
I I 44 - 63
There are several ways to understand political competitiveness and control,103 but a 
key dimension related to the fairness of the electoral process is that concerning media 
control and regulation. An index of this dimension has been compiled within a project
it is not conclusive enough to count for" his stricter version o f the indicator, the liberal version codes the 
candidate as supported by the governor (Hale 2005).
103 Reisinger and Moraski (2003) have recently studied regional levels o f  democracy and competitiveness. 
Other authors who worked on the subject include McMann and Petrov (2000).
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called "Public Examination"104 produced by the Russian Union of Journalists and other 
associations. The index is called "freedom of speech" and is the result of a 
comprehensive investigation of several aspects of the way information is produced and 
disseminated in each region in 1999. The variable using this index in the following 
analysis is labelled "Freesp". Map 4.2 above shows cross regional variations along this 
variable, which is used to indicate the degree of control exerted by regional governors 
over the political process in their regions. In the map, darker areas correspond to higher 
control (i.e. lower freedom of speech).
Urbanisation and Campaign access to districts
Two additional variables are introduced in the models. The first one is the degree of 
urbanisation of the district (specified as the share of the district population living in 
urban centres; that is, towns of more than 100,000 inhabitants). The data come from a 
publication of the Moscow Carnegie Center (McFaul, Petrov and Ryabov 2000: 565-72), 
which has the merit of presenting some socio-demographic indicators, derived from the 
1989 population census aggregated at the level of electoral district. As noted, the role of 
urbanisation on party development is a traditional hypothesis dating back to Stein 
Rokkan and his studies on the emergence of party systems during the transition to mass 
politics at the turn of the 19 century. It is posited that parties first develop in urbanised 
areas, and then attempt to penetrate the less urbanised provinces. The explanation for 
this pattern focused on the greater circulation of printed media and concentration of 
educated citizens in urban centres (Rokkan 1970). In the Russian case, as noted in 
chapter 3, urban centres are more accessible to party organisation than rural areas.
A second aspect of this accessibility problem points to the lack of transport 
infrastructures in remote areas to explain why parties initially neglect them in their 
mobilisation efforts. This is here captured by a separate variable, which measures the 
share of a region's population living in areas "difficult to reach". Data on this variable is 
taken from the Russian ministry of finance,105 where it figures as one of the elements of 
a formula used by the ministry to calculate the financial transfers needed by each region. 
The variable, labelled "Remote", is a composite index of two other variables. The first
104 "Public Examination: Evaluation of Freedom of Speech in Russia (1999-2000)". The index used here
is found on pp. 14-15. At www.freepress.ru/win/english.html (accessed June 2003).
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variable ("Var. A" in Table 4.3) is the proportion of the regional population living in 
areas where deliveries of goods can only occur within limited periods of the year;106 the 
second variable ("Var. B") is the proportion of the regional population living in 
mountainous areas.
Table 4.3: Population living in areas difficult to reach (%), selected regions.
Region Var. A Var. B "Remote"
Magadan Oblast 100% 0% 100%
Koryak Aut. Okrug 100% 0% 100%
Nenets Aut. Okrug 100% 0% 100%
Taimyr Aut. Okrug 100% 0% 100%
Chukotka Aut. Okrug 100% 0% 100%
Evenk Aut. Okrug 100% 0% 100%
Sakha (Yakutia), Republic of 84% 0% 84%
Karachevo-Cherkess, Republic of 0% 49% 49%
Altay, Republic of 46% 25% 46%
Yamalo-Nenets Aut. Okrug 45% 0% 45%
Khanty-Mansi Aut. Okrug 40% 0% 40%
Dagestan, Republic of 0% 38% 38%
Kabardin-Balkar, Republic of 0% 36% 36%
North Ossetia, Republic of 0% 31% 31%
Komi-Permyak Aut. Okrug 28% 0% 28%
Tomsk Oblast 23% 0% 23%
Buryatia, Republic of 7% 19% 19%
Tyva Republic 19% 2% 19%
Ingushetia, Republic of 0% 18% 18%
Krasnoyarsk Krai 16% 0% 16%
Kamchatka Oblast 16% 0% 16%
Komi, Republic of 14% 0% 14%
Amur Oblast 12% 0% 12%
Sakhalin Oblast 12% 0% 12%
Arkhangelsk Oblast 12% 0% 12%
Adygeya, Republic of 0% 10% 10%
Khabarovsk Krai 9% 0% 9%
Irkutsk Oblast 9% 0% 9%
Jewish Aut. Okrug 8% 0% 8%
Chita Oblast 7% 0% 7%
Karelia, Republic of 5% 0% 5%
105 Data taken from w w w .m infin .ru (accessed  A ugust 2003).
106 The formula used by the M inistry o f  Finance can be translated as "share o f  population in districts 
characterised by lim ited periods o f  deliveries" (the original version refers to the population " b  pafioHax c 
orpaHHHeHHtiMH cpoKaMH 3aB03a npoayKUHH").
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Tyumen Oblast 5% 0% 5%
Perm Oblast 2% 0% 2%
Primorsky Krai 2% 0% 2%
Murmansk Oblast 2% 0% 2%
Russian Federation 3% 1% 3%
Var. A: Percentage of regional population leaving in areas with limited periods of 
goods deliveries.
Var. B: Percentage of regional population living in mountainous areas.
"Remote": Percentage of regional population living in areas difficult to reach.
All other regions (not listed) score 0% on all three variables.
Source: Russian Ministry of Finance, www.minfin.ru (accessed August 2003).
The source of data used by the ministry of finance are the regions themselves in the 
first case, and bill of laws/decrees ("npoeKT nocTaHOBjierow") in the second case. The 
"Remote" variable is a composite index of the two variables, which simply takes the 
maximum between the two variables. In practice this means taking the values of the 
second variable for most regions, and the values of the first variable only for the 
republics of Adygeya, Dagestan, Ingushetiya, Kabardino Balkaria, Karachaevo- 
Cherkessia, North Ossetia, and Buryatiya (See Table 4.3).
Conclusion
This chapter has presented the operational definition of the independent variables called 
for by the theoretical framework of chapter 3. Some variables that are specific to one 
election only (e.g. party challengers who take different party labels in different 
elections) will be presented in detail in the context of the actual empirical analysis of the 
relevant election. Moreover, descriptive statistics will also be presented in the chapters 
containing the statistical analysis (chapter 6-8).
The difficulty of identifying a single satisfactory indicator for such complex social 
phenomena as "regionalist assertiveness" across all regions and several years has been 
noted. The case for using Dowley's index rests on the fact that any alternative measure 
the author would devise to describe synthetically the whole set of 89 regions along this 
dimension is bound to embody a degree of subjective judgement and would thus invite 
suspicions of systematic bias. Some descriptive/impressionistic corroboration of the 
chosen index was drawn from comparing it with other indicators of relevant dimensions. 
While not perfect, the data used in this research allows for a meaningful statistical
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analysis with which to explore new aspects of Russian voting behaviour. Given the 
current early stage of the scholarly understanding of Russian electoral process in the 
SMDs, this kind of analysis seems useful.
Having established the context and content of the election analyses to follow, before 
moving on to the analyses themselves, it remains necessary to present the 
methodological strategy behind them. This is done in the next chapter, and it includes 
the operational definition of the dependent variable.
5Designing the Empirical Analysis
“Once you know that hierarchies 
exist, you see them everywhere ”
Kreft and De Leeuw (1998: l ) 107
This chapter completes the set-up necessary before the presentation of the empirical 
analysis of the votes. Up until this point, the phenomenon under investigation has been 
referred to as the “success of the independents”. In this chapter, the notion receives an 
operational definition so that it can be measured and thus function as the dependent 
variable of the statistical models. This task requires a prior definition of the unit of 
analysis: should individuals, districts or regions constitute the level of inquiry? Both 
steps -  the definition of the unit of analysis and the operationalisation of the dependent 
variable -  are presented in the first section of this chapter.
The second section further specifies the unit of the analysis; bringing out the 
particular characteristics of the investigation which so lend it to multilevel analysis. 
The section defines and justifies the strategy for case selection and also describes the 
hierarchical structure of the data; i.e. how the units of the analysis (the SMDs) are 
“nested” within higher-order units (regions). This ‘nesting’ is of central importance to 
the design of the analysis. Coupled with the fact that what are taken to be the key 
explanatory variables of the ‘success of the independents’ apply at the higher level 
(regions), the hierarchical data structure was of crucial importance in determining the 
choice of multilevel modelling as the quantitative technique used to test the hypotheses. 
The final section of this chapter provides a detailed defence of this choice within a 
reflection on the role of context in political science explanations.
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5.1 The dependent variable: unit of analysis and measurement
The stated aim of this research is to explain cross-district differences in the electoral 
success of independent candidates, but how should "success of independent candidates" 
be conceptualised and measured?
Taken on its own, the formulation "success of independent candidates" suggests a 
highly simplified, indeed dichotomised, approach to electoral politics. All independents 
are grouped together in opposition to all party candidates. Obviously, in reality these 
two "camps" are internally highly heterogeneous along several dimensions. The reason 
for overlooking this heterogeneity here is to study the role of partisanship as such in the 
Russian elections. With this goal in mind, the key dividing line between candidates 
becomes their type of nomination -  i.e. party vs. non-party (independent) nomination. 
However, as noted in chapter 3, this dichotomous approach does not preclude an 
assessment of which party/ies in particular posed the greatest challenge to independents 
in the SMDs. Nor does it preclude the consideration of candidates’ strategic motivations 
for running either as independent or party nominees.
In fact, candidates running as "independents" are often party men who disown their 
party membership for campaign purposes. Conversely, some of the candidates 
nominated by parties, even those elected through party lists, are in fact independent 
politicians who lack party membership. Of the deputies elected to the first Duma 
through party lists, only 70% were in fact party members (White, Rose and McAllister 
1997: 183). Even the most "disciplined" Russian party, the KPRF, had about 15 percent 
of non-members on its PR list in 1999 (Golosov and Shevchenko 2002: 147). Despite 
this gap between formal nomination and real membership, it seems reasonable to posit 
that nomination decisions are not made lightly or by chance. On the contrary, these 
decisions reflect the perception of the likely success associated with each option 
(independent vs. party nomination). For this reason, it is especially interesting to include 
within the category of "independents" those party men who decide to run as 
independents. Their case is even more revealing of the perceived strategic edge offered 
by the different types of nomination.
107 Quoted in Jones and Gould (2003: lc).
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As for the operationalisation and measurement of the "success of independents", 
several options are conceivable. This section shows advantages and limitations of 
several plausible measurements of the dependent variable, and argues for the overall 
merits of the chosen one. The first step in the process of selecting a way to 
operationalise the dependent variable is to choose the unit of analysis. Should the 
"success of independents" be measured at the level of electoral districts, at the level of 
the units of the Russian Federation (regions), or at the level of individual candidates?
If candidates are the units of analysis, the dependent variable could be measured as 
candidates' vote shares. More precisely, to find factors of cross-district variability, only 
independent candidates should form the sample and their electoral returns should be 
related to the characteristics of the districts they run in, while controlling for the 
personal traits of individual candidates (incumbency, campaign resources, etc.). 
Alternatively, both independent and party candidates could be included in the sample in 
order to study the effect of independent nomination on electoral returns and the 
variability of this effect across districts. A problem with these two approaches is that 
electoral returns for an individual candidate (the dependent variable) are directly and 
inversely related to the score on the same variable for the other candidates running in 
the same district. This violates the assumption of regression analysis that measurements
|  AO
on the dependent variable should be independent from one another.
A simple way to avoid this problem is to measure electoral success at the level of 
electoral district. The choice of SMDs as units of analysis is also backed by the 
substantive argument that electoral competition occurs at this level -  that is, votes are 
counted at, and results apply to, the level of district. Indeed, a candidate's vote share has 
little substantive meaning when abstracted from the district in which he runs.109 Most 
importantly, the choice of the SMD as the unit of analysis corresponds to the research 
task of explaining spatial differences in independents' success. Indeed, "the different 
levels of analysis permit different questions to be addressed and lead to different 
understandings" (Erikson et al. 2002: 11).
108 G olosov  has addressed this problem  by taking into account the success o f  the challengers faced by  
each candidates (G olosov  2000), but this does not seem  to so lve  the issue.
109 M oreover, several variables discussed  b elow  (explanatory or control variables) are aggregated at the 
level o f  district.
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The limitation of taking districts as the unit is that all conclusions of the analysis will 
refer not to voters but to districts showing this or that aggregate characteristic of voters. 
The dependent variable is the district aggregate vote for independents, rather than 
individual voter's preferences. This implies a "shift of meaning" from individuals to 
SMDs (Htittner 1981, in Snijder and Bosker 1999: 13) and is related to the problem of 
"ecological fallacy", which warns against inferring individual voters' behaviour from 
patterns observed at the aggregate level (Robinson 1950). However, conclusions 
generated at the aggregate level have a legitimate purpose in their own right, as they 
answer specific questions about aggregate phenomena. In other words, a strong case can 
be made (and has been since Durkheim) that social phenomena are not always strictly 
reducible to methodological individualism. As one recent study reminds us, “political 
behaviour is social; groups of people interacting with one another do things, which are 
different from what would have occurred from the summation of atomized individuals” 
(Erikson et al. 2002: 10).
If "independents' success" is a property of districts, how is it measured at this level? 
Determining the unit of analysis narrows down the range of plausible measurements of 
the dependent variable, but, even so, the range remains rather wide. To help visualise 
the options, Table 5.1 presents an example of district electoral returns. The pros and 
cons of the main possible measurements are then reviewed:
Table 5.1: Example o f district 
electoral results (SMD 32, 1999)
Candidate Nomination Vote share (%)
A Party 40.26
B Indep 35.57
C Indep 6.96
D Party 3.62
E Indep 2.60
F Party 2.49
Against all 4.73% 
Invalid votes 3.80 %
A) The district winner
An intuitive strategy would be to focus on the district winner. If he/she is an 
independent, then independents are "successful" in the SMD. If the winner is a party
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candidate, independents are "unsuccessful", as in the example of Table 5.1. This 
measurement of the dependent variable equates "success" of the independents with their 
winning the district seat. This has the advantage of being a very intuitive and 
consequential notion of success. On the other hand, this measurement is not free from 
limitations, as it overlooks a great deal of information on the candidates who run in the 
SMD but do not happen to win.
In multicandidate districts like Russia's, the average number of candidates has been 
around 7, 12 and 10 in the three elections, with several SMDs having over 15 candidates. 
If attention is focused on the SMD winner only, this results in a significant loss of 
information. It could well be that a party candidate wins the seat with 30 percent of the 
vote, but that the remaining 70 percent goes to the independents. In such a case, it seems 
of some interest to understand why 70 percent of the voters preferred independent 
candidates, even though this vote did not translate into a victory for any of them.
B) Highest ranking
A measurement that takes into account some information beyond the district winner is 
the highest ranking obtained by any independent in the given SMD. In the example 
provided by Table 5.1, this would take the value of 2 (i.e. the best position achieved by 
independents is a second place). Thus, even though the district winner in Table 5.1 is 
not an independent, this measurement does reflect the fact that independents performed 
rather well. However, there are three problems with this measurement:
The first problem is that comparisons between districts are problematic. Two districts 
may both score 2 (i.e. a second place is the highest rank achieved by independents), but 
at the same time they may have a very different number of candidates -  one district may 
have ten candidates running, the other only two. In this case a score of 2 would mean 
very different things in the two districts.
The second problem is that highest ranking does not reflect the level of support 
associated with a given ranking. A second place could be associated with any vote share 
between 0 and 49.9 percent.
The third problem, which is closely related to the second, is that this measurement 
discards a great deal of information on the other independent candidates running in the
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SMD. One independent (the most successful) may achieve a second place, but the 
others may turn out to be 9th and 10th.
C) Average ranking
The third limitation of measurement B is partially avoided if one considers the average, 
instead of the highest, ranking reached by the independents. In the example of Table 5.1, 
this would be (2+3+5=10, 10/3=) 3.3. As an average, this does take into account the 
ranking of all independents. However, it is subject to the first two limitations of 
measurement B. It is insensitive to the number of independent candidates running (for 
example a score of 3 can be obtained both where only four candidates run, and where as 
many as 8 do, thus overlooking a substantive difference); and there is no way to gauge 
the level of support (vote share) associated with a given score. Moreover, it only 
marginally improves the third problem of measurement B, as it is insensitive to the 
"spread" around the mean of the ranking of individual independents.
D) Total vote share
A measurement that takes into account the level of support of all the independents in the 
district is the total of their vote shares. In the example of Table 5.1, this variable takes 
the values of 45 percent (i.e. the sum of the vote shares received by independent 
candidates B, C and E). In comparison to other measurements, this has the advantage of 
using information related to all independents running in the SMD. It also offers a quick 
measure of whether independents or party candidates received a majority of the vote in 
the district. However, measurement D also has a limitation in its comparability across 
districts. For example, a large value of measurement D can be due to 1) a few strong 
candidates, or 2) a large number of electorally marginal independents. In other words, 
the measurement is insensitive to the concentration of the vote for the independents.
Indeed, equating the two scenarios may seem counterintuitive, as independents' 
success seems to be greater in situation 1) than in 2). However, this is not necessarily 
the case, as one can argue that what counts is the total share of the district voters who 
prefer independent to party candidates, regardless of how well such voters and 
candidates co-ordinate and concentrate their votes. This view seems best grounded for 
the present purposes. To see the advantages of this measurement compared to just
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looking at the district winner, Map 5.1 (below) can be contrasted to Map 1.1 in the 
Introduction. The map below clearly conveys a greater deal o f information and detail.
Map 5.1: Measuring the success o f  independent candidates as total vote share, 1995
St. Petersburg^
Mosco1
% of vote for independents
1___J| 0 - 14.97
□ 14.97-29.09
29 09 - 47.05
47.05-66.65
| 66.65 - 96.97
As made clear by the above discussion, the selection o f a measurement for the 
dependent variable requires some degree o f subjective judgement over the notion o f  
"electoral success". No measurement is free from a degree o f subjectivism. Among 
plausible measurements, D seems the best suited to investigate cross-district differences 
in independents' support. It improves on key flaws o f other measurements by taking into 
account a great deal o f information on all independents in the district. Its limitation -  
insensitivity to the level o f concentration o f the vote for independents -  is tolerable 
given the underlying notion o f electoral success that is chosen in this study.
5.2 Case selection and data structure
Given the concept and measurement o f the "success o f independents" and the choice o f  
districts as the unit o f analysis described above, which cases should be selected for
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analysis? That is, which districts (SMDs) should be considered? The question is 
relevant because, in a number of SMDs, independents did not run at all,110 while in 
others only independents ran.111
One strategy would be to drop the cases where either only independents or no 
independents at all stood for election. This, however, is not acceptable because it would 
entail a great loss of valuable information. Indeed, the fact that the candidate supply of a 
district is so skewed in either direction (party or independent) is, on average, a symptom 
of the fact that the district is deeply unfavourable to either party or independent 
candidates, which is precisely the kind of phenomenon this study seeks to explain. The 
adopted strategy, therefore, is to include all SMDs for which official results are
1 p
available. By doing so, it should be acknowledged that the adopted understanding of 
the “success of the independents” is somewhat stretched to include the notion that total 
absence and total presence of independent candidates denote extreme low and extreme 
high “success”, respectively. This is consistent with the focus of the inquiry being on 
“what factors make districts favourable/unfavourable to the independents”. As seen in 
chapter 3, some of these factors operate directly, while others also have an effect on the 
entry decisions of party and independent candidates. Excluding cases with only/no 
independents would prevent that second element of the analysis.
The analysis takes into account the complex causal order posited by the explanatory 
framework (chapter 3). In particular, statistical tests reflect the fact that such region- 
level explanatory variables as regionalist assertiveness and geographic accessibility 
have both direct and mediated effects on the independents’ success, the latter flowing 
through the entry decisions of parties and the nomination decisions of notable 
candidates. It is not strictly necessary to use a formal two-stage model to observe the 
direct and mediated effects. By sequentially entering in the model the variables
110 There were 10, 5 and 3 districts with no independent candidate in 1993,1995 and 1999, respectively.
111 This occurred in 22, 2 and 5 SMDs in 1993, 1995 and 1999, respectively.
112 In 1993, the election did not take place in the five districts of the Republic o f Tatarstan, where the 
authorities boycotted the vote, and in the single district of Chechnya (N = 219). In 1995 elections were 
held in all 225 districts, while in 1999 the Chechen war meant that the election could not take place in the 
Chechen district (N = 224). In some districts the election was invalid, and was repeated several months 
later, because the option "against all" received a plurality of the votes. These districts are included in the 
analysis. To take the repeat election instead, would mean to abstract from the context of the election 
campaign, which would make these races less than comparable to the rest (the number of contestants is 
generally low and there are hardly any party candidates running in repeat elections).
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belonging to different causal "stages", it is possible to observe direct and indirect effects. 
This will become clearer in the analysis chapters (6-8).
Data structure: SMDs in regions
It has been noted that the SMDs, the units of the analysis here, are nested within regions. 
The technical implications of this hierarchical data structure are discussed in section 5.3 
below. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 in this section present the details of its configuration.
Table 5.2: Data structure
Level Number of observations Meaning
1993 1995 1999
1 219 225 224
Single-Member 
Districts (SMDs)
2 87n 89 88n Regions
r) Elections did not take place in two regions in 1993, nor in one region in 1999. 
Source: elaborated from CEC data.
In Table 5.2, the first column reports the hierarchical level of the data (level 1 for 
SMDs; level 2 for regions). The next three columns show the number of districts and 
regions used in the analysis for each election year (i.e. districts and regions in which 
elections in fact took place that year). In 1993, Chechnya refused to hold the vote, and 
Tatarstan officially boycotted it,113 bringing the total number of districts down from 225 
to 219. Similarly, elections did not take place in Chechnya in 1999.
Table 5.3 reports how many districts are contained in how many regions, both under 
the initial arrangement of 1993 and after the redrawing of district boundaries occurred 
in 1995. The reallocation of districts affected only some regions and was decided by 
Federal Law (zakon) N.146-F3 of 17 August 1995 (republished 10 September 1999). 
The first column in the table represents the number of SMDs in a region; the two 
columns on the right report the number of regions in each districting arrangement that 
contain that number of SMDs noted on the same horizontal in the first column. The
113 In four out of the five SMDs located in Tatarstan, turnout was below 25%. In one SMD, only one 
candidate was registered. In both cases, the results were invalid. This region held SMD vote in March 
1994, after the signing of a bilateral treaty with Yeltsin.
5. Designing the Empirical Analysis 151
federal unit endowed with the highest number of plurality seats is the city of Moscow 
with 15 SMDs.
Table 5.3: Number o f SMDs in regions
SMDs in a Number of Regions
Region 1993 1995 and 1999
1 35 38
2 29 25
3 4 5
4 10 10
5 3 3
6 3 2
7 2 3
8 1 1
10 1 -
11 - 1
15 1 1
Source: elaborated from CEC data.
Map 5.2 shows the borders of the electoral districts (marked by a thin line) within the 
regions (thicker line). The nesting of SMDs within federal units is more pronounced in 
the European part of Russia, in the North Caucasus, and in the Urals area, than in 
Siberia and the Far East, where most regions only have one SMD. This difference is due 
to the different concentration levels of the population. More populous regions received a 
larger number of SMDs in the attempt to roughly equalise the number of voters in each 
electoral district. The authorities aimed at an average of roughly 400,000 voters per 
SMD. But deviation from this norm abound, partly explained by the principle that each 
region should have at least one SMD, even if the population is far below the ideal figure.
SMDs socio-demographic characteristics
Russian single-member districts vary hugely along a large number of social and 
geographic dimensions. A grasp of this variability can be obtained from Table 5.4 
(below), which shows the range, central tendency and dispersion of a number of 
geographic and social indicators across the SMDs, elaborated from data presented in 
McFaul, Petrov and Ryabov (2000: 565-72). In terms of territorial size, SMDs range 
from 0.6 (a district in St. Petersburg) to 3100 Km2 (SMD 20, the whole Sakha Republic),
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with a mean of 83 Km2 and a standard deviation of over 257. This variability is even 
wider than the one observed in the territorial size of Russian units of the Federation.
Map 5.2: SMDs in Regions. European Russia, the Urals and North Caucasus
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In Russia, the percentage of district populations living in urban vs. rural areas also 
varies noticeably from SMD to SMD. In the least urbanised SMD, which coincides with 
the Ust-Ordynskiy Buryat Autonomous Okrug (SMD n.220), over 80 percent of the 
population live in rural areas (the most urbanised SMD are, of course, those coinciding 
with large cities - 100 percent urban).
Table 5.4: Variability o f  sociological characteristics o f  SMDs
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Min 0.6 24.8 12.4 18.6 0.0 11.1 1.4 4.1 2.4
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Source: own elaboration of data in McFaul, Petrov and Ryabov (2000: 565-72).
Data on a number of individual social traits is also available at the aggregate level of 
SMDs. These include the age structure of the population, its levels of education and its 
ethnic composition, although this information dates back to the 1989 national census.114 
According to this data, the "youngest" SMDs of the Federation are SMD n.10, in the 
Republic of Daghestan, with about one quarter of its population less than 14 years of 
age, and SMD n.223, in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, with the smallest share of 
residents older than 60,1.4 percent. The "oldest" SMDs, by contrast, are located in Tula 
Oblast (176), with only 11 percent of its residents below 14 years of age, and in Ryazan 
Oblast (150), with almost 28 percent aged 60 or above. As for education, the proportion 
of highly educated inhabitants ranges from 26.6 percent in Moscow, to 4.1 percent in an 
SMD (n.12) in Ingushetiya Republic. Finally, the share of ethnic Russians ranges from 
98 percent in an SMD (n.101) in Lipetsk Oblast, to 2.4 percent in one (n.10) in the 
Daghestan Republic.
114 Data from the 2002 census is not yet publicly available at the time o f writing.
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5.3 The study of context
This chapter has established that the investigation’s basic unit of analysis is the electoral 
district; this is the level of aggregation at which the dependent variable is measured. It 
has also been noted that districts are grouped within regions, and thus produce a nested 
or "hierarchical" data structure. In the terminology of hierarchical data structures, 
districts therefore represent level-1 units, and regions level-2 units. It can further be said 
that regions constitute the context of districts.
In recent years, the field of electoral studies has become more and more aware of the 
importance impact of context (Marsh 2002). One of the first attempts to explain sub­
national variations was Butler and Stokes’s work on British elections (Butler and Stokes 
1974, chapter 6), while the first important statistical treatment of such variation by 
means of multilevel modelling Jones, Johnston and Pattie (1992). The great majority of 
such works take individual voters’ behaviour (observed through opinion surveys) as the 
unit of analysis, and different higher-level units as context (neighbourhoods, counties, 
regions, etc.). The fact that this study instead takes district aggregate results as level-1 
units and regions as level-2 units doesn't fundamentally alter the logic of contextual 
analysis.
In practice, vote patterns can differ among regions (i.e. among contexts) simply 
because of a "compositional effect"; for example the labour vote can be expected to be 
higher in regions where working class voters are more numerous. In this case, 
controlling for a working class presence will seem to explain context away, because 
contextual differences are simply due to different "compositions" of regions in terms of 
working class residents. Clearly, these compositional effects are not properly contextual 
because they can be reduced to lower-level variables.
In a more rigorous sense, contextual effects can be of two types: 1) effects produced 
by the aggregation of lower-level characteristics, when the effect cannot be explained in 
terms of mere composition (examples of such contextual effects are neighbourhood 
effects and contagion effects -  see below); and 2) factors genuinely applying only at the 
higher (contextual) level.
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In the first case, the contextual factor is a summary measure of lower level 
characteristics and can be disaggregated back to its original individual level. A 
neighbourhood effect, for example, is posited when middle-class voters vote for Labour 
in predominantly working class districts. According to the neighbourhood effect 
hypothesis, this occurs because where a majority of district voters are workers, even 
non-workers will be exposed in their daily exchanges with neighbours to information 
flows in which the Labour Party is seen favourably. This leads to greater returns for 
Labour than one would expect based solely on the working class composition of the 
district. In sum, contextual effects of the first type derive from the spatial concentration 
of individual characteristics and the fact that individual "behaviour is contingent upon 
the environment created by the aggregation of individual traits" (Johnson, Phillips 
Shively and Stein 2002: 221).
The second type of contextual effect is directly measured at the context level, and not 
aggregated from lower level units. Indeed, this type is called a "global" effect because it 
cannot be disaggregated to lower level units. For example, the regionalist assertiveness 
and central political appeasement discussed in the explanatory framework of this thesis 
can be considered global contextual effects. They apply at the level of region, and are 
not aggregate measures of district characteristics.
It should be noted that, contrary to the political geographer (e.g. O'Loughlin 2003), 
the political scientist is generally sceptical of the thesis that "context matters" per se and 
that location in a given environment affects individual behaviour in its own right, as 
with the neighbourhood effect (King 1996). The political scientist aims at explaining 
context away. For example, if voters behave differently in different regions it must be 
because of some regional characteristic that is generalisable (e.g. the level of 
urbanisation); this characteristic may act directly on the dependent variable or be 
mediated by some other lower-level characteristic. Once the factor responsible for 
cross-context variation is found, context, in the geographical sense, is not a factor 
anymore and the contextual effect is simply compositional.
According to this view, it is useful to insert a variable for context, usually a series of 
dummy variables coding location in one-level OLS regression. This is done in order to 
avoid the missing variable bias (i.e. the error term correlated with the dependent 
variable) when it is not clear which factors lie behind cross-context variation. For
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example, after all independent variables supported by the theory have been entered into 
a model, part of the variance of the dependent variable may still be significantly related 
to location. If there are no clues as to what makes different locations affect the 
dependent variable, it is necessary to insert location as a categorical variable. Context, 
in this sense, is a residual category for unspecified and unknown effects. It does not 
matter per se.
On the other hand, the geographer has a quite different mind-set. Here, context 
matters per se, not as the carrier of some yet-to-specify hidden variable. A typical 
example of the purely contextual effect investigated by the geographer is the 
"neighbourhood effect" mentioned above. These effects are generated by the spatial 
concentration of lower-level characteristics and go beyond the effect one would expect 
on the basis of composition.
In this thesis, SMD results are seen within the wider context of regional politics 
(centre-regional relations, in particular). The SMD is the unit and the region is the 
context. The effects that apply at the level of regions are global contextual effects in the 
sense defined above. Context does not matter per se, but only as a carrier of global 
effects (regionalist assertiveness and others). At the same time, this study shares the 
geographer’s concern for the statistical implications of contextual effects, something that 
recently is finding its way into political and electoral studies as well (Marsh 2002). 
These technical implications for statistical analysis are discussed in the next section.
Quantitative technique: Multilevel modelling
Since the late 1980s the question of how best to treat nested data structures has found an 
increasingly popular answer in multilevel modelling. This technique was originally 
applied to geographical and educational studies, but then found application in virtually 
all scientific fields wherever the analyst deals with multilevel data. The simplest 
multilevel data structure involves two levels, as in the case of this thesis. The lower 
units of analysis (here SMDs) are called "level 1 units", and the higher level groups 
(here regions) are called "level 2 units".115
115 Recent introductory to intermediate textbooks that explain the advantages o f multilevel modelling over 
conventional techniques include Snijder and Bosker (1999), Steenbergen and Jones (2002), Stoker and 
Bowers (2002), Bryk and Raundenbush (1992). As mentioned, one of the first comprehensive 
applications to electoral data is Jones, Johnston and Pattie (1992).
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The basic advantage of multilevel modelling over other techniques is that it solves 
the problem of "autocorrelation" that may arise when the data structure is nested. 
Autocorrelation, or "intra-class correlation", refers to the similarity of units belonging to 
the same group. This occurs with stratified or cluster sampling, when individuals 
sampled from the same higher-level unit are subject to the same group influence. But it 
can also be present whenever the data structure is nested and there are reasons to expect 
contextual effects.
Autocorrelation means that the error terms of the units belonging to the same groups 
are correlated. This violates the assumption that error terms are independent, which lies 
at the basis of conventional techniques such as the Analysis of variance (ANOVA) and 
OLS regression. If the latter techniques are employed in the presence of autocorrelation, 
the standard errors of the estimated coefficients will be underestimated, thus leading to 
the overestimation of the level of significance of the main effects.
The formula for the coefficient of autocorrelation (p) corresponds to the proportion 
of total variance occurring between level 2 units. The higher this value, the more similar 
the level 1 units within groups:
p = Variance between level 2 units 
Total variance
The most widely used conventional method to take into account the multilevel nature 
of the data used to be entering a series of dummy variables, one for each context or level 
2 unit (except the dummy for the base category, if the constant is in the model). This 
method is often called analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). It solves the autocorrelation 
problem but has two important limitations not shared by multilevel modelling. The first 
is that dummy variables indicate contexts, but do not allow an explanation of the 
differences between contexts (Snijders and Bosker 1999: 42; Steenbergen and Jones 
2002: 221). This is because the dummy indicators for level-2 units already "absorb" all 
variability linked to that level. However, it is often of interest to test the effect of level- 
2 variables, which requires the presence of unexplained variability across level-2 units. 
Multilevel modelling allows the use of random coefficients for level-2 variables, whose 
effect can be estimated and tested. This is of crucial importance for this inquiry, as
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level-2 factors (such as regionalist assertiveness) are at the centre of its explanatory 
framework.
The second limitation of ANCOVA (and advantage of multilevel modelling) 
emerges in cases such as the present one, where level-2 units only contain relatively few 
level-1 units, and the additional assumption of "exchangeability" among level-2 units 
can be made (Snijders and Bosker 1999: 43-44). Formally, this assumption requires that 
level-2 effects are independently and identically distributed. "Stated less formally: the 
unexplained group effects are governed by 'mechanisms' that are roughly similar from 
one group to the next, and operate independently between the groups" (Snijders and 
Bosker 1999: 43). If this is the case, level-2 effects are treated as belonging to one 
distribution, which "helps counteract the paucity of the data that is implied by a 
relatively small" size of level-2 units (Snijders and Bosker 1999: 43). With dummy 
variables, on the contrary, each context is independent from the other, rather than 
coming from one distribution; to use dummy variables here is like running n separate 
models, one for each context. Finally, if there is a high number of level 2 units, the 
dummy variable approach requires a correspondingly high number of variables, which 
is "not very efficient nor parsimonious" (Hox and Kreft 1994: 287).
Given the same assumption of "exchangeability" and normality for the distributions 
of random coefficients, multilevel modelling also efficiently deals with "imbalance" in 
the data which arises when level-2 groups have different sizes. Indeed, the estimation 
procedure of multilevel software, the RIGLS procedure in the present case,116 takes into 
account the fact that information is not equally present in all level 2 groups. It weights 
down the contribution to the estimation of coefficients made by small level 2 units when 
they show extreme values.
To sum-up, in the present case, multilevel modelling allows one to study the effect 
on level-1 variables (here, success of the independents) of independent variables that 
can be either other level-1 variables (e.g. incumbency) or level-2 variables (e.g. support 
of regional governor). It also allows for the estimation of interactions between level-1
116 The estimation procedure utilised in the following chapters of analysis is called "Restricted Iterative 
Generalised Least Squares" (RIGLS). This procedure, introduced by Goldstein, is somewhat slower but 
more precise than the alternative provided in MLwiN, "Iterative Generalised Least Squares" (IGLS) 
(Goldstein 1986).
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and level-2 variables. All these advantages are had while taking into account the 
hierarchical structure of the data (Stoker and Bowers 2002: 241).
The general characteristics and equations for multilevel models are presented below. 
The first step is to consider the equation for a conventional, one-level regression. This 
corresponds to what is called micro model in the multilevel jargon. If the data structure 
is two-level hierarchical, with level-1 units nested within level-2 groups (e.g. SMDs 
nested in regions117), the micro model with two fixed predictors can be written as:
Yy =  P oX o +  P lX n j  +  /?2 X 2ij + S y  ( 1)
Where the indexes i and j  represent level-1 units and level-2 groups, respectively. Yy 
indicates the estimated value of the dependent variable for each unit. Yy is a linear 
combination of the constant xo; two independent variables xjy + X2y(i and j  indexed, i.e. 
measured at the level of units); and the residual "unexplained" variance around 
predicted values, sy, also measured at unit level.
In this hypothetical model all variables can take different values for each observed 
unit, as indicated by their i and j  indexes, but the effects (coefficients) of the variables 
are fixed. Indeed, the coefficients are not i and j  indexed and represent the average 
effect across all units. This is the approach of conventional, one-level, OLS regression. 
In this model, the residual term sy is considered "error", a nuisance, the amount of 
variability around predicted values Yy that the model cannot "explain".
Multilevel modelling is still regression-based, but aims at explicitly modelling the 
residual variance Sy. Instead of considering it "error", it investigates whether this 
variability has structure that can be accounted for by allowing the coefficients for the 
constant and the predictors to vary across level-2 groups.
In its simplest form, a multilevel model only includes the constant (or "intercept") as 
predictor. This model is called the "Null model" because no predictors are entered. We 
can write it as:
Yy = (3oij (2)
The j  and i indexes indicate that the parameter is allowed to vary across groups and 
across units within groups. It therefore equals a fixed value /3o (the "grand mean" or the
117 For brevity, in this section, level-1 units (SMDs) will be referred to simply as "units" and level-2 units 
(regions) as "groups".
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mean Y  value across all units, in all groups), plus a group-specific differential n y ,  and a 
unit-specific differential eoif.:
fioj = Po + IM)j + eoy (3)
When, in addition to the constant, the effect of one of the independent variables is also 
allowed to be random (i.e. to be estimated), the coefficient for this variable takes the j  
index (4):
Yy = fioj + PijXiij + & x2ij  + £ij (4)
In model (4) only the constant and ft, are random at level-2. In addition to the macro 
model for the constant (3), another can be written in which the coefficient of xj is the 
dependent variable:
fiij = /5y+ Hij (5)
Where the coefficient (slope) of the independent variable x\ is the result of the fixed, 
average effect, plus a level-2 specific differential (/X;y), the result is a distribution of 
coefficients (slopes). Both the constant and the slope /3/,-are assumed to be normally 
distributed random variables with a mean equal to their fixed value (j% and /3y, 
respectively), and with a standard deviation equal to the square root of the variance of 
their differentials (fioj and jiij, respectively).
Substituting (3) and (5) into (4) leads to:
Yij ~ @0 ~^ IM)j 4 (&] 4  fl>lj)X]ij "I" @2X2ij £\j (b)
For clarity, on the right hand side of the equation, the fixed part of the model is usually 
written first and the random part second:
Yij fio filXnj "I" @2X2ij 4" fiQj 4  fl]j Xjfj 4  £y (7)
The random part (fioj 4 ^ijXuj + £y) has two components, level-2 residuals (/' indexed) 
and level-1 residuals (i and j  indexed). This division of the random part into two levels 
is what makes the model a multilevel one. Because of the term iiijXjy (due to the random 
slope), level-2 residuals are not independent of x, as assumed in conventional one-level 
OLS; instead, the variability around predicted values of Y  (variance) varies for different 
levels of x. This is known as heteroskedasticity. Level-2 variance can depend on x either 
linearly (8) or quadratically (9):
Level-2 var (Yy I xnj) = var(iioj) 4  2cov(/^, \ii) x }ij (8)
Level-2 var (Yy I xhj) = var(/%) + 2cov(/%, fi}) xnj 4  var(/x;) x n f  (9)
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In this model, level-1 variance is simply var(fy). However, complex variability 
(heterogeneity) can also be modelled at level-1 as a function (linear or quadratic) o fx  
(heteroskedasticity at level-1), when x  is allowed to be random at level 1. In that case, 
the random part at level 1 will be (£oy + £iy xjy), and its linear and quadratic variance 
functions will be (10) and (11), respectively.
Level-1 var (Yy I xjy) = var(%) + 2cov(e0y , £jy) xiy (10)
Level-1 Var (Yy | Xnj) = Var(£0y) + 2COv(%, £iy) Xjy + Var(ffyy) Xiy (11)
In addition to modelling heteroskedasticity, or complex variability, at level 1 and 2, 
multilevel modelling allows the analyst to try and explain this variability. It has already 
been noted that the random, residual, part of a multilevel model has at least two parts, 
one for each level. By entering additional level-1 and level-2 variables, it is possible to 
reduce the residuals at level-1 and at level-2 respectively. However, given the causal 
framework to be tested here, the most interesting option is to try and explain why the 
coefficients of variables random at level-2 vary across groups. In other words, if there is 
significant variation in the effect of a variable across groups, a group-level variable 
could be responsible. This means that the coefficients for the constant and for the x  will 
depend on this level-2 variable (Wjj):
0Oj = 00 + CtjWjj + llOj (12)
B ij =  0 i+  ct-2 Wjj + (iij ( 13)
Substituting (12) and (13) into (4), leads to:
Yy = 1Qo + ajWjj + fioj + (0i+ a2Wjj + Hij)xiy + fc x2y + £y (14)
and, re-arranging into fixed and random parts:
Yy = 00 +  CL! W]j + 0]Xn+ tyWjjXn  + 02 x 2y + /% + fLjjXjy + £y (15)
The random part is unchanged, compared to (7), while in the fixed part there is a term 
for the main effect of the group-level variable (a/Wjj) ,  and an interaction term 
(a2W]jXii). This is the specification of a multilevel model with a cross-level interaction.
Such interaction can be entered and tested in the model to explain a significant 
random slope of a level-1 variable. But it can also be entered when the level-1 variable 
does not have a significant random slope, if there are substantive expectations of the 
interaction (Snijders and Bosker 1999: 74-75).
From this review of the general features of multilevel modelling, three kinds of 
specifications emerge as typical. Firstly, the most simple specification of the "Null,
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random intercept model"; secondly, the specification with "random intercept and 
random slope/s"; and thirdly, models with cross-level interactions. These types of 
models are estimated for each of the three elections in the next chapters. In the present 
study the analysis is run with a software specifically designed for multilevel modelling, 
MLwiN (version 1.10.0006). Among different types of software specifically designed 
for multilevel modelling, MLwiN is the "most extensive multilevel package" (Snijders 
and Bosker 1999:243).'18
Conclusion
This chapter completed the presentation of the preliminary information necessary to set 
up the statistical models discussed in the next chapters. This task has involved several 
steps. Firstly, it was necessary to explain the reasons behind the adopted 
operationalisation of the dependent variable: the "success of the independents". Four 
possible measurements of this dimension have been discussed and the case has been 
made for choosing the measure consisting of the joint vote share received collectively 
by the independents in a given SMD.
Secondly, the arguments for taking the electoral district as the unit of analysis and for 
an inclusive strategy of case selection have also been presented. All districts for which 
there are electoral returns are included in the analysis. Furthermore, ensuring an 
appreciation of the multilevel (or nested) nature of the data structure was crucial in 
order to make clear the connected statistical problems of autocorrelation, and the 
necessity for a relatively new (in electoral studies) technique of quantitative analysis - 
multilevel modelling.
This section has argued for the substantive and technical advantages of this technique 
over more conventional tools of quantitative analysis, such as one-level OLS regression. 
The formal characteristics of the multilevel equations have also been illustrated. They 
form the basis for the estimated models of independents' success discussed in the next 
three chapters. Moreover, procedures have been suggested to deal with the complex
118 MLwiN is written by members of the London Institute of Education. Further information can be found 
at the Institute's website (www.ioe.ac.uk1.
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causal order, and the related mediating effects, posited by the explanatory framework of 
chapter 3.
Next chapter analyses the first multiparty election of post-communist Russia under 
the prism of the explanatory framework described in chapters 3, with the operational 
definitions of chapter 4, and with the design outlined in this chapter. Due to problems in 
data availability for the 1993 vote, the empirical models will be tested in their full extent 
beginning with the analysis of the 1995 Duma elections.
6The 1993 Duma Elections
"The logic o f  post-com m unist revolutions offers a 
parsim onious and convincing explanation fo r  the 
defeat o f  Russia's Choice. However, this level o f  
analysis leaves several questions . . . unanswered 
and cannot explain several important paradoxes o f  
the Russian ca se . . . .  Why, fo r  instance, did Russia's 
Choice win 27.1 percent o f  the popular vote in 
Perm ' oblast, but only 16.7 in Samara oblast, two 
regions with sim ilar economic profiles and  
geographic location?"
Michael McFaul (1998: 132)
This thesis aims to contribute to solving the kind of "important paradox" that McFaul 
highlights in the epigraph. The essay from which it is taken is concerned with 
explaining the defeat of the pro-Kremlin party "Russia's Choice" in the PR tier of the 
1993 Duma elections.119 By contrast, this thesis only deals with the SMD tier. However, 
the same kind of paradox is also generated by geographic variations in SMD results.
This chapter is the first of three that put to test the explanatory framework presented 
in chapter 3, with the data described in chapter 4 and the design outlined in chapter 5. 
The first section provides the necessary background information on the political context 
of the election. The estimated statistical models are subsequently presented. As detailed 
in the preceding chapters, the empirical analysis consists of predicting the joint vote 
share obtained by the independent candidates running in each of 219 SMDs. The 
statistical technique adopted is multilevel modelling, with the SMD as the unit of 
analysis, and explanatory variables applied at the level of both regions and SMDs. The
119 Cross-regional variations in support are not the primary focus of his essay, and McFaul does not 
provide a satisfactory answer to the "paradox" he poses.
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main hypothesis is that the independents offered a better channel of representation for 
territorial cleavages than political parties. Therefore, other factors being equal, these 
candidates are expected to be more successful where territorial cleavages are prominent. 
During the 1990s, such territorial cleavages emerged in Russia in proportion to levels of 
regionalist assertiveness (regional autonomy demands). This variable should provide a 
significant contribution to the explanation of cross-regional variations in the success of 
independent candidates. Due to limited data availability, compared to the 1995 and 1999 
models, the analysis of the 1993 vote for the independents is carried out through a 
simpler model specification, which allows the testing of only a subset of the hypotheses 
included in the explanatory framework.
6.1 Background
The 1993 Duma vote was the first competitive election after the collapse of the Soviet 
system, which means it was the first meaningful and competitive mass vote in Russian 
history.120 However, the political context surrounding the vote was particularly difficult, 
as the election was called at the end of a bitter institutional struggle between the 
presidency and the parliament. The conflict, which had been escalating in the months 
preceding the vote, was rooted in the unclear separation of power between the two 
organs of federal government, and in the parliamentary opposition to the economic 
reforms of the government. After a protracted period of confrontation and stalemate, on 
September 21, Yeltsin disbanded the assembly by decree and called for new elections to 
be held on December 12. It took the storming of the parliament by armed forces to 
quash the resistance of several hundred deputies to Yeltsin’s decree. Some opposition 
leaders had also called for popular action against the president.
The date for Duma elections was to have been the subject of presidential- 
parliamentary negotiations and had not yet been set before the institutional conflict 
came to a head in late September. The announcement that the Duma vote was to be held
120 In November 1917, Russian citizens voted for the Constituent Assembly after the fall of the Tsarist 
regime. The Assembly, however, was soon disbanded by the Bolsheviks, in January 1918.
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on December 12 gave parties only two and a half months to prepare. Six out of thirteen 
parties competing in the proportional tier were founded in this short period.
For the voters, the hurried campaign was confusing for additional reasons, such as 
the fact that candidates' party affiliation was not reported on the ballot paper.121 
Moreover, the informational cost that any voter is required to bear in order to cast a 
meaningful vote was multiplied by the fact that, in addition to the vote for the Duma, 
voters in the 1993 elections were asked to cast their vote for the election of the higher 
chamber of the Parliament (the Federation Council), for the referendum on the new 
constitution, and, in some cases, for the election of local governmental bodies.
The contestants
Although political parties were legalised in 1990, with the exception of the 1991 
presidential election, when Democratic Russia helped Yeltsin become president, prior to 
1993 they lacked electoral incentives to organise and mobilise voters. By the time of the 
1993 elections, parties were little more than parliamentary factions, deprived of 
meaningful organisations on the ground. Even the Communists (KPRF), who inherited 
the sizeable local organisations of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, were far 
less effective than they would become in the next two years.
The Communist party had in fact been banned by presidential decree in 1991, for its 
involvement in the reactionary August putsch. On 30 November 1992, the 
Constitutional Court, while confirming the ban against communist federal level 
organisations, denied that it could apply to local branches. This ruling increased the 
fragmentation of the leftist political spectrum, and spurred the emergence of the 
Agrarian Party (APR). When the communist party was reinstated in February 1993 as 
the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), it took the shape of a loose 
association of diverse regional organisations (Golosov 1999: 1336). Following the crisis 
in the Autumn of 1993, Yeltsin outlawed the KPRF again on October 4, together with 
other organisations (especially right nationalist). The party was subsequently re­
legalised at the end of October and joined the electoral campaign (Colton 1998: 8, 12). 
In 1993, in any case, the KPRF did not yet possess a solid organisation in many regions,
121 This analysis is not handicapped by the same lack o f information since 96 percent o f SMD party 
candidates also appeared in their party's PR list, almost always in the subsection of the region where they 
were standing (Colton 1998: 21).
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where local branches were riven by internal conflicts. In Kursk oblast, for example, both 
independent communist or agrarian candidates and official communist candidates 
competed with each other in the same SMD in the Duma vote that year (Melvin 1998b: 
507-8).
In the PR tier, thirteen parties managed to gather 100,000 signatures and appeared on 
the ballot paper. Signatures had to be collected in at least seven different units of the 
federation (i.e. no more than 15% in any single region).122 On the proportional half of 
the ballot, the ideological spectrum of the contestants ranged from the pro-reform, pro- 
Yeltsin, Russia's Choice sponsored by the Kremlin, to the nationalist opposition of the 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) led by Zhirinovsky, the communist 
opposition of the KPRF and of the Agrarian Party of Russia (APR). More moderate pro­
reform parties included Yabloko and the Kremlin-supported "Party of Russian Unity 
and Accord" (PRES), while centrist positions were advocated by the Democratic Party 
of Russia (DPR), and by "Women of Russia". The remaining five parties on the ballot -  
i.e. the industrialists' group "Civic Union", the ecologist KEDR and other smaller 
formations -  did not cross the 5% barrier of representation.
In the majoritarian tier of the election, 1520 candidates ran in 225 districts. However, 
the election was boycotted in 6 SMDs, bringing the total to 219 (with 1502
1 9^candidates). Contrary to what would happen in the subsequent two Duma elections, 
all political parties and electoral blocs running in the PR tier also nominated candidates 
in the SMDs, and all parties running in the SMDs also ran in the PR tier. The total 
number of independent candidates in the districts was 820 (54%), while party 
candidates made up the remaining 700 (46%). The ranking of parties according to their 
nomination effort in the SMDs is reported in Table 6.1. It emerges that the best locally 
rooted parties were Yabloko, APR, and Civic Union, in addition to the parties of the 
Kremlin: Russia's Choice and PRES.
122 This requirement will become stricter in 1995, when the minimum number o f regions where signatures 
should be collected will become 15 (i.e. no more than 7% of the signatures could come from any single 
unit).
123 The election was not held in the one district of Chechnya and was boycotted in the 5 districts of 
Tatarstan.
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Table 6.1: Party nominations in the SMDs (totals)124
Party No. of No. of SuccessCands. Winners Rate
Russia's Choice 103 25 24.3%
Yabloko 85 6 7.1%
Civic Union 72 7 9.7%
Agrarian Party of Russia 69 16 23.2%
PRES 63 3 4.8%
LDPR 60 6 10.0%
RDDR 59 5 8.5%
Democratic Party of Russia 58 1 1.7%
KPRF 55 10 18.2%
Russia's Future - New names 33 1 3.0%
KEDR 22 0 0.0%
Dignity and Charity 15 3 20.0%
Women of Russia 6 2 33.3%
Independents 820 134 16.3%
PRES, Party of Russian Unity and Concord.
LDPR, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.
RDDR, Russian movement for democratic reforms. 
KPRF, Communist Party of the Russian Federation. 
KEDR, Constructive ecological movement of Russia. 
Source: elaborated from CEC data.
In contrast to patterns of party territorial penetration that will become established 
later on, it is remarkable to note that in 1993, the communists (KPRF) could nominate 
their candidates in only half as many SMDs as Russia’s Choice, or in a quarter of the 
total. By contrast, the organisational strength of the agrarian APR was also already 
suggested by the fact that it presented the largest number of signatures. Its 500,000 
signatures were well in excess of the 100,000 required; the average party only presented 
170,000 signatures (Colton 1998: 17).
It is important to note that none of the parties registered for the 1993 elections can be 
defined as a regionalist party. On the contrary, inaugurating a well-established pattern, 
most parties in 1993 were based in Moscow and dominated by Moscow elites. With the 
partial exception of PRES, party programmes advocated greater centralisation in federal 
relations. Centralisation was proposed for different reasons, ranging from the right-wing
124 In 1993, some parties formally supported two candidates in the same SMD. The parties APR, Russia's 
Choice, Civic Union, and RDDR did so in two SMDs each; while Yabloko, PRES, and DPR did so in one
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nationalistic position of the LDPR that entailed a strong, unitary state, to the 
paternalistic view of the "liberals" that ethnic regions cannot by themselves live up to 
the standards of democracy. In 1993, the only party trying to appeal to the autonomy 
aspirations of the regions was PRES. This can help explain the relatively good 
performance of that party in highly assertive regions such as Bashkortostan in the PR 
section of the vote (Hale 1998: 613). PRES may reasonably have represented the lesser 
evil for regionalist voters compared to the centralising position of the other parties in the 
PR section. However, in the SMDs, where voters usually have the option not to vote for 
any party and instead vote for an independent, PRES did not fare very well. In 
Bashkortostan, only one of the six winners was a PRES candidate, the others were four 
independents and one agrarian. Generally, in the SMD tier PRES only achieved three 
victories out of 62 SMDs contested.
Federal relations in the 1991-1993 period
Following the main hypothesis posited by the explanatory framework of this work the 
state of centre-regional relations is an important element of the political context of the 
vote. The salience of this dimension was heightened in 1993 by the fact that on the same 
day of the Duma vote, a new draft constitution was to be approved in a national 
referendum. The “key sticking point" (Lapidus and Walker 1995: 98) during the process 
of drafting the constitution had been precisely that of centre-regional relations. Indeed, 
of the three periods leading-up to the three Duma elections analysed in this study, the 
1991-1993 phase was characterised by the highest levels of fluidity in federal relations. 
This is not surprising in view of the fact that the collapse of the Soviet system in 1991 
dramatically opened-up the necessity of defining the federal bargain anew.
In the last year of existence of the Soviet Union (1991), the government of what was 
then called the Russian Socialist Federative Republic (RSFSR) could not afford 
antagonising its internal units because it was struggling with the USSR government to 
gain sovereignty. This phase was marked by the conflict between Yeltsin and 
Gorbachev, which induced each side to outbid the other in an attempt to muster the 
support of the ethnic republics within Russia.
SMD each. This means that the number of SMDs contested for those parties is lower than the number of 
candidates supported.
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Already in August 1990, during his visit to Tatarstan, Yeltsin pronounced his famous' 
statement that autonomous units should "take as much sovereignty as they can swallow". 
His attitude began to change in view of the new Union Treaty promoted by Gorbachev 
and of the demands of assertive regions, such as Tatarstan, which demanded to sign the 
Treaty with equal status as the RSFSR. Tatarstan also started boycotting federal 
elections with the June 1991 Russian presidential election (Lapidus and Walker 1995: 
84), continuing with the 1993 Duma elections.
Moreover, replicating the example of Union Republics, between July 1990 and July 
1991, all autonomous formations within the Russian Federation declared their 
sovereignty, including the four autonomous oblasts which would be upgraded to 
"autonomous republics" in 1991. The pre-1993 period also saw explicit acts of regional 
defiance towards federal authorities, such as the withholding of federal taxes, or the 
issuing of separate surrogate currencies, in response to the shortages and chaos created 
by the inflation of spring and summer 1992.
One of the arenas where regional regionalist assertiveness emerged most clearly is 
the negotiations over the Federal Treaty (finally signed 12 March 1992), which was to 
settle centre-regional relations and divide spheres of authority. While Chechnya and 
Tatarstan refused to sign, thus expressing a radical anti-centralist position, some other 
regions managed to extract special concessions in addenda to the treaty or in agreements 
connected to it. Bashkortostan's signature to the treaty, for example, can only be 
explained with reference to the special rights it obtained from Moscow shortly before 
the signing. These included the "right of ownership of natural resources on its territory, 
freedom to engage directly in foreign economic transactions, and the right to an 
independent system of taxation. Earlier, the Bashkortostan parliament had voted to 
suspend the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation's new Constitutional Court on its 
territory" {Moscow News, No. 16, p.5, in Lapidus and Walker 1995: fn.24). Other units 
that were to obtain large extensions of autonomy from secret addenda to the treaty 
include the Republics of Komi and Karelia. Autonomous okrugs were given equal status 
to the oblasts, ending their formal subordination to the regions in which they are located.
The Federal Treaty reflected a rather decentralised conception of federalism and 
recognised extensive rights for the republics. On the other hand, this spurred the 
resentment of ordinary regions, especially the net contributors to the federal budget,
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which did not obtain special privileges with the treaty. Some oblasts formed inter­
regional associations, the most important being the associations of regions in the Urals, 
in Siberia and in the Far East (Hughes 2002: 48). These inter-regional associations 
contained the potential to develop into an arena for collective mobilisation vis-a-vis the 
federal centre. Of eight such experiments, only the "Great Urals Association" did in fact 
have what could be seen as a phase of high anti-centralist activism. Even though co­
ordination ultimately failed, the governor of Sverdlovsk oblast, Rossel, declared a Urals 
Republic. Other oblasts made self-declarations of their republican status independently 
from the association to which they belonged to.
As in 1990-1991, also in 1992-1993 the bargaining position of the federal centre 
towards the regions was weak, this time due to the aforementioned executive-legislative 
conflict. When the latter conflict ended with Yeltsin's victory and the disbanding of the 
federal parliament in October 1993, a degree of recentralisation was obtained. The 
disbanding of the parliament spurred the disbanding of regional soviets and the 
dismissal of the regional governors who had opposed the president, including Rossel 
(Petrov 1999: 59).
In the meantime, agreement on a new constitutional text was proving elusive due to 
disagreements between republics on one side, and oblasts and krays on the other. 
Tatarstan withdrew from the negotiations in disappointment over the reduction in 
autonomy that was emerging from the draft text. The fmalisation of a draft was 
precipitated by the abrupt solution to the institutional conflict between the Russian 
presidency and the parliament. As mentioned, Yeltsin forcibly disbanded the parliament, 
called for new parliamentary elections and for a simultaneous referendum on the new 
constitution. Chechnya did not hold the vote, and Tatarstan boycotted it. Persuaded by 
side deals struck with Yeltsin, some other assertive regions, such as Sakha republic, did 
endorse the constitution; but only as a temporary solution and with qualifications.
This brief and sketchy account only serves as an indication of the political problems 
surrounding federal relations in the period leading-up to the 1993 Duma vote. In the 
statistical models below the quantitative indicator of regionalist assertiveness derives 
from Dowley’s index, as described in chapter 4. The effect of regionalist assertiveness 
should be investigated while controlling for instances of central appeasement of 
regional demands. It has been noted that in the period leading-up to the 1993 Duma
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elections, key examples of appeasement are constituted by the granting of important 
privileges to selected regions in order to induce them to sign the Federation Treaty of 
March 1992. These regions are the republics of Bashkortostan, Kalmikiya, Karelia, 
Komi and Sakha (Kahn 2002: 126; Treisman 1999: 34). Two other groups of regions 
received appeasing concessions from the centre: the Soviet-era Autonomous oblasts 
whose status was upgraded to that of "republic" in 1991 (the republics of Adygeya, 
Altay, Karachaevo-Cherkessya, and Khakassya); and the units whose Yeltsin-appointed 
heads of regional administration were removed by Yeltsin to appease local elites 
(Krasnodar Kray, Krasnoyarsk Kray, Voronezh Oblast, and Pskov Oblas) (Matsuzato 
2000). These three sets of regions are considered "politically appeased" in the models.
6.2 Analysis
It is important to recall from chapter 5 that the success of the independents (dependent 
variable) is measured as the share of the district vote obtained jointly by all the non­
partisans.125 It follows that the unit of analysis is not the individual candidate, but the 
electoral district (SMD). Moreover, while the models to follow are regression-based, 
conventional single-level OLS regression is not a satisfactory quantitative tool in this 
case, due to the nested data structure (SMDs are grouped within regions). This suggests 
the need for a multilevel analysis, whose features have been discussed in chapter 5. This 
technique allows one to partition the variance of the election outcome into two portions, 
one at the level of regions and another at the level of SMDs. Variable coefficients 
(effects) are allowed to be random (i.e. to be estimated) to account for such residual 
variability. For this reason, the models in the tables below include a random part in 
addition to the conventional fixed part of single-level designs.
It should also be remembered here that regionalist assertiveness can be measured 
with two variables, drawing from Dowley's data, based on two time periods of different 
length preceding the vote. The variable labelled "Dow88-93" is an average of 
assertiveness scores recorded over the wider time lapse (1988 to 1993), while "Dow92- 
93" reflects evidence of assertiveness recorded only in the last two years before the vote
125 The merits of this approach compared to alternative ones are discussed in chapter 5.
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(1992 to 1993). See Table A.4.1 in the Appendix for the scores of individual regions on 
these variables. Both measures are used in alternative models.
As argued in chapter 3, to correctly evaluate the impact of regional levels of anti­
centralist assertiveness on the success of the independents, the model should control for 
instances of central appeasement of regionalist demands. This is done through the 
variable "PolApp" (for "political appeasement") which is a dichotomous variable 
separating the regions which received political appeasement from the rest. 126 
Additionally, a variable measuring the size of direct central financial transfers to the 
regions tentatively controls for the possibility that regions are either dependent on the 
centre or financially appeased by it. This test is tentative because the real extent of 
centre-regional financial flows results from a large number of channels that are not 
easily detected.
As posited in the explanatory framework, regional level factors can only have a 
"distant" impact on district results. More proximate influences need to be found in the 
strategic setting unfolding in each electoral district. One key aspect of this setting is the 
presence of party candidates who can challenge the independents. Given the state of 
Russian political parties, especially at this early stage, and given the conditions 
surrounding the abrupt call of the vote, parties cannot simply be assumed to pose a 
strong challenge to independents in the districts, where territorial presence is crucial to 
success. Rather, it is two types of parties that can be expected to have a negative impact 
on independents’ success: 1) parties that are relatively more visible (nationally) and can 
thus provide name recognition for their candidates, and 2) parties with genuine local 
roots, or with at least a regionalist theme in their campaigning.
This causal relationship is complicated by the fact that parties choose where to 
nominate candidates strategically, i.e. on the basis of expected chances of victory. If 
levels of regionalist assertiveness affect the prospects of national parties, as argued in 
chapter 3, and if parties are aware of this dynamic, they will tend to avoid highly 
assertive regions. Thus, the party challenge variable is partly endogenous to the model, 
influenced by regionalist assertiveness. The latter variable, in turn, will have an indirect 
effect on the success of the independents, mediated by the strategic entry decisions of
126 The criteria for the coding were presented in chapter 4 with the operational definition of variables.
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political parties. This means that, in the estimated models, the coefficient of regionalist 
assertiveness should drop when the party variables are entered.
Furthermore, party campaigning is hampered by climatic and geographic conditions 
that make some voters more difficult to reach, thus improving the chances for the 
independents and negatively affecting the endogenous variables for party challenge. The 
physical accessibility of regions is rendered by the variable "Remote" for each region's 
share of population located in remote areas, as defined in chapter 4. Finally, a variable 
for urbanisation is considered to control for the traditional Rokkanian hypothesis that 
political parties thrive in urban environments, before attempting to penetrate the 
countryside. Due to 1993 data constraints, more variables and hypotheses will be 
discussed in connection to the 1995 and 1999 elections.
A summary description of the distribution of the explanatory variables is available in 
Table 6.2.127 Six variables have continuous or scale measurements. In the models, these 
have been centred around their overall mean in order to allow for a meaningful 
interpretation of the estimated coefficient of the constant and of the interaction terms in 
the models.
The following section presents the estimated models and coefficients. The 
presentation of statistical results follows several steps, through which increasing 
complexity is introduced in the models by means of additional sets of variables. In this 
way, it is possible to note the effect of the new variables on the coefficients of those 
already included. Finally, random terms (beyond the constant) are considered in the last 
specifications. It turns out that only the effect of "presence of a Russia's Choice 
candidate" varies significantly across regions, therefore "RuChoice" is the only random 
variable at level 2 and level 1 in the last model (model 5, Table 6.5). The last model is 
the most complete possible with the available data. The multilevel equation of the 
complete model is anticipated here to motivate the estimations of the models. The 
equation includes all variables belonging to the explanatory framework discussed in 
chapter 3 and follows the format of the general multilevel equation presented in the 
previous chapter. The "micro model" is:
127 The dependent variable, independents' success, has been described in the introduction to the thesis and 
in chapter 5.
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Yy = ft,- (CONS) + f t  (DOW92-93); + f t  (POLAPP),- + f t  (TRANSF)j 
+ f t  (REMOTE),- + f t  (URBAN)/,- + f t  (PRES)y + f t  (LDPR)y + f t  (APR)/,
+ ft,- (RUCHOICE)/, + fto (YABL)y + f t /  (DIGN&CH) y + f t2 (DPR)/,
+ f t /  (CIVICUN)y + f t ,  (KPRF)y + f t5 (KEDR)y + f t  * (WOFRUSS)y 
+ f t  7 (RUSFUT)/, + fts  (RDDR)/, + £ij 
Where the coefficients for CONS and RUCHOICE are random, thus requiring two 
"macro models": 
f t /  =  f t  +  IM)j
&9j ~  f t  +  fl9j +  e?y
Substituting the four macro models into the micro model, and rearranging with the fixed 
part preceding the random part, the equation takes the following form:
Yy = f t  (CONS) + f t  (DOW92-93), + f t  (POLAPP),- + f t  (TRANSF),-
+ f t  (REMOTE), + f t  (URBAN)y + f t  (PRES)/, + f t  (LDPR)y + f t  (APR)/,
+ f t  (RUCHOICE)y + f t 0 (YABL)/, + f t / (DIGN&CH) /, + f t 2 (DPR)/,
+ f t /  (CIVICUN)/, + f t ,  (KPRF)y + f t 5 (KEDR)/, + f t 6 (WOFRUSS)y 
+ f t 7(RUSFUT)/, + fts(RDDR)/,- + fioj (CONS) + fly (RUCHOICE)
+ ea (RUCHOICE) + e/W (No RUCHOICE)/,
The term e/py (No RUCHOICE),;, is due to the fact that the dummy for Russia's Choice 
is allowed to vary at level 1 and that "separate coding", instead of contrast coding, was 
used to specify the variable.
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Table 6.2: Variables used in the models o f the 1993 election, descriptive statistics
Hypothesis Level
Variable
Label
Type of 
Variable Description
Categorical: Percent 
of cases (N) Mean
Std.
Dev. Min. Max. Cases Missing
Regionalist
assertiveness
2 DOW88-93 Continuous Average score on Dowley's 
index based on 1988-93 
observations
2.9 0.6 1.6 4.4 225 0
2 DOW92-93 Continuous As above but based on 1992- 
93 observations
2.9 0.6 1.3 4.6 225 0
Appeasement 2 POLAPP Categorical Region received political 
appeasement
0
1
86.2% (194) 
13.8% (31)
225 0
2 TRANSF Continuous Financial transfers from Centre 
to region
18.7 20.5 0 94.1 224 1
Geographic 
accessibility of 
region
2 REMOTE Continuous Percent of regional population 
living in difficult areas
0.1 0.2 0 1.0 224 1
Party challenge 1 KPRF Categorical Candidate nominated by 
"KPRF" is running
0
1
75.6% (170) 
24.4% (55)
225 0
1 LDPR Categorical Candidate nominated by 
"LDPR" is running
0
1
73.3% (165) 
26.7% (60)
225 0
Table continues on next page .
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Table 6.2: continued.
Variable Type of Categorical: Percent of Std.
Hypothesis Level Label_______ Variable Description______________________ cases (N)________Mean Dev. Min. Max. Cases Missing
1 YABL Categorical Candidate nominated by 0 62.7% (141) 225 0
"Yabloko" is running 1 37.3% (84)
1 WOFRUSS Categorical Candidate nominated by 0 97.3% (219) 225 0
"Women of Russia" is running 1 2.7% (6)
1 KEDR Categorical Candidate nominated by 0 90.2% (203) 225 0
"KEDR" is running 1 9.8% (22)
1 PRES Categorical Candidate nominated by 0 72.4% (163) 225 0
"PRES" is running 1 27.6% (62)
1 APR Categorical Candidate nominated by 0 70.2% (158) 225 0
"APR" is running 1 29.8% (67)
1 RUCHOICE Categorical Candidate nominated by 0 55.1% (126) 225 0
"Russia's Choice" is running 1 44.9% (101)
1 DIGN&CH Categorical Candidate nominated by 0 86.4% (110) 225 0
"Dignity and Charity" is running 1 13.6% (15)
1 RUSFUT Categorical Candidate nominated by 0 82.8% (192) 225 0
"Russia's Future" is running 1 17.2% (33)
1 DPR Categorical Candidate nominated by 0 66.1% (168) 225 0
"DPR" is running 1 33.9% (57)
Table continues on next page.
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Table 6.2: continued.
Hypothesis Level
Variable
Label
Type of 
Variable Description
Categorical: Percent of
cases (N) Mean
Std.
Dev. Min. Max. Cases Missing
1 CIVICUN Categorical Candidate nominated by "Civic 
Union" is running
0 54.8% (155)
1 45.2% (70)
225 0
1 RDDR Categorical Candidate nominated by 
"RDDR" is running
0 66.1% (168) 
1 33.9% (57)
225 0
Control 1 URBAN Continuous Percent of population living in 
urban centres
72.4 21.2 18.6 100.0 225 0
Note: in the models, all continuous variables have been mean-centred, in order to facilitate the interpretation of the constant.
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The models
Tables 63-6.5 present the six estimated models (numbered 0 to 5) for the 1993 elections. 
In the tables, each column is devoted to one model, and the fixed part is followed by a 
random part, as explained in the section on the general multilevel model in chapter 5. 
The random part contains the variance in the success of independents occurring at level 
2 (regions) and, below, the variance occurring at level 1 (SMDs). It should be 
remembered that when there is only one random term at a given level the variance at 
that level is simply the variance of the random term. On the other hand, when there is 
more than one random term, the variance is jointly defined by their variances and 
covariances.128 In that case, it is not sufficient to look at the significance of each 
individual term to determine whether the variance at that level is significantly different 
from zero, but a joint test is necessary. Such a test is reported for the most important and 
complete models. Furthermore, the conventional t-test for significance of individual 
coefficients is only valid for fixed terms (those appearing only in the fixed part).129 An 
"R" indicates that the term is random and that its significance cannot be assessed with 
the t-test. Rather, the question becomes the significance of the overall variance to which 
that variable contributes at a given level.
The simplest multilevel model presented in Table 6.3 is Model 0, the "Null Model". 
This includes only the constant as predictor, which represents the overall, all-Russian, 
mean success of the independents.130 In addition, because the constant is allowed to be 
random at level 2 and level 1, it is possible to formally assess the variability of 
independents' success across regions and across SMDs within regions, thus adding to 
the impressionistic presentation of the spatial variability given in the introduction to the 
thesis.
128 In the random part of models 5 and 6, the covariance terms are separated by "/" (e.g. 
CONS/RUCHOICE is the covariance between the constant and "RUCHOICE"). Single terms in the 
random part are individual variances.
129 For these, the conventional marking is reported to the right of the standard error in each column (* for 
a t-value greater than 1.96 and statistical significance at the 0.05 level; ** for a t-value greater than 2.58 
and significance at the 0.01 level; and, finally, *** for a t-value greater than 3.28 and significance at the 
0.001 level).
130 The coefficient of the constant in a multilevel "Null Model" represents a weighted average of the 
dependent variable, not the simple mean that single-level OLS regression would produce. The multilevel 
software MLwiN follows a complex estimation procedure (in this case called RIGLS, see chapter 5). To 
simplify matters, it can be said that the procedure takes into account the fact that some level 2 groups may 
only contain a few level 1 units, and assigns them less weight in the estimation.
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Table 6.3: Predicting independents' success. Estimated multilevel models (0-2)
Hypothesis Variable
Lev.
Model 0
Estim. S.Err.
Model 1
Estim. S.Err.
Model 2
Estim. S.Err.
Fixed part
CONS 51.245 2.083 R 51.608 2.140 R 51.797 2.176 R
Regionalist
Assertiveness
DOW92-93 2 
DOW88-93 2
11.086 3.900 “
11.973 4.434 “
Appeasement POLAPP 2 
TRANSF 2
-7.371 5.921 
0.194 0.102
-7.554 6.003 
0.188 0.103
Accessibility REMOTE 2 1.378 9.946 0.531 10.049
Control URBAN 1 -0.110 0.086 -0.120 0.086
Random part 
Level 2
CONS
Level 1
CONS
159.793 57.504 “  
430.533 51.109 *“
104.985 47.914 * 
402.306 49.750 “ *
109.477 48.627 * 
401.020 49.698 *“
-2*Log likelihood 
N
2000.650
219
1813.087
201
1813.739
201
*p < 0.05 “ p<0.01 “ *p< 0.001
Indeed, in Model 0 the portion o f variability in independents' success that occurs 
between regions (i.e. the variance at level 2) is fully described just by the variance of the 
constant at level 2, which is the only element o f the random part o f the model. Its 
significance is directly interpretable as the significance of the cross-regional differences 
in independents' success. In particular, the fact that the portion of variance belonging at 
level 2 (159.8) is significantly different from zero indicates that the phenomenon under 
study varies across regions in a more systematic fashion than would occur by chance. 
This means that a multilevel model is necessary. At the same time, however, the 
variance occurring at level 1 (430.5), across SMDs within regions, is significant and 
larger than that at level 2. The coefficient o f autocorrelation which indicates the
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of Tatarstan and the 1 district of Chechnya). When the N drops below this point, it is 
due to missing values on the independent variables.
Models 1 and 2 introduce the set of variables linked to the main hypothesis, with 
alternative measurements for regionalist assertiveness. Both in Model 1 and Model 2 the 
variable expressing the main hypothesis, regionalist assertiveness, is statistically 
significant (at p<0.01) while controlling for political appeasement ("PolApp"), for 
direct financial transfers from the centre ("Transf'), for the share of regional population 
living in remote areas ("Remote") and for the degree of district urbanisation ("Urban"). 
This means that, with 99 percent of confidence, the more assertive a region is in its 
autonomy demands, the greater the electoral chances for the independents. More 
precisely, a unit increase in assertiveness (Dow92-93) is predicted to produce an 
increase of 11 percentage points in the success of the independents. A unit increase 
corresponds, for example, to passing from a region advocating a decentralised 
federation (a score of 3 on Dowley's index) to one advocating an ethnofederal 
arrangement, with privileges for ethnic units (a score of 4 on the index). The other 
variables of models 1 and 2 are not significant and it is not possible to reject the null 
hypothesis that these variables have no effect on independents' success. The size of the 
unexplained variance at both levels has dropped, especially at level 2, due to the 
inclusion of the mentioned predictors. It can be further noted that the -2*Log likelihood 
also decreased significantly. The difference between model 0 and model 1 is about 187, 
well above 11, the critical value of the log likelihood test statistic asymptotically 
distributed as Chi-sq, with 5 degrees of freedom, at the 0.05 level of significance.
The main hypothesis of this study is therefore confirmed for the 1993 election. 
However, the explanatory framework (see chapter 3) also allows for the effect of 
regionalist assertiveness to be mediated by intervening variables at the district level. As 
the remainder of this analysis shows (models 3-5), taking into account party entry 
strategies illuminates this mediating effect, adding to the sophistication of the causal 
paths. Rather than regionalist assertiveness directly impacting upon the returns for the 
independents, it affects the decisions of parties on whether or not to contest a given 
SMD, which, in turn, affects the chances of the independents.
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This mediating effect is shown in Models 3 and 4 (Table 6.4). A series of thirteen 
dummy variables is entered, one for each political party which nominated at least one 
candidate in the 225 SMDs.
Table 6.4: Predicting independents' success. Estimated multilevel models (3-4)
Hypothesis Variable
Lev.
Model 3
Estim. S.Err.
Model 4
Estim. S.Err.
Fixed part
CONS 73.069 2.968 R 73.097 2.954 R
Regionalist DOW 92-93 2 0.687 3.669
Assertiveness DOW88-93 2 2.450 4.123
Appeasement POLAPP 2 -2.119 5.411 -2.834 5.427
TRANSF 2 0.138 0.089 0.130 0.090
Party challenge KPRF 1 -6.088 3.353 -5.943 3.354
PRES 1 -5.088 2.847 -5.155 2.849
LDPR 1 -9.457 3.234 ** -9.266 3.231 **
APR 1 -12.352 3.121 *** -12.247 3.106 ***
KEDR 1 -7.279 4.752 -7.287 4.749
RUCHOICE 1 -13.939 2.724 *** -13.876 2.728 ***
YABL 1 -6.044 2.966 * -6.019 2.964 *
DIGN&CH 1 -9.842 5.100 -9.905 5.101
WOFRUSS 1 -10.151 8.616 -9.807 8.621
RUSSFUT 1 -2.615 3.856 -2.359 3.857
DPR 1 -7.097 3.180 * -7.246 3.188 *
CIVICUN 1 -7.083 2.930 * -6.987 2.931 *
RDDR 1 1.235 3.205 1.281 3.206
Accessibility REMOTE 2 -6.869 8.640 -7.448 8.665
Control URBAN 1 0.029 0.074 0.025 0.074
Random part
Level 2
CONS 119.383 39.287 ** 116.971 38.756 **
Level 1
CONS 243.203 30.688 *** 243.858 30.803 ***
•2*Log likelihood 1714.362 1714.000
N 201 201
*p < 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p< 0.001
It is worth again noting that, contrary to conventional designs found in the literature 
for similar issues, the unit o f analysis here is the SMD, not the candidate. Obviously, 
more than one party can and do nominate candidates in the same SMD. Therefore, the
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party dummies entered here are distinct variables, not mutually exclusive states of a 
single categorical variable.
Two main points should be noted with regard to Models 3 and 4. The first interesting 
finding is that the coefficient for regionalist assertiveness sharply decreases, and indeed 
loses significance. This is consistent with the notion of parties mediating the effect of 
regionalist assertiveness, as outlined above and posited in chapter 3, and it should not 
lead one to conclude that regionalist assertiveness does not have a significant effect. The 
second point to note is that only six of the thirteen parties running in the SMDs have a 
significant impact on the chances of the independents. Indeed, as noted in chapter 2, 
most parties lacked the territorial presence or name recognition needed to perform well 
in the SMDs. Parties with significant effects are all "national" parties, in the sense that 
they lack regionalist themes or roots, with the partial exception of the agrarian party 
(APR), which is strongly organised in the territories dominated by collective farming. 
The "party of the regions", PRES, did not pose a significant threat to the independents, 
despite its potential challenge to independents’ competitive advantage in representing 
regionalist sentiments. This suggests that the true nature of the PRES as a creature of 
the Kremlin came across to the voters animated by anti-centralist sentiments, despite the 
party's regionalist rhetoric.
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) 
did challenge the independents, as did the Civic Union. The latter party, especially, is 
usually overlooked in accounts of the 1993 Duma vote because it performed poorly in 
the PR tier of the election (with 1.9 percent). In the districts, however, it made more of a 
difference than parties that received high shares of the PR vote, such as the KPRF, 
PRES, Women of Russia, and KEDR. It is also of particular interest to note the 
weakness of the communist party (KPRF) in the 1993 district races, as the party's 
territorial organisations were still fragmented (see above).
As for the magnitude of the estimates, on average the presence of a candidate of 
"Russia's Choice" reduces the chances of the independents by about as much as 14 
percentage points compared to a district not contested by the party. Similarly strong 
effects are estimated for the APR, and -  in descending order -  for the LDPR, the DPR 
and Civic Union, and Yabloko. In a hypothetical SMD where all parties with a
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significant effect enter the contest, the predicted vote share gained by the independents 
is reduced to roughly 16 percent, where all other variables have average values.
Finally, a sharp decrease in the level 1 variance between models 1-2 and 3-4 (from 
over 400 to 243) is due to the partial structuring of the cross-district variability achieved 
with the party variables. Interestingly, at the same time, the level 2 variance increases 
despite the level two variables remaining the same. This means that part of the variance 
previously attributed to level 1 can be considered level 2 variance. This confounding of 
the variance between the two levels may occur due to the fact that several regions only 
have one SMD, so that the two levels overlap. The -2*Log likelihood also decreases 
(from 1813 to 1714), which is a significant improvement over model 2, in terms of the 
log likelihood ratio test, for 13 degrees of freedom.
So far, the only coefficient allowed to vary across regions and SMDs has been the 
constant, reflecting the fact that the level of independents' success for average SMDs 
(the predictors are mean centred) vary significantly across regions. Model 5 expands the 
complexity of the model by allowing one of the other coefficients to be random at both 
levels. This is done under the assumption that the complexity of social reality implies 
complex patterns of variability in relationships between variables. The coefficient with a 
cross-regional variability closest to statistical significance is the effect of "RuChoice" 
(for the party "Russia's Choice"). The level 2 variance term due to "RuChoice" is 175 
(with a std. error of 103). This means that the effect of a challenge posed by Russia's 
Choice in the SMDs does not vary significantly from region to region.131
Even so, the mere fact that a more complex variability is explored (and level 1 
heteroskedasticity allowed for) makes the model more precise; as evidenced by the 
decrease in -2*log likelihood and by the fact that a previously insignificant effect, 
namely the challenge by the party "Dignity and Charity", becomes significant and 
important. Model 5 is the final model for 1993. The equation predicting independents' 
success in model 5 has been introduced above, before the presentation of the estimated 
models.
131 The effects of other parties turned out to be even less variable across regions.
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Table 6.5: Predicting independents' success. Estimated multilevel model 5
Hypothesis Variable
Lev.
Model 5
Estim. S. Err.
Fixed part
CONS 73.416 2.948 R
Regionalist DOW92-93 2 1.787 3.675
assertiveness DOW88-93 2
Appeasement POLAPP 2 -2.859 5.348
TRANSF 2 0.125 0.087
Party challenge KPRF 1 -5.839 3.092
PRES 1 -5.748 2.712 *
LDPR 1 -10.922 3.107 ***
APR 1 -12.037 2.913 ***
KEDR 1 -5.569 4.434
RUCHOICE 1 -13.315 3.273 R
YABL 1 -6.406 2.894 *
DIGN&CH 1 -13.629 4.983 **
WOFRUSS 1 -13.572 7.878
RUSSFUT 1 -2.333 3.641
DPR 1 -7.435 3.124 *
CIVICUN 1 -6.277 2.791 *
RDDR 1 1.468 3.002
Accessibility REMOTE 2 -8.144 8.434
Control URBAN 1 0.021 0.067
Random part
Level 2
CONS 196.789 52.516
RUCHOICE 175.599 103.133
CONS/RUCHOICE -120.247 62.755
Level 1
RUCHOICE 286.844 58.598
NoRUCHOICE 131.387 26.997
NoRUCHOICE/RUCHOICE n.a. n.a.
-2*Log likelihood 1704.523
N 201
*p < 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p< 0.001
N.a. = non-applicable, because separate coding was used for the categories 
of a dummy variable (all categories have a dummy variable). By definition the 
two categories are mutually exclusive and cannot covary.
Based on model 5, Figure 6.1 shows the bivariate relationship between regionalist 
assertiveness and the success of independent candidates, while controlling for the entire 
model. Triangular shapes represent regions. It is apparent that the two variables are 
related, which confirms the main hypothesis of this thesis for the 1993 Duma elections.
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In other words, the graph confirms that, roughly, the greater the level of regionalist 
assertiveness, the greater the success for the independents, controlling for the rest of 
model 5. It has also been noted, based on models 1 to 5, that this relationship is in part 
mediated by the presence/absence of political parties that challenge the independents, a 
presence/absence which is in turn affected by regionalist assertiveness. It is worth 
looking at the latter causal path in greater detail. If the notion of a mediating effect is 
valid, the nomination decisions of at least some of the political parties in models 3 to 5 
should, in turn, be predicted by levels of regionalist assertiveness.
Figure 6.1: Main hypothesis: predicted bivariate relationship, from final model
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SMDs with low assertiveness, it only contested about one quarter of the SMDs in highly 
assertive areas.
Figures 6.2-3: Nomination o f Russia's Choice candidates in regions scoring below (left) 
and above (right) the median score o f  regionalist assertiveness.
(In boxes: number and percent o f  districts contested by Russia's Choice)
Regions that score above 3 on ”Do92-93'Regions that score below 3 on "Do92-93'
RussChoice cand. 
10/24%RussChoice cand. 
91 / 49%
No RussChoice cand. 
93/51%
No RussChoice cand. 
31 / 76%
Source: elaborated from Dowely's dataset and CEC data.
A more accurate test of the hypothesis that party entry strategies mediate the effect of 
regionalist assertiveness on independents’ success can be obtained by testing whether 
party entry decisions are significantly predicted by this variable. To this end, a series of 
logistic multilevel models have been run each with a party dummy as dependent 
variable. The models for the four parties whose entry decisions are indeed significantly 
affected by regionalist assertiveness are reported in Table 6.6 below. Each column is 
devoted to a model for a party's entry decisions.
Table 6.6 shows that APR, LDPR and especially KPRF and Russia's Choice appear 
to have been significantly affected by considerations of the anti-centralist sentiments of 
regions in their strategic allocation of campaign resources and candidates across the 
Russian territory. The effects are all negative, suggesting strategic withdrawal from
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Appendix). The relationship between the probability that these parties contest a given 
SMD and regionalist assertiveness is evident and clearly negative, as expected.
The logistic models of party entry strategies and the related graphs support the 
interpretation given above of the drop in statistical significance of the coefficient for 
regionalist assertiveness when party challenges are considered in models 3-5 (Tables 6.4 
and 6.5). The drop should not induce one to think that the variable is not a significant 
predictor of the success of the independents. Rather it should be read as confirmation 
that most of its effect is mediated. Because the effect of regionalist assertiveness on the 
probability of party nomination is negative, and, in turn the effect of party challenge on 
the success of the independents is also negative, the net indirect effect of the first 
variable on the last is positive, as expected.
A precise quantification of this mediating effect can be reached by two 
considerations. Firstly, the coefficient for regionalist assertiveness in model 1 (Table 
6.3), which equals 11, represents the "total effect" of the variable (i.e. direct plus 
indirect). Secondly, the coefficient in the final model (model 5, Table 6.5), which equals 
1.8, is the direct effect. As a result it can be concluded that the size of the indirect, 
party-mediated, effect is (11-1.8=) 9.2. It should be noted that the "direct effect" might 
well in fact be mediated by variables not included in the models. In particular, in the 
analysis of the 1995 elections (next chapter), with greater data availability, it is possible 
to see that a second mediating effect can be produced by the strategic decisions of 
notable candidates at the district level.
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Table 6.6: Predicting party entry in SMD races. Logistic multilevel models
Hypothesis Variable
Lev.
APR
Estim. S. Err.
Russia's Choice
Estim. S.Err.
KPRF
Estim. S.Err.
LDPR
Estim. S.Err.
Fixed part
CONS -1.932 0.450 R -0.554 0.181 R -2.006 0.381 R -1.682 0.312 R
Regionalist
Assertiveness
DOW92-93 2 -1.736 0.781 * -0.904 0.352 ** -1.727 0.583 ** -1.331 0.581 *
Appeasement POLAPP 2 
TRANSF 2
1.693 1.069 
0.006 0.020
1.235 0.495 * 
-0.015 0.011
0.441 0.813 
0.023 0.817
0.462 0.837 
-0.001 0.017
Accessibility REMOTE 2 -4.923 4.215 -0.484 1.122 -7.633 5.116 -1.126 1.909
Control URBAN 1 -0.015 0.012 0.022 0.008 ** 0.009 0.012 0.009 0.012
Random part 
Level 2
CONS
Level 1
CONS
3.649 1.327 ** 
1.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 
1.000 0.000
0.856 0.571 
1.000 0.000
1.566 0.747 * 
1.000 0.000
*p < 0.05 **p <0.01
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Figure 6.4: The impact o f regional assertiveness on KPRF entry decisions 
(Estimated by the "KPRF” logistic model in Table 6.6)
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Figure 6.5: The impact o f  regional assertiveness on LDPR entry decisions 
(Predictedfrom the "LDPR" logistic model in Table 6.6)
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Conclusion
The empirical analysis of the 1993 elections indicates that the main hypothesis of this 
thesis is confirmed by the data. As posited in the explanatory framework, regionalist 
assertiveness has both direct and mediated positive effects on the success of the 
independents. In other words, autonomist sentiment affects first and foremost the 
strategic decisions of parties on where to nominate candidates. Where key parties do 
nominate candidates, they pose a significant challenge to the independents.
This pattern emerges despite the exceptional circumstances of the 1993 campaign. 
Such circumstances included the little time that most parties had to prepare for the vote, 
the omission of candidates' party affiliation from the ballot paper, and the inability of 
young parties to project a brand name image. In short, parties failed to constitute the 
informational shortcuts that would have made them particularly relevant for voters 
overwhelmed by several simultaneous elections.
In sum, the 1993 elections confirm the main expectations of the present explanatory 
framework. However, greater data availability for the 1995 and 1999 elections allows 
richer and better specified models. In the next chapter, a consideration of the personal 
resources of candidates is added to the analysis of the 1995 Duma elections.
7The 1995 Duma Elections
“We, fo r  example, have excellent relations with 
Moscow. We received a great deal o f  autonomy, 
we d o n ’t have demands on the centre. I  dispute  
the view that ‘relations based on bilateral 
treaties lead to a break-up ’, I  firm ly  d isagree”
M.G. Rakhimov, 
President of the Republic of Bashkortostan, 
in 17 March 1999 interview.132
According to the Russian Constitution, the first post-communist Duma was to last two 
years, half the normal term. As a consequence, a new vote took place in December 1995, 
only two years after the first. The election was marked by high levels of volatility, both 
in terms of voters' preferences, and in terms of party supply. If party system 
institutionalisation was evidently still weak, individual parties had nonetheless grown in 
organisational strength. This applies primarily to the KPRF, which dramatically 
improved its penetration of, and electoral performance in, the SMDs.
In comparison to the previous chapter, the statistical models for 1995 are able to look 
at one additional factor -candidates' personal resources. This allows a study of party 
performance that controls for the role of campaign assets, such as personal resources, 
independent from the party label.
As for the main hypothesis, the models reinforce the findings of the previous chapter. 
Regionalist assertiveness is shown to have had a significant and positive impact on the 
chances of independent candidates. However, while the effect of regionalist 
assertiveness increased, the indirect effect -  i.e. that mediated through party entry 
decisions -  decreased. This suggests that parties were starting to compete in SMDs
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previously written off as “hostile”. In this chapter, confirmation is provided for the fact 
that the strategic decisions of local notable candidates on whether to run as a party or as 
an independent candidate are (partly) affected by considerations of anti-centralist 
sentiments in the regions. This means that such decisions provide a second channel for 
the mediation of the impact of regionalist assertiveness on the chances of the 
independents.
7.1 Background
The contestants
One of the most startling aspects of the 1995 Duma election is the proliferation of 
parties and electoral blocs. Forty-three organisations crowded the proportional ballot. 
Fifteen of these were "associations" or "movements", rather than parties or electoral 
blocs.
In the SMD tier, the total number of SMD candidates rose considerably between 
1993 and 1995. However, while the number of independent candidates rose by 29 
percent (from 819 to 1057), the ranks of party candidates grew several times faster, by 
124 percent. Indeed, the number of party candidates more than doubled since the 
previous election, passing from 700 to 1571 (see Figure 7.1). Therefore, even though 
their absolute number grew between 1993 and 1995, the share of candidates running as 
independents dropped from 54 percent to 40 percent. In terms of electoral success, 
independents won 77 of 225 plurality races in 1995, which means that only 7 percent of 
all independent candidates won a seat (77/1057). By contrast, in 1993 independents had 
won in 134 SMDs, with a 16 percent rate of success relative to their total numbers 
(134/819).
The 43 organisations registered for the PR race nominated 1459 candidates in the 
SMDs; an additional 114 were nominated by twenty-one "electoral unions and blocs" 
(TsIK 1998: 145) which did not appear on the PR ballot paper and collectively obtained 
only about 2 percent of the district votes. A number of explanations have been advanced
132 Interviewed by V.L. Filippov (Filippov 2001: 96), own translation.
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for the multiplication of electoral organisations running in 1995, which is responsible 
for the sharp rise in the number of party candidates noted above.
Figure 7.1: Number o f  SMD candidates, 1993 and 1995
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Institutionalist accounts stress that a change in the electoral rules made it easier to 
register an organisation for the election. Indeed, in addition to explicitly political 
organisations, social organisations -  such as the "Union of Housing and Municipal 
Workers" -  were allowed to put candidates forward by a ruling of the Supreme Court
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Indeed, these campaign benefits seem to have created an incentive for small and 
personalistic formations to register party lists and may also plausibly explain why 
"parties" with a regionalist flavour appeared in 1995 (and not in 1993 or 1999133) even 
though they had no chances of crossing the PR threshold. This would apply in particular 
to the only truly regionalist party of Russian elections to date, "Transformation of the 
Fatherland" (see chapter 4, and below), and to an electoral bloc called "89" after the 89 
regions of Russia. As Belin and Orttung explain, "Bloc 89 had its roots in the Russia's 
Choice movement in 1993 but could also be considered an interest group party 
representing the eighty-nine regions of Russia" (Belin and Orttung 1997: 61). Moreover, 
even a number of independents themselves decided to form a party, the "Bloc of 
Independent Candidates". These three parties, however, were inconsequential for the PR 
electoral results (they received only 0.5, 0.06, and 0.12 percent of the PR votes, 
respectively). Another party trying to appeal to regionalist sentiments, PRES, was more 
established, having run already in the 1993 campaign (see chapter 6). Deprived of the 
Kremlin's support, however, PRES only gathered 0.36 percent of the proportional vote, 
even less than in the previous election, and failed to make an impact in the SMDs.
Other explanations for the proliferation of party candidates in 1995 have pointed out 
that a limit of 12 was introduced on the number of candidates that could appear on the 
federal part of a party's PR list. Additional candidates beyond the top 12 would have to 
be listed in regional sub-lists. This was meant to reduce the predominance of Moscow 
politicians in PR lists, and to spur greater inclusion of candidates from the provinces. 
One unintended consequence, it is suggested, was to lead prominent Moscow politicians, 
who could not find a place among the first 12 places on parties' federal lists, to form 
their own party, thus contributing to the increase in the number of electoral 
organisations contesting the 1995 election (Moser 2001: 502).
A third hypothesis points to the additional local visibility gained by parties' focused 
on the PR competition by running campaigns in the SMDs (Herron 2002). This 
hypothesis runs counter to the hypothesis driving this research; namely, that parties 
chose where to concentrate their resources on the basis of their expected chances of 
victory and these chances varied across the territory partly according to levels of 
regionalist assertiveness (as noted for the 1993 vote in chapter 6). In comparison to the
133 The mentioned incentive was withdrawn in 1999, as will be explained in die next chapter.
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difficult organisational situation of the 1993 campaign, this research does suggests that 
in 1995 parties were extending their reach further into the provinces, running even 
where their chances of winning SMD seats were small (see below). Thus, in 1995 more 
than in 1993, it is plausible that the strategic incentive of cross-tier contamination came 
to weight more heavily in parties' entry decisions.
However, even without relying on special explanations, in general, the very fact of 
the 1993 elections had put parties back in business, and the PR tier of the election had 
strengthened them (Petrov 1999: 59). Major national parties, while refraining from 
supporting regionalist demands, became aware of the need to improve their connection 
to the regions. The party of federal power, "Our Home is Russia" (NDR) included 60 
"senior officials from the regions" in its political council (Belin and Orttung 1997: 34), 
while the third place on the communist KPRF party list was occupied by Aman Tuleev, 
the speaker of Kemerovo oblast legislative assembly.
Table 7.1: Party nominations and victories in the SMDs
Party, electoral bloc or association
No. of 
Cands.
No. of 
Winners
Success
Rate
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 188 1 0.5%
Communist Party of the Russian Federation 130 58 44.6%
Our Home is Russia (NDR) 104 10 9.6%
Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) 90 5 5.6%
Agrarian Party of Russia 87 20 23.0%
Democratic Choice of Russia (DVR)134 80 9 11.3%
Yabloko 69 14 20.3%
Forward, Russia! 67 3 4.5%
Communists, Workers of Russia - for the Soviet Union 64 1 1.6%
Bloc of Ivan Rybkin 64 3 4.7%
Power - To the People 41 9 22.0%
Trade Unions and Industrialists of Russia - Labour Union 40 1 2.5%
Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko 33 2 6.1%
Social Democrats 29 0 0.0%
Party of Workers' Self-Government (PST) 27 1 3.7%
Strong Power ("Derzhava") 25 0 0.0%
Bloc of Stanislav Govorukhin 25 1 4.0%
Party of Russian Unity and Concord (PRES) 23 1 4.3%
Women of Russia 20 3 15.0%
Russian Ecological Party "KEDR" 19 0 0.0%
134 In three SMDs, DVR nominated two candidates.
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My Fatherland 18 1 5.6%
Stable Russia 18 0 0.0%
Russian All-Peoples Movement 18 0 0.0%
Bloc of Independent Candidates 17 1 5.9%
Association of Russian Lawyers 15 0 0.0%
Party of Economic Freedom 15 1 6.7%
Party - People's Union 15 0 0.0%
Transformation of the Fatherland 15 1 6.7%
Education - Future of Russia 14 0 0.0%
Duma-96 14 0 0.0%
Political Party Christian-Democratic Union-Christians of Russia 13 0 0.0%
Federal-Democratic Movement 11 0 0.0%
For the Motherland! 11 0 0.0%
Union of Patriots 11 0 0.0%
All-Russian Socio-Political Movement of Transport workers 11 0 0.0%
Party of Beer's Lovers 11 0 0.0%
"Zemskii Sobor" 9 0 0.0%
Inter-National Union 9 0 0.0%
Party of Peace and Good (bloc includes several formations) 7 0 0.0%
Non-Party Political Voters' Movement "Common Cause" 7 1 14.3%
Faith, Labour, Conscience 6 0 0.0%
Union of Housing-Communal Workers 6 0 0.0%
All-Russian Muslim Movement "Nur" (light) 6 0 0.0%
"89" (89 regions of Russia) 6 1 16.7%
Russian Party 5 0 0.0%
Fronteer Generation 5 0 0.0%
We Serve Russia! 5 0 0.0%
Bloc of Tikhonov-Tupolev-Tikhonov 5 0 0.0%
Rebirth 5 0 0.0%
League of Independent Scholars of Russia 5 0 0.0%
Democratic Alternative 4 0 0.0%
Party in Support of Lowering Taxes 4 0 0.0%
Union of Communists 4 0 0.0%
Our Future 3 0 0.0%
Conservative Party 3 0 0.0%
Russian Party of Car Drivers 3 0 0.0%
Union of Russian Muslims 3 0 0.0%
Pre-electoral Bloc including leaders of the Party for the Protection 
of Pensioners and other parties 3 0 0.0%
National-Republican Party of Russia (NRPR) 2 0 0.0%
Workers' Collectives and Greens for SSR 1 0 0.0%
National Salvation Front 1 0 0.0%
Russian Union of Local Self-Government 1 0 0.0%
European Liberal Democratic Party 1 0 0.0%
Independents 1057 77 7.3%
SSR (Soyuz Sovladelzev Rossii), Union of Collective Owners of Russia. 
Source: own elaboration of CEC data.
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Federal relations in the 1994-1995period
It is worth presenting a brief overview of the main development in centre-regional 
relations during this period as this is background information of particular significance 
to the main hypothesis of this research. The starkest development in this context was 
certainly the armed invasion of Chechnya at the end of 1994. On the one hand, this set 
an example for other potentially recalcitrant regions, while on the other, it stimulated 
the need for Moscow "to form a belt of regions politically loyal to the federal center 
around Chechnya" (Lavrov 1998: 31). This aim was pursued, for example, by granting 
economic concessions to the Caucasus republics of Ingushetia, Dagestan, Karachaevo- 
Cherlessia (which were granted a free economic zone in 1994), Kabardino-Balkaria, and 
North Ossetia (Lavrov 1998: 31). This arguably defused the potential for regionalist 
assertiveness in these regions.
Apart from the eruption in Chechnya, the period following the 1993 Duma elections 
up to the December 1995 vote was marked by a progressive determination of federal 
relations. A crucial difference with the previous period was the fact that the new 
Constitution had been approved in the December 1993 referendum. When compared to 
the Federal Treaty of the previous year, the federal arrangement institutionalised by the 
constitution marked a step towards centralisation of centre-regional relations (Petrov 
1999: 59). However, it still represented an uneasy compromise between the two 
prevalent and diverging views on the ideal form of federal arrangements -the one 
advocating a centralised state where all units would be equal to each other, and the one 
demanding that ethnically-designated units preserve their special status and privileges.
This divergence made it difficult to reach a compromise between the autonomous 
units (republics and autonomous okrugs) and ordinary regions and resulted in key 
passages of the constitution being left deliberately vague or worded in a mutually 
contradictory manner, i.e. those defining the distribution of authority between centre 
and different types of units. Nevertheless, by and large, the passage of this fundamental 
text did usher in a period of more moderate regionalist assertiveness compared to that 
between 1991 and 1993. Further movement toward a detente in centre-regional relation 
was marked by a string of bilateral treaties between Yeltsin and the executive powers of 
selected regions. Of particular note is the first such treaty. Signed in 1994 with 
Tatarstan, it formally reconciled this assertive region with the Russian state-building
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process. This treaty granted important shares of autonomy and economic benefits to 
Tatarstan so that it "defused the conflict" with Moscow (Lapidus and Walker 1995: 107). 
Internally to the region, the bilateral treaty also "severely weakened the positions of 
radical nationalist forces in the republic, whose influence was based almost entirely on 
fear of an 'imperial enemy'" (Payin 1998: 18).
Seven treaties were signed before the December 1995 elections with the most vocal 
republics, a practice that reinforced the elements of asymmetry in Russian federalism by 
granting them special rights and privileges. Such bilateral treaties can be considered a 
systematic tool used by the centre to appease the most recalcitrant regions and preserve 
the integrity of the federation (Hughes 2002). However, demands for equality of 
treatment among regions were raised by regions which did not receive special privileges 
in the 1994-1995 bilateral agreements and treaties. Perm oblast and net contributors to 
the federal budget, such as Sverdlovsk oblast, Krasnoyarsk kray, and the city of St. 
Petersburg, are examples of resentful units (Lavrov 1998: 29). This resentment led to 
new special agreements in 1995-96 with several oblasts, i.e. after the Duma elections 
and in view of the presidential vote of June 1996 (Hughes 1996).
The general atmosphere of regionalist appeasement can also be inferred from the 
signing of the 1994 Agreement on Public Accord. Signed by all republics, the Accord 
included a passage stating that "the rights of the Federation's subjects can be realized 
only if the state integrity of Russia and its political, economic and legal unity is 
maintained" (Payin 1998: 18).
7.2 Analysis
The quantitative analysis of independents' success across SMDs and regions in the 1995 
elections follows the same pattern as that used to analyse such success in the 1993 
elections. This means that the models reported in Tables 13-1.1 have the same general 
characteristics as those described in chapter 5; they are multilevel, and require tables of 
coefficients to be divided into a fixed and a random part. The dependent variable is the 
success of independent candidates, measured as the joint vote share received by the 
independents in each SMD and the 225 SMDs constitute the units of analysis. As in the
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previous chapter, continuous variables have been mean-centred to facilitate 
interpretation. For the details on the operational definitions of the independent variables, 
chapter 4 should be consulted.
Two measures of regionalist assertiveness, drawing from different time spans, are 
included in alternative models. The variable which averages observations over the 
longest period (1991-95) is "Dow". This is just the mean score on Dowley's index as 
published in her 1998 article. The other measurement, "Dow94-95" is more time- 
specific, based on the 1994-95 years only (regional scores on these two variables are 
listed in Table A.4.1 in Appendix).
Estimated models control for key concessions made by the central government to 
appease regionalist demands (through the variable "PolApp"), and for the effect of 
central financial transfers to the regions. In 1995, political appeasement is considered to 
have been achieved with the signing of bilateral treaties when these included substantial 
concessions to the federal units, which applies to five republics. Additionally, units that 
had received substantial concessions in the process of signing the Federal Treaty of 
1992 are also considered still appeased in 1995. The two groups of regions mostly, but 
not completely, overlap (see chapter 4). While one could mention other instances of 
appeasement, the two accounted for here are considered to be the strongest in most of 
the literature (for example Kahn 2002).
In addition to regional level variables, the models also test for the effect of party 
challenges to the independents in the SMDs. Parties expected to perform well in the 
SMDs, thus challenging the independents, are first and foremost "major" national 
parties (being relatively more visible in the national campaign). This category includes 
the main party of power, "Our Home is Russia", headed by prime minister Victor 
Chernomyrdin. The "Bloc of Ivan Rybkin", named after its leader, the speaker of the 
first Duma, was another party of power sponsored by the Kremlin, although one that 
was meant to appeal to the electorate of centre-left. The party "Congress of Russian 
Communities" (KRO) is also included in this category here, despite being neglected in 
most of the academic literature due to its poor PR results. In the SMD tier, KRO made 
an impressive organisational effort; nominating candidates in as many as 90 SMDs (see 
Table 7.1).
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Regionalist parties are the second type to be considered. "Transformation of the 
Fatherland" was the only genuinely regionalist party in 1995. The PRES, as a pseudo- 
regionalist party (see chapter 3), can also be added to the analysis. Moreover, an 
additional set of party variables is included to test the hypotheses that the 1995 
proliferation of small parties formed around a single or a few leaders explains the 
decrease in the number and success of independents. This proliferation of personalistic 
formations, in turn, is attributed to the above-mentioned new incentives for party 
registration which appeared in 1995. This type of party is exemplified by the "Bloc of 
Tikhonov-Tupolev-Tikhonov", the "Bloc of Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko", etc. (see party 
variables in Table 7.2).
Moreover, the larger body of data available for the 1995 elections allows for the 
consideration of more complex strategic scenarios unfolding in the SMDs than those 
based solely on party supply (as in the models for the 1993 elections). Indeed, in 
addition to the party challenge, the analysis of the 1995 vote takes into account the 
effect of candidates’ personal resources (or notability). As detailed in chapter 4, two 
dummy variables reflect whether the distribution of regional and federal political elite 
members across the party/independent pools is skewed in favour of the independents 
("Regpol" and "Fedpol"). A third dummy variable, "Incumb", marks the districts where 
one of the independents is the district incumbent.
Both dimensions of the district candidate supply (party presence and the personal 
resources of both party and independent candidates) can be expected to have a complex 
role in the model. As explained in chapter 3, and noted in the previous chapter with 
reference to the party variables, these factors are at the same time causes of 
independents' success and consequences of regionalist assertiveness. In terms of 
candidates' notability, for example, the decision of notable candidates (i.e. regional or 
federal political elites and incumbents) to run as independent is strategic, i.e. affected by 
the fact that, in regionally assertive regions, the chances of parties success are lower 
(other factors being equal). Both the party and the notability variables, therefore, are 
expected to mediate the effect of regionalist assertiveness. This means that, in the 
sequence of estimated models, the coefficient for regionalist assertiveness should 
decrease twice, firstly when the party variables are entered, and then, even further, when 
the notability variables are considered.
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The remaining variables follow the rationale of their counterparts in the preceding 
chapter. "Remote" measures the share of regional population affected by adverse 
climatic and geographic conditions that make it difficult for national parties to enter the 
contest and campaign. This variable, therefore, is positively related to the chances for 
the independents, but, similarly to regionalist assertiveness, it has an indirect effect; 
mediated through the party and notability variables. Indeed, the difficulty of party 
involvement in the campaigns taking place in remote regions negatively affects the 
likelihood that parties nominate candidates (party variables), and/or reduces the ability 
of parties to contribute to a candidate's campaigning in those regions, thus inducing 
local notables to run as independents (notability variables). Finally, reflecting widely 
shared expectations on party development detailed in chapter 3, the "Urban" variable 
controls for levels of urbanisation.
The final model of this chapter (Model 7), which tests the explanatory framework to 
the greatest extent possible given the available data, is described by the equation below. 
It requires a "micro" and two "macro" models. The micro model is:
Yij = (30J (CONS) + 0y (DOW), + 02 (POLAPP), + 05 (TRANSF),- + 0* (REMOTE),
+ 05 (URBAN)y + 05 (NDR)y + 07 (No KPRF)/, + 0? (BLOKIND)/, + 0P (APR),,
+ 0/0 (KRO)/, + 077 (RYBKIN)y + 0/2 (REGPOL)/, + 013 (FEDPOL)y 
+ 074y (INCUMB)y + Eij 
In this, two coefficients (for CONS and INCUMB) are random, thus requiring the 
macro models:
@oj = 0o + lk)j
@14ij = 014 + Hl4j + Cl4ij
Substituting the four macro models into the micro model and rearranging with the fixed 
part preceding the random part results in the final equation:
Yy = 0o (CONS) + 07 (DOW), + 02 (POLAPP),- + 0, (TRANSF)j
+ fa  (REMOTE), + 05 (URBAN)/,- + 06 (NDR)y + 0 7 (No KPRF)/,- + 05 (BLOKIND)/,- 
+  09 (APR)y +  070 (KRO)/, +  077 (RYBKIN)y +  0I2 (REGPOL)y +  0I3 (FEDPOL)y 
+ 074 (INCUMB)/, + fi0j (CONS) + (i14J (INCUMB) + e14ij (INCUMB)
+ eisij (No INCUMB)y 
The term ejsy (No INCUMB)y is due to the fact that the dummy for incumbency is 
allowed to vary at level one and that "separate coding", instead of contrast coding, was
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used to specify the variable. A description of the explanatory variables can be found in 
Table 7.2.
7. The 1995 Duma Elections 204
Table 7.2: Independent variables in models, descriptive statistics
Hypothesis Level
Variable
Label
Type of 
Variable Description
Categorical: 
Percent of cases (N) Mean
Std.
Dev. Min. Max. Cases Missing
Regionalist
assertiveness
2 DOW Continuous Dowley's index (1991-1995 
average)
2.8 0.5 1.6 4.6 225 0
2 DOW94-95 Continuous Dowley's index (1994-95 
average)
2.53 0.59 1.67 4.72 225 0
Appeasement 2 POLAPP Categorical Region received substantial 
political inducements
0 92.4%
1 7.6%
(208)
(17)
2 TRANSF Continuous Financial transfers from Centre 
to region
15.1 16.0 0.0 81.3 224 1
Geographic 
accessibility of 
region
2 REMOTE Continuous Percent of regional population 
living in remote areas
0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 224 1
Notability 1 INCUMB Categorical One of the indeps is the 0 74% (167) 225 0
incumbent 1 26% (58)
Table continues on next page.
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Table 7.2: continued.
Variable Type of Categorical: Std.
Hypothesis Level Label Variable Description Percent of cases (N) Mean Dev. Min. Max. Cases Missing
1 REGPOL Categorical Reg pol elite tends to run as 0 73% (164) 225 0
indep 1 27% (61)
1 FEDPOL Categorical Fed pol elite tends to run as 0 82% (185) 225 0
indep 1 18% (40)
Party challenge 1 No KPRF Categorical Candidate nominated by 0 57.8% (130) 225 0
"KPRF" is not running 1 42.2% (95)
1 No LDPR Categorical Candidate nominated by LDPR 0 83.6% (188) 225 0
is not running 1 16.4% (37)
1 YABLOKO Categorical Candidate nominated by 0 69.3% (156) 225 0
Yabloko is running 1 30.7% (69)
1 NDR Categorical Candidate nominated by NDR 0 53.8% (121) 225 0
is running 1 46.2% (104)
1 RYBKIN Categorical "Bloc of Ivan Rybkin" 0 71.6% (161) 225 0
1 28.4% (64)
1 PRES Categorical Candidate nominated by 0 89.8% (202) 225 0
PRES is running 1 10.2% (23)
1 APR Categorical Candidate nominated by APR 0 61.3% (138) 225 0
is running 1 38.7% (87)
Table continues on next page.
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Table 7.2: continued.___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable Type of Categorical: Std.
Hypothesis Level Label Variable Description__________________ Percent of cases (N) Mean Dev. Min. Max. Cases Missing
TRANSFA Categorical Candidate nominated by 0 93.3% (210) 225 0
"Transformation of the 1 6.7% (15)
Fatherland" is running
KRO Categorical Congress of Russian 0 60.0% (135) 225 0
Communities (KRO) 1 40.0% (90)
BLOKIND Categorical Candidate nominated by "Bloc 0 92.4% (208) 225 0
of Independents" is running 1 7.6% (17)
PAMFIL Categorical "Bloc of Pamfilova-Gurov- 0 85.3% (192) 225 0
Lysenko" 1 14.7% (33)
GOVOR Categorical "Bloc of Stanislav Govorukhin" 0 88.9% (200) 225 0
1 11.1% (25)
COMMCA Categorical Non-Party Political Voters' 0 96.9% (218) 225 0
Movement "Common Cause" 1 3.1% (7)
TIKH Categorical "Bloc of Tikhonov-Tupolev- 0 97.8% (220) 225 0
Tikhonov" 1 2.2% (5)
Control URBAN Continuous Percent of population living in
urban centres
72.4 21.2 18.6 100.0 225 0
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The models
As in the 1993 models, the presentation of statistical results in the next section follows
the strategy of gradually increasing the scope of the model in order to note the effect of
new variables on the coefficients of those already included. In each step, entire sets of
variables are entered to illustrate the working of a given hypothesis. Model expansion
and specification is, therefore, driven by theoretical considerations, rather than by the
mechanic observation of changes in model fit due to single additional variables.
Moreover, the gradual expansion of the model aptly meets one key concern of the
explanatory framework; namely to detect both the direct and indirect effects of
regionalist assertiveness. This can be done by first entering the predictors of the main
hypothesis, then adding the mediating effects and observing the resulting variation in
the main variable's coefficient. A final element of complexity, undertaken in the last
models after having discussed the fixed effects, is the consideration of random effects at
level 2. This is made possible by the multilevel design of the analysis. It is useful to
start the discussion of the estimated models from the "Null model", which includes only
the constant as a predictor (Model 0 in Table 7.3).
In this specification, the coefficient for the constant corresponds to the average, all-
Russia, share of the vote received by the independents across the districts, which is 36.4 
1 ^percent. However, this model also reveals that the level of success of the 
independents varies significantly around this overall, Grand Mean. More precisely, 
multilevel modelling partitions the variance into variability across regions, and across 
districts within regions. In the null model, the variance of the constant, random at both 
levels, is precisely the variance of the outcome. In this case, the variance occurring at 
both levels is significantly different from zero (p < 0.001). In comparison to the 
variance structure of the 1993 elections, a larger portion of the variability in the success 
of the independents occurs at the level of region, namely 40 percent, as indicated by the 
coefficient of autocorrelation,137 p = 190.8/(190.8+284.3) = 40. Differences among 
regions can be expected to play a greater role in 1995 than in 1993. This estimate of the
135 For a simple textbook example of "mediating effects", see Allison (1999: 60-2). For a more general 
treatment of causal order, see Davis (1985). The latter includes the treatment o f direct and indirect effects 
(Davies 1985: 22-27).
136 As mentioned in chapter 6, this is a weighted average, produced by the RIGLS estimation procedure of 
MLwiN.
137 In 1993, p = 27.
7. The 1995 Duma Elections 208
partition of the variance is based on the full range of SMDs, as the vote was regularly 
held in all districts in 1995 (N = 225).
Table 7.3: Predicting independents' success. Estimated multilevel models (0-2)
Hypothesis Variable
Lev.
Model 0
Estim. S.Err.
Model 1
Estim. S.Err.
Model 2
Estim. S.Err.
Fixed part
CONS 36.436 1.971 R 34.714 1.628 34.418 1.540
Regionalist
assertiveness
DOW91-95 
DOW 94-95
2
2
11.109 3.916 **
10.425 3.329 **
Appeasement POLAPP
TRANSF
2
2
-14.387
0.212
7.068 * 
0.102 *
-13.730
0.246
6.570 * 
0.100 *
Accessibility REMOTE 2 23.027 7.715 ** 24.575 7.554 **
Control URBAN 1 -0.010 0.071 -0.005 0.071
Random part 
Level 2
CONS 190.822 52.086 *** 52.844 29.313 37.554 26.425
Level 1
CONS 284.276 33.749 *** 316.698 35.982 *** 325.564 36.545 ***
-2*Log likelihood 
N
1987.195
225
1948.158
224
1946.813
224
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001
The first two models with independent variables in addition to the constant (Models 
1 and 2) are identical except for the measurement of regionalist assertiveness, which, as 
explained above can be based on two different time spans. Regardless of which of the 
two measures is considered, Models 1 and 2 find that regionalist assertiveness has a 
highly significant impact on the success of independent candidates (p < 0.01). For a unit 
increase in regionalist assertiveness (for example, passing from a region advocating a 
unitary state, to one demanding a centralised federation), the average increase in the 
vote for the independents is 10-11 percent, keeping the other variables constant. It 
should be remembered that this coefficient reflects both the direct and indirect effect of 
regionalist assertiveness, as part of the causal impact is expected to flow through SMD- 
level variables, such as party challenge (as shown for 1993), which are only introduced 
from Model 3 onwards. Indeed, as subsequent models introduce the SMD-level 
variables, the size and significance of the coefficient for regionalist assertiveness 
decreases.
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A similar dynamic should be kept in mind when observing the coefficient for 
"Remote". In Models 1 and 2, the effect of this variable appears very important and 
significant (p < 0.01). A one percent increase in the share of the regional population 
living in areas difficult to reach (see chapter 4 for details on the operational definition), 
is predicted to have a boosting impact of over 23 percent on the collective vote share of 
the independents. As with regionalist assertiveness, this effect turns out to be largely 
indirect; i.e. mediated by SMD-level variables, as shown below.
As for the appeasement hypothesis, the estimated coefficient for "PolApp" is also 
significant and important in size. As expected, the sign of the coefficient is negative. 
The regions that had received political appeasement from the Kremlin, for example in 
the form of bilateral treaties granting important privileges and spheres of autonomy, see 
the independents receive a vote share 14 percentage points lower than other regions.
The "Transf' variable is also statistically significant. What it suggests, however, is 
surprising in the light of the present theoretical framework. It was expected that greater 
transfers from the centre to the regions should reflect either regional dependency on the 
federal budget, or financial appeasement of regionalist demands; in both cases reducing 
anti-centralist sentiments and, therefore, the chances of the independents. According to 
the hypothesis the sign of the coefficient should be negative, but this is disproved by the 
fact that the coefficient for "Transf' is positive, and significantly so.
However, for a number of reasons, this finding does not undermine the main 
hypothesis being tested here. The chief reason is that it could simply be that the data on 
this dimension is not suitable or sufficient to detect the real extent of centre-regional 
financial transfers. This problem was anticipated in chapter 4, where it was noted on 
that account that the outcome of the test for the financial appeasement hypothesis would 
be at best provisional. However, as the finding is of marginal importance to the 
explanatory framework as such, that a detailed analysis of centre-regional financial 
flaws lies beyond the scope of this thesis does not impair its main arguments.
The only variable to lack statistical significance in models 1 and 2 is the level of 
urbanisation, suggesting that the traditional pattern of party success in urban centres is 
not confirmed in the Russian case of 1995 (nor of 1993 for that matter).
Finally, there are two points of interest in relation to the distribution of the variance 
at the two levels. On the one hand, there is a sharp drop in the unexplained variance at
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level 2 from model 0 to models 1-2, passing from 190 to 52. This is the expected effect 
of entering level-2 variables that explain most of the cross regional differences in the 
success of the independents. In fact, after taking into account the regional-level 
hypotheses of this study, the remaining variability across regions is not significant 
anymore. On the other hand, a less obvious difference between model 0 and models 1 -2 
is that the variance at level 1 increases somewhat (from 284 to 316). This indicates that 
more variability in the outcome occurs between SMDs than previously gauged by 
looking at the Null model. In other words differences previously attributed to the level 
of regions, now turn out to be due to differences among SMDs. To try and explain this 
level 1 variability, the following models enter level 1 variables.
Table 7.4: Predicting independents' success. Estimated multilevel models (3-5)
Hypothesis Variable Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Lev. Estim. S.Err. Estim. S.Err. Estim. S.Err.
Fixed part
CONS 46.401 2.779 R 45.974 2.758 R 45.355 2.482 R
Regionalist DOW 2 6.522 3.391 6.907 3.195 *
assertiveness DOW 94-95 2 6.557 2.965 *
Appeasement POLAPP 2 -14.359 5.960 * -14.142 5.527 * -14.624 5.660 **
TRANSF 2 0.269 0.089 ** 0.287 0.089 ** 0.262 0.085 **
Accessibility REMOTE 2 11.240 6.828 12.239 6.759 12.378 6.665
Control URBAN 1 0.008 0.071 0.007 0.071 -0.020 0.066
Party challenge NDR 1 -9.380 2.345 *** -8.857 2.351 *** -9.067 2.269 ***
No KPRF 1 7.315 2.391 ** 7.380 2.376 ** 7.314 2.317 **
No LDPR 1 1.792 3.130 1.688 3.116
YABL 1 -2.185 2.546 -2.092 2.534
BLOKIND 1 -10.593 4.373 * -10.876 4.361 * -10.855 4.273 *
TRANFA 1 -0.548 4.881 -0.868 4.856
APR 1 -12.251 2.574 *** -12.482 2.549 *** -12.468 2.479 ***
PRES 1 -3.218 3.796 -3.591 3.778
KRO 1 -4.776 2.473 -4.486 2.476 -5.014 2.389 *
PAMFIL 1 -1.676 3.415 -1.620 3.392
RYBKIN 1 -7.456 2.540 ** -7.496 2.532 ** -7.304 2.482 **
GOVOR 1 -0.608 3.776 -0.977 3.765
COMMCA 1 2.089 6.698 1.134 6.738
TIKH 1 -3.152 7.894 -2.730 7.874
Random part
Level 2
CONS 2.991 14.568 0.000 0.000 0.376 13.430
Level 1
CONS 274.855 29.515 *** 275.840 25.902 *** 270.474 28.840 ***
-2*Log likelihood 1876.102 1874.649 1878.435
N 224 224 224
*p < 0.05 **d < 0-01 *»*n<nnm
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The first set of SMD-level predictors to be entered is related to the hypothesis that 
some parties in particular may pose effective challenges to the independents. Models 3 
and 4 present a first test for the challenge posed by party candidates by means of 
dummy variables measuring whether a candidate of the given party ran in the district or 
not. Note that, unlike all other parties, the KPRF and the LDPR nominated candidates in 
a majority of SMDs. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficient for the 
constant, it is advisable to choose the most frequent state (presence or absence) as the 
base category of dummy variables. For those two parties the base category, coded 0, is 
"presence" of a party candidate. The value of 1 is assigned to the "absence" of a party 
candidate. For this reason the variables are labelled in negative form, "No KPRF" and 
"No LDPR", and their coefficients have positive signs.
As explained above, in 1995 the range of parties considered include "major" parties, 
a regionalist party ("Transformation of the Fatherland") and the minor, personalistic, 
formations that are sometimes credited in the literature with the drop in the success of 
the independents observed between 1993 and 1995. Of the 14 parties considered, only 5 
posed a significant challenge to the independents (i.e. where they stood, the 
independents consistently suffered lower success rates). These five parties include such 
expected names as those of the parties of power (mainly NDR, but also the "Bloc of 
Ivan Rybkin"), the communists of the KPRF and the agrarian party (APR), all of which 
could count on a network of local organisations. It is the fifth party that is of particular 
interest; an utterly "minor" party with the oxymoronic name, "Bloc of independent 
candidates". A decrease of over 10 percent in independents’ ratings is predicted in 
those 17 SMD contests in which ‘bloc of independent candidates’ ran. This points to 
the competition that the "bloc of the independents" represented for the "real" 
independents, even though it actually won only 1 SMD seat (Table 7.1), and 
demonstrates that the importance of similar small parties in subtracting votes from 
independents can be underestimated when analysts only look at the number of winners 
claimed by parties.
Similar considerations apply to the "Bloc of Ivan Rybkin", which is predicted to 
subtract an average of 7.5 percentage points from the total share of the independents 
(even though it only won three races) in the 64 SMDs it contested. Among smaller 
formations, the effect of KRO is almost significant. As for non-significant party effects,
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findings include the irrelevance of the LDPR -  despite its having run 188 district 
campaigns (more than any other party in 1995) -  and the weakness of Yabloko and 
PRES, as well as of Rossel's regionalist experiment, "Transformation of the Fatherland". 
It was also found that the three other personalistic parties did not make a difference in 
terms of independents' chances (taken together, they only contested between 33 and 5 
SMDs). The inclusion of level-1 variables in models 3 and 4 resulted in the expected 
drop in the level 1 variance from 316-25 to 274-75. Level 2 variance also decreased, 
suggesting that part of the variability across SMDs was previously emerging at the level 
of regions.
Model 5 simply shows the elimination of non-significant party variables, 
implemented to obtain a more parsimonious design.138 The variable for the KRO party 
is retained because, of all non-significant party coefficients, it is the nearest to 
significance in models 3-4. Indeed, once the other parties are eliminated, the effect of 
KRO becomes statistically significant in model 5. Other non-significant variables are 
kept in the model for their theoretical interest within the explanatory framework 
("Remote"), or as a control effect ("Urban"). The elimination of the non-significant 
eight party variables only increases the -2*log likelihood by 4 points.
An important result to note is that, contrary to the 1993 models, the coefficient for 
regionalist assertiveness is still significant after entering the mediating effect of party 
nominations (in models 4-5, it is only marginally lower than the significance level in 
model 3). However, the coefficients for "Dow" or "Dow94-95" are smaller than in the 
models without party variables, confirming that part of the effect is indeed mediated 
through party decisions on where to nominate candidates, as discussed in the previous 
chapter for the 1993 models. Moreover, additional mediating effects can be represented 
by the next set of SMD-level variables; those on the personal characteristics of the 
candidates forming the two pools (independent/party candidates). This hypothesis is 
tested in the models of Table 7.5.
The variables on candidate notability are entered in Model 6. The candidates' 
characteristics being tested relate to their occupational status (regional and federal 
political elite positions) and to district incumbency. Two dichotomous variables,
138 It should be remem bered from chapters 4  and 6 that the party variables are not dum m ies o f  a single  
variable, but separate variables.
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"Regpold" and "Fedpold", mark out from all other districts those in which a majority of 
either regional or federal political elites run as independents. Finally, along the 
"Incumb" dummy variable, SMDs where the district incumbent runs as an independent 
are coded 1, all others are coded 0.
All coefficients for these three variables are statistically significant. Where regional 
political elites tend to run disproportionally as independents, this fact increases the 
success of the non-partisans by 7.5 percentage points, compared to other SMDs and 
controlling for other variables. Where most candidates occupying federal political 
positions run as independents, this is predicted to boost their chances by 12.5 percentage 
points. As for incumbency, where the district incumbent decides to run as an 
independent, the percentage of votes obtained by the independents is predicted to rise by 
7 points.
The introduction of these level 1 variables brings the value of -2*log likelihood down 
to 1832 (from 1878 of Model 5), a statistically significant improvement of model fit. 
Also, the total unexplained variance registered at level 1 drops from 270 to 223, as 
expected, when important level 1 factors are entered. Another consequence of these 
three variables is that two of the party variables lose importance. Namely, the parties 
KRO and "Bloc of Ivan Rybkin" cannot be said to significantly affect independents' 
returns once the personal characteristics of candidates in the independent/party pools are 
controlled for. This may suggest that the impact of these formations was in fact due to 
the personal qualities of their candidates, rather than to the party label per se. This is 
consistent with the nature of such parties; created from above and centred on a few key 
political elites, rather than autonomous institutions. Conversely, it is worth noting that 
not only such major parties as NDR, KPRF and the APR, but also a formation 
conventionally deemed marginal, the "Bloc of the independents", still emerges as a 
significant challenge to the independents after controlling for candidates' elite status and 
incumbency.
Finally, it is of interest that the coefficient for regionalist assertiveness in Model 6 
further decreases in comparison to the model with the party variables (from 7 to 4.6). 
This confirms the expectation that part of the effect of that variable on the success of the 
independents is mediated by the notability variables. In other words, both federal 
political elites and the district incumbent tend to run as independents in proportion to
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the anti-centralist sentiments of the region. In turn, when they do run as independents, 
they bring valuable personal characteristics to the pool of independent candidates, thus 
increasing their electoral returns.
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Table 7.5: Predicting independents' success. Estimated multilevel models (6-7)
Hypothesis Variable Model 6 Model 7
Lev. Estim. S.Err. Estim. S.Err.
Fixed part
CONS 35.721 2.686 R 35.858 2.364 R
Regionalist DOW 2 4.636 2.954 5.973 2.852 *
assertiveness DOW94-95 2
Appeasement POLAPP 2 -7.825 5.260 -7.101 4.760
TRANSFERS 2 0.228 0.077 ** 0.250 0.069 ***
Accessibility REMOTE 2 3.618 6.340 0.633 6.044
Control URBAN 1 -0.009 0.060 0.005 0.048
Party challenge NDR 1 -7.607 2.135 *** -7.534 1.784 ***
No KPRF 1 6.807 2.113 ** 6.270 1.848 ***
No LDPR 1
YABL 1
BLOKIND 1 -8.522 3.929 * -9.064 3.814 *
TRANFA 1
APR 1 -11.298 2.268 *** -11.201 2.108 ***
PRES 1
KRO 1 -3.134 2.203 -3.936 2.007 *
PAMFIL 1
RYBKIN 1 -3.220 2.326 -3.280 2.267
GOVOR 1
COMMCA 1
TIKH 1
Candidate REGPOL 1 7.498 2.521 ** 9.072 2.377 ***
notability FEDPOL 1 12.534 3.402 *** 13.551 2.909 ***
INCUMB 1 7.095 2.880 * 6.495 2.886 R
Random part
Level 2
CONS 0.456 11.126 32.618 18.110
INCUMB 189.738 81.087
CONS/INCUMB -94.653 36.271
Level 1
CONS 222.948 23.785 ***
INCUMB 134.586 36.974
No INCUMB 219.175 27.779
No INCUMB/INCUMB n.a. n.a.
-2*Log likelihood 1832.294 1819.919
N 224 224
*p < 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p< 0.001
N.a. = non-applicable, because separate coding was used for the categories of the dummy variable. By 
definition the two categories are mutually exclusive and cannot covary.
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The specification of the fixed part of the final model, Model 7, is the same as the 
previous model (6), the only difference in the final model is the inclusion of a random 
component to the effect of "Incumb" at both levels. It is important to check whether any 
of the level 1 variables have random effects across regions, if the complex variability of 
the real world is to be effectively approximated. In other words, complex variability 
should be assumed, and constant effects should be proved. This approach is 
controversial and its lull (philosophical) implications cannot be addressed here. 
However, it should be noted that of all level 1 factors, only the coefficient for 
incumbency varies significantly across regions and across SMDs (based on joint chi-sq 
tests for the two random parts). Allowing the model to reflect this complex variability, 
thus relaxing the conventional assumption of homoskedasticity at level 1, results in a 
more precise model, as evidenced by the lower value of -2*log likelihood.
In this final model the significance of other variables is slightly altered, as regionalist 
assertiveness and the KRO party variable regain significance (atp  < 0.05). In sum, once 
the indirect effects of regionalist assertiveness are controlled for, the coefficient of 
"Dow" in model 7 represents the direct portion of its effect in the posited casual 
framework. Namely, the direct effect of regionalist assertiveness on independents' 
success is such that, regardless of party strategy decisions and of the personal 
characteristics of the candidate pools, a unit increase in "Dow" produces an increase of 
6 points in the joint vote share of the independents, controlling for political 
appeasement financial transfers, district geographic accessibility and levels of 
urbanisation. If this value is subtracted from the coefficient for regionalist assertiveness 
in model 1, the size of the indirect effect of regionalist assertiveness can be computed to 
be (11 - 6 =) 5. In other words, for a unit increase in "Dow", the independents are 
predicted to collectively gain 5 extra percentage points through the induced strategic 
decisions o f  parties and notable candidates.
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Figure 7.2: Main hypothesis, predicted bivariate relationship, from final model
Reg Assertiveness (DOW91-95)
Based on the specification of Model 7, where the success o f independent candidates 
is predicted by regionalist assertiveness only, Figure 7.2 graphically renders the 
relationship posited by the main hypothesis o f this research. The graph confirms the 
positive relationship between the two variables expected on the basis o f the explanatory 
framework.
As was the case for the 1993 analysis, the fact that part o f the effect of regionalist 
assertiveness is mediated by SMD-level variables can be tested with the help o f logistic 
models. These predict the probability that parties nominate candidates in a given SMD 
(Table 7.6), or the probability that elite candidates decide to run predominantly as 
independents (Table 7.7). The variables in these models are the level 2 variables whose 
effect is understood to be mediated in the explanatory framework (i.e. primarily 
regionalist assertiveness, but also, potentially, remote location and urbanisation).
The two models in Table 7.6 show that, o f the parties that are considered for the 
1995 elections, APR and KRO seemed to have based their entry decisions to a 
significant extent on considerations o f the regionalist sentiments o f the regions. The 
agrarian party APR also appears to have been influenced -  understandably -  by the 
level o f urbanisation o f the SMDs, and by the geographic accessibility of populations. 
Variables indicating these factors have significant coefficients, and their signs follow
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expectations. To interpret the coefficients, the effect on the logit is transformed into 
effect on probabilities in Figure 7.3, which shows the decreasing probability that the 
party KRO will enter an SMD race as levels o f regionalist assertiveness increase.
Table 7.6: Predicting party entry decision. Logistic multilevel models
Hypothesis Variable
Lev.
APR
Estim. S.Err.
KRO
Estim. S.Err.
Fixed part
CONS -0.594 0.169 R -0.514 0.172 R
Regionalist
assertiveness
DO W91-95 2 -0.901 0.433 * -1.339 0.484 **
Appeasement POLAPP 2 
TRANSF 2
0.132 0.822 
0.002 0.012
-0.018 0.961 
0.001 0.013
Accessibility REMOTE 2 -3.200 1.443 * -0.745 1.070
Control URBAN 1 -0.039 0.009 *** 0.023 0.009 *
Random part 
Level 2
CONS
Level 1
BCONS
0.000 0.000 
1.000 0.000
0.110 0.228 
1.000 0.000
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001
Like the variables on the parties, the variables on candidates' personal resources are 
expected to show the mediated effect o f regionalist assertiveness and remote location. If 
this is true, the entry decisions o f at least some notable candidates should be predicted 
by the mediated variables (regionalist assertiveness and remote location). The models in 
Table 7.7 confirm this expectation by predicting the probability that regional and federal 
political elites run predominantly as independents. It is found that this probability for 
federal political elites is significantly and positively affected by regionalist sentiments, 
as expected. Interestingly, the probability that these candidates run as independents is 
negatively affected by the political appeasement that a region may have received. In 
other words, the probability that notable candidates run as independents is smaller in 
politically appeased regions than in the rest o f the country, regionalist assertiveness and 
the other variables being equal.
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Figure 7.3: The impact o f  regional assertiveness on KRO entry decisions 
(Predictedfrom the "KRO” logistic model in Table 7.6)
0.8-r
2 *  “
07-
+ ->  £Z
_c= o
>% ^  0.6i t
+1 or)— d)
0.5--
0.4
1.6 2.0 2.3 2.7 3.0
Reg Assertiveness (DOW91-95)
Table 7.7: Predicting the nomination decisions o f notable candidates. 
Logistic multilevel models
Hypothesis Variable
Lev.
FEDPOL
Estim. S. Err.
REGPOL
Estim. S.Err.
Fixed part
CONS -1.530 0.204 R -0.969 0.161 R
Regionalist
assertiveness
DOW91-95 2 1.284 0.511 * -0.321 0.463
Appeasement POLAPP 2 
TRANSF 2
-2.019 1.018* 
0.017 0.013
-1.259 1.016 
-0.012 0.012
Accessibility REMOTE 2 0.886 0.876 4.303 1.268 ***
Control URBAN 1 -0.002 0.010 -0.008 0.009
Random part 
Level 2
CONS
Level 1
BOONS
0.160 0.409 
1.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 
1.000 0.000
*p < 0.05 ***p< 0.001
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For regional political elites, a very significant effect is produced by the geographic 
remoteness of regions. The greater the share of voters living in areas difficult to reach, 
the greater the probability that regional political elites run as independents. This can be 
attributed to the fact that parties tend to avoid stretching their campaign resources to 
reach geographically inhospitable areas. Indeed, this has been found to be the case for 
the APR party in the logistic model mentioned above (Table 7.6).
Conclusion
The independents represented a smaller proportion of both candidates and winners in 
the 1995 Duma elections, compared to 1993. The literature has advanced several 
hypothesis, mainly institutional, that can plausibly account for this general change. In 
the context of the explanatory framework of this thesis, it can be added that regionalist 
assertiveness was generally lower in the 1994-1995 period than in 1993 (see Figure 4.2, 
chapter 4), which arguably reduced the need for non-party representation. However, the 
question remains as to why the independents proliferated relatively more in some areas 
than in others. This is the question addressed by this thesis and cross-regional 
differences in levels of anti-centralist sentiments are found in this chapter to constitute a 
significant part of the answer.
Moreover, in comparison to the 1993 district campaigns, major political parties 
started competing in a wider range of districts, thanks to improved organisational 
preparation, including areas previously deemed off limits due to regionalist 
assertiveness. The communist KPRF became a major challenger to the independents in 
the district races. This change is also evident in the fact that SMD entry decisions were 
negatively affected by levels of regionalist assertiveness only for two parties (APR and 
KRO). In 1993 this was found for four major parties.
Nevertheless, strategic entry decisions by parties and notable candidates in the SMDs 
still mediated the effect of regionalist assertiveness. However, while in 1993 almost all 
the effect was mediated by party decisions, in 1995 regionalist assertiveness retained a 
statistically significant direct effect on the outcome, in addition to important indirect 
influences. The only true regionalist party, "Transformation of the Fatherland", based in
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only one region, could not make a significant impact on the causal mechanism of 
regionalist assertiveness and did not effectively challenge the independents. Even in its 
native Sverdlovsk oblast, the party's performance did not convince voters (as noted in 
chapter 4). All this was to change in preparation for the third Duma vote, in 1999. The 
next chapter presents a different political context in which the independents are 
challenged by an interregional political party created by powerful regional governors 
themselves as a vehicle to take a firmer hold of national politics and to advance the 
presidential ambitions of its leader.
The 1999 Duma Elections
“No m atter what party  we create, 
it always turns out to be the C P SU ”.
Viktor Chernomyrdin139
Due to a quite different political context, the 1999 Duma elections showed a markedly 
different pattern of proliferation for independent candidates than the 1993 and 1995 
elections. A distinguishing trait of the 1999 vote is the much more direct and 
generalised involvement of regional governors. The reason for this is ultimately linked 
to two factors. The first derives from the fact that, unlike at the time of the 1995 
elections, by December 1999 all regional leaders had been popularly elected at least 
once. Having a popular mandate -  as opposed to having been appointed by Yeltsin -  
gave governors a new degree of independence from the centre (Petrov 2001). The 
second factor is the weakness of the federal centre resulting from the August 1998 
financial and political crisis. The crisis brought to an end the attempted recentralisation 
of 1997 and significantly reduced the financial means that the centre had available to 
keep dependent regions under control and to appease restive units.
For the present purposes, the most important product of this state of affairs is that, for 
the first time, several regions’ heads joined together to form a national political party. 
This description strictly applies only to the "Fatherland-All Russia" (OVR) party, as 
Unity was promoted by the Kremlin. In addition to the considerations just mentioned, a 
trigger for this unprecedented regional activism was the sharp increase in the stakes 
associated with the Duma vote. One authoritative observer of Russian politics, Richard
139 In Remington (2003: 232).
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Sakwa, has recently characterised the 1999 elections as the attempt by the Regions to 
"storm the Kremlin".
Unlike in 1995 (when a presidential election was also in sight), Yeltsin could not 
stand for re-election (for legal and health reasons) and the most assertive regions joined 
behind a new presidential hopeful, Primakov. In the light of this, it is clear that the 
elections were no longer (only) an occasion for bargaining with the centre and 
extracting privileges as appeasement, but they were seen as an instrument to take over 
the centre directly. It is difficult to overestimate the impact of this change on the 
operation of the core hypothesis of this thesis. Because the regions forming and leading 
OVR included some of the units which manifested the greatest potential for conflict 
with the centre, for the first time the channelling of regional assertiveness could be 
carried out by a party rather than providing a competitive advantage to independents. 
And regional administrative resources were the key instrument used by regional leaders 
to achieve this shift.
8.1 Background
The contestants
In 1993 and 1995 parties registered for the PR portion of the vote were also the main 
(although not the only) suppliers of party candidates in the districts. The 1999 campaign 
followed this pattern and the decline in the number of party lists from 43 in 1995 to 26 
in 1999 was translated into a decline of party candidates in the SMDs (see Figure 8.1). 
While the number of independent candidates rose slightly from that in the previous vote 
(from 1057 to 1143), the number of party candidates decreased by over 30 percent, 
passing from 1571 to 1083.
This is despite the fact that new parties were formed. Of these new forces, however, 
the pro-Kremlin party "Unity" was too recent to organise a large pool of nominations in 
the districts. Despite the sizeable campaign resources mobilised by the Kremlin in its 
support (especially media resources), Unity only entered 31 SMD races (see Table 8.1). 
Nevertheless, the statistical analysis below shows that where it did run it had a 
significant negative impact on the chances of the independents.
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Table 8.1: Party nominations and victories in the SMDs
Party, electoral bloc or association
No. of 
Cands.
No. of 
Winners
Success
Rate
Communist Party of the Russian Federation 129 47 36%
Electoral Alliance "Yabloko" 114 7 6%
All-Russian Sociopolitical Movement "Spiritual Heritage" 107 1 1%
Fatherland - All Russia (OVR) 91 31 34%
Bloc of Zhirinovsky/Russian Liberal Democratic Party 90 0 0%
Electoral union "Our Home is Russia'" 90 7 8%
Bloc of General A. Nikolaev, of Academic S. Fedorov 68 1 1%
Union of Right Forces (SPS) 66 5 8%
Russian Socialist Party 63 1 2%
Congress of Russian Communities 
And Yurii Boldyrev's Movement 45 1 2%
Interregional Movement "Unity" ("Medved") 31 10 32%
Pensioners' Party 28 1 4%
Russian All People's Union 28 2 7%
Electoral bloc "Communists, Workers of Russia -  
for the Soviet Union" 20 0 0%
All-Russian Political Movement "In Support of the Army" 20 2 10%
Peace, Labour, May 18 0 0%
Russian Ecological Party "Kedr" 15 0 0%
All-Russian Sociopolitical Movement "For Civil Dignity" 13 0 0%
Women of Russia 12 1 8%
Movement of Patriotic Forces - The Case for Russia 10 0 0%
Stalinist Bloc for the USSR 7 0 0%
Socialist Party of Russia 6 0 0%
Social-Democrats 5 0 0%
Russian Party 3 0 0%
Russian Patriotic Popular Movement 2 0 0%
Party of Peace and Unity 1 0 0%
Russian Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs 1 0 0%
Independents 1143 107 9%
Note: No party nominated more than one candidate per district, contrary to what happened in 1993 
and 1995.
Source: own elaboration of CEC data.
Confronted with the decline in the number of parties on the PR ballot compared to 
1995, analysts have turned to institutional factors in search for explanations. Colton and 
McFaul found that a 1997 change in the law on party registration extended the 
minimum time that had to elapse between registration with the Ministry of Justice and
8. The 1999 Duma Elections 225
the vote (from 6 months to one year). Moreover, parties that registered by submitting a 
financial deposit would lose it if they received less than 3 percent of the PR vote. If the 
party received less than 2 percent, it would have to pay the state for the free TV and 
radio exposure received during the campaign (Colton and McFaul 2003: 23). Thus, the 
incentives that had unintentionally stimulated party proliferation in 1995 were largely 
withdrawn in 1999.
Figure 8.1: Number ofSMD candidates, 1993, 1995 and 1999
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As a result, the share of SMD candidates running as independents rose from 40 to 51 
percent since 1995. In both 1995 and 1999 the relative distribution of candidates in the 
two pools (independent vs. party) had been a good predictor of the relative success of 
the two pools. During the 1990s, when the independents won a smaller share of seats (as 
in 1995) they had also made up a smaller share of the candidates, and vice versa. In this 
sense, the rate of success of the independents (number of seats won / number of 
candidates) did not change much from 1995 to 1999 (always ranging between 7 and 10 
percent).140 It can be derived from this that the nomination stage (when candidates 
decide whether to run as party or as independent candidates) is decisive for the overall 
level of success. This confirms the importance of rules providing incentives for party vs.
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independent nomination (such as those in place for the 1995 elections, which favoured 
party proliferation, see chapter 7) for explaining temporal patterns.
These considerations, however, only explain differences in the aggregate level of 
success between elections. The interesting question remains unanswered as to why 
levels of success vary substantially below the aggregate, sub-nationally, at any given 
election. Indeed, this is the research question of the thesis. So far, for the 1993 and 1995 
elections, evidence has been presented showing that levels of success for the 
independents are higher in those regions where they provided a channel of expression 
for salient regionalist sentiments.
In the case of the 1999 vote, this explanatory mechanism could no longer apply. To 
understand why, the empirical tests must be preceded by a brief review of the main 
developments in centre-regional relations leading up to the Duma elections.
Federal relations in the 1996-1999period
The most significant element in the centre-regional relations of this period with respect 
to its impact on the Duma vote is the formation of a motley alliance of regions, with 
traditionally different aims and interest, behind the "Fatherland-All Russia" (OVR) 
party in 1999. The party united the powerful and popular mayor of Moscow, Luzhkov 
(head of the "Fatherland" movement), with the leaders of such regionally assertive 
republics as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (grouped in the loose movement "All Russia"), 
as well as St. Petersburg's "governor" Yakovlev. Tatarstan's president, Shaimiev, had 
been the main promoter of the "All Russia" movement. This formation represented "the 
most vigorous attempt to get the governors to act in concert" in order to "promote 
decentralization within a stable federation, and at a minimum to foreclose any rollback 
on the concessions the governors had wrested from Moscow in the 1990s" (Colton and 
McFaul 2003: 83). By the time the Duma election approached, the union between 
"Fatherland" and "All Russia" had enlisted many other regional governors and speakers 
of regional assemblies.
The OVR party cannot be strictly considered a regionalist party, since its opposition 
to the federal centre is not based in one unit only or on the support of only one ethnic 
group. However, the "All Russia" component did mark the first electoral coalition of
140 Nor has it changed much since, according to the latest -  2003 -  poll.
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governors generated from below; that is, from the regions, rather than by the Kremlin, 
such as was done previously with NDR's ties to key governors. The main aim of the 
alliance of governors was certainly to influence the shape of federal arrangements; and, 
in particular, for traditionally assertive regions to defend their autonomy. Why was such 
an alliance formed for the 1999 elections and not before?
The answer lies in the changes in federal relations in the 1996-99 period. Firstly, 
regions became more assertive as a result of holding their first gubernatorial elections, 
mostly in 1996 (Petrov 1999: 59). With a popular mandate, regional governors gained 
an independent basis of power, as opposed to being appointed by Yeltsin as before. 
Secondly, the centre's strategy of appeasing regions with bilateral treaties (48 were 
signed) had to be terminated due to the August 1998 financial crisis. The central 
weakness resulting from the financial crisis also put an end to the recentralisation that 
had been attempted by prime ministers Chubais and Kirienko* from 1997. The 
centralising measures had included the appointment of presidential representatives to 
the republics, and a confrontation with the regions of Primorskii kray and the republics 
of Sakha and Udmurtia over compliance with federal law. Under Kirienko (April-May 
1998), they also included exemplary attacks against corruption in Kursk oblast and 
against big oil companies in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Petrov 1999: 59).
With the August 1998 financial crisis, the centre lost the means to fund appeasement. 
In particular, the crisis meant that the practice of central loans to the regions, which had 
been a prime channel for politically motivated financial flows undetected by the budget 
law, virtually stopped in 1999 (Kuznetsova 2001: 75). Similarly, Luzhkov's Moscow 
lost the transfers it used to receive for its functions as "federal capital". In addition to 
undermining the vertical links between centre and regions, the 1998 crisis also had 
some positive effects for cross-regional, horizontal economic co-operation. The 
devaluation of the rouble made imports prohibitively expensive, thus stimulating 
domestic industries and trade (Alexseev 1999: 269). An integrated Russian market 
became more evident, which is in sharp contrast to the situation of the early 1990s, 
when regions behaved like islands (Smymyagin 1998: 3-4).
The weakness of the centre, and o f the presidency in particular, was signalled by the 
unprecedented successful imposition by the Duma of Primakov as the new prime 
minister after the August crisis, thus overruling Yeltsin's preference for Chernomyrdin.
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A new power configuration emerged with a prime minister, Primakov, who did not owe 
his post to the president. This allowed a de-coupling of regions’ relations with the 
president from those with the government. Indeed, while Yeltsin was growing 
unpopular, and his health was unstable, Primakov allied himself with some important 
regions by bringing them into the federal government. He also forged an alliance with 
Tatarstan's Shaimiev, sanctioned by the renewal of the bilateral treaty with that region, 
as well as devolved shares of state companies to regional control (Petrov and Titkov 
2001: 40). When Primakov was ousted by Yeltsin in May 1999, he became the leader of 
the "Fatherland-All Russia" (OVR) alliance. Another example of an assertive regional 
leader forming an electoral bloc is Samara's Titov, who formed "Golos Russiya" and 
created an alliance with the party SPS (Petrov and Titkov 2001: 45). However, many 
governors who had initially joined the initiative left the project when it became clear 
that OVR was the horse to bet on.
8.2 Analysis
The analysis of the 1999 elections follows the same pattern as that in the previous two 
chapters. A series of multilevel models is presented that expand the specification and 
complexity of the analysis by sequentially entering additional sets of variables grouped 
on the basis of the hypothesis they are meant to test. This strategy has the advantage of 
showing the effect of entering new variables on those already included and is especially 
useful when multiple causal stages are posited, such as when some independent 
variables have not only direct effects, but also indirect effects; i.e. mediated by other 
independent variables.
The range of variables examined is larger here than for the 1993 and 1995 elections 
(see Table 8.2). As the literature has stressed, the 1999 vote saw an extensive use of 
"administrative resources" by regional governors willing to play a greater role in federal 
politics and to influence the result of Duma elections (see chapter 3). The impact of this 
factor on the success of independent candidates is studied in this chapter through two 
interacting variables. The first is "GovCat" (standing for "Governor Categorical"), 
which derives from Hale's data and detects whether governors’ support in a given SMD
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was received by an independent or a party candidate (if any). The second variable is 
"Freesp", which measures regional levels of freedom in the circulation of information 
and therefore indicates the extent to which regional politics is "controlled" by the 
governor.141 Hale's data also allow for consideration of another new variable in the 1999 
models: "FigCat". This is a categorical predictor that aims to detect the effect of the 
backing by Financial-Industrial Groups (FIGs) on independent candidates' chances. 
These three variables did not appear in either the 1993 nor the 1995 models.
The remaining variables are already familiar to the reader of chapters 6 and 7. Partial 
exceptions are constituted by the individual parties expected to challenge the 
independents, and by the two measures of regionalist assertiveness that aim at adjusting 
Dowley's index for the centre-regional relations that occurred after 1995. As for the 
party variables, the fluidity of the supply side of Russia's party system (discussed in 
chapters 1 and 2) means that important parties were new to the 1999 elections (OVR, 
Unity, SPS, and Spiritual Heritage). The other listed parties had already contested one 
or both of the previous elections (Yabloko, KPRF, LDPR, and NDR).
As also noted in chapter 7, two of the dummy variables for party challenges, "No 
KPRF" and "No Yabloko", are coded in negative terms; i.e. the value of 1 is assigned to 
districts where no candidate of that party was running. This is the opposite of the coding 
rule followed for other parties, and it is due to the fact that these two parties nominated 
candidates in a majority of districts. In order for the constant in the models to represent 
the value of Y for the average district, it is useful to set the base category of dummies to 
be the most common state of the variable. This coding explains the positive sign of the 
effect of these two variables in the models below, as opposed to the negative ones 
recorded for the other party challenges.
As for the measurement of regionalist assertiveness, the variables "Asser99a" and 
"Asser99b" represent an attempt to correct Dowley's index and take into account key 
developments in centre-regional relations that occurred after 1995 (see chapter 4 for 
details). These are used as alternative measures to the original Dowley's index (which is 
based on 1991-95 only). The equation for the final model (Model 12, discussed below) 
is as follows.
141 See chapters 3 and 4 for details on the variables and their operational definition.
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The "micro model" is:
Yy = fioj (CONS) + f t  (DOW), + f t  (POLAPP), + f t  (TRANSF), + f t  (REMOTE),
+ f t  (URBAN)/, + f t  (UNITY)/, + f t  (No KPRF)/, + f t  (OVR)/,- + f t  (NDR)/,
+ $ I0  (REGPOL)y + f t/  (FEDPOL)y + ^  (INCUMB)/, + $ 13 (FIGPAR)/,
+ f t ,  (FIGIND)/, + $]5ij (GOVPAR)/, + /5y^  (GOVIND)/, + f t  7 (FREESP),
+ fts  (FREESP*GOVIND)/, + ftp (FREESP*GOVPAR)y + ei}
Where three coefficients (for CONS, GOVIND and GOVPAR) are random, thus 
requiring three "macro models":
$oj =  f t  + fioj
$J5ij ~ $15 + fil 5j + eisij 
$16ij = $16 + 1^16j + ei6ij
Substituting the three macro models into the micro model, and rearranging with the 
fixed part preceding the random part:
Yy = $ 0 (CONS) + f t  (DOW), + f t  (POLAPP), + f t  (TRANSF), + f t  (REMOTE),
+ f t  (URBAN)/, + f t  (UNITY)y + f t  (No KPRF)/,- + f t  (OVR)/,- + f t  (NDR)/,- 
+ $io (REGPOL)y + $n  (FEDPOL)y + f t y (INCUMB)y + $ J3 (FIGPAR)/,
+ $ 1 4  (FIGIND)/, + $ ]5  (GOVPAR)/, + f t 5 (GOVIND)/, + f t 7 (FREESP),
+ ft* (FREESP*GOVIND)/, + $ 19 (FREESP*GOVPAR)/, + pq (CONS)
+ hjSJ (GOVPAR)/, + p16J (GOVIND)/, + e15i (GOVPAR)/, + e]6i (GOVIND)/,
+ e2oij (No GOVSUPP)y 
A schematic description of the variables used in the models of this chapter is provided 
in Table 8.2.
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Table 8.2: Independent variables in models, descriptive statistics
Hypothesis Level
Variable
Label
Type of 
Variable Description
Categorical: 
Percent of cases (N) Mean
Std.
Dev. Min. Max. Cases Missing
Regionalist
Assertiveness
2 DOW Continuous Dowley's index 
(1991-95 average)
2.8 0.5 1.6 4.3 224 1
2 ASSER99A Continuous Dowley's index corrected 1 3.1 0.5 1.8 4.6 224 1
2 ASSER99B Continuous Dowley's index corrected 2 2.8 0.6 1.7 4.7 224 1
Appeasement 2 POLAPP Categorical Regions who received political 
inducements
0 39.7% (89)
1 60.3% (135)
224 1
2 TRANSF Continuous Financial transfer from Centre to 
region (1996-99 average)
18.1 13.2 0.7 69.8 224 1
Geographic 
accessibility of 
region
2 REMOTE Continuous Percent of regional population 
living in difficult areas
0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 224 1
Administrative 2 FREESP Continuous Index of Freedom of Speech 36.2 11.5 0.0 63.1 224 1
resources
1 GovCat Categorical No clear support 0 14.7% (33) 224 1
GOVIND Gov supp indep 1 39.3% (88)
GOVPAR Gov supp party 2 46.0% (103)
Table continues on next page.
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Table 8.2: continued.
Hypothesis Level
Variable
Label
Type of 
Variable Description
Categorical: Std. 
Percent of cases (N) Mean Dev. Min. Max. Cases Missing
Financial 1 FIGCat Categorical No clear support 0 77% (171) 224 1
resources FIGIND FIGs support indep. candidate 1 15% (34)
FIGPAR FIGs support party candidate 2 8% (19)
Notability 1 INCUMB Categorical One of the independents is the 0 76% (171) 224 1
incumbent 1 24% (53)
1 REGPOL Categorical Regional political elite tends to 0 71% (158) 224 1
run as indep 1 29% (66)
1 FEDPOL Categorical Federal political elite tends to 0 88% (198) 224 1
run as indep 1 12% (26)
Party 1 No KPRF Categorical Candidate nominated by "KPRF" 0 42.7% (96) 224 1
challenge is not running
1 57.3% (129)
1 LDPR Categorical Candidate nominated by LDPR 0 60.0% (135) 224 1
is running 1 40.0% (90)
1 No Yabloko Categorical Candidate nominated by 0 49.3% (111) 224 1
Yabloko is not running 1 50.7% (114)
1 Unity Categorical Candidate nominated by Unity is 0 86.2% (194) 224 1
running 1 13.8% (31)
Table continues on next page.
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Table 8.2: continued.
Hypothesis Level
Variable
Label
Type of 
Variable Description
Categorical:
Percent of cases (N) Mean
Std.
Dev. Min. Max. Cases Missing
1 OVR Categorical Candidate nominated by OVR is 
running
0
1
59.6%
40.4%
(134)
(91)
224 1
1 SPS Categorical Candidate nominated by SPS is 
running
0
1
70.7%
29.3%
(159)
(66)
224 1
1 SPIRHER Categorical Candidate nominated by 
"Spiritual Heritage" is running
0
1
52.4%
47.6%
(118)
(107)
Control 1 URBAN Continuous Percent of SMD population living 
in urban centres
72.4 21.2 18.6 100.0 225 0
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The models
The first finding on the 1999 elections is that the level of success of independent 
candidates varies significantly from region to region, as shown by the fact that the level 
2 variance of the constant in Model 0 is significantly different from zero (p < 0.01). A  
multilevel approach is warranted (Table 8.3).
Table 8.3: Predicting independents' success. 
Estimated multilevel"Null model"
Hypothesis Variable
Lev.
Model 0
Estim. S.Err.
Fixed part
CONS 46.091 2.076 R
Regionalist
assertiveness
DOW 2 
ASSER99A 2 
ASSER99B 2
Appeasement POLAPP 2 
TRANSF 2
Accessibility REMOTE 2
Control URBAN 1
Random part 
Level 2
CONS
Level 1
CONS
169.603 57.296 ** 
408.727 47.872 ***
-2*Log likelihood 
N
2038.496
224
**p<0.01 ***p< 0.001
Similarly to the 1993 situation, however, the proportion of variability occurring at 
the level of regions is rather small, with a coefficient of autocorrelation (p) of (169.6 / 
408.7=) 0.29. The "Null model" also reveals that the average success of the 
independents across the SMDs, weighted according to the RIGLS estimation 
procedure,142 is 44.5 percent of the vote. The number of cases for the Null model is 224 
because the vote did not take place in the separatist Chechen Republic, where a new 
Russian military campaign had recently started.
142 See chapter 5.
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Table 8.4: Predicting independents' success. Estimated multilevel models (1-3)
Hypothesis Variable
Lev.
Model 1
Estim. S.Err.
Model 2
Estim. S.Err.
Model 3
Estim. S.Err.
Fixed part
CONS 44.515 3.109 R 44.388 3.114 R 44.478 3.114 R
Regionalist
assertiveness
DOW 2 
ASSER99A 2 
ASSER99B 2
-1.590 4.138
-1.499 4.052
0.181 3.593
Appeasement POLAPP 2 
TRANSF 2
0.619 4.109 
0.041 0.152
0.611 4.111 
0.041 0.152
0.693 4.122 
0.037 0.152
Accessibility REMOTE 2 25.445 9.399 ** 25.454 9.415 ** 24.784 9.321 **
Control URBAN 1 -0.039 0.081 -0.039 0.081 -0.038 0.081
Random part 
Level 2
CONS
Level 1
CONS
139.845 52.350 ** 
415.634 48.373 ***
139.982 52.374 ** 
415.585 48.369 ***
141.860 52.734 ** 
414.900 48.297 ***
-2*Log likelihood 
N
2029.432
224
2029.445
224
2029.602
224
**p<0.01 ***p< 0.001
Models 1-3 introduce the variables of the main hypotheses. Clearly, neither 
regionalist assertiveness in any of its three measurement options, nor the variables for 
political and financial appeasement are significant. The same applies to the district level 
of urbanisation. The only significant factor is the geographic accessibility of regions, 
which confirms the expectation that impervious physical conditions hamper the ability 
of political parties to challenge independents and thus provides a favourable 
environment to the latter. This effect is expected to be mostly indirect, mediated by the 
level 1 variables that measure the decisions of notable candidates to join either of the 
two pools (party/independent), as well as those that measure the decisions of parties on 
where to nominate their candidates. These variables are entered beginning with Model 4,
w /V i 1 r'Vi r n p a n c  til at flu* p r > p f f i r > i p n t  n f  " T? p m n t f i "  i n  1 T - ~  1------ i  — * ----- — *■— ] -----
8. The 1999 Duma Elections 236
independents. This is an average value that should be read while bearing in mind that 
most regions have values of zero on this variable.143
Table 8.5: Predicting independents' success. Estimated multilevel models (4-6)
Hypothesis Variable
Lev.
Model 4
Estim. S.Err.
Model5
Estim. S.Err.
Model 6
Estim. S.Err.
Fixed part
CONS 48.571 3.441 R 48.091 3.469 R 47.960 3.450 R
Regionalist
assertiveness
DOW 2 
ASSER99A 2 
ASSER99B 2
-4.766 2.864
-1.301 3.085
-0.731 2.714
Appeasement POLAPP 2 
TRANSF 2
-0.132 2.837 
0.060 0.107
0.145 2.874 
0.053 0.108
0.157 2.866 
0.054 0.108
Party challenge UNITY 1 
OVR 1 
No KPRF 1 
LDPR 1 
NoYABL 1 
SPS 1 
NDR 1 
SPIRHER 1
-8.292 3.562 * 
-15.320 2.619 *** 
18.706 2.491 *** 
-5.786 2.511 * 
4.519 2.480 
-8.669 2.777 ** 
-3.680 2.539 
-2.090 2.537
-7.991 3.583 * 
-15.475 2.637 *** 
18.662 2.507 *** 
-5.662 2.524 * 
4.400 2.495 
-8.307 2.808 ** 
-3.411 2.549 
-1.708 2.574
-7.940 3.582 * 
-15.557 2.632 *** 
18.688 2.507 *** 
-5.625 2.526 * 
4.392 2.500 
-8.219 2.794 ** 
-3.367 2.548 
-1.602 2.552
Accessibility REMOTE 2 12.786 7.124 11.868 7.302 11.447 7.179
Control URBAN 1 -0.009 0.065 -0.011 0.065 -0.012 0.065
Random part 
Level 2
CONS
Level 1
CONS
28.196 22.408 
290.429 32.448 ***
31.448 23.252 
291.861 32.710 ***
30.538 23.068 
292.678 32.770 ***
-2*Log likelihood 
N
1910.359
224
1913.168
224
1913.256
224
*p < 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p< 0.001
The first level 1 variables to be entered are those under the label of "party challenge", 
starting from Model 4. In the first, simple, models to include party variables (Models 4- 
6), it emerges that, of the parties that nominated their candidates in the SMDs, only 
Unity, OVR, KPRF, SPS and LDPR offered significant challenges to the independents. 
By contrast, Yabloko, "Spiritual Heritage" and NDR do not pose a significant challenge
143 Regions that have a non-zero share o f  population located in difficult areas are listed in chapter 4 (Table
4.3).
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to the independents despite having nominated candidates in 114, 107, and 90 SMDs 
respectively. The size (and the statistical significance) of the challenge effect is 
especially large for the OVR and the KPRF.
As expected, the inclusion of party variables causes a decrease in the coefficient of 
"Remote", whose effect is mediated by the party variables, and in the value of the - 
2*log likelihood. Moreover, a sharp drop in the variance is observed not only at level 1, 
where it is expected, but also at level 2, suggesting that part of the variability previously 
attributed to differences across the regions, is in fact derived from level 1 variations. 
The only difference among Models 4 to 6 is the use of alternative measurements of 
regionalist assertiveness (as described in chapter 4). The findings are robust to these 
changes. Because the -2log likelihood level is lower when "Dow" is used for regionalist 
assertiveness, this variable is preferred to the alternative measures of that dimension in 
the next models.
Model 7 expands the analysis to consider the effect of the distribution of notable 
candidates in the two pools. Of interest is that, contrary to the 1995 case, the decision of 
federal political elite members to run as independents did not significantly improve the 
chances of the non-partisans. It is, instead, regional political occupational status and 
district incumbency that can alter the results. Of particular note is that where the 
incumbent is an independent, the vote share of the non-partisans increases by almost 13 
percentage points.
Two additional variables measured at level 1 are entered in Models 8 and 9. These 
variables, which were not considered in the 1995 models, derive from the categorical 
variable "FigCat" elaborated on the basis of data gathered by Hale for use in his 2005 
forthcoming article (see chapter 4). The variable, as built for this thesis, reflects whether 
the financial backing by what Hale calls "Financial-Industrial Groups" (FIGs) detected 
in a given district was predominantly aimed at independent or party candidates. It is 
entered in the form of two dummies, "FIGPar" and "FIGInd", which reflect, respectively, 
whether the FIGs were supporting (predominantly) independents, or party candidates. In 
both cases, the base category of the variable to which the effect is compared is 
constituted by those SMDs in which no clear support was detected by Hale’s sources.
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Table 8.6: Predicting independents' success. 
Estimated multilevel model 7
Hypothesis Variable
Lev.
Model 7
Estim. S.Err.
Fixed part
CONS 42 .628  3.561 R
Regionalist
assertiveness
DOW
ASSER99A
ASSER99B
-3 .550  2.691
Appeasement POLAPP
TRANSF
0.810
0 .072
2 .664
0.100
Party challenge UNITY
OVR
No KPRF
LDPR
No YABL
SP S
NDR
SPIRHER
-7.759 3 .379 *
-14.910 2 .497 ***
14.820 2 .484 ***
-3.931 2 .414
3 .243 2 .379
-6 .195 2 .684  *
-3 .197 2.435
-1 .187 2 .429
Candidate
notability
REGPOL
FEDPOL
INCUMB
5.379
3.802
12.854
2 .663  * 
3.634  
2.873  ***
Accessibility REMOTE 12.182 6 .854
Control URBAN -0.062  0 .062
Random part 
Level 2
CONS
Level 1
CONS
20.556  19.186
264 .604  29.399
-2*Log likelihood 
N
1883.255
224
*p < 0.05 ***p < 0.001
FigCat tests one important aspect of campaign finance, the backing that candidates 
may receive from financial-industrial groups. It appears from Model 8 that financial 
backing for the independents markedly improved their chances (however, this effect
disappears when governor's support is considered in Model 9). It is possible to observe 
in Model 8 that the LDPR challenge is no longer significant once the financial support
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is considered. This suggests that the impact of the LDPR candidates was mainly based 
on their financial backing.
The support that independent and party candidates may receive from the regional 
governor is measured by the categorical variable "GovCat", which is also based on 
Hale’s data. This variable introduces the effect of "administrative resources" into the 
equation. It is specified by two dummy variables, "GovPar" and "Govlnd", coded in a 
way similar to "FigCat". Namely, "GovPar" takes a value of 1 for SMDs where the 
governor supports a party candidate; and "Govlnd" takes a value of 1 where the 
governor supports an independent candidate. When both dummies take the value of 0, 
no governor support was detected in the SMD. The significance of the "GovPar" term 
confirms the expectation that a governor's support for a party candidate is a strong 
negative factor affecting the chances of independent candidates in 1999.
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Table 8.7: Predicting independents' success. Estimated multilevel models (8-10)
Hypothesis Variable
Lev.
Model 8
Estim. S.Err.
Model 9
Estim. S.Err.
Model 10
Estim. S.Err.
Fixed part
CONS 41.249 3.484 R 46.780 4.148 R 49.036 3.900 R
Regionalist
assertiveness
DOW 2 
ASSER99A 2 
ASSER99B 2
-2.316 2.754 -4.203 2.637 -3.148 2.540
Appeasement POLAPP 2 
TRANSF 2
1.251 2.701 
0.056 0.101
2.382 2.548 
0.060 0.094
3.228 2.543 
0.060 0.094
Party challenge UNITY 1 
OVR 1 
No KPRF 1 
LDPR 1 
No YABL 1 
SPS 1 
NDR 1 
SPIRHER 1
-9.416 3.347 ** 
-13.421 2.470 *** 
14.451 2.424 *** 
-2.947 2.367 
2.655 2.354 
-5.513 2.619 * 
-3.656 2.377 
-1.324 2.371
-8.124 3.043 ** 
-7.484 2.361 ** 
10.161 2.251 *** 
-0.710 2.167 
2.977 2.116 
-1.772 2.401 
-4.080 2.144 
-2.237 2.166
-8.255 2.908 ** 
-6.793 2.021 *** 
10.210 2.063 *** 
-1.400 2.034 
3.452 1.940 
-2.763 2.271 
-4.487 1.950 * 
-3.244 1.860
Candidate
notability
REGPOL 1 
FEDPOL 1 
INCUMB 1
6.221 2.612 * 
3.756 3.540 
12.199 2.799 ***
6.335 2.351 ** 
3.829 3.187 
12.258 2.507 ***
5.172 2.235 * 
1.181 3.032 
11.586 2.394 ***
Financial support FIGCAT
FIGIND 1 
FIGPAR 1
10.148 3.320 ** 
-4.923 3.618
5.238 3.067 
-2.080 3.317
4.456 2.717 
-4.092 3.107
Admin, resources GOVCAT
GOVPAR 1 
GOVIND 1 
FREESP 2
-17.709 3.423 *** 
-0.708 3.292 
-0.199 0.138
-18.951 2.226 R 
-2.303 2.674 R 
-0.196 0.137
Accessibility REMOTE 2 8.666 6.913 2.949 6.418 2.410 6.028
Control URBAN 1 -0.070 0.062 -0.040 0.058 -0.070 0.053
Random part 
Level 2
CONS 
GOVPAR 
GOVIND 
CONS/GOVPAR 
CONS/GOVIND 
GOVPAR/GOVIND 
Level 1 
CONS 
GOVPAR 
GOVIND 
No GOVSUPP 
GOVPAR/GOVIND 
GOVPAR/NoGOVSUPP 
GOVIND/NoGOVSUPP
30.373 20.326 
243.493 27.435 ***
34.790 18.284 
189.250 21.579 ***
92.131 41.685 
-48.031 16.585 
51.852 51.852 
29.009 18.377 
-44.413 37.955 
-78.253 16.842
199.161 30.762 
111.540 25.292 
136.715 39.480 
n.a. n.a. 
n.a. n.a. 
n.a. n.a.
-2*Log likelihood 
N
1870.210
224
1819.163
224
1800.292
224
*p < 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p< 0.001
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Districts where the regional governor supports a party candidate see the joint share of 
the independents drop by about 18 percentage points, compared to districts where no 
candidate had the backing of the governor. Of particular note is the lack of significance 
of the reverse effect; i.e. governor's support for an independent. Where the governor 
backed an independent, this did not translate into a significant advantage, when 
compared to SMDs where the governor did not appear to back any candidate. While 
about half of all governor-supported candidates were independents (Figure 8.2), the 
most powerful governors seem to have backed party candidates. This is true of the OVR 
party which was sponsored by some of the strongest regional "bosses", including 
Luzhkov of the City of Moscow and Shaimiev of Tatarstan. Map 8.1 shows the regions 
where OVR's share of the PR vote was above its all-Russian average. These regions are 
the City of Moscow, Moscow oblast, the Republics of Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, 
Mordovia, Chuvashya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Karachaevo Cherkessia, Kabardino 
Balkaria, and North Ossetia, and the autonomous okrugs of Aga Buriat and Nenets. 
Many of these units' leaders had joined, or become affiliated with, OVR.
Map 8.1: Regional concentration o f  the OVR vote, PR tier, 1999 Duma elections
OVRs share of regional vote (1999) 
Below average
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It is worth noting that entering the "GovCat" variable also eliminates the significance 
of the party challenge of SPS, while reducing the effect of OVR and KPRF. This 
finding points to the collinearity of these variables with "GovCat", which confirms that 
the impact of these parties was partially due to the support received from regional 
governors and their administrative resources. A description of the distribution of 
governors’ support across candidates and districts is presented in Figure 8.2 above.
Model 10 allows for complex variability to be modelled. The effect of governors’ 
support is allowed to vary across regions and across SMDs. In other words, the rigid 
assumption that the variance is constant along the values of the predictors is relaxed for 
the "GovCat" variable. Indeed, based on model 10, the assumption of homoskedasticity 
at level one must be rejected, as the variance terms are (both individually and jointly) 
significantly different from zero. Level 2 variance is also significant (joint chi-sq test). 
As for the heterogeneity of the effect of "GovCat" at level two, it is expected that the 
effect of governors’ support is not constant across regions, but that it increases the more 
tightly they control the regional political process. This cross-level interaction is 
explored in the last two models. It can be noted that the more complex specification 
produces a more precise model, with a lower -2*log likelihood.
Finally, Models 11 and 12 add the interaction between governors’ support (the two 
dummies of "GovCat") and freedom of speech, based on the expectation that support by 
the governor should count more in regions with lower levels of freedom in the 
information sphere. Indeed, one key avenue for governors to control regional politics is 
through their control of the regional media. This is confirmed by the fact that the 
interaction term for governors’ support of a party candidate is significant. This means 
that that districts where a party candidate is supported by the governor are less 
favourable to independents, but also that this negative effect increases the greater the 
control exercised over the circulation of information is in a region (i.e. the worse a 
region scores on "Freesp"). In Model 12 the non-significant party variables are 
eliminated.
The interaction effect between "GovSupp" and "Freesp" is graphically depicted in 
Figure 8.3 below. The three regression lines are obtained with the MLwiN "predictions" 
tool, by predicting Y by means of "Freesp", "GovCat" and "Freesp*GovCat" only, but 
based on the specification of the whole Model 12. In this way, a simple relationship is
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singled out from a multiple regression model, while controlling for all other variables in 
that model. The regression lines are then plotted against the scatter of observations.
The lower line (turquoise, with a positive slope) represents the relationship between 
freedom of speech and independents' success for districts where the governor supports a 
party. Of the other two lines, the dark blue one, with a smaller slope, represents the 
relationship for districts with no clear governor support. The difference between these 
two lines (the turquoise and the dark blue) is shown to be significant in Model 12. 
Conversely, the difference between the third line (green, with a steep negative slope), 
which represents districts where the governor supports an independent, and the line for 
"no clear support" (dark blue), is not significant.
Figure 8.3: The cross-level interaction 
between Governors ’ support and freedom o f speech
Gov supp party
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Table 8.8: Predicting independents' success. Estimated multilevel models (11-12)
Hypothesis Variable Model 11 Model 12
Lev. Estim. S.Err. Estim . S.Err.
Fixed part
CONS 4 9 .6 0 6 3 .9 8 3  R 4 7 .4 9 5 3 .2 8 7  R
Regionalist DOW 2 -3 .1 5 9 2 .4 9 5 -2 .7 0 3 2 .4 7 6
assertiveness A SSE R 99A 2
A SSE R 99B 2
Appeasement POLAPP 2 3 .5 6 8 2 .5 3 2 3 .8 2 3 2 .4 5 7
TRANSF 2 0 .0 6 0 0 .0 9 3 0 .0 6 4 0 .0 9 3
Party challenge UNITY 1 -7 .484 2 .9 3 8  * -6 .5 5 3 2 .9 5 9  *
OVR 1 -7 .2 1 7 2 .2 9 4  ** -7 .1 9 3 2 .2 2 3  **
No KPRF 1 9.651 2 .1 0 0  *** 8.951 2 .1 2 5  ***
LDPR 1 -0 .9 5 7 2 .0 4 4
No YABL 1 2.861 2 .0 0 6
S P S 1 -2 .4 2 2 2 .2 6 2
NDR 1 -4 .1 3 7 2 .0 5 0  * -4 .2 5 9 2 .0 2 0  *
SPIRHER 1 -3 .3 2 0 1.941
Candidate REGPOL 1 5 .5 6 2 2 .2 3 8  * 6 .6 9 4 2 .2 3 3  **
notability FEDPOL 1 2.061 3 .0 5 5
INCUMB 1 11.811 2 .3 9 3  *** 12 .8 9 9 2 .3 5 3  ***
Financial support FIGCAT
GOVPAR
GOVIND
FREESP
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In other words, governor support makes a great deal of difference in regions where 
the public sphere is tightly controlled (as reflected in the freedom of speech index). This 
is shown by the wide gap between the two lines on the left side of the graph. However, 
governor support makes less of a difference as freedom of speech increases, to the point 
that it makes virtually no difference in regions with pluralistic information domains, as 
illustrated by the narrow gap between the two lines on the right side of the graph. This 
provides solid confirmation that governors’ preferences, on their own, only reflect part 
of the story on administrative resources and that considerations of the cross-level 
interaction provide a more realistic perspective.
Conclusion
This chapter reaches sharply different conclusions than the previous two. It has been 
shown that in 1999 regionalist assertiveness was no longer correlated with independents' 
success anymore; it also no longer affected the outcome in a mediated way -  i.e. 
through political parties' nomination decisions -  as it did in 1993 and 1995. However, 
parties do appear to mediate the effect of physical accessibility of districts. Indeed, the 
coefficient for "Remote" decreases once party variables are entered.
The irrelevance of regionalist assertiveness in determining independents’ success can 
be explained with reference to the change in the political environment; in particular, to 
the fact that the leaders of restive regions managed to form a viable political alliance 
culminating in the formation of the OVR party. This removed a key precondition for the 
validity of the hypothesis -  the absence of meaningful "parties of the regions". In this 
sense, the findings of the 1999 model are consistent with the explanatory framework 
presented in the thesis.
It should be noted that the overall level of success of the independents (high in 1993, 
lower in 1995 and high again in 1999) is not necessarily relevant to the operation of the 
core hypothesis. The latter hypothesis aims at explaining why the independents are 
more successful in some district than in others, not the overall, average levels. To 
explain diachronic changes, the literature has already pointed to the effect of changing 
institutional rules. The validity of these explanations, which apply at the national level,
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may be debated in specific terms, but they all face the puzzle of sub-national differences 
and patterns. In 1999, if regionalist assertiveness cannot explain these spatial 
differences, the emergence of administrative resources as a main tool of voters' 
mobilisation can. This is, however, not just a story of governors supporting party 
candidates and thereby reducing the chances of independents. The effect of governors’ 
support is significantly dependent on cross-regional differences in the level of political 
pluralism, first of all pluralism in the realm of production and dissemination of 
information.
9Conclusion
The task of this last chapter is twofold. The first part summarises the main points of the 
whole thesis. These include the research question, the limits of the existing literature, 
the adopted research design and explanatory framework, and the findings of the 
empirical analysis. The second task is to discuss the implications of the findings for a 
number of scholarly debates. In this respect, the most direct contribution of the thesis is 
in the field of Russian party and electoral studies: on notions of party identification and 
on the determinants of voting behaviour in Russia generally (section 9.2). The 
implications of the empirical findings, however, can reach beyond Russia's borders, and 
help qualify widely spread assumptions on the role of parties in the processes of 
democratic consolidation and federal building (section 9.3).
9.1 A summary of the thesis
The research question
This work has presented an empirical investigation of the causes of sub-national 
variation in the success of independent candidates in Russian elections to the Duma, the 
Lower House of the Federal Parliament, in the 1990s. The introductory chapter stressed 
that the proliferation of independent candidates was one of the starkest signs of party 
weakness in that decade. It has been argued that this is an important subject because 
political parties are essential to the functioning of modem democracy. Indeed, only 
institutionalised parties can provide the collective accountability of mlers (Aldrich 
1995).
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The proliferation of Russian independents has two main dimensions. At the national 
level, independents received a very substantial share of the vote cast in territorial 
districts, ranging from 35 to 60 percent across the first three post-communist elections. 
These are very large figures compared to established democracies such as the U.K., but 
they are also large compared to other post-communist young democracies, the only 
comparable levels have been observed in Ukraine. This picture, however, only captures 
part of the phenomenon. There is much to be learnt about independents' proliferation 
from the sub-national level. Indeed, the introductory chapter has shown that the level of 
success for parties/independent candidates varies widely across the territory of the 
Russian Federation. Two images of such variability are presented in Map 1.1 and Map 
5.1.
The existing literature
The task of the thesis has been to explain this sub-national variation in independent 
candidates' proliferation. This angle is heuristically fruitful because it challenges the 
conventional wisdom based on the national picture, and adds a new dimension to the 
scholarly understanding of party development in Russia. Chapter 2 illustrated the lack 
of suitable explanations in the existing literature. Indeed, while some scholars have 
studied party development in the regions, they have either chosen a limited number of 
federal units (e.g. Colton and Hough 1998; Moser 1999; Hutcheson 2003); investigated 
regional-level elections (e.g. Golosov 1997, 1999; Gelman and Golosov 1998); or failed 
to adopt a convincing explanatory framework or methodology (e.g. Moser 1999; 
Golosov 2002; Golosov and Shevchenko 2000). As a result, the approach to party 
weakness that receives most currency takes two shapes, both confined to the national 
average and the stereotypical aspects of the phenomenon.
The first group includes empirical studies based on opinion surveys and on the 
proportional representation (PR) side of Russia's mixed electoral system (e.g. White, 
Rose and McAllister 1997; Colton 2000; Colton and McFaul 2003). Because PR ballots 
by definition only include party labels, these works can study the determinants of 
support for one party vs. the other, but not the causes of partisanship as such. This 
limitation also affects the contributions of electoral geographers who have sought to
Conclusion 249
explain spatial patterns in the distribution of PR votes (e.g. Clem and Craumer 1996, 
2000).
The second group of studies includes qualitative approaches that link party weakness 
to the legacies of the Soviet regime (e.g. a "flattened" social structure and authoritarian 
political culture, see Linz and Stepan 1996 and Eckstein et al. 1998, respectively), or to 
contingent factors (e.g. presidentialism, the electoral system, above-parties stance of the 
first president, see Huskey 1999, Moser 2001 and Fish 1995a, respectively). Useful as it 
is for explaining Russia's party weakness at the national level, this approach is of little 
help in explaining sub-national variations because the proposed factors are constant 
across the regions.
Research design
How should the research question be addressed then? As the Introduction and chapter 5 
have explained, this thesis has adopted a statistical large-w design that takes into account 
all districts in all regions where the Duma vote took place in 1993, 1995 and 1999. The 
focus of attention has been on the sub-national variability in the success of independent 
candidates, measured as the total vote share received by the independents in each of 225 
single-member districts (SMDs). SMDs constituted the unit of analysis: the smallest 
level at which the data are gathered or aggregated. The design took into account the fact 
that electoral districts are grouped within regions. This is important because key 
explanatory factors of cross-regional variation in the election outcome apply at the level 
of region and make SMDs belonging to the same region more similar to each other than 
SMDs randomly taken.
In the jargon of statistics this phenomenon is called autocorrelation and leads to 
biased estimates if not dealt with in the quantitative analysis. The best way to take this 
data property into account is to use multilevel modelling. One key advantage over the 
more traditional analysis of variance technique is that multilevel modelling allows one 
not only to detect cross-regional differences, but also to explain them by means of 
regional variables (chapter 5). Indeed, while the main variables of the explanatory 
framework of this thesis apply at the level of regions, other variables are properties of 
districts. Just which variables were expected to explain sub-national variations in the 
success of the independents is summarised in the next sub-section.
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The explanatory framework
Chapter 3 has shown that the explanations put forward by this research revolve around 
the notion that the electoral process should be considered within its wider political 
context. In particular, it has been argued that it is important to link voting behaviour to 
the process of federal bargaining unfolding over much of the 1990s, after seventy years 
of fictitious federalism under the Soviet regime. In this respect, the 89 Russian federal 
units ("regions" for brevity) can be ideally placed on a continuum according to the 
degree of autonomy advocated in the federalisation process. Some regions demanded a 
federation in which units had greater autonomy or even independence (Chechnya), 
while at the opposite end of the spectrum were regions that advocated greater 
centralisation in centre-regional relations. A quantitative measure of these regional 
autonomy stances was adapted for use here from an index elaborated by Kathleen 
Dowley (1998).
A key claim of this thesis has been that regionalist assertiveness (the degree of 
autonomy demands) had a positive effect on the success of independent candidates. This 
hypothesis rested on two considerations. Firstly, the more assertive a region, the 
stronger its anti-centralist sentiments and the less popular national parties based in 
Moscow. Secondly, regionalist parties, which would likely be popular in assertive 
regions, are heavily discouraged under the electoral system (registration rules, and PR 
barrier of representation) and have been absent from the ballots. Under these 
circumstances, regionalist assertiveness constituted a territorial cleavage (in the sense 
defined by Lipset and Rokkan 1967) that gave the independents a competitive 
advantage over political parties in articulating and representing regionalist sentiments. 
However, centre-regional relations clearly involved two actors -  the regions and the 
federal centre. In addition to regional demands, therefore, it was necessary to consider 
(and statistically control for) central responses. In particular, Moscow tried to appease 
the most vocal regions by means of bilateral treaties and other concessions that defused 
anti-centralist sentiments.
Moreover, for the 1999 models, regional "administrative resources" were also 
considered. This factor refers to the support that a regional governor can provide for a 
given candidate. Data kindly made available by Henry Hale were used to identify which 
candidate received a governor's support in which district. The effect of such support was
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expected to be greater the tighter the governor's control over regional politics (as 
indicated by the level of freedom of speech observed in the region). The independents 
would be advantaged or penalised according to whether the governor supported an 
independent or a party candidate. For the 1999 vote, Hale's data also allowed a test of 
the impact of financial backing on independents' success. Geographic accessibility 
was also considered as an explanatory factor of spatial differences in the proliferation of 
the independents. This effect has been posited to be indirect, as it negatively affects the 
ability of national parties to nominate their candidates in regions with very cold 
temperatures or mountainous territories, especially as the elections are held in 
December.
The explanatory factors mentioned so far apply at the level of region. Independents' 
success, however, was observed at the sub-regional level of electoral districts and varied 
widely among SMDs. Clearly, this portion of variability had to be addressed by district- 
level factors. Two such factors were identified in the strategic decisions of key actors of 
SMD races -  political parties and notable candidates. As for political parties, the 
expectation was that m ajor national parties are endowed with greater name 
recognition (brand name effect) and could be expected to reduce the chances for 
independents simply by entering an SMD race (no party managed to nominate its 
candidate in all, and very few in most, districts). It should be remembered that 
regionalist parties are virtually absent due to electoral rules (chapters 3 and 7 discussed 
marginal exceptions). With regard to notable candidates, the assumption was that they 
have greater a priori chances of success (due to their local visibility, resources, 
connections with the local administration, incumbency, etc.). Therefore, they would 
boost or dampen the success of independents according to their decision to stand as 
independent or party candidates, respectively.
The explanatory framework also took into account the fact that the decisions of 
parties to enter a given race, and of notables to stand as independent vs. party candidates, 
are strategic. This means that such decisions are affected by the expectation of success 
or failure that are associated with them. In other words, parties were expected to be 
more likely to enter an SMD race where they saw greater chances of success. Similarly, 
notables were expected to be more likely to stand as independents where they felt that
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party nomination would reduce their chances of success. One key factor expected to 
determine these actors’ expectations of success was regionalist assertiveness.
It follows that notable candidates were expected to be more likely to run as 
independents, and parties more likely to avoid entering the contest, the greater the 
regionalist assertiveness. As a result, in addition to its direct effect, regionalist 
assertiveness was expected to have a positive indirect effect on independents' success, 
mediated through the strategic decisions of notables and parties. A similar indirect 
effect was also expected for geographic accessibility. A path diagram of direct and 
indirect causal relations is portrayed in Figure 3.1.
The findings
All the main hypotheses summarised above received confirmation to some extent in the 
statistical analysis, although the causal dynamic of 1999 vote was different from that 
behind the previous two elections. Chapters 6 and 7 showed that independent candidates 
enjoyed a competitive advantage over national parties in articulating territorial 
cleavages in the first two elections. Indeed, controlling for instances of central 
appeasement, levels of regionalist assertiveness had a statistically significant and 
positive effect on the electoral chances of independent candidates in 1993 and 1995. 
This effect is not observed in the 1999 elections, when the leaders of assertive regions 
managed to form a political party to "storm the Kremlin" in view of the 2000 
presidential elections (chapter 8). This meant that voters in a number of assertive 
regions would be induced to support the new interregional party, instead of independent 
candidates. This explains why, in the models for 1999, the coefficient for regionalist 
assertiveness, while not meeting conventional levels of statistical significance, had a 
negative sign.
In the 1999 case, the widespread belief that regional administrative resources were 
paramount has been partially confirmed by the analysis of the SMD vote. Governor's 
support indeed helped parties challenge the independents, but it did not appear to make 
a significant difference when it was geared towards the independents. This is because 
the "weight" of regional leaders backing parties, especially OVR, and those backing 
individual independent candidates, was markedly different. The "big khozyains" 
(bosses) were behind OVR candidates, not the independents. Also, not surprisingly,
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governor's support appeared to be collinear with the support of large financial interests. 
Even so, the backing of Financial-Industrial Groups (FIGs) significantly increased the 
chances of independent candidates (chapter 8).
It is important to note that, when it did apply -  i.e. in 1993 and 1995 -  the effect of 
regionalist assertiveness on independents' success was confirmed to be both direct 
and indirect. As expected, the indirect portion of the effect was mediated through the 
strategic considerations of key electoral actors -  political parties and notable candidates. 
The analysis confirmed that parties tended to nominate candidates in favourable 
environments (low regionalist assertiveness) and to write some SMDs off as too 
impervious. However, already in 1995, parties appeared to start widening their spatial 
reach and contesting districts located in less favourable regions. Indeed, in 1995 major 
parties contested a larger number of SMDs than in 1993. Nevertheless, both in 1993 and 
1995, levels of regionalist assertiveness were shown to play a significant role in the 
strategic entry decisions for several parties (chapters 6 and 7).
The impact of the nomination decisions of major political parties and local notables 
were also confirmed to be statistically significant. In terms of party challenges to the 
independents, in 1999 an effective threat was represented, in descending order, by the 
KPRF, OVR, "Unity" and, somewhat surprisingly given its poor PR performance, NDR 
(chapter 8). In 1995, the independents were effectively challenged by the APR, the 
"Bloc of Independents", NDR and the KPRF (chapter 7). In 1993, the greatest 
challenges were posed by "Dignity and Charity", "Russia's Choice", the APR, the LDPR, 
the DPR, Yabloko, "Civic Union", and the PRES (chapter 6). As for notable 
candidates, in 1995 the independents were significantly more successful where they 
could count members of the regional and federal elite, or the district incumbent in their 
ranks. In 1999 this effect was confined to incumbency and regional elite status.144
Moreover, purely geographic considerations also played a significant role in 
determining party resource allocations to the SMDs. For some parties, the difficulty of 
reaching populations located in remote and inhospitable areas significantly reduced the 
probability o f entering the race. In addition to the effect of regionalist assertiveness and 
geographic accessibility, levels of urbanisation are confirmed to be significantly 
associated with a high probability that parties like Yabloko and Russia's Choice
144 This variable could not be tested for the 1993 elections due to data availability constraints.
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nominate candidates. Geographic remoteness also negatively affected the probability 
that local elites would run as party candidates (as shown by the model on "Regpol" in 
chapter 7, Table 7.7).
9.2 Implications for the scholarly understanding of Russian elections
This study leads to an important reinterpretation of the phenomenon of the independents. 
As noted in chapters 2 and 3, the prevalent view is that a strong showing by 
independents is simply a sign of party failure. According to this view, the reason for the 
proliferation of independent candidates in the 1990 elections was that most parties 
lacked the organisational capacity to campaign effectively in the districts, and also 
failed to attract local notables to their ranks. Because parties could not offer much in the 
way of campaign resources, candidates endowed with personal assets (or supported by 
the governor and/or by financial groups) decide to run as independents. This study has 
shown that such an account is only partially accurate.
This research has shown that the success of independents is not merely a sign of 
party failure; a significant portion of their success was due to the fact that they fulfilled 
a positive articulation and representation function. In those regions where territorial 
cleavages were salient, the independents had a competitive advantage over national 
parties, regardless of the latter’s organisational resources. This advantage also took the 
form of a disincentive for national parties even to contest districts in areas of high 
regionalist assertiveness.
The influence of regionalist assertiveness on the entry decisions of political parties 
also suggests a qualification to the cross-contamination hypothesis, according to which 
the mixed electoral system provides parties with the incentive to nominate candidates in 
as many SMDs as possible. Even if they don't stand a chance of winning the district seat, 
parties gain in local visibility by running a local campaign and are thought thereby to 
improve their vote returns in the PR tier of the vote (Herron 2002). However, in the 
light of the findings of this research, this view needs to be qualified. Party incentives to 
nominate candidates in the SMDs also have a territorial dimension linked to regional 
anti-centralist sentiments, thus the contamination effect posited by Herron should not be
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taken to apply equally across the territory. However, the thesis that the incentives for 
cross-tier contamination were stronger in 1995 (Belin and Orttung 1997), is consistent 
with the finding that fewer parties were affected by levels of regionalist assertiveness in 
their 1995 SMD entry decision than in 1993.
Moreover, as explained in chapter 3, the findings of this study help specify the 
assertion found in the existing literature that the independents benefit from posing as the 
true representative of "local interests". It is not just any kind of local interest that 
provides them with a competitive advantage over national parties; local interests may 
well coincide with the articulation of functional cleavages that are the domain of party 
representation. Only local interests that coincide with a territorial cleavage -  i.e. 
interests that set a territorial community apart from the rest of the country -  can be 
expected to provide an advantage to the independents. Regionalist demands provide a 
clear example of such a territorial cleavage because they are by definition rooted in 
individual regions. Thus even though several federal units demanded greater autonomy, 
their co-ordination proved difficult until 1999 due to the different claims generating 
their regionalist demands (mainly ethno-cultural defence vs. resistance to fiscal 
exploitation) (Solnick 1996).
Perhaps the most direct contribution this study makes to the literature on Russian 
electoral politics regards the issue of "party identification". The reliance on opinion 
surveys based on the PR tier meant that the existing literature missed a great deal of 
relevant information related to the proliferation of the independents in the SMDs. This 
study suggests that the weakness of party attachments was not felt equally throughout 
the country, nor was this inequality randomly distributed. Because attachment to 
regionalist parties is practically ruled out by the electoral system, the only party 
attachment that voters can develop (i.e. to national parties) is more likely to grow where 
centre-regional relations are co-operative rather than conflictive, other factors being 
equal. Moreover, the analysis of the 1999 vote confirms the cynicism of those who 
stressed the mobilisational sources of Russian voting behaviour. The governors of 
important regions can induce their voters to show "attachment" to the "right" party.
With regard to the 1999 elections, the importance of administrative resources also 
qualifies, with regard to the 1999 elections, the view that the Russian electorate is 
becoming structured along social cleavages. Some persistent lines of division among
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voters are indeed linked to social traits (education, age, income, etc.) or to the 
urban/rural cleavage. However, macro-political regional effects should added to these 
individual-level perspectives. Namely, the re-opening of the nation- and state-building 
processes after the collapse of the Soviet system, and the ensuing process of centre- 
regional bargaining. These have brought back to prominence the territorial type of 
cleavage.
9.3 Comparative implications
One grounding assumption of this research has been the importance of the party 
institution for the functioning of democracy and for democratic consolidation. In 
addition to being the only way to ensure the collective accountability of the rulers 
towards the ruled, parties are deemed to perform the vital task of deepening the 
legitimacy of the political system through possibly integrating all sectors of society into 
the political process. As a result, institutionalised parties can prevent alienated and anti- 
systemic sentiments from taking root outside democratic institutions (Huntington 1968; 
Morlino 1998).
In the case of federal systems, one possible source for anti-system sentiment is the 
articulation of strong autonomy demands. By integrating and moderating centrifugal 
forces, political parties are considered to be a key institution to counter this danger and 
help sustain federal stability. In the paradigmatic formulation of the "integrated party", 
the party is expected to bridge "sectional" (territorial) divisions because it needs to be a 
national organisation in order to conquer highly desired national offices (primarily the 
presidency). The party cannot afford internal divisions, and each individual member 
politicians is inclined to moderate the demands of his particular constituency in order to 
advance a common cause and to keep the reputation of the whole (Aldrich 1995, Cox 
1997, Filippov et al. 2004). In this literature, the requirements for the emergence of such 
integrated party are mainly institutional. Parties should aspire to win important national 
office, and control its spoils, in order to have an incentive to be national and to bridge 
territorial cleavages. If integrated parties are the solution, regionalist parties are part of 
the problem. Indeed, one clear implication of the theory of the "integrated party" is that
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regionalist parties, i.e. parties based in one federal unit (or a subset of units) and 
representing the territorial (sectional) cleavage, should be avoided as inimical to federal 
stability.
This approach to federal stability parallels the discussion of the role of parties in 
democratic consolidation in that it focuses on the type of party that can best promote the 
outcome,145 while the prior logical step of considering whether the party institution is 
necessary at all is usually skipped.146 This thesis, by looking at non-party candidates, 
suggests taking a step back and considering the question of "whether parties”. The 
relationship between party development and federal stability is inherently different for 
transitional and consolidated democracies. In established federations like the USA and 
Canada, territorial cleavages emerged after the development of the party system. The 
party was the natural channel for regionalist grievances, if only because an organisation 
was needed to compete with existing party organisations. By contrast, in a transitional 
setting, especially in one as difficult as post-communist transformations, parties are 
doomed to be organisationally weak and deprived of local and social roots. In Russia, 
the federalisation process began at the very beginning of the transition from Soviet 
system, even before the formal birth of sovereign Russia, and could not find an effective 
channel of representation in the party institution.
In a transitional setting the very emergence of parties should be taken as problematic. 
It makes more sense to ask what the impact of centre-regional relations on party 
development is, than the opposite question of what type of party can best stabilise 
federal relations (as with the "integrated party" approach). Indeed, this thesis has shown 
how centre-regional relations can become a key casual factor of uneven party 
development across the country, at least under Russian conditions. Clearly, the drafters 
of Russian electoral law sought to undermine the possibility for genuine and viable 
regionalist parties to emerge. At the same time, however, the parties that did emerge, 
while "national" in name, did not live up to the standards of the "integrated party" 
model. Especially, they could not effectively "bridge" territorial/sectional divisions and 
completely replace regionalist with national loyalties. As a result, regionalist sentiments
145 The effect o f  centre-regional relations on party type is sometimes explored. See, for example, 
Tuschhoff (1999) and Thorlakson (2002).
146 Both in the field of democratisation and in federal relations, the role o f corporatist institutions, instead 
of political parties, is sometimes explored (Pelinka 1999, Encamacion 1999).
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were salient in some regions, especially in the first half of the 1990's, and this favoured 
independents in the 1993 and 1995 elections.
The Russian case suggests that, in the absence of strong national parties, and given 
that regionalist parties are to be avoided, non-party electoral representation in the form 
of independents can provide a suitable compromise solution for federal stability. On the 
one hand, the possibility to vote for independent candidates gives a "voice" opportunity 
to regionalist sentiments, which would otherwise lack any channel of expression absent 
regionalist parties. Lacking a "voice" option would increase the alienation from the 
political process and feed into the anti-systemic potential of regionalist sentiments.
And yet, while independents would provide such a "voice" for autonomy demands, 
they lack the ability to effectively promote the regionalist agenda. Indeed, independents 
failed to constitute a cohesive and disciplined group in the Duma. Many joined party 
factions immediately after elected or decided to form different groups.147 They came 
from different regions, so it could be expected their interests would have been difficult 
to reconcile. Their policy impact was less dramatic than that of a cohesive regionalist 
party based in one or few regions would have been.148 In this sense, the independents 
(unwittingly) contributed to federal stability.
They provided a "safety valve" for the expression of anti-systemic pressures, while 
ultimately failing to constitute an effective opposition to the centralisation drive in 
federal relations that prevailed after 1999, with Putin. On the contrary, regionalist 
parties would have entrenched and helped crystallise territorial cleavages, subjecting the 
stability of the federation to far greater pressure than the independents could ever 
manage. The independents, therefore, introduced an element of flexibility in the Russian 
political system, that (together with more prominent flexibility tools, such as bilateral 
negotiations) allowed the federal arrangement to survive the peak phase of regionalist 
assertiveness.
147 Parliamentary 'factions' formed primarily by independent candidates are "New Regional Policy" in the 
first Duma, "Russia's Regions" in the second and third Duma, and "People's Deputy" in the third Duma.
148 Prominent students of the roll call voting in the Duma (Smith and Remington 2001; Remington 2003), 
have not investigated the effect of independent nomination on legislators' policy attitudes. Smith and 
Remington (2001) have seen the Duma as dominated by policy debates on the left-right dimension, while 
regionalist issue would be salient in the Federation Council. Much as this is true, this research invites an 
exploration of the stances of deputies elected as independents in the Duma voting. The names of the 
parliamentary factions (see previous fh.) formed by so many independents, indeed suggests a regionalist 
concern.
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By casting some doubts on the desirability of purely party-based representation under 
transitional conditions in unstable federations, this research invites a reconsideration of 
the role of parties in the general task of democratic consolidation. The function of 
articulating and representing interests is not always best carried out by political parties 
when these are weak and federal stability is under threat. Under such circumstances, 
while it is sensible to discourage regionalist parties, it might be advantageous for 
stability to allow regionalist sentiments to find a channel in non-party representatives.
Appendix
Table A. 1.1: Federal units in economic regions
Economic region Federal units
Central Bryansk Oblast, Vladimir Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kaluga Oblast, Kostroma Oblast, 
Moscow Oblast, Orlovskaya (Orel) Oblast, Ryazan Oblast, Smolensk Oblast, Tver 
Oblast, Tula Oblast, Yaroslavl Oblast, Moscow City
North West Kaliningrad Oblast, Leningrad Oblast, Novgorod Oblast, Pskov Oblast, St. 
Petersbura
North Karelian Republic, Komi Republic, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Vologoda Oblast, 
Murmansk Oblast, Nenets Autonomous Okrug
Volga-Vyatka Mariy El Republic, Mordovian Republic, Chuvash Republic, Kirov Oblast, Nizhny 
Novgorod Oblast
Volga Kalmikiya Republic, Tatarstan Republic, Astrakhan Oblast, Volgograd Oblast, 
Penza Oblast, Samara Oblast, Saratov Oblast, Ulyanovsk Oblast
Central Black Earth Belgorod Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Kursk Oblast, Lipetsk Oblast, Tambov Oblast
North Caucasus Adygey Republic, Daghestan Rep, Ingushetiya Rep, Kabardin-Balkar Republic, 
Karachay-Cherkess Republic, North Osetian Republic, Chechen Republic, 
Krasnodar Kray, Stravropol Kray, Rostov Oblast
Urals Bashkortostan Republic, Udmurt Republic, Kurgan Oblast, Orenburg Oblast, Perm 
Oblast, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast,
Permyak Autonomous Okrug
West Siberia Altay Republic, Altay Kray, Kemerovo Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast, Omsk Oblast, 
Tomsk Oblast, Tyumen Oblast, Khanty Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, Yamalo- 
Nenets Autonomous Okrug
East Siberia Buryat Republic, Tyva Republic, Khakass Republic, Krasnoyarsk Kray, Irkutsk 
Oblast, Chita Oblast, Aga-Buryat Autonomous Okr, Taymyrskiy (Dolgano-Nenets) 
Autonomous Okrug, Ust-Ordynskiy Buryat Autonomous Okrug, Evenk Autonomous 
Okrug
Far East Sakha Yakut Republic, Primorsky Kray, Khabarovsk Kray, Amur Oblast, Kamchatka 
Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Jewish Autonomous Oblast, Koryak 
Autonomous Okrug, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug.
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Table A.4.1: Ranking o f regions on Dowley's index, with time-specific mean scores
Rank Region Dowley's index (1991-95 mean)
1988-93
mean
score
1992-93
mean
score
1994-95
mean
score
1 Chechen Republic 4.62 4.37 4.58 4.72
2 Tatarstan Republic 4.33 4.37 4.44 4.07
3 Bashkortostan Republic 4.00 3.97 4.09 3.69
4 Mariy El Republic 3.86 3.40 3.60 3.50
5 Tyva Republic 3.80 3.71 3.82 3.57
6 Sakha Yakut Republic 3.68 3.49 3.58 3.77
7 Khakass Republic 3.64 3.56 3.75 3.33
8 Adygey Republic 3.62 3.30 3.38
9 Chuvash Republic 3.62 3.27 3.25 3.57
10 Karelian Republic 3.56 3.52 3.58 3.25
11 Buryat Republic 3.50 3.69 3.67 2.33
12 Ingushetiya Republic 3.50 3.50 3.53 3.31
13 Komi Republic 3.44 3.36 3.23 2.40
14 Udmurt Republic 3.43 3.38 3.78 4.00
15 Altay Republic 3.33 3.25 3.40 3.00
16 Nenets Autonomous Okrug 3.33 4.00 4.00 3.00
17 Khanty Mansiysk Aut Okrug 3.33 3.25 3.67 3.00
18 Chukotka Autonomous Okrug 3.33 3.75 3.00 2.00
19 Kalmikiya Republic 3.29 3.65 3.73 2.50
20 Yamalo-Nenets Aut. Okrug 3.25 3.60 3.50 2.50
21 Mordovian Republic 3.20 3.31 3.25 2.33
22 Taymyrskiy Aut. Okrug 3.17 3.67 3.67 2.75
23 Tyumen Oblast 3.13 3.08 3.20 2.33
24 North Osetian Republic 3.12 3.03 3.11 3.18
25 Kabardin-Balkar Republic 3.05 3.16 3.16 3.80
26 Sverdlovsk Oblast 3.04 2.95 2.90 3.07
27 Karachay-Cherkess Republic 3.00 3.31 2.88 2.33
28 Aga-Buryat Autonomous Okrug 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.50
29 Permyak Autonomous Okrug 3.00 3.50 4.00 3.00
30 Ust-Ordynskiy Buryat Aut. Okrug 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.50
31 Irkutsk Oblast 2.88 2.91 2.88 2.86
32 Vologoda Oblast 2.86 3.00 3.00 2.50
33 Daghestan Rep 2.84 2.90 2.94 2.20
34 Khabarovsk Kray 2.83 3.00 3.00 2.67
35 St. Petersburg 2.82 2.76 2.70 2.60
36 Omsk Oblast 2.80 2.00 2.00 2.67
37 Jewish Autonomous Oblast 2.80 3.00 3.33 2.50
38 Kaliningrad Oblast 2.79 2.88 3.20 2.43
Appendix 262
39 Nizhny Novgorod Oblast 2.79 2.82 2.90 2.71
40 Vladimir Oblast 2.75 2.50 3.00 2.67
41 Magadan Oblast 2.75 2.50 2.40 2.33
42 Chelyabinsk Oblast 2.75 2.75 2.73 2.33
43 Evenk Autonomous Okrug 2.75 3.00 3.00 2.50
44 Moscow City 2.72 2.70 2.50 2.71
45 Bryansk Oblast 2.71 2.50 2.50 2.00
46 Voronezh Oblast 2.71 2.67 2.75 2.67
47 Novosibirsk Oblast 2.69 2.73 2.67 2.14
48 Primorsky Kray 2.67 3.17 3.00 2.64
49 Astrakhan Oblast 2.67 3.00 3.00 2.00
50 Ivanovo Oblast 2.67 2.50 2.50 2.00
51 Kurgan Oblast 2.67 3.00 3.00 2.00
52 Murmansk Oblast 2.67 3.00 3.00 2.25
53 Novgorod Oblast 2.67 3.00 3.00 2.60
54 Orlovskaya (Orel) Oblast 2.67 2.57 2.50 1.80
55 Pskov Oblast 2.67 2.75 2.33 2.50
56 Chita Oblast 2.67 2.78 2.83 2.20
57 Kemerovo Oblast 2.64 2.71 2.57 2.50
58 Krasnoyarsk Kray 2.63 2.67 2.72 2.44
59 Volgograd Oblast 2.62 2.50 2.40 1.80
60 Amur Oblast 2.60 2.40 2.40 2.20
61 Leningrad Oblast 2.60 2.75 2.67 2.00
62 Altay Kray 2.57 2.40 2.67 2.33
63 Arkhangelsk Oblast 2.57 2.75 2.75 2.33
64 Tomsk Oblast 2.57 2.38 2.33 2.33
65 Samara Oblast 2.54 2.50 2.67 2.50
66 Kaluga Oblast 2.50 2.33 2.00 2.00
67 Kamchatka Oblast 2.50 3.00 3.00 2.67
68 Kirov Oblast 2.50 3.00 2.00
69 Penza Oblast 2.50 2.25 2.25 1.67
70 Perm Oblast 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.33
71 Saratov Oblast 2.50 2.75 2.88 2.20
72 Tambov Oblast 2.50 2.00 2.00 2.50
73 Yaroslavl Oblast 2.50 3.20 3.00 2.00
74 Moscow Oblast 2.43 2.50 2.50 2.33
75 Orenburg Oblast 2.43 3.00 3.00 1.67
76 Tula Oblast 2.43 2.50 2.33 2.29
77 Sakhalin Kray 2.38 2.25 2.00 2.00
78 Ulyanovsk Oblast 2.38 2.50 2.50 2.00
79 Krasnodar Kray 2.36 2.75 2.71 2.63
80 Kostroma Oblast 2.33 3.00 3.00 2.00
81 Smolensk Oblast 2.33 1.60 1.33 2.00
82 Stravropol Kray 2.25 2.71 2.50 2.27
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83 Belgorod Oblast 2.25 2.00 2.00 2.00
84 Rostov Oblast 2.20 2.56 2.60 2.10
85 Ryazan Oblast 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
86 Tver Oblast 2.00 2.67 2.00 2.00
87 Koryak Autonomous Okrug 2.00 2.00
88 Lipetsk Oblast 1.75 1.67 1.80 2.00
89 Kursk Oblast 1.60 1.60 1.75 2.00
Russian Federation 2.84 2.91 2.91 2.53
The ranking is based on Column 3.
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Table A.4.2: Ranking o f regions on Dowley's index adjusted fo r  1999
Rank Region Asser99a Asser99b
1 Chechen Republic 4.62 4.72
2 Tatarstan Republic 4.42 4.29
3 Sakha Yakut Republic 4.09 4.14
4 Bashkortostan Republic 4.00 3.85
5 Mariy El Republic 3.86 3.50
6 Nenets Autonomous Okrug 3.83 3.50
7 Khanty Mansiysk Aut Okrug 3.83 3.50
8 Chukotka Autonomous Okrug 3.83 2.50
9 Tyva Republic 3.80 3.57
10 Yamalo-Nenets Aut. Okrug 3.75 3.00
11 Taymyrskiy (Dolgano-N.) Aut. Okrug 3.67 3.25
12 Khakass Republic 3.64 3.33
13 Tyumen Oblast 3.63 2.83
14 Adygey Republic 3.62 3.62
15 Karelian Republic 3.56 3.25
16 Chuvash Republic 3.56 3.54
17 Buryat Republic 3.50 2.33
18 Ingushetiya Republic 3.50 3.41
19 Aga-Buryat Autonomous Okrug 3.50 3.00
20 Permyak Autonomous Okrug 3.50 3.50
21 Ust-Ordynskiy Buryat Aut. Okrug 3.50 3.00
22 Udmurt Republic 3.47 3.75
23 Komi Republic 3.44 2.40
24 Kalmikiya Republic 3.40 3.00
25 Vologoda Oblast 3.36 3.00
26 Altay Republic 3.33 3.00
27 Khabarovsk Kray 3.33 3.17
28 North Ossetian Republic 3.31 3.34
29 Jewish Autonomous Oblast 3.30 3.00
30 Kaliningrad Oblast 3.29 2.93
31 Samara Oblast 3.27 3.25
32 Vladimir Oblast 3.25 3.17
33 Magadan Oblast 3.25 2.83
34 Evenk Autonomous Okrug 3.25 3.00
35 Bryansk Oblast 3.21 2.50
36 Voronezh Oblast 3.21 3.17
37 Mordovian Republic 3.20 2.33
38 Astrakhan Oblast 3.17 2.50
39 Ivanovo Oblast 3.17 2.50
40 Kurgan Oblast 3.17 2.50
41 Murmansk Oblast 3.17 2.75
42 Pskov Oblast 3.17 3.00
43 Chita Oblast 3.17 2.70
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
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Kemerovo Oblast 3.14 3.00
Volgograd Oblast 3.12 2.30
Amur Oblast 3.10 2.70
Leningrad Oblast 3.10 2.50
Altay Kray 3.07 2.83
Arkhangelsk Oblast 3.07 2.83
Kabardin-Balkar Republic 3.05 3.80
Sverdlovsk Oblast 3.02 3.04
Karachay-Cherkess Republic 3.00 2.33
Kaluga Oblast 3.00 2.50
Kamchatka Oblast 3.00 3.17
Kirov Oblast 3.00 2.50
Perm Oblast 3.00 2.83
Saratov Oblast 3.00 2.70
Tula Oblast 2.93 2.79
Irkutsk Oblast 2.88 2.86
Sakhalin Oblast 2.88 2.50
Ulyanovsk Oblast 2.88 2.50
Krasnodar Kray 2.86 3.13
Daghestan Rep 2.84 2.20
Primorsky Kray 2.84 2.82
Kostroma Oblast 2.83 2.50
St. Petersburg 2.82 2.60
Omsk Oblast 2.80 2.67
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast 2.79 2.71
Stravropol Kray 2.75 2.77
Chelyabinsk Oblast 2.75 2.33
Moscow City 2.72 2.71
Rostov Oblast 2.70 2.60
Novosibirsk Oblast 2.69 2.14
Novgorod Oblast 2.67 2.60
Orlovskaya (Orel) Oblast 2.67 1.80
Krasnoyarsk Kray 2.63 2.44
Tomsk Oblast 2.57 2.33
Penza Oblast 2.50 1.67
Ryazan Oblast 2.50 2.50
Tambov Oblast 2.50 2.50
Yaroslavl Oblast 2.50 2.00
Koryak Autonomous Okrug 2.50 2.50
Moscow Oblast 2.43 2.33
Orenburg Oblast 2.43 1.67
Smolensk Oblast 2.33 2.00
Belgorod Oblast 2.25 2.00
Kursk Oblast 2.10 2.50
Tver Oblast 2.00 2.00
Lipetsk Oblast 1.75 2.00
Russian Federation 3.11 2.82
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Figure A .6.1: The impact o f regional assertiveness on APR entry decisions 
(Predicted from the "APR " logistic model in Table 6.6)
Reg Assertiveness
Figure A.6.2: The impact o f  regional assertiveness on Russia's Choice entry decisions 
(Predictedfrom the "Russia’s Choice" logistic model in Table 6.6)
Reg Assertiveness (DOW92-93)
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Figure A.6.3: The impact o f urbanisation on Russia's Choice entry decisions 
(Predictedfrom the "Russia's Choice" logistic model in Table 6.6)
0.8-r
0 5  0.6- -
0.4- -
0 .2 - -
0.0
102
Urbanisation
Bibliography
Achen, C. and W. Shively (1995). Cross-Level Inference. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Aldrich, J. H. (1995). Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation o f Political Parties 
in America. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
Alexander, J. (2000). Political Culture in Post-Communist Russia: Formlessness and 
Recreation in a Traumatic Transition. London and New York: Macmillan and St. 
Martin's.
—  (2002). “Komi and the Center: Developing Federalism in an Era of Socioeconomic 
Crisis.” in Centre-Periphery Relations in the Former Soviet Union: Unity or 
Separation. Edited by D. R. Kempton and T. D. Clark, Westport (Connecticut) 
and London: Praeger.
Alexseev, M. A. (1999). “Asymmetric Russia: Promises and Dangers.” in Center- 
Periphery Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia. Edited by M. A. Alexseev, London: 
Macmillan.
Alker, H. R. (1969). “A Typology of Ecological Fallacies.” in Quantitative Ecological 
Analysis in the Social Sciences. Edited by M. Dogan and S. Rokkan, Cambridge 
(MA) and London: MIT Press.
Allison, P. D. (1999). Multiple Regression. Thousand Oaks (CA), London, and New 
Dehli: Pine Forge Press.
Bibliography 269
Ansolabehere, S., J. M. Snyder, Jr. and C. Stewart, III (2000). “Old Voters, New Voters, 
and the Personal Vote: Using Redistricting to Measure the Incumbency.” 
American Journal o f Political Science, 44 (1): 17-34.
Azrael, J. R., E. Payin, Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies (Rand Corporation), et 
al. (1998). Conflict and Consensus in Ethno-Political and Center-Periphery 
Relations in Russia. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
Balzer, M. M. (1999). “Dilemmas of Federalism in Siberia.” in Center-Periphery 
Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia. Edited by M. A. Alexseev, London: Macmillan.
Bartolini, S. and P. Mair (1990). Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The 
Stabilisation o f European Electorates 1885-1985. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Belin, L. and R. W. Orttung (1997). The Russian Parliamentary Elections o f  1995. 
Armonk, NY and London, England: M.E. Sharpe.
Blondel, J. (1981). “Political Integration and the Role of Political Parties: The Case of 
Spain.” in Mobilization, Center-Periphery Structures and Nation-Building: A 
Volume in Commemoration o f Stein Rokkan. Edited by T. Per, Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget.
Brie, M. (1997). The Political Regime o f Moscow - Creation o f a New Urban Machine? 
Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fur Sozialforschung.
Brown, R. (1998). “Party Development in the Regions: When Did Parties Start to Play a 
Part in Politics?” in Party Politics in Post-Communist Russia. Edited by J. 
Lowenhardt, London: Frank Cass.
Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalism Reframed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bibliography 270
Brudny, Y. M. (1998). “St. Petersburg: The Election in the Democratic Metropolis.” in 
Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the Election o f 1993. Edited by T. J. 
Colton and J. F. Hough, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Bryce, J. (1888). The American Commonwealth. London: Macmillan.
—  (1921). Modern Democracies. London: Macmillan.
Bryk, A. S. and S. W. Raundenbush (1992). Hierarchical Linear Models. Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage.
Budge, I. and H. Keman (1990). Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and 
Government Functioning in Twenty States. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bums, K. G. (1998). “Primor'e: Local Politics and a Coalition for Reform.” in Growing 
Pains: Russian Democracy and the Election o f 1993. Edited by T. J. Colton and J.
F. Hough, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Butler, D. and D. E. Stokes (1974, 2nd edition). Political Change in Britain: Forces 
Shaping Electoral Choice. London: Macmillan.
Cain, B. E., J. A. Ferejohn and M. P. Fiorina (1986). The Personal Vote: Constituency 
Service and Electoral Independence. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press.
Campbell, A., P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller, et al. (1960). The American Voter. New 
York: John Wiley and Sons.
Canon, D. T. (1990). Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United 
States Congress. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bibliography 271
Caramani, D. (2003). “The End of Silent Elections: The Birth of Electoral Competition, 
1832-1915.” Party Politics, 9 (4): 411-44.
—  (2004). The Nationalization o f Politics: The Formation o f National Electorates and
Party Systems in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carey, J. M. and M. S. Shugart (1995). “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A 
Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas.” Electoral Studies, 14 (4): 417-39.
Chaisty, P. and J. Gleisner (2000). “The Consolidation of Russian Parliamentarism: The 
State Duma, 1993-8.” in Institutions and Political Change in Russia. Edited by N. 
Robinson, London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press.
Chaisty, P. and P. Schleiter (2002). “Productive but Not Valued: The Russian State 
Duma, 1994-2001.” Europe-Asia Studies, 54 (5): 701-24.
Chirikova, A. and N. Y. Lapina (2001). “Political Power and Political Stability in the 
Russian Regions.” in Contemporary Russian Politics. Edited by A. Brown, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clem, R. S. and P. R. Craumer (1996). “The Geography of the Russian 1995 
Parliamentary Election: Continuity, Change and Correlates.” Post-Soviet 
Geography, 36 (10): 587-616.
—  (1998). “Regional Patterns in Voter Turnout.” in Elections and Voters in Post-
Communist Russia. Edited by M. Wyman, S. White and S. Oates, Cheltenham, 
UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
—  (2000). “Regional Patterns of Political Preference in Russia: The December 1999
Duma Elections.” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 41 (1): 1-29.
Bibliography 272
Clem, R. S. and P. R. Craumer (2000a). “Spatial Patterns of Political Choice in the Post- 
Yel’tsin Era: The Electoral Geography of Political Choice of Russia's 2000 
Presidential Election.” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 41 (7): 465-82.
—  (2002). “Urban and Rural Effects on Party Preference in Russia: New Evidence
from the Recent Duma Election.” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 43 (1): 
1- 12.
Colton, T. J. (1998). “Introduction. The 1993 Election and the New Russian Politics.” in 
Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the Election o f 1993. Edited by T. J. 
Colton and J. F. Hough, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
—  (1998a). “Determinants of the Party Vote.” in Growing Pains: Russian Democracy
and the Election o f 1993. Edited by T. J. Colton and J. F. Hough, Washington
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
—  (2000). Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia.
Cambridge (MA) and London: Harvard University Press.
Colton, T. J. and J. F. Hough, Eds. (1998). Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the 
Election o f 1993. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Colton, T. J. and M. McFaul (2003). Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: The 
Russian Elections o f 1999 and 2000. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press.
Cox, G. W. (1997). Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's 
Electoral Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crowley, S. (1998). “The Kuzbass: Liberals, Populists, and Labor.” in Growing Pains: 
Russian Democracy and the Election o f 1993. Edited by T. J. Colton and J. F. 
Hough, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Bibliography 273
Dahlberg, M. and E. Johnsson (2002). “On the Vote-Purchasing Behaviour of 
Incumbent Governments.” American Political Science Review, 96 (1): 27-40.
Dallin, A., Ed. (1993). Political Parties in Russia. Berkeley: University of California at 
Berkeley.
Dalton, R. J. and M. P. Wattenberg, Eds. (2000). Parties without Partisans: Political 
Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davis, J. A. (1985). The Logic o f  Causal Order. Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi: 
Sage.
Dawns, A. (1957). An Economic Theory o f Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
Desai, R. M., L. M. Freinkman and I. Goldberg (2003). Fiscal Federalism and Regional 
Growth: Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s. Washington: The 
World Bank.
Dowley, K. M. (1998). “Striking the Federal Bargain in Russia: Comparative Regional 
Government Strategies.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 31 (4): 359-80.
Drobizheva, L. M. (1998). Asimmetrichnaya federatsiya: vzglyad iz tsentra, respublik i 
oblastei. Moskva: Izdatelstvo instituta sotsiologii RAN.
Duverger, M. (1959 [1951]). Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the 
Modern State. London and New York: Methuen and John Wiley.
Epstein, L. D. (1975). “Political Parties.” in Handbook o f  Political Science. Edited by
G. F.I. and P. N.W., Reading (Mass.): Addison-Wesley. IV.
Erikson, R. R., M. B. Mackuen and J. A. Stimson (2002). The Macro Polity. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bibliography 274
Erikson, R. R., G. C. Wright and J. P. Mclver (1994). Statehouse Democracy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Evans, G. and S. Whitefield (1998). “The Emerging Structure of Partisan Divisions in 
Russian Politics.” in Elections and Voters in Post-Communist Russia. Edited by 
M. Wyman, S. White and S. Oates, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: 
Edward Elgar.
Farukhshin, M. (2002). “Tatarstan: Syndrome of Authoritarianism.” in Regional Politics 
in Russia. Edited by C. Ross, Manchester and New York: Manchester University 
Press.
Filippov, M., P. C. Ordeshook and O. Shvetsova (2004). Designing Federalism: A 
Theory o f Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Filippov, V. L. (2001). “M.G. Rakhimov. Prezident Respubliki Bashkiriya.” in 
Federalizm kak on ect... Intervyu s rukovoditelyami subektov RF o federalizme i 
regionalnoi politike. Edited by V. L. Filippov and D. v. Grushkin, Moscow: 
Rossiiskaya Akademiya Nauk Tsentr Tsivilizatsionnykh i Regionalhykh 
Issledovanii; Institut "Vostok-Zapad".
Finer, H. (1949). Theory and Practice o f Modern Government. New York: H. Holt.
Fish, S. M. (1995). “The Advent of Multipartism in Russia, 1993-95.” Post Soviet 
Affairs, 11 (4): 340-83.
—  (1995a). Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian
Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
—  (1997). “The Pitfalls of Russian Superpresidentialism.” Current History, 96 (612):
326-30.
Bibliography 275
Fish, S. M. (2001). “The Dynamics of Democratic Erosion.” in Postcommunism and the 
Theory o f Democracy. Edited by R. D. J. Anderson, S. M. Fish, S. E. Hansonet al, 
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Flora, P., S. Kuhnle and D. Urwin, Eds. (1999). State Formation, Nation-Building and 
Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory o f Stein Rokkan: Based on His Collected 
Works. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Freinkman, L., D. Treisman, and S. Titov (1999). Subnational Budgeting in Russia: 
preempting a potential crisis. Washington (DC): World Bank.
Friedgut, T. H. and J. W. Hahn, Eds. (1994). Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics. 
Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
Gelman, V. (1998). “The Iceberg of Russian Political Finance.” in Funding 
Democratization. Edited by P. Burnell and A. Ware, Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press.
—  (1999). “Second Europe-Asia Lecture. Regime Transition, Uncertainty and 
Prospects for Democratisation: The Politics of Russia's Regions in a Comparative 
Perspective.” Europe-Asia Studies, 51 (6): 939-956.
—  (1999a). “Subnational Institutions in Contemporary Russia.” in Institutions and
Political Change in Contemporary Russia. Edited by N. Robinson, London and 
New York: MacMillan, St. Martin's Press.
—  (2003). “Post-Soviet Transitions and Democratizations: Towards Theory Building.”
Democratization, 10 (2): 87-104.
Gelman, V. and G. V. Golosov (1998). “Regional Party System Formation in Russia: 
The Deviant Case of the Sverdlovsk Oblast.” in Party Politics in Post-Communist 
Russia. Edited by J. Lowenhardt, London ; Portland, OR: F. Cass.
Bibliography 276
Glatter, P. (1999). “Federalization, Fragmentation, and the West Siberian Oil and Gas 
Province.” in The Political Economy o f the Russian Oil Edited by D. Lane, 
Lanham and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
Goldstein, H. (1986). “Multilevel Mixed Linear Model Analysis Using Iterative 
Generalised Least Squares.” Biometrika, 73: 43-55.
Golosov, G. V. (1995). “New Russian Political Parties and the Transition to 
Democracy.” Government and Opposition, 30 (1): 110-19.
—  (1997). “Russian Political Parties and the 'Bosses': Evidence from the 1994
Provincial Elections in Western Siberia.” Party Politics, Vol.3 (No.l): 5-21.
—  (1999). “From Adygeya to Yaroslav: Factors of Party Development in the Regions
of Russia, 1995-1998.” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.51 (8): 1333-65.
—  (2002). “Party Support or Personal Resources? Factors of Success in the Plurality
Portion of the 1999 National Legislative Elections in Russia.” Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies, 35: 23-38.
Golosov, G. V. and Y. D. Shevchenko (2000). “Faktori elektoralnogo uspekha v 
odnomandatnykh okrugakh.” in Pervyj elektoralnogo zikl v Rossii: 1993-1996gg. 
Edited by V. Gelman, G. V. Golosov and E. Melenshkina, Moskva: Ves Mir.
—  (2002). “Strategii pereizbraniya incumbentov na dumskikh vyborakh.” in Vtoroi
elektoralnyi tsikl v Rossii: 1999-2000gg. Edited by V. Gelman, G. V. Golosov and
E. Y. Meleshkina, Moscow: Ves Mir.
Gorenburg, D. P. (2003). Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bibliography 277
Gould-Davis, N. (1998). “Nizhnii Novgorod: The Dual Structure of Political Space.” in 
Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the Election o f  1993. Edited by T. J. 
Colton and J. F. Hough, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Gudkov, L. and B. Dubin (2000). Rossiiskie vybory: vremiya serykh. VTsIOM, 
Moscow.
Hahn, J. W. (1997). “Democratization and Political Participation in Russian Regions.” 
in Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, 
and Moldova. Edited by K. Dawisha and B. Parrott, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
—  (2002). “The Development of Political Institutions in Three Regions of the Russian
Far East.” in Regional Politics in Russia. Edited by C. Ross, Manchester and New 
York: Manchester University Press.
Hale, H. E. (1998). “Bashkortostan: The Logic of Ethnic Machine Politics and 
Democratic Consolidation.” in Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the 
Election o f 1993. Edited by T. J. Colton and J. F. Hough, Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press.
—  (1999). “Machine Politics and Institutionalised Electorates: A Comparative 
Analysis of Six Duma Elections in Bashkortostan.” Journal o f  Communist Studies 
and Transition Politics, Vol. 15 (No.4): 70-110.
—  (forthcoming 2005). "Why Not Parties? Supply and Demand on Russia's Electoral
Market." Comparative Politics, 37 (2).
Hanson, P., and Michael Bradshaw, Ed. (2000). Regional Economic Change in Russia. 
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
Bibliography 278
Heckman, J. J. (1979). “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error.” Econometrica, 
47(1): 153-62.
Helf, G. and J. W. Hahn (1992). “Old Dogs and New Tricks: Party Elites in the Russian 
Regional Elections of 1990.” Slavic review, 51 (3): 511-30.
Herrera, R. and M. Yawn (1999). “The Emergence of the Personal Vote.” Journal o f 
Politics, 61 (1): 136-50.
Herron, E. S. (2002). “Mixed Electoral Rules and Party Strategies.” Party Politics, 8 
(6): 719-33.
Hill, F. and C. G. Gaddy (2003). The Siberian Curse: How Communist Planners Left 
Russia out in the Cold. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Hofferbert, R. I. (1972). “State and Community Policy Studies: A Review of 
Comparative Input-Output Analyses.” in Political Science Annual. Vol. 3. Edited 
by J. A. Robinson, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Hofstadter, R. (1969). The Idea o f a Party System: The Rise o f Legitimate Opposition in 
the United States, 1780-1840. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of 
California Press.
Holmes, S. (1994). “Superpresidentialism and Its Problems.” East European 
Constitutional Review, 3 (1): 123-26.
Hosking, G., J. Aves and P. J. S. Duncan (1992). The Road to Post-Communism: 
Independent Political Movements in the Former Soviet Union. London; New 
York: Pinter Publishers.
Hough, J. F. (1977). The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory. Cambridge, Mass.; 
London: Harvard University Press.
Bibliography 279
Hough, J. F. (1997). Democratization and Revolution in the Ussr, 1985-1991. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
—  (1998). “Institutional Rules and Party Formation.” in Growing Pains: Russian
Democracy and the Election o f  1993. Edited by T. J. Colton and J. F. Hough, 
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Hough, J. F. and S. G. Lehmann (1998). “The Mistery of Opponents of Economic 
Reform among the Yeltsin Voters.” in Elections and Voters in Post-Communist 
Russia. Edited by M. Wyman, S. White and S. Oates, Cheltenham, UK; 
Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
Hox, J. J. and I. G. G. Kreft (1994). “Multilevel Analysis Methods.” Sociological 
Methods and Research, 22 (3): 283-99.
Huckfeldt, R. and J. Sprague (1993). “Citizens, Contexts and Politics.” in Political 
Science: The State o f  the Discipline 2. Edited by A. Finifter, Washington D.C.: 
APSA.
Hughes, J. (1994). “Regionalism in Russia: The Rise and Fall of the Siberian 
Agreement.” Europe-Asia Studies, 46 (7): 1133-61.
—  (1994a). “The 'Americanization' of Russian Politics: Russia's First Television
Election, December 1993.” The Journal o f  Communist Studies and Transition 
Politics, 10 (2): 125-50.
—  (1996). “Moscow's Bilateral Treaties Add to Confusion.” Transition, 20 September:
39-43.
—  (1997). “Sub-National Elites and Post-Communist Transformation in Russia: A
Reply to Kryshtanovskaya & White.” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.49 (No.6): 1017- 
36.
Bibliography 280
Hughes, J. (2002). “Managing Secession Potential in the Russian Federation.” in 
Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict. Edited 
by J. Hughes and G. Sasse, London and Portland (OR): Frank Cass.
Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press.
Huskey, E. (1999). Presidential Power in Russia. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Hutcheson, D. (2003). Political Parties in the Russian Regions. London and New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon.
Ishiyama, J. (1998). “Red Versus Expert: Candidate Recruitment and Communist Party 
Adaptation in Post-Soviet Politics.” Party Politics, 4 (3): 297-318.
—  (1999). “Partii-preemnitsy kommunisticheskikh i organizatsionnoe razvitie partii v
postkommunisticheskoi politike.” Polis, 4 (52): 148-67.
—  (1999a). “Political Integration and Political Parties in Post-Soviet Russian Politics.”
Demokratizatsiya, 7 (2): 121-38.
—  (1999b). “Political Parties and Candidate Recruitment in Post-Soviet Russian
Politics.” Journal o f Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 15 (No.4): 
41-69.
—  (2000). “Candidate Recruitment, Party Organisation and the Communist Successor
Parties: The Cases of the Mszp, the Kprf, and the Lddp.” Europe-Asia Studies, 52
(5): 875-96.
Ishiyama, J. and R. Kennedy (2001). “Superpresidentialism and Political Party 
Development in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.” Europe-Asia Studies, 
53 (8): 1177-91.
Bibliography 281
Jacobson, G. C. (1980). Money in Congressional Elections. New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press.
Johnson, M., W. Phillips Shively and R. M. Stein (2002). “Contextual Data and the 
Study of Elections and Voting Behavior: Connecting Individuals to
Environments.” Electoral Studies, 21: 219-33.
Johnston, R. J. (1990). “Lipset and Rokkan Revisited: Electoral Cleavages, Electoral 
Geography, and Electoral Strategy in Great Britain.” in Developments in Electoral 
Geography. Edited by R. J. Johnston, F. M. Shelley and P. J. Taylor, London and 
New York: Routledge.
Jones, K. and M. Gould (2003). Multilevel Analysis, lg. Course-Pack fo r  the Course in 
Multilevel Analysis, Essex Summer School fo r  Social Science Data Analysis.
Jones, K., R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie (1992). “People, Places and Regions: 
Exploring the Use of Multi-Level Modelling in the Analysis of Electoral Data.” 
British Journal o f Political Science, 22 (3): 343-80.
Jones, M. P. and S. Mainwaring (2003). “The Nationalization of Parties and Party 
Systems: An Empirical Measure and an Application to the Americas.” Party 
Politics, 9 (2): 139-66.
Kahn, J. (2002). Federalism, Democratisation, and the Rule o f Law in Russia. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Kaspe, S. I. and A. I. Petrokovskij (2000). “Administrativnye i informatsionnye resursy 
v kontekste vyborov-99.” Politiya, 16 (2): 5-28.
Katz, R. S. (1980). A Theory o f  Parties and Electoral Systems. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press.
Bibliography 282
Katz, R. S. (1997). Democracy and Elections. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Katz, R. S. and P. Mair (1993). “The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: The 
Three Faces of Party Organization.” The American Review o f Politics, Vol. 14 
(Winter): 593-617.
Kelsen, H. (1929). Vom wesen und wert der demokraties. Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck).
Kholodkovskij, K. G. (2000). “Politicheskoe strukturovanie rossijskogo obschestva: 
vliyanie parlamentskikh vyborov 1999g.” in Kuda idiet Rossiya? Vlast, 
obschestvo, lichnost 2000. Edited by T. I. Zaslavskaya, Moskva: Moskovskaya 
Vysshaya Shkola Sozialnikh i Ekonomicheskikh Nauk.
Kim, C. L., J. Green and S. C. Patterson (1976). “Partisanship in the Recruitment and 
Performance of American State Legislators.” in Elite Recruitment in Democratic 
Politics. Comparative Studies across Nations. Edited by H. Eulau and M. M. 
Czudnowski, New York and London: Sage Publications.
King, G. (1991). “On Political Methodology.” Political Analysis, 2: 1-30.
—  (1996). “Why Context Should Not Count.” Political Geography, 1 (2): 159-64.
—  (1997). A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual
Behavior from Aggregate Data. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
King, G., R. O. Keohane and S. Verba (1994). Designing Social Enquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kitschelt, H. (1995). “Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies. 
Theoretical Propositions.” Party Politics, 1 (4): 447-72.
Bibliography 283
Kitschelt, H., Z. Mansfeldova, R. Markowski, et al. (1999). Post-Communist Party 
Systems. Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Kitschelt, H. and R. Smyth (2002). “Programmatic Party Cohesion in Emerging 
Postcommunist Democracies: Russia in Comparative Context.” Comparative 
political studies, 35 (10): 1228-56.
Klimanov, V. V. (2000). “Politicheskie aspekty mezhregionalnogo ekonomicheskogo 
sotrudnichestva.” in Politika i ekonomika v regionalnom izmerenii. Edited by V. 
V. Klimanov and N. y. V. Zubarevich, Moskva and Sankt-Peterburg.
Kolosov, V. A., N. V. Petrov and L. V. Smimyagin (1990). Vesna 1989. Geografiya i 
anatomiya parlamentskikh vyborov. Moscow: Progress.
Kostelecky, T. (2002). Political Parties after Communism: Developments in East- 
Central Europe. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Kreft, I. and J. De Leeuw (1998). Introducing Multilevel Modeling. London: Sage.
Kullberg, J. S. (1998). “Preserving the Radical Stronghold: The Election in Moscow.” 
in Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the Election o f 1993. Edited by T. J. 
Colton and J. F. Hough, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Kuznetsova, O. g. (2001). “Regionalnye byudzhety.” in Regioni Rossii v 1999g.: 
ezhegodnoe prilozhenie k  "Politicheskomy almanakhy Rossii". Edited by N. 
Petrov, Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, "Gendalf1.
Laakso, M. and R. Taagepera (1979). “Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with 
Applications to West Europe.” Comparative political studies, 12: 3-27.
Bibliography 284
Lapidus, G. W. (1999). “Asymmetrical Federalism and State Breakdown in Russia.” 
Post-Soviet Affairs, 15 (1): 74-82.
Lapidus, G. W. and E. W. Walker (1995). “Nationalism, Regionalism, and Federalism: 
Center-Periphery Relations in Post-Communist Russia.” in The New Russia: 
Troubled Transformation. Edited by G. W. Lapidus, Boulder, San Francisco and 
London: Westview Press.
Lavrov, A. M. (1998). “Budgetary Federalism.” in Conflict and Consensus in Ethno- 
Political and Center-Periphery Relations in Russia. Edited by J. R. Azrael and E. 
Payin, Santa Monica, CA: Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies (Rand 
Corporation), and Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Research.
Lavrov, A. M. and A. G. Makushkin (2001). The Fiscal Structure o f  the Russian 
Federation: Financial Flows between the Center and the Regions. Armonk, N.Y., 
and London: M.E. Sharpe.
Lazarsfeld, P. F., B. Berelson and H. Gaudet (1968 [1944]). The People's Choice: How 
the Voter Makes up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign. New York: Columbia 
University Press.
Lentini, P. (1995). “Reforming the Soviet Electoral System.” in Elections and Political 
Order in Russia: The Implications o f the 1993 Elections to the Federal Assembly. 
Edited by P. Lentini, Budapest, London, New York: Central European University 
Press.
—  (1995a). “Conclusion.” in Elections and Political Order in Russia: The Implications 
o f the 1993 Elections to the Federal Assembly. Edited by P. Lentini, Budapest, 
London, New York: Central European University Press.
Leskov, S. (2003). “Partiyu vlasti zadumali pri imperatore. Retseptam rossiiskoi 
politekhnologii uzhe 100 let.” Izvestiya, 1 June, 5.
Bibliography 285
Levada, Y. (1996). “Chelovek politicheskii: tsena i roli perekhodnogo perioda.” in 
Prezidentskie vybori 1996 goda i obshestvennoe mnenie. Edited by VTsIOM, 
Moskva.
Levchik, D. A. (1996). “Politicheskii 'kheppening'.” Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya, (8, 
August): 51-56.
Lewis, P. G. (1996). “Introduction and Theoretical Overview.” in Party Structure and 
Organization in East-Central Europe. Edited by id., Cheltenham.
—  (2000). Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern Europe. London and New
York: Routledge.
Linz, J. J. (1969). “Ecological Analysis and Survey Research.” in Quantitative 
Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences. Edited by M. Dogan and S. Rokkan, 
Cambridge (MA) and London: MIT Press.
—  (1994). “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?” in
The Failure o f Presidential Democracy. Edited by J. J. Linz and A. Valenzuela, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Linz, J. J. and A. C. Stepan (1996). Problems o f Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Lipset, S. M. and S. Rokkan (1967). “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments: An Introduction.” in Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross 
National Perspectives. Edited by L. S. M. and S. Rokkan, New York: Free Press.
Maclver, R. (1947). The Web o f  Government. New York: Macmillan.
Bibliography 286
Mainwaring, S. and T. R. Scully, Eds. (1995). Building Democratic Institutions: Party 
Systems in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Mainwaring, S. P. (1999). Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave o f 
Democratization: The Case o f Brazil. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Mair, P. (1994). “Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State.” in How Parties 
Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western 
Democracies. Edited by R. S. Katz and P. Mair, London: Sage Publications.
March, L. (2002). The Communist Party in Post-Soviet Russia. Manchester and New 
York: Manchester University Press.
Marsh, C. and J. W. Warola (2001). “Ethnicity, Ethnoregionalism, and the Political 
Geography of Putin's Electoral Support.” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 
42 (3): 220-33.
Marsh, M. (2002). “Electoral Context.” Electoral Studies, 21: 207-17.
Martinez-Vasquez, J. and J. Boex (2001). Russia's Transition to a New Federalism. 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
Maslow, A. H. (1968). Toward a Psychology o f  Being. New York: Van Nostrand 
Company.
Matsuzato, K. (2000). “Progressive North, Conservative South? - Reading the Regional 
Elite as a Key to Russian Electoral Puzzles.” in Regions: A Prism to View the 
Slavic-Eurasian World. Towards a Discipline o f "Regionology". Edited by K. 
Matsuzato, Sapporo, Japan: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University.
Bibliography 287
Matsuzato, K. (2001). “From Communist Boss Politics to Post-Communist Caciquismo 
- the Meso-Elite and Meso-Govemments in Post-Communist Countries.” 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 34 (2): 175-201.
— , Ed. (2004). Fenomen Vladimira Putina i rossiiskie regioni: pobeda neozhidannaya 
ili zakonomemaya? Moskva: Materik.
McAllister, I. and S. White (1998). “To Vote or Not to Vote: Election Turnout in Post- 
Communist Russia.” in Elections and Voters in Post-Communist Russia. Edited 
by M. Wyman, S. White and S. Oates, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, 
USA: Edward Elgar.
McFaul, M. (1993). “Party Formation after Revolutionary Transitions: The Russian 
Case.” in Political Parties in Russia. Edited by A. Dallin, Berkeley: International 
and Area Studies, University of California at Berkeley.
—  (1998). “Russia's Choice: The Perils of Revolutionary Democracy.” in Growing 
Pains: Russian Democracy and the Election o f 1993. Edited by T. J. Colton and J. 
F. Hough, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
McFaul, M., N. Petrov and A. Ryabov, Eds. (2000). Rossiya v izbiratelnom tsikle 1999- 
2000 godov. Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, "Gendalf'.
McKay, D. (2000). Designing Europe: Comparative Lessons from the Federal 
Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McMann, K. M. and N. V. Petrov (2000). “A Survey of Democracy in Russia's 
Regions.” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 41 (3): 155-82.
Melvin, N. (1998). “The Consolidation of a New Regional Elite: The Case of Omsk 
(1987-1995).” Europe-Asia Studies, 50 (4): 619-50.
Bibliography 288
Melvin, N. (1998a). “Kursk: A Preserve of Communism.” in Growing Pains: Russian 
Democracy and the Election o f  1993. Edited by T. J. Colton and J. F. Hough, 
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Michels, R. (1962 [1915]). Political Parties: A Sociological Study o f the Oligarchical 
Tendencies o f Modern Democrcay. New York: Dover Publications.
Miller, A. H., William M. Reisinger, and Vicki L. Hesli (1998). “Leader Popularity and 
Party Development in Post-Soviet Russia.” in Elections and Voters in Post- 
Communist Russia. Edited by M. Wyman, S. White and S. Oates, Cheltenham, 
UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
Miller, A. H., G. Erb, W. M. Reisinger, et al. (2000). “Emerging Party Systems in Post- 
Soviet Societies: Fact or Fiction 1” Journal o f Politics, 62 (2): 455-90.
Miller, A. H. and T. F. Klobucar (2000). “The Development of Party Identification in 
Post-Soviet Societies.” American Journal o f  Political Science, 44 (4): 667-86.
Miller, A. H. and M. P. Wattenberg (1983). “Measuring Party Identification: 
Independent or No Partisan Preference?” American Journal o f Political Science, 
27(1): 106-21.
Miller, W., S. White and A. Heywood (1996). “Twenty-Five Days to Go: Measuring 
and Interpreting the Trends in Public Opinion During the 1993 Russian Election 
Campaign.” Public Opinion Quarterly, 60: 106-27.
Mitchneck, B. (2001). “Regional Governance Regimes in Russia.” in Regional Russia 
in Transition: Studies from Yaroslavl'. Edited by J. W. Hahn, Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Bibliography 289
Mitrokhin, S. S. (2001). “Predposylki i osnovnye etapy detsentralizatsii gosudarstvennoi 
vlasti v Rossii.” in Tsentr - regioni - mestnoe samoupravlenie. Seria "Studia 
politica". Edited by G. M. Lyukhterkhandt-Mikhaleva and S. I. Ryzhenkov, 
Moskva and Sankt-Peterburg: IGPI, Letnii sad. 4.
Moraski, B. J. and W. M. Reisinger (2003). “Explaining Electoral Competition across 
Russia's Regions.” Slavic review, 62 (2): 278-301.
Morgan-Jones, E. and P. Schleiter (2004). “Governmental Change in a President- 
Parliamentary Regime: The Case of Russia 1994-2003.” Post Soviet Affairs, 20
(2): 132-63.
Morlino, L. (1995). “Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern 
Europe.” in The Politics o f Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in 
Comparative Perspective. Edited by Richard Gunther, N. Diamandouros and H. J. 
Puhle, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
—  (1998). Democracy between Consolidation and Crisis. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Moser, R. G. (1995). “The Impact of the Electoral System on Post-Communist Party 
Development: The Case of the 1993 Russian Parliamentary Elections.” Electoral 
Studies, 14 (4): 377-98.
—  (1999). “Independents and Party Formation: Elite Partisanship as an Intervening
Variable in Russian Politics.” Comparative Politics, (January): 147-65.
—  (1999a). “Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States.”
World Politics, 51 (April): 359-84.
Bibliography 290
Moser, R. G. (2001). “The Consequences of Russia's Mixed-Member Electoral 
System.” in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best o f Two Worlds? Edited 
by M. S. Shugart and M. P. Wattenberg, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—  (2001a). Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties and 
Representation in Russia. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Mukharyamov, N. M. and L. M. Mukharyamova (2004). “Tatarstan V Usloviyakh 
Retsentralizatsii Po-Putinski.” in Fenomen Vladimira Putina I  Rossiiskie Regioni: 
Pobeda Neozhidannaya Ili Zakonomernaya? Edited by K. Matsuzato, Moskva: 
Materik.
Munro, N. and R. Rose (2002). Elections without Order: Russia's Challenge to 
Vladimir Putin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Myagkov, M., P. C. Ordeshook and S. A. (1997). “The Russian Electorate 1991-1996.” 
Post Soviet Affairs, 13 (2): 134-66.
Nicholson, M. and International Institute for Strategic Studies. (1999). Towards a 
Russia o f  the Regions. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies.
O'Donnell, G., P. C. Schmitter and L. Whitehead, Eds. (1986). Transitions from  
Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Olga, S. (1999). “A Survey of Post-Communist Electoral Institutions: 1990-1998.” 
Electoral Studies, 18: 397-409.
O'Loughlin, J., M. Shin and P. Talbot (1996). “Political Geographies and Cleavages in 
the Russian Parliamentary Elections.” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 37
(6): 355-85.
Bibliography 291
Ordeshook, P. C. and O. V. Shvetsova (1994). “Ethnic Heterogeneity, District 
Magnitude, and the Number of Parties.” American Journal o f Political Science, 38 
(1): 100-23.
Oreshkin, D. B. (2001). “Elektoralnaya demokratiya i zelostnost politicheskogo 
prostranstva Rossii.” Zhurnal o vyborakh: 28-33.
Oreshkina, D. (2000). “A vse-taki oni upravlyaiutsya!” Nezavisimyi golos Rossii, (2): 
15-17.
Orttung, R. W. (1995). From Leningrad to St. Petersburg: Democratization in a 
Russian City. London: MacMillan Press.
Ostrogorsky, M. Y. (1982 [1902]). Democracy and the Organization o f  Political 
Parties. New Brunswick (USA) and London (UK): Transaction Books.
Ostrow, J. M. (2000). Comparing Post-Soviet Legislatures: A Theory o f  Institutional 
Design and Political Conflict. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.
Pammett, J. H. and J. DeBardeleben (2000). “Citizen Orientations to Political Parties in 
Russia.” Party Politics, 6 (3): 373-84.
Panebianco, A. (1988). Political Parties: Organization and Power. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Payin, E. A. (1998). “Ethnic Separatism.” in Conflict and Consensus in Ethno-Political 
and Center-Periphery Relations in Russia. Edited by J. R. Azrael and E. Payin, 
Santa Monica, CA: Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies (Rand Corporation), 
and Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Research.
Bibliography 292
Petrov, N. (1999). “Otnosheniya 'tsentr-regioni' i perspektivy teritorialno- 
gosudarstvennogo pereustroistva strany.” in Regioni rossii v 1998g.: ezhegodnoe 
prilozhenie k "politicheskomy almanakhy Rossii". Edited by N. Petrov, Moscow: 
Moscow Carnegie Center, "Gendalf'.
— , Ed. (2001). Regioni Rossii v 1999g.: ezhegodnoe prilozhenie k "politicheskomu 
almanakhu Rossii". Moskva: Tsentr Kamegi.
Petrov, N. and A. Titkov (2000). “Kampaniya v regionakh. Regionalnoe izmerenie 
vyborov Rossiya v izbiratelnom zikle 1999-2000 godov.” in Rossiya v 
izbiratelnom zikle 1999-2000 godov. Edited by M. McFaul, N. Petrov and A. 
Ryabov, Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, "Gendalf'.
—  (2001). “Rossiiskoe obschestvo v 1999g.” in Regioni Rossii v 1999 g.: ezhegodnoe 
prilozhenie k "politicheskomy almanakhy Rossii". Edited by N. Petrov, Moscow: 
Moscow Carnegie Center, "Gendalf'.
Pharr, S. J. and R. D. Putnam, Eds. (2000). Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling 
the Trilateral Countries? Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Poguntke, T. and S. E. Scarrow (1996). “The Politics of Anti-Party Sentiment: 
Introduction.” European Journal o f Political Research (special edition), 29 (3): 
257-62.
Popov, V. (2002). “Asimmetrichnyi federalism.” Ekspert, 37 (7 October).
Public Examination: Evaluation o f  Freedom o f Speech in Russia (1999-2000): 
www.freepress.ru/win/english.html. Accessed June 2003.
Reisinger, W. M. and B. J. Moraski (2003). “Regional Democratic Change in Time and 
Space: Tracking Electoral Competition in Russia's Regions.” Slavic review, (2): 
278-301.
Bibliography 293
Remington, T. (1998). “Political Conflict and Institutional Design: Paths of Party 
Development in Russia.” in Party Politics in Post-Communist Russia. Edited by J. 
Lowenhardt, London: Frank Cass.
—  (2003). “Coalition Politics in the New Duma.” in The 1999-2000 Elections in
Russia: Their Impact and Legacy. Edited by V. L. Hesli and W. M. Reisinger, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Remington, T. and S. S. Smith (1996). “Political Goals, Institutional Context, and the 
Choice of an Electoral System: The Russian Parliamentary Election Law.” 
American Journal o f Political Science, 40: 1253-79.
—  (2001). The Politics o f Institutional Choice: The Formation o f the Russian State
Duma. Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Remington, T. F. (2001). The Russian Parliament: Institutional Evolution in a 
Transitional Regime, 1989-1999. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Riker, W. H. (1964). Federalism: Origins, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little 
Brown.
Robinson, W. S. (1950). “Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals.” 
American Sociological Review, 15: 351-67.
Rokkan, S. (1970). Citizens Elections Parties: Approaches to the Study o f the Processes 
o f  Development. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Rokkan, S. and S. M. Lipset (1967). Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross- 
National Perspectives. New York and London: Free Press; Collier Macmillan.
Rokkan, S. and D. Urwin (1983). Economy, Territory, Identity: Politics o f  Western 
European Peripheries. London: Sage.
Bibliography 294
Rose, R. (2000). “A Supply-Side View of Russia's Elections.” East European 
Constitutional Review, 9 (1/2): 53-9.
Rustow, D. A. (1970). “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model.” 
Comparative Politics, 2 (2): 337-63.
Sakwa, R. (1993). “Parties and the Multiparty System in Russia.” RFE/RL Research 
Report, 2 (31, July): 7-15.
—  (1995). “The Development of the Russian Party System. Did the Elections Change
Anything?” in Elections and Political Order in Russia: The Implications o f the 
1993 Elections to the Federal Assembly. Edited by P. Lentini, Budapest, London, 
New York: Central European University Press.
—  (1995a). “The Russian Elections of 1993.” Europe-Asia Studies, 47 (2): 195-227.
—  (1996). Russian Politics and Society. London; New York: Routledge.
—  (2002). “Federalism, Sovereignty and Democracy.” in Regional Politics in Russia.
Edited by C. Ross, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and Party Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Schattschneider, E. E. (1942). Party Government. New York: Rinehart.
—  (1960). The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View o f Democracy in America. New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Schedler, A. (1997). The End o f Politics? Explorations into Modern Antipolitics. 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire (England), and New York: Macmillan and 
St. Martin's Press.
Bibliography 295
Schmitter, P. C. (1992). “The Consolidation of Democracy and Representation of Social 
Groups.” American Behavioral Scientist, 35 (4/5): 422-49.
—  (1997). “Autobiographical Reflections: Or How to Live with a Conceptual
Albatross around One's Neck.” in Comparative European Politics: The Story o f  
the Profession. Edited by H. Daalder, London and Washington: Pinter.
—  (2001). “Parties Are Not What They Once Were.” in Political Parties and
Democracy. Edited by L. Diamond and R. Gunther, Baltimore and London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press.
Shugart, M. S. and J. M. Carey (1992). Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional 
Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shugart, M. S. and M. P. Wattenberg (2001). “Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: A 
Definition and Typology.” in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best o f  Two 
Worlds? Edited by M. S. Shugart and M. P. Wattenberg, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Shvetsova, O. (1999). “A Survey of Post-Communist Electoral Institutions: 1990- 
1 9 9 8 Electoral Studies, 18 (3): 397-410.
Siegfried, A. (1913). Tableau Politique De La France DeL'ouest. Paris: A. Colin.
Slider, D. (1994). “Federalism, Discord, and Accommodation: Intergovernmental 
Relations in Post-Soviet Russia.” in Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics. Edited 
by T. H. Friedgut and J. W. Hahn, Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
—  (1996). “Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 12 (3):
243-64.
Bibliography 296
Slider, D. (2001). “Russian Governors and Party Formation.” in Contemporary Russian 
Politics. Edited by A. Brown, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Slider, D., V. Gimpelson and S. Chugrov (1994). “Political Tendencies in Russia’s 
Regions: Evidence From the 1993 Parliamentary Elections.” Slavic Review, 53
(3): 711-32.
Smith, S. S. and T. F. Remington (2001). The Politics o f Institutional Choice: The 
Formation o f the Russian State Duma. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press.
Smymygin, L. V. (1998). “Typologies of Regional Conflicts in Modem Russia.” in 
Conflict and Consensus in Ethno-Political and Center-Periphery Relations in 
Russia. Edited by J. R. Azrael and E. Payin, Santa Monica, CA: Center for 
Russian and Eurasian Studies (Rand Corporation), and Center for Ethnopolitical 
and Regional Research.
Smyth, R. (1998). Building Democracy by Winning Votes? Candidates and Parties in 
Transitional Russia. PhD thesis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan.
—  (1998a). “Political Ambition, Elite Competition, and Electoral Success in Saratov
Oblast.” in Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the Election o f 1993. Edited 
by T. J. Colton and J. F. Hough, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Snijder, T. A. B. and R. J. Bosker (1999). Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic 
and Advanced Multilevel Modeling. London; Thousand Oaks; New Delhi: Sage.
Solnick, S. (1996). “The Political Economy of Russian Federalism.” Problems o f  Post- 
Communism, (November/December): 13-25.
—  (1998). “The 1996-1997 Gubernatorial Elections in Russia: Outcomes and 
Implications.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 14 (1): 48-81.
Bibliography 297
Solnick, S. (2000). “Is the Center Too Weak or Too Strong in the Russian Federation?” 
in Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis and the Quest fo r  Democratic 
Governance. Edited by V. Sperling, Boulder: Westview Press.
Solzheitsyn, A. (1991). Rebuilding Russia: Reflections and Tentative Proposals. 
London: Harvill.
Stavrakis, P. J., J. DeBardeleben and L. Black, Eds. (1997). Beyond the Monolith: The 
Emergence o f  Regionalism in Post-Soviet Russia. Baltimore and London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press.
Steenbergen, M. R. and B. S. Jones (2002). “Modeling Multilevel Data Structures.” 
American Journal o f Political Science, 46 (1): 218-37.
Stoker, L. and J. Bowers (2002). “Designing Multi-Level Studies: Sampling Voters and 
Electoral Contexts.” Electoral Studies, 21: 235-67.
Stolzenberg, R. M. and D. A. Relies (1997). “Tools for Intuition About Sample 
Selection Bias and Its Correction.” American Sociological Review, 62 (3): 494- 
507.
Stoner-Weiss, K. (1997). Local Heroes: The Political Economy o f Russian Regional 
Governance. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
—  (2001). “The Limited Reach of Russia's Party System.” Politics & Society, 29
(September).
—  (2002). The Sources o f  Resistance to Russian Central State Capacity in the
Periphery. Paper presented at the 34th National Convention of the AAASS, 
Pittsburgh, PA (USA).
Bibliography 298
Strokanov, A. (2003). The Elections to the State Duma in December 1999: Russia's 
Choice at the End o f the Twentieth Century. Lewinston, Queenston, Lampeter: 
The Edwin Mellen Press.
Suny, R. (1994). The Revenge o f the Past: Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse o f  
the Soviet Union. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Svinin, V. (2003). “Sibirskie gubematory protiv tsentralizatsii nedropolzovaniya.” 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 June: 11.
Taras, R. (1998). “The Politics of Leadership.” in Developments in Central and East 
European Politics 2. Edited by S. White, J. Batt and P. G. Lewis, Durham: Duke 
University Press.
Taylor, P. J. and R. J. Johnston (1979). Geography o f  Elections. Harmondsworth 
(Middlesex, UK): Penguin.
Teague, E. (1994). “Center-Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation.” in National 
Identity and Ethnicity in Russian and the New States o f Eurasia. Edited by R. 
Szporluk, Armonk (NY) and London: M.E. Sharpe.
Thorlakson, L. J. (2002). Federalism and Party Competition: A Comparative Analysis 
o f Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Austria, Germany and the United States. PhD 
thesis. London: University of London.
Tikunov, V. and D. Oreshkina (2000). “'Upravlyaemaya demokratiya': rossiiskii 
variant.” Ekspert, (11-12): 61-65.
Toka, G. (1997). “Political Parties in East Central Europe.” in Consolidating the Third 
Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives. Journal o f Democracy Book. 
Edited by L. Diamond, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Bibliography 299
Treisman, D. S. (1997). “Russia's 'Ethnic Revival': The Separatist Activism of Regional 
Leaders in a Postcommunist Order.” World Politics, 49 (2).
—  (1999). After the Deluge: Regional Crisis and Consolidation in Russia. Michigan:
University of Michigan Press.
TsIK (Tsentralnaya Izbiratelnaya Komissiya) (1994). Rezultaty golosovaniya na 
vyborakh v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu po odnomandatnym izbiratelnym okrugam. 
Moscow: Unpublished report.
—  (1996). Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federalnogo Sobraniya 
Rossiiskoi Federatzii 1995: Elektoralnaya statistika. Moscow: Ves Mir.
—  (2000). Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federalnogo Sobraniya 
Rossiiskoi Federatzii 1999: Elektoralnaya statistika. Moscow: Ves Mir.
—  (2003). Elections o f Deputies to the State Duma o f the Federal Assembly o f  the
Russian Federation: Electoral Statistics, 1995 and 1999. Moscow: Ves Mir.
TsIK (Tsentralnaya Izbiratelnaya Komissiya) and Merkator (1999). Vybory v Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii: 1991-1998. Cd-Rom. Moscow: Merkator.
Tsygankov, A. (1998). “Manifestations of Delegative Democracy in Russian Local 
Politics: What Does It Mean for the Future of Russia?” Communist and Post- 
Communist Studies, 31 (4): 329-44.
Tuschhoff, C. (1999). “The Compounding Effect: The Impact of Federalism on the 
Concept of Representation.” in Compounded Representation in Western European 
Federations. Edited by J. B. Brzinski, T. D. Lancaster and C. Tuschhoff, London: 
Frank Cass Publishers.
Bibliography 300
Urban, M. and V. Gelman (1997). “The Development of Political Parties in Russia.” in 
Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus 
and Moldova. Edited by K. Dawisha and B. Parrott, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Von Beyme, K. (1996). Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe. London and New 
York: Macmillan Press and St. Martin's Press.
VTsIOM (2000). VTsIOM: Monitoring obshestvennogo mneniya, 45 (1).
Wattenberg, M. P. (1996). The Decline o f American Political Parties: 1952-1994. 
Cambridge (MA) and London: Harvard University Press.
Watts, R. L. (1996). Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s. Kingston (Ontario): 
Queen's University.
White, S. and I. McAllister (1999). “Reforming the Russian Electoral System.” Journal 
o f Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 15 (4): 17-40.
White, S., R. Rose and I. McAllister (1997). How Russia Votes. Chatham, New Jersey: 
Chatham House.
Wyman, M., S. White, B. Miller, et al. (1995). “Public Opinion, Parties and Voters in 
the December 1993 Russian Elections.” Europe-Asia Studies, 47 (June): 591-614.
Wyman, M., S. White and S. Oates, Eds. (1998). Elections and Voters in Post- 
Communist Russia. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
Zaslavsky, V. (1993). “Success and Collapse: Traditional Soviet Nationality Policy.” in 
Nations and Politics o f the Soviet Successor States. Edited by I. Bremmer and R. 
Taras, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bibliography 301
Zaslavsky, V. (1994). “From Redistribution to Marketization: Social and Attitudinal 
Change in Post-Soviet Russia.” in The New Russia: Troubled Transformation. 
Edited by G. W. Lapidus, Boulder: Westview Press.
Zubarevich, N. V. and A. Treivish (2001). “Sotsialno-ekonomieheskoe polozhenie 
regionov.” in Regioni Rossii v 1999g.: Ezhegodnoe prilozhenie k  
"Politicheskomy almanakhy Rossii". Edited by N. Petrov, Moscow: Moscow 
Carnegie Center, "Gendalf'.
